Transnational
Security Threats In The Asia-Pacific Region Transnational
Security Threats In The Asia-Pacific Region The events of September 11, 2001, the subsequent
uncovering of terrorist cells in East Asia, and several high-profile smuggling
cases have brought a new awareness of how an inter-related set of transnational
threats – particularly terrorism, organized crime, smuggling, piracy, and
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – are undermining the security
and stability of many countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The
post 9-1-1 "War on Terrorism" has required the development of a broad
multinational, coalition and enhanced integration of a variety of governmental
and non-governmental capabilities – intelligence services, law enforcement
agencies, banking and finance authorities, military forces, diplomatic
resources, and private businesses and organizations.
This year’s symposium, “Transnational Security Threats In The Asia-Pacific Region,” was undertaken with encouragement from the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command. It sought to: enhance understanding of how transnational threats are affecting regional security; identify shifts in security plans and policies and examine further changes that may be warranted, and explore opportunities for regional cooperation. A listing of key findings and issues raised follows along with a summary of the highlights from each of the event’s five panels.
Rapid
population growth, migration, urbanization, resource scarcities, and the
forces of globalization are all contributing to the growth of transnational
threats in the region.
While
most governments in the region share U.S. outrage over terrorism, many fear
domestic and international backlash if they become too closely aligned with
U.S. military operations in the GWOT.
International
cooperation among states participating in the G-8 Financial Action Task
Force’s (FATF) Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) process
has helped in the monitoring of large financial transfers and money
laundering. However, China and
some of the micro states of the region do not participate in the FATF and
don’t have transparent financial transaction practices.
Regional
cooperation to combat terrorism is growing, but there are constraints.
Information-sharing within and among governments in the region has
improved, but could be further enhanced.
The
war on terrorism has given an important additional basis for continued U.S.
military presence in the region. Some
even suggested an expanded U.S. presence in Southeast Asia is warranted.
CINCPAC’s
concept of building practical operational cooperation among militaries in
the Asia/Pacific region to develop a security community provides a solid
foundation for the flexible bilateral and multilateral relationships that
will be critical to the success of the next phase of the war on terrorism.
The
next phase of the war requires an indirect strategy to “drain the
swamps” that feed terrorism. This
strategy will need to combine selected military operations and financial
controls with expanded foreign development assistance, more effective public
diplomacy and information campaigns, and support to moderate leaders and
teachers in Islamic communities around the region.
Panel
I -
Introduction and Survey of Regional Views on the Implications of
Transnational Threats
The
conditions that allow transnational threats to develop and flourish are evident
in many Asia-Pacific countries, but are not unique to the region.
A mixture of local conditions and the forces of globalization challenge
existing governments and social structures. The spillover of regional problems
in a mobile society, exacerbated by globalized trade and fast-moving banking and
financial services systems can amplify their effects internationally. The most
significant contributing conditions are:
demographic growth rates;
migration;
global infectious diseases;
urbanization; and
resource scarcities.
No panelist suggested that these
challenges directly produce transnational security threats, just that they offer
fertile soil for their development. Weaker
states are poorly equipped to address any of these problems effectively, and
this allows threats to take root and develop.
Stronger societies, while not immune to these problems, have greater
resources and strong incentives to keep them in check.
Japanese reactions and response to the events of September 11 have been markedly different than those of the United States. Those differences have important implications for the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and foretell longer-term changes in the relationship. Japan shared America’s outrage over the terrorist attacks and was quick to state this in both official and private discourse. The global war on terrorism provided Japan an opportunity, which it has taken, to demonstrate the importance it places on its relationship with the United States. It has also accelerated a slow, but growing shift toward a willingness to use its military capability to influence international affairs. Since World War II, Japan has eschewed the use or threat of military force, relying on money, trade and diplomacy to influence other nations. There is an increasing interest in being able to shape, rather than to respond to the international security environment.
Japanese public opinion polls indicate the following:
Growing ambivalence towards the U.S. Alliance;
Fear of entrapment in a conflict because of their cooperation with the U.S. with more negative views within communities which host U.S. bases;
Little change in their perception of the threats facing Japan. It is difficult for the Japanese people to accept that Al Qaeda’s threat extends to Japan;
A
reduction in their feeling of safety and security.
Few countries
in the region face greater transnational challenges than Indonesia. Internal
political strife and social turmoil are played out over thousands of islands,
with lingering economic devastation from the 1997-98 financial crisis affecting
every segment of the country. The
government of Indonesia condemned the terrorist attacks, but is far from openly
supportive of the U.S.-led war on terrorism.
The leadership believes that they must keep their distance from the war
in deference to its 87 percent Muslim population.
Recent arrests in Singapore and the Philippines make it difficult for
Indonesia to claim that terrorists have not found refuge in that country.
That said, with open conflict often formed along religious lines raging
in several parts of the country, it’s not surprising that the government is
not eager to add new enemies.
The panelists
agreed that Indonesia cannot turn back from the democratization process. The
prescription offered to allow Indonesia to meet the challenges of transnational
threats was: to fix the host of other long-term challenges the country faces –
establish good governance, with stable economic and political systems,
effective, non-corrupt supervision and management, and an effective legal
system. The U.S. and other
countries can assist with economic assistance, law enforcement training, and
military operations.
Most of the
Islamic activism in Southeast Asia is associated with local issues – political
autonomy being the primary factor. Bombings
and killings, which occur with unfortunate frequency are acts of terror to be
sure, but for the most part are for internal “consumption.”
The notable exception has been the large cell discovered in Singapore.
Views are mixed concerning ties between these groups and Al Qaeda.
Abu Sayyaf, proclaimed religious fervor during its early days, but is
little more than a criminal gang, primarily depending on kidnapping for funds.
Southeast
Asia has no multilateral institution that has been effective in dealing with
regional crises. However, there has
been some progress in developing some ad hoc bilateral and multilateral
arrangements. The leaders of
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore share concerns over the large
number of their citizens who were traveling abroad to study at hard-line Islamic
religious schools, and they held a series of meetings in August 2001 to discuss
ways to deal with Islamic extremism.
To maintain
the appearance of separation from the U.S. war on terrorism, many East Asian
countries have preferred to keep their cooperation and intelligence sharing
quiet. Certain unilateral actions have caused a rift between states in the
region. Malaysia’s decision to
deport nearly a half million registered Indonesian workers is an example – and
has served to inflame relations between those countries.
Terrorists
and criminal groups have cooperated, and are collaborators of convenience.
However, one panelist argued that intelligence sharing and other
cooperation among terrorist groups is still very limited. Fortunately, such
cooperation has been hindered by the same lack of trust and suspicions that
limit cooperation between regional governments.
Panel
II –
The Money Trail
Following the money trail that supports
terrorism, organized crime, and other transnational threats in the Asia-Pacific
region is a critical challenge in combating them.
In addition, several governments that
are members of the FATF – the Philippines, Cook Islands and Marshall Islands,
have been slow in enacting or implementing anti-money laundering legislation.
China’s financial transaction laws are also weak and poorly enforced,
particularly in the south.
After September
11, many governments in the region concluded that the only way to ensure better
monitoring of financial transactions was to promulgate a NCCT list, and threaten
sanctions that would limit market access for FATF members that were not
complying with Task Force standards.
This “name and shame” threat appears to have had an impact in the Philippines.
Development of “white lists” of states making good progress, as well as “black lists” identifying laggards, may also help.
The NCCT list is produced by technocrats, not politicians – a strength.
Panel
III – Evolving
Transnational Threats
The perception of the terrorist threat
changed on September 11, but the threat assessment didn’t and shouldn’t
change. There is a natural
tendency to ignore threats during quiescent periods and to show hyper-attention
in the aftermath of a successful attack. With
continued success in the war on terrorism, it is likely there will be fading
interest in the U.S. and abroad.
Most of the targets attractive to Al
Qaeda are in the continental United States.
For operational (convenience) reasons, overseas attacks may be employed,
either against U.S. interests or those of our allies, following the precedent of
the attacks on the USS Cole and the Embassies in Africa, and the disrupted plot
by Ramzi Ahmed Yousef to
destroy a dozen U.S. commercial airliners.
The war on terrorism must eventually
address the roots of terrorism. The war will be hard and tedious, requiring cell
by cell destruction or disruption. The
campaign and potential collateral damage inflicted by certain operations may
induce other groups to target U.S. interests.
In general, terrorist activities are poor quality military targets.
They usually operate without extensive infrastructure and large stocks of
equipment.
The United
States can sustain and even expand counterterrorism cooperation with a diverse
array of countries if it is sensitive to their differing concerns, objectives,
and political circumstances and willing to make adjustments accordingly.
Limited cooperation against terrorism with governments with whom the U.S.
has generally unfriendly or even hostile relations is also possible without
compromising on other differences. The
war on terrorism has also opened up the prospect of new efforts against weapon
proliferation and other objectionable policies of various states of concern.
Historically, terrorists groups
exhibited limited interest in weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Through the 1990’s, interest has increased and technological
developments may ease their access to WMD.
Moral and political concerns may circumscribe terrorists’ willingness
to use WMD, but use of these capabilities is likely. Several potential paths exist for proliferation of WMD
to non-state actors:
Independent Development – the hardest and least likely;
Unauthorized acquisition from a state – theft or sale from corrupt officials;
Turnkey acquisition from a state – problematic because programs are illegal;
State manipulation of a terrorist group; and
State masquerading as a terrorist group.
Panel
IV – Implications for
Military Forces
Panelists agreed that the war on global
terrorism has given an important additional basis for continued U.S. military
presence in the Asia/Pacific region. Given
the particular concerns about terrorist activities in Southeast Asia, one
participant suggested that the U.S. presence in that sub-region needs to expand
– not necessarily through opening of a major new base, but something larger
than current U.S. operations in Singapore. The war on terrorism can be used as
an entrée to allow expanded military-military interactions. Further ad hoc
military cooperation in the region is likely in the future.
For some governments, counterterrorism cooperation can provide the
“polite reason” for U.S. military deployments in the region, though for many
the dominant, long-term security concern is China.
Diversity and dispersion of U.S. military forces around the region
provides promise of better security for those forces and is more desirable
politically.
Several
participants commented that the lack of development of the ASEAN Regional Forum
into an effective instrument for regional security cooperation over the past
decade was a major lost opportunity. Panelists
and participants agreed that CINCPAC’s concept of building practical
operational cooperation among militaries in the Asia/Pacific region in the
development of a security community provides a solid foundation for developing
the kind of variable and flexible bilateral and multilateral relationships that
will be critical to the success of the next phase of the war on global
terrorism. Limited U.S. support to
coalition forces, as in the Indonesian peacekeeping operation and Philippine
forces waging the counterinsurgency operations against Abu Sayyaf rebels, were
cited as models for empowering forces in the region and avoiding over-reliance
on U.S. forces.
In spite of
increasing demands upon military forces in nearly all nations to adapt and
expand their capabilities to deal with transnational threats, most remain
focused upon a core business of war fighting.
Few changes are evident in equipment procurement programs.
Panel
V – Improving Regional Cooperation
Regional
cooperation to combat terrorism is growing, but there are constraints. Information sharing within and among governments in the
region has been improved since September 11, but could be further enhanced.
The South Asian Regional Cooperation states issued a declaration against
terrorism, however tensions between India and Pakistan have limited the
practical effect of this cooperation. The
U.S. is working to enhance the counterterrorism capabilities of partners
throughout the world through expanded bilateral assistance to law enforcement
agencies.
Participants agreed that the next phase of the war required an indirect strategy to “drain the swamps” that feed the hydra headed phenomenon of terrorism. This strategy will need to combine selected military operations and financial controls with expanded foreign development assistance, more effective public diplomacy and information campaigns, and support to moderate leaders and teachers in Islamic communities around the region. Panelists agreed that poverty does not cause terrorism, however, overseas development assistance plays a critical role in giving hope to populations that feel buffeted by globalization and have been the recruiting bases of many terrorists. The U.S. has encouraged the World Bank and other international aid donors to make this a priority.
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