GENERAL
KIM DONG SHIN, ROK ARMY (RET.)
Former Minister of Defense, Republic of Korea
The U.S. National Security Strategy provides an important framework from which to examine the current crisis and other challenges in Northeast Asia. From the beginning, this strategy targets North Korea as much if not more than any other state. North Korea poses a unique a threatening set of challenges with weapons of mass destruction. North Korea is in particularly sharp contrast with South Korea in issues such as human dignity, democracy, and market economies. The National Security Strategy suggests that the United States should exult in its alliance with South Korea, while condemning North Korea to serious U.S. efforts to achieve change. Yet ROK and U.S. relations are currently having some difficulties, while there appears to be no clear plan, no operationalization of the strategy, to deal with North Korea.
At issue are increasing ROK nationalism with regard to its economic and other successes, North Korea's nuclear weapons development, and the US‑led war on terrorism. As the Republic of Korea and the United States are marking the 50th anniversary of their signing of a Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953, internal and external confusion and instability continue with a looming crisis caused by Pyongyang's nuclear development and U.S. preparations for and execution of the war against Iraq. In Europe, due to different national interests, some countries are opposed to the prospective military actions of the US and UK, while in Northeast Asia debates remain unabated over Pyongyang's nuclear weapons development. Delicate differences in assessments and predictions on Pyongyang's clandestine nuclear programs, coupled with concern about the dangers of war, have led to broad debate on the serious of North Korean actions and even some claims that the United States is responsible for this crisis. Nationalist anti‑American sentiments seen among some South Korean media and citizens, and reactive anti‑Korean sentiments in the United States caused by exaggerated reports by some U.S. media have led to an eruption of demands for reductions and relocations of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, further straining the relationship of the time‑honored alliance of the two countries. There are some differences in assessing their current situations and different expectations for the future, coupled with whether or not they can accommodate the unraveling situations and have confidence in their own capabilities to resolve the situations.
Therefore, our two nations need to overcome the current crisis originating from North Korea's nuclear weapons development and search for a more mature and advanced alliance relationship. As we prepare for another 50 years of our alliance, anti-American and anti‑Korean sentiments due to a lack of understanding and prejudice, should not drive our external policies and damage our alliance. Difference in assessments and predictions about the North Korean nuclear weapons and U.S. forces in Korea could become too divisive and aggravated. Before then, our two nations should further develop our alliance and security cooperation by resolving the problems facing us and pursuing closer consultation far in advance. We should develop a strategic plan that defines shared objectives, such as a strengthened and more balanced alliance or achieving a peace regime in Korea, and identifies feasible paths toward these objectives. Such a plan would also identify crises that could occur en route to these objectives, how we might avert them, and what we would need to do if they develop nevertheless. While reality may diverge from such a strategic plan, periodic adjustments would bring us back on track, just as we do with our operational plans.
Examining the Current Situation,
The three countries in question find themselves in different situations. South Korea is facing a shift in political power in which young and liberal generations have formed the mainstream. They are demanding breakthroughs in their relations with the United States as well as North Korea in order to put an end to a North‑South standoff and to expedite a peace regime on the Peninsula. The United States is leading a global war against terrorism, having focused its mind and might on dismantling Iraqi WMDs and dethroning Saddam Hussein. But the United States is also demanding that the rogue state of North Korea abandon its secret nuclear programs. The Bush administration wants to see some progress made by North Korea in five areas: North Korea's nuclear weapons, other WMDs including chemical and biological weapons, missiles, conventional forces, and human rights. The comprehensive approach to resolving the North Korean problem, or a package deal, is still on the table waiting for Pyongyang to understand the U.S.'s benign intention and receive all the benefits that will be forthcoming. North Korea remains a closed society with a "march of affliction" imposed repeatedly on its populace in the face of what it perceives as imminent military attacks from the United States. It also appears to have a lingering fear about the widening gap in national power with the South, causing the North to feel doubts and desperation. While North Korea desperately wants to be “empowered,” its economic and political difficulties leave it with few options—other than nuclear weapons—to achieve empowerment.
Anti‑American sentiments have tapered off in South Korea, though this pattern has generally not been recognized in the United States. Meanwhile, anti-Korean sentiments are apparently on the rise in the U.S. The anti‑American sentiments epitomized by the so‑called candlelight vigils and demonstrations were ignited and sustained by the tragic accident of two South Korean schoolgirls, the acquittals of two U.S. soldiers involved in the accident, and what many South Koreans perceived as insincere and belated apologies from the U.S. The street demonstrations came to a peak around the Presidential election in December of last year and have since decreased. Although some street demonstrations continue in South Korea, they are noticeably subdued and staged largely in the name of a pacifist, anti‑war feelings. Moreover, a number of pro-U.S. demonstrations have also occurred. According to a recent public opinion survey conducted as late as February 8, only 7 percent of the respondents favored an immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces in Korea, while 43.1 percent supported gradual reductions and 47 percent desired continued presence. The survey result shows that nearly 80 percent of South Koreans favor U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula, even though those favoring gradual reductions have increased over the years. The same respondents expressed their views on the candlelight demonstrations: 74.5 percent sought revision of the SOFA and only 12.7 percent sought to express anti-American sentiments. Many voices in Korea have called for a “more equal” alliance between the Korea and the United States, to reflect the significant economic and political advancements that Korea has made. Koreans are looking for equality both in terms of the SOFA and in terms of the operational control of forces and other issues in the alliance. On the other hand, Korean demonstrations and other actions have caused a sense of betrayal and indignation in the United States against South Korea, and debates have been going on in the U.S. Congress over possible reductions of its troops in Korea.
Meanwhile, the North Korean nuclear weapons crisis developed. There are basically two conflicting views in South Korea today regarding North Korea's continuation of its nuclear weapons programs. One common view is that Pyongyang is not capable of developing nuclear weapons and is simply bluffing and intimidating, seeking direct talks with Washington to help overcome its perennial economic crisis and energy shortage. The other equally common view is that while Pyongyang may want some negotiations with Washington, it will never abandon its nuclear weapons programs, even if doing so would eventually secure a U.S. guarantee of regime survival. Measures to deal with the North Korean nuclear problem differ accordingly.
Similarly, Seoul and Washington show a slight difference in their assessments of the current status and potential of Pyongyang's nuclear development, its linkage with international terrorist organizations, and the role each expects to play. In other words, it is Washington's analysis that Pyongyang has moved from seeking negotiations to seeking real possession of nuclear weapons. These differences might arise from the differing national interests and strategies of the two nations, their threat perceptions, and problems in information sharing. Washington has aired its readiness to use military options to resolve Pyongyang's nuclear problem, if necessary, but only as a last resort. For now, it has agreed with President Roh’s government that a negotiated outcome is preferred. Nevertheless, the United States has decided to dispatch additional forces to fill the vacuum that might be created around the Korean Peninsula as some U.S. forces in the region move toward the Gulf Region for a possible war with Iraq. North Korea has made strong responses to these U.S. measures. From a North Korean perspective, the deployment of bombers, a carrier, and F-117s into the region appears to be exactly the package the United States might send to carry out a surgical strike against the North Korean nuclear facilities. North Korea has thus announced its inherent right to take preemptive action against U.S. targets, only to raise the worries about an escalatory spiral that could lead to another war on the Korean Peninsula.
In response to highly visible anti‑American demonstrations in South Korea, many Americans including journalists, scholars, and Congressmen, began to voice their anger and demand a possible reduction and relocation of American troops stationed in South Korea. U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said that he is ready to discuss with the ROK government the issues of restructuring and relocating U.S. forces in Korea, in his drive for a worldwide readjustment of U.S. forces. Security analysts are concerned about the profound impact on deterrence that could come from rapid reductions of American forces and relocation of American ground forces south of the Han River. Of particular concern is the tripwire effect of having significant U.S. forces in the route of any North Korean invasion.
The Republic of Korea and the United States see the necessity to further develop their alliance, with its highest priority on managing the current crisis on the Korean Peninsula through a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear weapon problem. They also emphasize trilateral policy cooperation among Seoul, Washington and Tokyo and search for a multilateral approach to resolving this problem. At the 34th Security Consultative Meeting held in Washington in December of last year, the ROK and the U.S. agreed to conduct a joint study on the future of their alliance. Minister Lee and Secretary Rumsfeld signed a Terms of Reference for the Future ROK‑U.S. Alliance Policy Initiative that will enable formal discussions on procedures for strengthening their alliance over the next ten years.
In conclusion, I would like
to make some personal Policy
Recommendations on the ROK/U.S. alliance and future security cooperation.
First, the United States and South Korea need a strategic plan that can guide our alliance through the coming years. This plan should identify objectives for the alliance and means for achieving them. The U.S. National Security Strategy would serve as one basis for formulating these objectives and strategies; South Korea also needs to develop its own National Security Strategy to serve as a counterpart. From these two strategies, a combined strategic plan should flow naturally. But it should also identify possible stumbling blocks that could occur in coming months and years and suggest both how these might be avoided and how to cope with them should they occur.
Second, the United States and South Korea need to resolve the existing North Korean nuclear weapon crisis promptly, and with priority. As a first step in formulating a strategic plan, our governments should work together to:
• Determine a mutually agreeable option to propose to North Korea as part of multilateral discussions with North Korea. Prepare this in the next month.
• Present this option to the other regional players (especially Japan and China), and work with them to develop a multilateral position on resolving the crisis.
• Take this agreed approach to North Korea and seek North Korean agreement. Make it clear to North Korea that the security of its government, its access to economic support, and potential movement toward a peace regime are contingent on accepting the multilateral proposal.
• In areas where North Korea disagrees or wants other actions, work together to address and resolve these issues.
Third, we can expect that one objective of this combined strategy would be Building a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula, which is one of the ten major goals of the new ROK government. The combined strategic plan should lay out an approach to accomplish this objective, and would like include efforts by the two governments to:
• Push forward a North‑South peace declaration or a peace treaty only in conjunction with real tangible progress in North‑South arms control. To this end, South Korea should consider proposing to Pyongyang a joint study on defining a future roadmap for their relations.
• Conduct North‑South arms control in conjunction with reductions of U.S. forces.
• Demand openly and strongly to Pyongyang the need to build military CBMs, abandon its nuclear and other WMDs, and implement arms control, while encouraging it to shape an environment for reform and openness as well as change in its perceptions about the U.S.
• Assist the South Koreans to perceive the alliance and USFK as conducive to building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.
Fourth, on adjusting the ROK‑U.S. alliance and reducing and relocating USFK as part of rebalancing the relations in general, the following preconditions should be met:
‑• The ROK armed forces should improve their military planning capabilities both in hardware and software. It has very limited experience in making an independent war plan of its own, and lacks deterrent capabilities against North Korean and other regional threats, particularly in intelligence‑gathering capability.
• Verifiable arms control should be implemented between the North and South. Otherwise, anti‑American sentiments in South Korea might give a wrong signal to Pyongyang that the U.S. is willingly withdrawing its forces from South Korea, which in turn will lead Pyongyang to make a miscalculation about the security situation on the Korean Peninsula.
• A package deal should be pursued between Washington and Pyongyang in which the latter's nuclear and other WMDs, missiles, and conventional forces are exchanged for the former's force reductions and relocations.
• Closer prior consultation and full understanding should come before adjusting the alliance and the USFK. Any important decision lacking mutual understanding and laden with emotion should be avoided as much as possible.
• A consensus should be formed between the U.S. and Korean governments and their populace and concrete action plans should be prepared in advance.
Fifth, on the implementation of the Future ROK‑U.S. Alliance Policy Initiative, the ROK and U.S. should:
• Resolve some prominent issues that affect South Koreans' daily lives such as SOFA with full consultation, but make sure that we do not endanger more substantial and vital issues such as the overall ROK‑U.S. alliance.
• Lead the joint study and gradually allow other governmental agencies, the National Assembly/Congress, and government‑funded research institutes to join them (Track 1).
• Complement Track 1 by fostering discussions among the academia, media and civilian organizations (Track 2).
• Build a consensus between their two nations and earn their support.
Sixth, the ROK government should prepare to receive wartime opcon by:
• Prepare now for a transfer of all the delegated authorities currently exercised by CINCCFC, as a major step leading to a transfer of war‑time operational control.
• Consider an option in which a ROK general exercises a temporary operational control during joint exercises, in conjunction with USFK reductions and relocations.
• Increase defense budget from 2.7 percent of its GDP to 3 percent at a minimum to facilitate its force improvement programs.
Lastly, on shaping a stable environment for U.S. military presence in parallel with a more mature alliance that better befits a changing security environment in Northeast Asia, the ROK government should:
• Make an objective assessment of the contributions that the ROK‑U.S. alliance and U.S. military presence have made for the past five decades in terms of South Korean economic growth and democratization, and give generous support to the formation of an advanced alliance for the 21st century; and
• Shape a favorable and stable environment for U.S. forces to station in South Korea by providing diplomatic, financial, and social assistance to improve the overall quality of life.