New
Security Strategy of the US and Northeast Asia:
Won-soo
KIM
Korean
Foreign Ministry
1. Introduction
The 9/11 terrorist attacks drove the United States to
overhaul its strategic thinking and planning. Traditional form of deterrence, as
was so viciously and clearly demonstrated, was insufficient in preventing such
a terrorist attack. As a result, active
defense and counter-proliferation is getting greater attention. The popularly called Bush Doctrine
emphasizing preemption is a widely discussed topic. Nowadays, it seems that capability-based assessment makes more
sense than a threat-based assessment, as threat becomes more and more diverse
as well as asymmetrical and unpredictable, with potential enemies harder to
identify and deter. The possible nexus between international terrorism and
weapons of mass destruction, or WMD, is thus highlighted as the single most
dangerous threat to the security of the US and indeed, the world.
New strategic adjustments that the US is making will undoubtedly
have significant implications not only for global security but also for the
security arrangements of the Northeast Asian region. On a global scale, serious
debate is ensuing concerning the legality as well as the practicality of
anticipatory interventions, which aim to prevent or preempt present and
imminent danger. It is sort of a perennial question of international law how to
define present and imminent danger, and who has the authority to address
it. The debate about the threshold of
legitimacy will most likely continue on without any conclusive prescriptions.
The United Nations Security Council still remains a useful tool to decide on
and enforce such actions, but its usefulness will largely depend on whether
consensus between the so-called P-5, permanent five, can be built.
In Northeast Asia, the once contentious issue involving
Missile Defense (MD) now looks as if settled down, but some issues still
possess the potential to resurface in the future, affecting the overall
security situation of the region. The US and China are strategically
cooperating on eradicating terrorism, but other issues between the two nations
will require careful scrutiny. In
Sino-American relations, there are a host of issues, bilateral, regional and
global, the dynamics of which is in constant flux and evolution.
Currently, the North Korean nuclear issue stands out as the
most dominant factor affecting the security strategy of the US, the Republic of
Korea and other states in Northeast Asia. The future discourse on the security
strategy in Northeast Asia will be shaped largely by when and how the nuclear
problem is resolved. In this paper, I will try to draw on lessons from the
1993-94 nuclear crisis and use them comparatively in thinking about what should
be done to resolve the current problem. I will also discuss related issues such
as the future of the ROK-US alliance.
2. North Korean Nuclear Problem: Comparative
Analysis with 1993-94
The North Korean nuclear crisis of 1993-94 persisted for about
one and a half years before being resolved with the signing of the Agreed
Framework (AF). The Agreed Framework was the product of a long and drawn-out
process, experiencing many ups and downs and at times, even threatening to fall
apart altogether. It should be noted
that the AF was based on mutual distrust and hence, each stage was marked with
a series of quid-pro-quo milestones. It
was a compromise deal, sort of the second best, not the best, taken under the situation
of lack of trust about each other.
Furthermore, South Korea's exclusion from the negotiation process
created political tensions at home, making coordination between the US and ROK
a very daunting and challenging task.
After the conclusion of the AF, the Korean Peninsula Energy Organization
(KEDO) projects had been implemented relatively smoothly until the disclosure
of North Korea’s uranium enrichment program last October.
It is uncertain and difficult to predict about how the
current nuclear problem will unfold.
Although I have no doubt that the current situation is very serious, I
also believe the current standoff cannot be considered - yet - as a real
crisis. Therefore, the international community still has some time left to work
out a diplomatic solution, which makes me cautiously optimistic about the
prospects of a peaceful resolution.
As compared to 1993-94, we have good news as well as bad
news. I will discuss the good news first. Overall, the international community
is better equipped to handle such a problem. First, a number of dialogue
channels with North Korea are open and in operation. Inter-Korean dialogue and
various cooperation projects are making progress. In particular, reconnecting
the inter-Korean railways and adjacent roads, which go through the
demilitarized zone (DMZ), is one of the more noteworthy projects as it
signifies both military confidence building measures unique to Korea as well as
the potential for future economic cooperation beyond the Korean Peninsula.
Furthermore, Japan and North Korea have been maintaining
contacts between each other for the normalization talks, despite the recent
cooling-off over the issue of abducted Japanese nationals. Over a dozen western
countries normalized relations with North Korea since 2000 and some of them
even opened resident diplomatic missions in Pyongyang. The US has also
maintained the communication channel with North Korea in New York at the
working level. The World Food Programme
(WFP) has kept a resident office with staff members monitoring the distribution
of international food assistance. Among other things, these contacts clearly
reduce the risk of an inadvertent escalation of tension, which could develop
into a full-fledged crisis because of miscommunication and/or
misunderstanding.
Secondly, the overall bargaining position of the
international community over North Korea has improved compared with 1993-94.
The internal economic situation of North Korea has gotten worse and its
relative dependence on outside assistance, most notably food and energy, has
gone up.
Thirdly, North Korea is beginning to show signs of change -
though slow and tentative - in its economic management. On July 1st last year,
North Korea introduced a set of measures aimed at improving economic
management. These measures were deemed the most sweeping both in scope and
intensity. North Korea also designated, in rapid succession, three special
economic zones in Shinuijoo, Kaesung and Mt. Kumgang areas. The Shinuijoo
district is adjacent to the border with China. Kaesung and Mt. Kumgang
districts are just over the demilitarized zone.
North Korea has seemingly taken the Chinese model of special
zones as an example, adding its own modifications, by designating four focal
points of development, rectangular in its shape. The northeastern point of this
rectangle had been designated some time ago in Rajin-sunbong, an area close to
the border with Russia and China. North Korea may have intended to develop
these zones with an eye on investment from China through Shinuijoo, Russia
through Rajin-sunbong, South Korea through Kaesung and Mt. Kumkang areas,
respectively.
It is clear that the success - or failure - of these
economic measures will depend, inter alia, on how much and how fast foreign
investment and technology will flow into North Korea. Only investment and
assistance from outside can fill the shortage in supply of key materials in
North Korea. For example, without supply from outside, North Korea's price and
wage hikes are likely to result in hyperinflation. In this respect, time is not
on North Korea's side.
But, if we look at the strategic side of the equation, the
story becomes a little different. Here comes the bad news. Unlike 1993, North
Korea now pursues two different tracks of nuclear development programs: one
using highly enriched uranium (HEU) and the other using reprocessed plutonium.
Now that the freeze has been lifted from the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon,
the potential for North Korea's nuclear capability will grow with time. As
compared to 1993, the nuclear menu list of North Korea gets longer. And the
worse news is that, unless checked, it may become even longer and harder to
roll back, as time passes by. In this case, time does not seem to be on our
side.
3. Tasks Ahead: Get to the Basics
Now the next question is what we should do about this
problem. My short answer is to get back to the basics. Firstly, the
international community must recheck what are the objectives to be achieved and
policy tools to be employed.
A peaceful and nuclear-free Korean peninsula remains the
top-priority objective fully shared by South Korea and the US as well as the
neighbors. It should be emphasized here that peaceful resolution of the nuclear
problem is not just a statement of a policy tool, but of a policy goal.
Similarly, nuclearization of the Korean peninsula is unacceptable, as it will
be a strategic nightmare for the Korean people as well as for all states in
Northeast Asia. To achieve these two priority objectives, we will have to
employ a wide range of diplomatic options, bilateral and multilateral, in a
gradual manner proportionate to North Korea's action and anticipatory of North
Korea's reaction.
Secondly, to be effective, policy tools should be decided
and employed as jointly as possible by the allies and friends. Diplomatic
options will not work unless backed by strong deterrence. North Korea will not
take them seriously, unless convinced that there is no room for driving a wedge
between the allies. Therefore, we cannot over-emphasize the imperative for
maintaining a rock-solid ROK-US alliance and keeping bilateral consultation on
important policy decisions as close as possible. Both the timing and depth of such a consultation, matters very
much in ensuring the effectiveness of policies to be carried out.
In this context, joint wisdom should be applied as to the
on-going consultation on the future of the alliance. This consultation is expected to produce a blueprint for a
stronger, better and more effective alliance for the 21st
Century. The alliance has worked and
adapted successfully to changing circumstances based on the solid pillar of
shared interests and objectives for the last 50 years. I firmly believe that we have ample reasons,
security, political, economic and social, to further strengthen the alliance
for another 50 years.
In revitalizing the alliance toward a more comprehensive and
mature partnership, there are a number of sensitive issues, political,
economic, social and military, to be considered and discussed. Many of them have serious political as well
as logistical and financial implications. We will have to carefully manage the
consultation process, so that wrong signals will not be sent to their peoples
and neighbors including North Korea. At
this critical juncture, this process should not do anything that can be
construed as implying the weakening of both countries’ commitment to the
alliance. South Korea and the US, I am
sure, will ultimately strengthen the alliance in a way that will continue
positive contribution to the peace and stability not only on the Korean
peninsula but also in Northeast Asia.
Next comes the trilateral coordination between South Korea,
US and Japan. Overall strategy and detailed tactics to deal with North Korea
can be best sorted out through the trilateral coordination framework. Then,
these strategy and tactics can be implemented through close cooperation with China,
Russia and the EU countries as well as the international organizations such as
the UN and the IAEA.
Roles of China and Russia, two big neighbors with close
relations with both Koreas, fully share two priority objectives and will be
instrumental in bringing about a peaceful resolution. It makes sense to devise a framework to involve the four
neighbors and the two Koreas. But the
problem is that North Korea is not forthcoming to such a multilateral
dialogue. One of North Korea’s
arguments is that they would be put in a disadvantageous position, as the only
country not having normal relations with all participants, notably the US and
Japan. They insist on a different set
of bilateral talks with each country.
We will have to find out an optimal formula of dialogue that involves
North Korea. The ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF) is a good example that can be expanded.
North Korea agreed to join the ARF in 2000 that provided an opportunity
for bilateral contacts as well as multilateral consultation on regional
security issues.
Thirdly, public diplomacy at home must be strengthened to
expand a support base for the chosen policy options. Here, special attention
should be paid to how allies and friends will speak with one voice and relate
it to the press.
Efforts should also be intensified to increase public
awareness about the salient policy issues such as the continuing need for the
ROK-US alliance into the future. Last year's death of two young school girls
was a tragic accident, and in hindsight, the aftermath of the accident could
have been handled quite differently.
Candlelight vigils attracted a lot of public attention both in Seoul and
Washington. Some portrayed them as a
proof of rising anti-Americanism and call for the withdrawal of the US forces
from South Korea. But this is not a
factual statement. The fact is that the
majority of people joining the demonstration argued for a Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) that better protects the interest of the Korean people. This call for a better SOFA operation itself
presupposes the continued presence of the US forces. Both the US and South Korean governments are recognizing this
call for a more harmonious and friendly relations between the US troops in
Korea and ordinary Korean citizens as a legitimate concern. Both governments are closely cooperating to
address this concern in many ways.
One of the lessons learned was that both governments should
step up their public relations campaign to improve mutual awareness about each
other's culture and legal systems and to educate their peoples about the
alliance rationale and the facts about SOFA-related issues. It is particularly important to show to the
Korean people that the operation of SOFA is being substantively improved, so as
to dispel popular misperceptions that the terms of SOFA with South Korea still
provide for more concessions in criminal jurisdiction and other provisions than
those with Japan or with Germany.
4. Conclusion
A. Summary of our North Korea Policy
Let me now summarize our North Korea policy. As former
President KIM Dae-jung stated, the first pillar of our North Korea policy must
be strong deterrence represented by the ROK-US alliance. This will enable us to
seek reconciliation with North Korea in peace. Former President Kim persuaded
the North Korean leadership to come forward, assuring them that we do not have
any intentions to absorb their system. In other words, we will not seek the
destabilization or collapse of the North Korean system ‘intentionally’ as our
policy objective.
I believe this still holds, as we are dealing with a regime
that increasingly feels vulnerable and insecure. We have to guard against the
danger of the North’s lashing out from sheer desperation. With a solid
deterrence posture, we will not be intimidated under any circumstances, but we
will also have to do our best to minimize any risk factor to our common
security. I also believe the best way to lead desperate people out of the dark
tunnel is to show them a light, some ray of hope at the end of the tunnel so as
not to keep them in the dark completely shut off from the light.
About the current nuclear problem, President ROH Moo-hyun
sets out three principles: 1) North Korea's nuclear program is unacceptable; 2)
this problem should be resolved peacefully; and 3) South Korea will take a
proactive role in the process for peaceful resolution through bilateral
consultation with the US, trilateral coordination with US and Japan, and
cooperation with China, Russia, EU and other friends. Peaceful resolution of
the problem is a statement of a policy objective as well as of a policy tool.
North Korea's nuclear program is a very serious matter, but we need to exhaust
all efforts to resolve it by peaceful means.
Let me conclude by adding one final footnote about the
future prospects. As I said earlier, two different clocks for North Korea are
ticking. The larger clock does not move in North Korea's favor. But the smaller
clock for nuclear program, once activated, runs the risk of moving in North
Korea's favor. We need to devise a formula that can stop the nuclear clock as
soon as possible and deactivate it for good. I believe we have fair chances for
diplomatic solution, if we can induce North Korea to concentrate on fixing
their larger clock that is not moving in their favor, with assistance from us
following the deactivation of the nuclear clock.
Given the lessons learned from 1993-94 and subsequent
management of the North Korean issue, exploring a comprehensive approach (a
roadmap) is worthwhile and should be done with a sense of urgency. This time,
partial solution is neither feasible nor desirable. All concerns of the
international community should be addressed in a verifiable and irreversible
manner. To achieve this, North Korea's concerns will have to be addressed as
well. Given mutual distrust, it is realistic to arrange both sides' interests
in a roadmap that will show milestones as well as roads to the destination.
These milestones will work as checkpoints for both sides to verify progress in
implementing each other's commitments, and allow one side to go back, whenever
it finds the other side to renege or cheat.
As to the formality, comprehensive approach requires broad
participation of interested parties. In the end, any comprehensive settlement
will undoubtedly require broadest possible contribution from the international
community in one way or another.
But the tricky question is how to trigger such a dialogue.
Indeed, beginning it will mean that we more than half way through. Here, we
will have to either overcome or, at least, bypass North Korea's insistence that
dialogue take place with the US only. Frankly, there is no panacea on how to
begin dialogue. But I do hope we can build on common ground as to the formality
of dialogue through a variety of contacts and communications involving North
Korea. I believe it is always better to try something rather than do nothing
and wait for a good thing to happen. In this respect, we appreciate efforts
made by a number of our allies and friends thus far with expectations that some
will bear fruit sooner rather than later.
In pursuing peaceful resolution of the North Korean issue,
the maintenance of close alliance consultation and coordination works as the
base. Alliance relationship between
South Korea and the US has to be renewed with greater vitality in a
future-oriented manner not only for both countries’ self-interests but also for
promoting regional peace and prosperity.