2001 PACIFIC SYMPOSIUM:
“Enhancing Regional Cooperation Through New Multilateral Initiatives,”
1. V.Admiral Gaffney, President, National Defense University;
2. Lt. Gen. Thomas Case, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Command;
3. Lt. Gen Stackpole, President, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies;
4. Dr. Stephen Flanagan, Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University;
Distinguished participants;
Ladies and Gentlemen
It is indeed an honor and a great privileged for one to be invited to join you all here at the “2001 Pacific Symposium.”
I have the best of both worlds here.
My passport still describes me as “Foreign Minister.”
When the immigration officer at the airport asked me yesterday why I was here for, I told her “I come to attend the CINCPAC SYNPOSIUM”
She said, “Oh, you are big here.”
But in the Program, I am described as “Former Foreign Minister of Thailand.”
Now I can talk freely without having my senior officials worrying about me making diplomatic faux pas. And if I make some, they won’t be responsible for them.
I see many of you looking rather disappointed because of the change in the menu tonight. You were promised a Hawaiian Lu’au dinner feast by Admiral Blair, whom I understand is an expert, among other things, in making Hawaiian roast pig.
Instead you are now being served a Thai dish called “Tom Yam Kung?”
I can’t promise you that my talk will be as juicy as it would have been with the CINCPAC Commander as the Chef.
I will try to make it spicy with my person “Reflections on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation?”
You see, I’ve had the job of Foreign Minister for 3 years and 2 months, until last month to be exact.
So I have a lot of reflections to share with you.
I feel like a mosquito in a nude camp.
I have an overview of the subject matter, I just don’t know where to begin.
Our Asia Pacific region has seen many major conflicts involving practically all major powers during the course of the last half century.
-The Second World War
-The Korean War
-The Vietnam War
To name the major ones.
And we were not spared from the hot spell of the Cold War either.
We were all practically victims of the violence, tensions and open conflicts in one form or another, costing heavy toll in lives and material well-being.
For a long while the Cold War gave us a paradigm, a clearly defined battle line – distinguishing two ideological camps.
The Post Cold-War Asia Pacific is more fluid, more complex and harder to define, – characterized by a wider spread of flashpoints, with ethnic tensions and territorial disputes galore.
We have heard today of: Kashmir of South Asia, to the troubles of Indonesia, to the Pacific Islands, to the Southern cone, to the Shanghai Five, to the Taiwan Straits, to the South China Sea, to the Korean Peninsula.
Piracy and transnational crimes in the forms of drugs and human trafficking, economic crimes, the human sufferings associated with domestic strife.
The concept of our security in the Post Cold Ware Era has been transformed quite dramatically – as a consequence of various major changes that had occurred.
Economic rivalries among states have become the causes of conflicts rather than ideological differences.
Domestic conflicts within states’ boundaries have become more pronounced.
Threats of instability have become more informal but no less destabilizing, no less disruptive.
Millions of drug addicts, horrifying numbers of people suffering from HIV Aids, unaccountable toll of casualties due to human trafficking and organized crimes, millions are being forced to flee their homelands and become stateless and refugees or displaced persons in foreign lands, many millions more are internally displaced because of the internal conflicts of various kinds.
“Human Security” has become a new serious challenge to the international community.
“State Sovereignty” concept has become problematic to “peace and security” in human term.
The international community, and, indeed, our Asia Pacific community, have not yet found effective responses to the “human security challenge.”
Traditional alliances are no longer adequate for the threat are no longer traditional, formal, open, perceivable and, therefore, interceptable, so to speak.
We can only respond to the new security challenges by way of multi-dimensional, multi-layered, multi-pronged strategy.
And by nature, these responses themselves must be informal, gradual, incremental, loosely structured, appropriate to the contexts of particular situations.
Let me share with you some of the real life situations that I, as Foreign Minister of an Asean country had to handle and see if we can draw some lessons from them:
MYANMAR (BURMA)
We began with “Flexible Engagement”
Principle of non-interference
Burden of Proximity
How to handle the problems of drugs, illegal migrants, refugees, border violences?
Luxury of distance
Razali Ismail, UN Sec.Gen. Special Envoy
The Asean Summit discussed Myanmar issue in Brunie at the APECT Leaders’ Meeting, and in Singapore at the Asean Summit last November.
The first time an internal issue discussed at the highest level
Flexible Engagement is alive and well ?
The Role of Prime Minister Mahathir Muhammad of Malaysia last January
The first sign of dialogue and reconciliation in Myanmar
CAMBODIA
Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai of Thailand role in the 1998 reconciliation process--
Japan’s Four Point Plan
Delayed membership in ASEAN until all political settlements agreed to as brokered by ASEAN TROIKA ON CAMBODIA and Friends of Cambodia
ARF – NORTH KOREA’S ADMISSION
The Bangkok –Phnompehn Inititive
The Sihanouk-Hun Sen Factor
The original Six- Party Meeting on the sideline of ARF in Bangkok July 2000
The efforts in Cartagena’s NAM’s Foreign Ministers Meeting, Havana’s G-77 Summit
Manila-Phnompehn-Bangkok diplomatic route.
Application for full membership, rather than an observor, who conveniently happens to be in the region while ASEAN Ministerial Meeting taking place, ARF convening.
Conducive atmosphere, comfortable, non threatening, mutual benefit, environment of trust,
Impossible to turn down the offer.
EAST TIMOR (1999)
The crisis after the Plebiscite
The APEC Leaders Meeting in Oakland –mid September 1999
The first security-political meeting of APEC Foreign Ministers
The encounters with Gen. Wiranto and President Habibi in Jakarta
The Japanese contribution, “the UN Trust Fund”
The difficulty on the home front
The Asean non-interference doctrine
The first Southeast Asian (not ASEAN) regional response to a regional security challenge
But ASEAN will never be the same again as a result of it.
OBSERVATONS AND LESSSONS LEARNED:
1. In Asia, Western Pacific: no dichotomy, present absolutely cut off from the present, nothing is black and white, no issue is absolutely right or wrong, good or bad, negative or positive, East or West, Us or Them. All things are moving and constantly changing, eventhough we could not perceive the changes, “You cannot step in the same river twice. Because there is a new body of water every second. The water flows. All things are in the state of flux.”
2. Multilateral = multi initiatives, less control from the center, less driven by any one party, more background support (U.S. logistical support in transport, intelligence, planning, Japanese funding, UN endorsement), less form, less structure, more process, gradual, incremental, not quite fit the Western mentality and thought process., more inclusive rather than exclusive, US already belongs to the Asia-Pacific Community, A new Structure implies exclusion of some, inclusion of others.
3. Regard diversity as strength rather than weakness, Asia-Pacific not as homogeneous as Western Europe and North America, Look for openings to benefit from the diversity, every member has something to offer from its own unique position and connections, we only have to identify them.
4. All issues are related, nothing is taken in isolation from others, security cooperation, trade relations, political interactions, cultural exchanges, difficulty in one area will affect relations in other, nothing is clearly defined and absolutely separate from the rest, there are always “spill over effects” from one issue to another
I think the best approach is to look for common ground and opportunity for cooperation within the diverse regions of the Pacific.
If you think of creating or constructing a community for whatever purpose, you will already do the defining, excluding some and including others.
From being an insider-you, by virtue of your design, automatically become an outsider, disruptive of the existing “Community”.
From a communal member to being an intruder from outside
China already counts itself “in” the Asia –Pacific Community
Japan considers itself “in”
India considers itself “in”
Russia considers itself “in” (Pacific Concord, APEC< ARF)
Australia and New Zealand consider themselves “in”.
The EU too is trying to get “in” through ASEM process and ARF-PMC
The U.S. should feel very comfortable in the “Community”
The concept of “Security Community” is only half right- on target.
Only that from the Asian perspective the Community already exists. And it is all comprehensive.
It would be more appropriate and practical to “share the burden, appreciating the differences, accommodating the contending interests.
Much like the Founding Fathers’ concept of “Extended Sphere of Interests” in their effort to create a “more perfect union.” (James Madison in the Federalist Papers)
Communal approach common security challenges as distinct from “security community”
According to Captain James Cook, Hawaii is “the most important discoveries throughout the extent of the Pacific Ocean”.
Since we are all here from over 40 countries around the region,
Let us forge that sense of belonging to the Greater Asia- Pacific Community from this great City of Honolulu out.
Not for the particular interest of any one, but for the common security of all.
Less on state security, please.
More on “human security.”
Let us live less as “an island, entire of itself,” as John Donne admonished us three and a half centuries ago.
But more as being “a part of the main,” sharing the fruits of peace and prosperity, in the community of mankind.
And therefore, John Donne continued, “never send to know for whom the bell tolls”
The Bell of communal security, communal responsibility, communal belonging.
“It tolls for thee,”
And thee, and thee.
It tolls for all of us.
Ladies and Gentlemen:
And -Thank You for Your Attention.!
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%