Grigoriy S. Logvinov
General overview
Russia is a multinational and multi-confessional
state with European mentality and Eurasian territory. In these conditions the foreign political choice will seal its
future-therefore time-serving in foreign policies should be avoided. The choice of multipolarity relieves the
country from entering into alliances with some countries against others. There is no prospect of it in the next 15 to
20 years therefore we can concentrate on domestic problems; foreign policy
should create favorable conditions for this.
It is in Russia’s interests to cooperate with all
poles in all parts of the world yet those in Europe and Asia, and the United
States should enjoy priority – the former because of their geographic proximity
and intensive integration which directly influences the degree of Russia’s
involvement in world economy; the latter, because of the same involvement in
world economy and because there is a large-scale and many-sided complex of
military problem which can be settled only through maintaining and
strengthening strategic stability.
Considering the fact that Eurasia is today the hub
of the world and a continent where the worst international crises play out and
where the most important natural resources are concentrated, and also
considering the fact that all the leading world players – the United States,
Germany, Great Britain, France and another 12 states that form the European
Union, as well as China, Japan and India – are in Eurasia, there is in fact a
dispute going on today about who and to which extent will be controlling the
beating of this geopolitical, economic and resource heart of mankind. None of
the countries involved in this dispute can duck out of it without losing out
not so much on their prestige of symbolic greatness as on concrete, practical
and tangible interests in terms of dollars, barrels and cubic meters and, in
the final analysis, it terms of its economic potential and national well-being.
With its central position in this key “neuralgic
center” Russia is still less able to duck out of this dispute. Leaving or agreeing to leave the key regions
of Eurasia would mean for Russia not integration into the Western system of
financial-economic and military-political alliances but rather being pushed out
to the periphery of Eurasian and, therefore, world politics.
Today, the USA and the EU account for nearly 21 percent
of the world GDP each; the share of Japan, China, and ASEAN has topped 20
percent. It is estimated that by 2015
the share of the United States and the EU will start decreasing while China,
Japan, and the Asian group in general will account for a quarter of the world
GDP.
At this background Russia’s share of slightly more
than 1/5 percent of the world GDP looks insignificant yet its potentials have
not yet been realized. Indeed, the
country boasts of 15-20 percent of hypothetical oil reserves, 42 percent of
gas, and 43 percent of coal. By the
absolute size of its GDP, Russia is among the second dozen of the most
developed countries; its intellectual property is estimated at $ 400 billion,
its high-tech potential is considerable.
Today, economic processes are being globalized; the
role of the state is objectively decreasing while the role of inter-state,
supra-state and other alliances is increasing.
Sun Tzu, great Chinese thinker and military leader
of ancient times, wrote that the supreme art of any soldier was to prevent a
war rather than to win it. It should be
said that the Military Doctrine agrees with the political approaches of the
majority of the leading countries’ military doctrines. In this respect it has something in common
with the new NATO strategic conception.
Systemic analysis of contemporary military doctrines and demonstrated
their common features with and distinctions from that of Russia's. It turned out that we shared common
approaches to many issues, especially in the political part. True, we often crossed swords over details
that we tended to regard as all-important.
Political ambitions and attempts to realize the new
possibilities and create new centers of force were spurred on when the bipolar
system, the dumb-bell that for many years had been preserving strategic balance
and maintaining a relative stability in the world, disappeared. This is true of Europe, China, and the
Pacific region in general. The Islamic
world is showing a desire to consolidate and strengthen its mounting influence
in the world. There is another trend
leading towards a multipolar world.
The opposition between them is, in fact, the main
threat to stability, security, and peace.
The main thing is that the system of threats in the military sphere proper
is changing; they are transforming into non-military threats and, quite often,
present a bigger threat to stability than military threats. The threat of global military confrontation
is being replaced with the threats that will shape the nest millennium or the
twenty-first century: separatism ethnic and religious extremism which, as an
attentive observer can see, are blending with terrorism, and the terrorist
means of securing political aims. In
fact, it has become the main threat.
From this it follows that local wars and armed
conflicts fraught with unfolding into larger wars present a real and increasing
danger. The world has become globalized
to the extent that these conflicts may escalate if nothing is done by concerted
efforts to stifle them at the beginning.
Military doctrine of Russia is not only a doctrine
of war prevention – it is a doctrine of deterrent. What we have in mind is not merely nuclear deterrent but
deterrent in general: deterrent of escalation.
Growing tension, regional and global arms race, unjustified use of
force, including nuclear force, etc.
Naturally enough, we pay particular attention to nuclear deterrence and
the new provision related to the use of nuclear weapons. All the guarantees in their completeness,
including the “negative guarantees” which Russia, as one of the nuclear powers,
has undertaken in the UN have been entered into the new doctrine.
It says: “The Russian Federation has reserved the
right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other mass
destruction weapons against it and (or) its allies, and also in response to a
large-scale aggression with the use of conventional weapons in situations
critical for the Russian Federation’s national security”. In other words, if an aggression against
Russia with the use of conventional weapons creates a danger for Russia’s
continued existence as a subject of international law and international
relations, that is, the continued existence of the nation of Russia as part of
socium, Russia will deem it right to employ all the means at its disposal, the
nuclear armaments included. It should
be noted that this use can be provoked only by aggression – other
interpretations come straight from the devil.
Russia is developing and strengthening, in a balanced
way, general purpose forces together with developing, strengthening and
improving its strategic and nuclear forces strictly within its
responsibilities, international agreements and treaties on elimination,
limitation and reduction of armaments, strategic and nuclear included. The doctrine says that the deterrence
potential and the development and qualitative improvement of the general
purpose forces, the combined units, units and structures in operational readiness,
are two key priorities.
The doctrine of partnership is the third feature of
the Military Doctrine of Russia. It
says that Russia regards as its primary obligation of fundamental importance to
treat all the states of the world operation within the UN Charter and not
nurturing or realizing aggressive plans against it as its partners in
strengthening security, peace and stability.
The doctrine has identified the main criteria of partnership. It should be added that in this sphere our
ideas differ from those of our colleagues in NATO and the leading
countries. A discussion on the issue is
under way. There are three criteria of
partnership as it is interpreted in Russia, Which are of general humane
importance.
Russia in Asia
Pacific Region
For Russia, the Asia Pacific Region is of crucial
importance. It would be improper to
evaluate, where Russia has more priorities - in Europe or in Asia. Our policy can have neither a European, nor
an Asian bias. The reality is, that a
country with unique geopolitical location like Russia’s should have national
interests everywhere. We need to have a
very strong footing in Asia via strengthening our participation international
structures in Asia Pacific Region and, what is not less important, via
broadening of interaction with leading Asian countries, first of all, our
neighbors. Our goals are clear: Russia,
passing through deep domestic reforms, is interested in providing in improving
situation in the region, safeguarding stabile, predictable situation. Our main objectives are further integration
into economic cooperation structure in Asia and assertive approach to
consolidating regional security. We
will work to advance bilateral relations with leading states of Asia, above all
with China and India, and to build good-partner relations with Japan.
There are very interesting, to some extend -
controversial processes developing in Asia Pacific Region. Together with clear positive trends, first
of all, reduction of tension on Korean peninsula, there are still a lot of
“explosives“ for regional conflicts. On
the threshold of the third millennium new threats have emerged - terrorism,
religious extremism and separatism, transnational crime and others. Lack of mutual confidence, caused by decades
of alienation is not overcome yet. We
are seeking mutually acceptable solutions on all levels, in all organizations,
first of all - in the UN. The proof how
serious we are is not only tight schedule of Russian President’s contacts with
Asian leaders - in the recent months V.V.Putin visited PRC, DPRK, Japan, ROK,
Mongolia, Vietnam, had a number of important meetings with regional leaders
during “Millennium summit” in New-York.
What is more important, the quality of our relations between Russia and
Asian countries is changing.
Russia and
China
Russia is establishing there a long-term partnership
with China as its most important foreign partner in East Asia. The United States is rather concerned about
such cooperation and especially its military aspects. The Taiwan problem is an internal Chinese problem in the final
analysis as long as Russia is concerned.
For the United States it is a key question of its global strategy. Whereas Beijing can expect of Moscow extreme
restraint over China’s actions regarding Taiwan, the United States cannot act as
restrained and quite probably it would end up involved in a full-scale conflict
with China precisely over Taiwan’s future.
Russia and China together with Kazakhstan,
Kirgizstan and Tadjikistan set an example of the first in history of Asia
agreements on arms reduction and CBM measures, followed later by a similar
arrangement between China and India.
Now Russia and China together with Kazakhstan,
Kirgizstan and Tadjikistan are strengthening cooperation within “Shanghai
Forum” in combating new threats: terrorism, religious extremism, drugtrafficing
transnational organized crime etc.
Russia’s policy on Korean peninsula
Situation in North-East Asia is of profound
importance for Russia, due the sub-region directly annexes to our eastern
borders. In North-East Asia interests
of major regional players are intersected.
It’s quite clear, that the security dialogue in the
sub-region heavily depends on situation on the Korean peninsula. We believe, that the best, most optimal way
to solve existing here problems is an equal, open dialogue among all parties
interested. Russia is quite positive
towards four-party negotiations (DPRK, ROK, USA, PRC), but the main way,
leading to final solution is bilateral dialogue between two Korean states.
The announcement in April 2000 on an unprecedented
inter-Korean summit, which drew the entire world's attention to the Korean
Peninsula, played a definite role in the adoption of the necessary decision in
Moscow. The time had come for Russia to
have a positive influence on the Korean situation, to promote the processes of
inter-
Korean rapprochement and improvement of the
situation, while taking into account its national interests. The opportunity had come to correct the
hypertrophied assessments of the danger of the North Korean missile program,
and, therefore, to counter the serious arguments of those in favor of
developing the US NMD. The trip to
Pyongyang right before the Asian G-8 summit on Okinawa was also extremely
opportune from the point of view of stimulating Russia's Asian policy as a
whole, thus demonstrating its attention to Asia's urgent problems and being
appropriately incorporated into the Russian leader's itinerary.
Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to
North Korea was an international political sensation. It became clear by the autumn that serious political processes
were developing on the Korean Peninsula, in which it was necessary for Russia
to participate.
The Russian-North Korean summit took rather a
long time to come about, although physically it could unlikely have been held
before May 2000, for example (before the inauguration of the new Russian
president). During the first half of
the 1990s, Russian foreign policy was faced with a multitude of new challenges,
against the background of which the Korean problem, although still important,
lost its urgency. The situation of
orchestrated tension in Korea, even if it meant a potential security threat to
Russia's Far Eastern borders, was nothing compared to the really urgent
challenges (ranging from Chechnya to Iraq and Yugoslavia), allowing for the
fact many people in Moscow did not see North Korea's “nuclear missile threat”
as posing the greatest danger to life on the planet, and even fewer
serious-minded people believed in the imminent collapse of North Korea. Russia, contrary to the widespread opinion
in the West, has in practice retained potential levers to influence the Korean
situation (military aid, for example), but has not resorted to them, since the
situation, from the Russian point of view, that is, perceived through the prism
of Russian national interests, did not call for this.
Of course, it must be admitted that along with
Russia's waning attention to Korean affairs, its opportunity to influence the situation
in Korea has also faded, whereas the United State's role on the Peninsula has
shot up abruptly. If asked about the
reasons for this situation, it must be admitted that Moscow's potential on the
Korean Peninsula drastically diminished not only due to the overall weakening
of Russia's international position's, but also because the Soviet Union failed
to make the best use of its long-standing relations with Pyongyang during the
last few years of its existence.
The logic normalization of relations with Seoul
at the end of the 1980s should not have been accompanied by a de facto complete
break with Pyongyang, despite all the ideological differences between the two
countries. Russia should have learned a
lesson from the more than century-long history of involvement in Korean
affairs: everything going on in that country has a direct effect on Russia's
national interests, and, therefore, destabilization of the situation in Korea
should not be tolerated, regardless of what we think about the system in North
Korea.
Maintaining peace and stability on the
peninsula is still Russia's top priority in this region. Of course, we are in favor of a peaceful
unification of Korea, from which Russia should get a prosperous neighbor and friendly
partner, but resolution of this problem, in the final analysis, is primarily
the affair of the Korean people themselves.
Russia does not have any particular need to directly interfere in this
process, since it does not threaten our practical interests, rather on the
contrary. Russia's role in it boils
down to well-intentioned support and constructive promotion of inter-Korean
reconciliation and reduction of tensions in relations between the two Korean
states. As the many years of experience
show, the role of an intermediary in Korean affairs is unappreciated and
ineffective. It is in Russia's
interests to develop good-neighborly mutually beneficial cooperation with the
Korean people as a whole, with a nation that does not have any ill feelings
toward Russia, since we have never fought each other.
Can all the above-mentioned goals be achieved
without normal, good-neighborly relations with each of the Korean states? Taking into account that after an extremely
effective start, relations with South Korea in the 1990s developed
constructively and steadily (although not without problems), from the pragmatic
point of view it became necessary, and this was clear to any unbiased person,
to fasten the «loose end,» that is, sort out relations with the North, no
matter what Russia thought of the political and economic system in that
country. That country and its residents
are our close neighbors, and Russia simply cannot, and should not, ignore more
than 20 million people on its own doorsteps.
Apart from being in Russia's own national interests, normalization of
relations with North Korea is also of vital importance from the point of view
of regional security. Isolation of
North Korea, its weakening and degradation, and moreover a system crisis, could
be a serious threat to the region. All
the regional players are essentially interested in the stable development and
progress of North Korea; however, Russia is best placed to make the most
significant contribution to this since the second half of the 1990s.
North Korea shares Russia's attitudes towards
issues that are important to it, such as ABM, the central role of the UN, the
non-enlargement of NATO, and others.
Pyongyang could not fail to notice the strengthening of ties between
Russian and China, which is North Korea's essentially the only remaining major
political ally. All of this ensured the
possibility, despite the ideological differences and disagreements on several
major issues, to cooperate not only bilaterally, but also on the international
arena.
The new treaty on friendship, good-neighborly
relations, and cooperation signed on February 9, 2000 became a political and
juridical symbol and formal basis for the new system of bilateral
relations. It is vastly important that
the treaty was based on the desire to respect the goals and principles of the
UN Charter, the commonly accepted norms of international law, ensuring peace
and security in Northeast Asia, and not aimed against the interests of third
countries.3 This was the first time that a document containing such
formulations and obligations had appeared in the diplomatic history of North
Korea, and the fact that the republic signed it under these accepted
international principles is largely to Russia's credit. The treaty envisages a
mechanism of regular consultations, immediately notifying each other in the
event of aggression against one of them or a situation threatening peace and
security (this is essentially a mild form of political guarantee of
security). It envisages rapid elimination
of the split between the two Koreas and unification based on the principles of
independence, peaceful unification, and national consolidation (these
principles, which were coordinated by the North and South on July 4, 1972, were
also confirmed by the leaders of the North and South during the historical
inter-Korean summit in June 2000).
Foreign observers paid special attention to the
statement that “references to the so-called missile threat from some states as
justification for reviewing the ABM Treaty of 1972 are completely unsubstantiated,”
in regard to which North Korea officially announced for the first time that
“its missile program does not threaten anyone and is for strictly peaceful
means” (the latter formulation was ultimately agreed upon personally by the
heads of state at talks with a small group of participants). In this context, Kim Jong II stated that if
any state concerned about the DPRK missile program agreed to launch two or
three satellites for North Korean every year without charge, North Korea would
not need its own missiles for launching satellites into orbit.
It should be admitted that discussion of this
subject in the world press was not always well-disposed. With reference to a meeting between Kim Jong
II and. South Korean correspondents on August 12, 2000, several western mass
media circulated a report that Kim Jong II said this supposedly "was a
joke." In fact, Kim Jong II
essentially confirmed at this meeting an idea that he expressed earlier when he
stated (cited from material from the Republic of Korea press): "I told Russian President Vladimir
Putin that we will not develop missiles if the US agrees to launch our
satellites for us." 8
We can judge just how serious the conversation with Vladimir Putin was on this
subject (and it took place during the official negotiations among a small group
of participants) from the fact that Kim Jong II even suggested including this
idea in the Joint Russian-Korean Declaration.
When mentioning the “joking” context of the discussion, the North Korean
leader probably meant the irony, which was indeed expressed by both leaders
about how difficult it was for people most concerned about North Korea's
missile program to take this proposal seriously. Moreover, the approach of the US administration, which expressed
its willingness to consider the possibility of launching North Korean
satellites in exchange for an end to its development of long-range ballistic
missiles, shows that this move by the North Korean leader was taken seriously
in Washington's corridors of power.9
Of course, one brief visit after such a long
period of limited contacts cannot immediately resolve all the problems involved
in restoring bilateral relations.
Moreover, it is understandable that the severe economic crisis in the
North and the limited, to put it mildly, opportunities for Russia, still
continuing its own reforms to render economic aid to North Korea are making a
dramatic upsurge in economic cooperation extremely difficult. Nevertheless, these problems (including
issues touched upon during the visit) are at least being discussed. The intergovernmental commission on
economic, trade, scientific and technological cooperation has been entrusted
with stepping up development of major cooperation projects in the metal
industry, transportation, forestry, the oil, gas, light, and other
industries. It was also decided to give
special attention to modernizing enterprises built with Soviet technical
assistance. The matter may specifically
concern completing construction of the East Pyongyang heat and power plant and
expanding the Pyongyang heat and power plant, as well as possible cooperation
in establishing production at the Kim Chak metal plant, allotting the Korean
side new territories in Russia for the lumber business, and processing oil at
the Synni oil refinery in Sonbon (providing its capacities are restored).
Russia obviously needs to join forces with
other members of the world community interested in the stable development of
North Korea in order to implement the above-mentioned projects and others. This cooperation (it is customary to call it
trilateral, keeping in mind primarily the participation of South Korea, but in
practice we can also talk of the participation of Japan, China, the EU, the US,
and international financial institutions) appears extremely promising and
mutually advantageous. As the talks in
Pyongyang showed, the North Koreans are essentially ready to accept this
approach to. Particular attention was given
to the project for restoring trans-Korean railroad traffic and organizing the
transit of freight from South Korea along the Trans-Siberian Railroad in
Russia. North and South Korea later
agreed to reopen railroad traffic, and the Russian side intends to give
priority attention to this project.10
There was also talk about cooperation in the
humanitarian sphere; for example, the North Koreans are interested in renewing
Russian language textbooks for college and school students in North Korea. There is also the possibility of restoring
student exchanges and other forms of cooperation in the area of science and
education, culture, health care, social security, law, environmental
protection, tourism, sport, etc. For
the first time in many years, contacts have also been established with the North
Korean military, which is also important from the political point of view,
taking into account the role it plays in North Korean society. The restoration of contacts in this
direction will also help to equalize the military balance on the Korean Peninsula
(which has not been in North Korea's favor during the past few years), and this
means strengthening stability and improving security.
By bringing its relations with North Korea out of stagnation, Russia is
by no means striving for an equal “distance” from the North and
the South, does not intend to infringe on anyone's legitimate interests, to “oust” anyone from the
Korean and regional processes, to build any “triangles,” etc. Our goals are
transparent and fully in keeping with the goals of the other regional players.
We suggest achieving these goals along with all the countries interested in the
peace, stability and prosperity of the countries on the Korean Peninsula.
As we know, the spirit and philosophy of the President Kim Dae Jung’s “sunshine policy” is welcomed in
Russia, since it is the most sensible and realistic approach to inter-Korean
relations. Filling with real content the constructive reciprocal partnership
relations set forth in the basic treaty signed by Russia and the Republic of
Korea in 1992 obviously presupposes that Russia should become more actively
involved in settling the Korean problem. It seems that the current leadership
in the South understands this: it put forward the idea of six countries (both
Koreas, China, the US, Japan and Russia) adopting a «Joint Declaration for
Peace and Stability in Northeast Asia». This point of view coincides with the
Russian initiative to convene a multilateral conference on Korea.
As of
today, Russian-South Korean relations are those of constructive reciprocal
partnership, as set forth in corresponding bilateral documents.8 The
political dialogue is extremely active, which among the Asian countries yields
in intensity only to China, Japan and India.
Meetings are regularly held at the head of state level (Boris Yeltsin's
visit to Seoul in November 1992, South Korean presidents Kim En Sam's and Kim
Dae Jung's visits to Russia in June 1994 and May 1999, respectively). There is active interaction at the foreign
minister level between the two countries (from 1992 to 2000 several reciprocal
visits took place between the foreign ministers). New summit and high-level meetings are waiting their turn.
A
multitude of joint ventures operate in both our countries. Several major economic cooperation projects have
been coordinated, including construction of a Russia-China-South Korea gas
pipeline from the Irkutsk Region, and the building of a Russian-Korean
industrial complex in the Nakhodka free economic zone. Interaction in international organizations,
the UN, APEC (which South Korea helped us to become a member of), ASEAN, ARF,
and ASEM, is going well. Direct air and
sea communication is being maintained, and scientific and technical ties are
expanding via academies of sciences and scientific institutions, and cultural
and sports exchanges are taking place.
Military and technological cooperation is also developing to a limited
extent.
We can
look to the future with optimism: trade, regional contacts, and investment
cooperation will grow (particularly if South Korea can give them the
corresponding state support). The South
Koreans are still interested in our science and technologies.
With
respect to concerns about tomorrow the most important thing is for the two
nations to increase their knowledge about each other. We need to develop a creative process of mutual understanding
with the aid of the mass media, scientists, cultural figures, and "people's diplomacy."
It is
thought that if the Koreans engage in this cause with the forbearance and
determination characteristic of them, progress will be achieved. And it appears that this is precisely how
the present South Korean leadership is geared.
Of course, this also requires practical steps and solutions on our part.
The two
countries need close cooperation in their own interests and in the interests of
peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. It is thought that Russia will continue to
make a more constructive contribution to the problem of settlement in Korea.
Russia and Japan.
In the
recent three years we’ve made a strong progress in relations with Japan, at
least on expert level - we’ve got a better understanding of each other, our
dialogue became more open. It is a
great achievement.
Japanese
side decided to abandon direct linkage between territorial issue and
development of economic relations with Russia.
It was an extremely wise and longsighted decision. That’s why now territorial issue is no more
an obstacle, but more likely restraining factor in Russian -Japanese relations.
We are
eager to proceed with negotiations on Peace Treaty with Japan, which is much
broader, than a Boarder Agreement.
Security
issues in Asia Pacific Region
We view the future security arrangements in Asia
multilevel institutions based on the whole complex of multilateral relations
and mechanisms.
We are satisfied about clear activisation of the
security dialogue among Asian countries in the recent years both in bilateral
and multilateral format. The most
important in this respect is activity of ASEAN regional forum (ARF). Russia supports ARF and is eager to help its
further development. After DPRK joined
ARF in July 2000, the institution became complete, more valuable as region wide
dialogue mechanism.
We note with satisfaction, that members of ARF
managed to build a solid dialogue on a number of regional and global issues,
directly related to situation in Asia Pacific.
The last ministerial meeting of ARF confirmed, that all member countries
are interested in further promoting it’s activity, particularly concerning
strengthening confidence in military-political sphere and proceeding with work
on concept and principles of preventive diplomacy in the region.
Developing preventive diplomacy in Asia-Pacific is of
special importance, because it lays dawn basis for ARF activity for midterm
prospect. We are positive about draft
concept of preventive diplomacy, prepared by Singapore on behalf of ASEAN.
We understand, that this topic is new for
Asia-Pacific and that there are still not few differences among regional
countries on the essence of preventive diplomacy. To artificially force this process would be
counterproductive. At the same time,
this work should not be artificially slowed down. We need to reach clear common vision and understanding of basic
principals of preventive diplomacy.
We believe, it’s important while working on
preventive diplomacy to emphasize the leading role of UN in maintaining
international peace and stability, to closely link definition, concept and
principals of preventive diplomacy for Asia-Pacific with UN Charter,
resolutions of UN GA and UN Security Council, to take into consideration the
experience of implementing preventive diplomacy in other regions of the world. At the same time we should also think about
conditions and methods of implementation of preventive diplomacy, possible
mechanisms of it’s launching, so that we could later engage into studying with
issues in details.
We think, that one of the key elements in this respect
is working out region wide “codes of conduct." Russia together with ASEAN countries is working on “track two” on
Declaration on Principled Guiding Mutual Relations in Asia Pacific Region “The
Pacific Concord."
The very idea of “code of conduct” in Asia-Pacific
was presented by Russia in 1995 and became main topic discussed of “track two”
seminar, held in Moscow in 1996. The
same year an alternative draft - very similar to Russia’s one - was worked out
by ASEAN. In 1999 on a Vladivostok
conference we’ve presented a new draft of “Pacific Concord," based on
existing Russian and ASEAN papers. In
February 2000 we held another “track two” expert meeting in Moscow, attended by
representatives of all leading countries of Asia-Pacific - Russia, China, USA,
Japan, Singapore and Thailand. Nearly
simultaneously ASEAN Institute for strategic and international studies prepared
draft of region wide “code of conduct” in Asia-Pacific, also called “Pacific
Concord." ASEAN expressed interest
in uniting efforts in further work with Russia.
Some new elements recently became noticeable in
development of regional international links.
The most important is trend towards building new consultative structures
on the base of “ASEAN +three” (ASEAN plus PRC, ROK and Japan) within East Asian
economic space.
The launch of multilateral dialogue on sub-regional
level requires a balanced, well-calculated approach. Some countries, including Russia, have some questions, concerning
how such new institutions might be compatible with already existing structures,
first of all, ARF and APEC. We welcome
the statements of East Asian countries to maintain central role of ARF and
APEC.
We believe, that building multilateral dialogue on
sub-regional level proves, that Asia and Pacific is moving towards multipolar
structure