Chinese Security Interests and
Activities
with Central
Asian States
Presented at the National Defense University Conference on
Meeting U.S.
Security Objectives in a Changing Asia
April 22-23, 2004
Dr. Bates Gill
Freeman Chair in China Studies
Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Washington, D.C.
I.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most
interesting aspects of China’s more proactive regional diplomacy and security
policy of recent years has been its emergence as an increasingly prominent
player in Central Asia. Perhaps “re-emergence” is a better term, as
the historical anomaly is the absence of a Chinese presence throughout most of the 20th
century. China’s interest in building relations with Central Asia is not startling given its long history in the
region. Rather, it is the agility it has
exercised in doing so that has taken many by surprise.
Beginning in the mid- to
late-1990s, Beijing moved deftly to delineate and disarm its borders with former
Cold War rivals Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, establish a
multilateral international organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO), and set the foundation for a promising set of diplomatic and economic
relationships for the future, all the while working with considerable success to
alleviate traditional suspicions among Central Asian states about China’s
intentions in the region. The joint
military exercises China held with Kyrgyzstan in 2002 – the first open joint
peacetime military exercises China held with any country – and the multilateral
military exercises held amongst China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan a year later, were emblematic of the remarkable changes afoot
between China and its Central Asian neighbors.
To be sure, China faces many challenges in its effort to bolster its
diplomatic, economic, and security-related presence in Central Asia. While Russia’s previously strong influence is waning, Central
Asian elites continue to harbor closer ties to Moscow than to Beijing, if for historical and linguistic reasons
alone. The United States become far more
active in the region, especially since the advent of the global war on terror
and specifically due to military operations in south and southwest Asia. Other key players, such as NATO and its Partnership
for Peace, countries of the European Union, Turkey, and Iran are likewise interested to tap into the benefits of
good diplomatic, economic, and security relations with Central Asian
states.
Nevertheless, on the basis
of geography and economic realities alone, China appears well-placed to expand its influence in the
region over the long-haul. Central Asian
states will continue to seek robust engagement with China as their transportation infrastructure and
developing economies become more intertwined, and China will likely continue to exercise a light but
effective diplomatic touch to assure stable, productive relations along its
interior frontiers, dispelling fears that it is seeking regional hegemony.
To examine China’s
emergent role in Central Asia, this presentation will
proceed in four sections. First, it lays
out China’s
principal interests in pursuing a more robust engagement strategy in Central
Asia. Second, it will
provide a brief overview of China’s
recent interactions with Central Asia, with a particular
focus on the inception and establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO). Third, the
presentation will briefly cover future directions and prospects for China-Central
Asian relations. Fourth, the
presentation will consider what these developments mean for regional security
and U.S.
interests.
II. CONTEMPORARY CHINESE INTERESTS IN THE
REGION
Three principal points are helpful in framing China’s
interests in seeking a more robust engagement strategy with Central
Asia.
First, China’s
efforts in Central Asia are part and parcel of a broader
and long-term diplomatic strategy of fostering stable and productive relations around
the country’s periphery while shoring up a more widely-accepted Chinese
regional leadership role. Under the rubric of a “new security concept” and the more
recent notion of “China’s
peaceful rise”, Chinese regional diplomacy
and security policy has made considerable strides in establishing relationships
with most of its neighbors which are more flexible, responsive, and productive.
Much of this diplomatic strategy aims at a domestic
purpose: by pursuing a more benign and
beneficial external environment, Chinese leaders can turn their focus on the
enormous sociopolitical and socioeconomic development challenges they face at
home. China’s
engagement in Central Asia is part of this overall
trend, as Beijing seeks stable
relations in the region to legitimate China’s
image as a benign regional leader.
Second, Beijing
has a number of significant national security interests at stake in fostering
stable and productive relations with its Central Asian neighbors. First and foremost has been the demarcation
and demilitarization of China-Central Asian border, not least with Russia. China shares a nearly 7,000 kilometer border
with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and has gone to great
lengths, even making important territorial compromises and cessions in the
process, to fully settle border differences with Central Asian states.
In key agreements in 1996 and 1997, Beijing
supported and jointly implemented with Central Asian states the pullback of troops and equipment to 100 kilometers off the
common borders, verification of those agreements, and pre-notification of
exercises and other military activities.
The 1996 agreement stipulated that military forces in the border regions
will not be used to attack one another, military exercises will not be aimed at
one another and will be limited in frequency and scale, major military
exercises within 100 kilometers of the border require notification and
invitation to the neighboring Shanghai Five states to send observers, and
friendly military-to-military exchanges will be established.
On its security agenda with Central Asian states, Beijing
also seeks to insure that the region does not become a base for what it calls
“the three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism. In addition, Beijing
hopes that through security-related cooperation with Central Asian states, it
can better address security concerns arising from ethnic Uyghur
separatists – the diaspora of which extends across
Central Asian borders – who seek greater autonomy and even independence from China.
The third major interest for Beijing
in the region is the opportunity for economic development and trade. With growing demand for energy and other raw
materials, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan
and eastern Russia
in particular, represent a vital source of oil, gas and other resources to fuel
China’s rapidly
developing economy. Central
Asia also holds great potential as a budding market for the export
of inexpensive Chinese goods.
Overall, Chinese interests in the region have moved from an
initial concern with border demarcation and security to a greater emphasis on
the prospects for economic development, trade, and the exploration of opportunities
in the extractive and energy sectors. As
China moves up
the economic ladder, it is increasingly capable of delivering much-needed
capital, technology, expertise, and a diverse array of inexpensive consumer
goods to Central Asia.
However, given Central Asia’s many economic and
investment drawbacks and difficulties, full realization of China-Central Asian
complementarities is probably 10 to 15 years away, if not more. China
is likely to continue exploring energy development opportunities in Central
Asia, but over the near- to medium-term will do so largely to
become acquainted with the workings of the international energy markets, while
steadily diversifying its investments and potential sources of supply over the
longer-term. Realities of geography and
economic necessity – particularly China’s ever-growing energy demand on the one
hand, and Central Asia’s enormous development needs on the other – point to
much stronger and interdependent economic and trade relations between China and
Central Asia over the longer-term future.
III. CHINA’S MULTILATERAL APPROACH IN THE REGION
China’s robust multilateral approach in the region in form of
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has its roots in the border
demarcation talks China
held with Russia, Kazkahstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan in the early-1990s.
These talks evolved into the creation of the “Shanghai Five” in 1996
with the aim to finalize the border demarcation process and introduce a range
of confidence-building measures along their common borders. The Shanghai Five then evolved into a
formal treaty organization which included a sixth participant, Uzbekistan,
and has focused on issues well beyond border demarcation, such as counterterrorism,
economic integration, and even tourism.
The brief history of the SCO
closely parallels China’s
qualified successes in becoming a more prominent political, diplomatic, and
economic player in Central Asia. The most
significant early accomplishments of the group include its package of military
confidence building measures – including a pullback of some troops and
equipment to 100 kilometers off the common borders, verification procedures
along the border, and pre-notification of exercises and other military
activities – all of which were largely achieved and implemented by
1996-97.
By the July 2000 Shanghai Five
summit, the five parties announced that implementation of the 1996 and 1997
agreements had “helped build for the first time, in the border belt of more
than 7,000 km, a region of trust and transparency where military activities are
predictable and monitorable.” In addition, the group has made strong
statements of its opposition to a range of illegal activities in their
jointly-affected region, such as terrorism and arms smuggling, and agreed in
1999 to establish a joint anti-terrorist center, and to step up cooperation on
these issues amongst their security, customs, and military forces. The counterterrorism center was to be established
at Bishek, Kyrgyzstan, but is now slated to formally open in June 2004 in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.
Over the late 1990s, the Shanghai Five took further steps to
institutionalize interactions among its members: establishing a Joint
Monitoring Group to oversee the implementation and verification of their
various military confidence-building measures: establishing the “Bishkek Group”
amongst their officials concerned with public and state security; and
regularizing meetings between the countries’ defense chiefs, foreign ministers,
and other top leaders. The push toward greater
institutionalization of the Shanghai Five process culminated in the
establishment of the SCO at the June 2001 summit meeting of the group in Shanghai.
At that meeting, a State Coordinators
Council was formally established and tasked with drawing up a charter for the
organization.
The June 2002 summit of the group issued the 26-article SCO
charter, which sets out the goals, principles, organs, financing, and
membership rules of the SCO. Areas of SCO cooperation identified in the
charter include: enhancing regional security; seeking common understanding on
international issues; combating terrorism, separatism and extremism; combating
illegal activities such as smuggling, drug trafficking, and other illegal
immigration; coordinating policies on arms control; encouraging regional
economic cooperation; encouraging freer transborder
trade and energy development; ensuring proper exploitation of natural
resources, such as water; assisting one another in cases of humanitarian
emergencies; exchanging judiciary information; and expanding cooperation in
scientific, technological, educational, health, cultural, athletic, and tourism
endeavors.
The charter identifies seven organs for the SCO: Meeting of
Heads of State, Meeting of Heads of Government (Premiers), Meeting of Foreign
Ministers, Meeting of Leaders of Various Departments, State Coordinators
Council, the Regional Counterterrorism Center, and the Secretariat, and
describes the tasks and meeting schedules of each. The document stipulates how new members would
be selected, and how current members could be expelled if necessary.
The May 2003 summit set up the SCO Secretariat, which was
formally inaugurated in January 2004.
This administrative body is based in Beijing,
and is headed by a career Chinese diplomat, Zhang Deguang,
a former ambassador to Russia
and Kazakhstan,
who will serve for an initial term of three years. (See Box
1 below for an overview of the SCO Secretariat.) The May 2003 summit of the SCO also called on
the organization to build toward an annual budget of approximately $4 million,
and chose an official organizational flag and emblem depicting the SCO region
bordered by “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization” in both Chinese (at the
top) and Russian (on the bottom).
Looking ahead, the SCO will hold its next heads-of-state
summit in June 2004 in Tashkent. At that meeting, the SCO
Counterterrorism Center
will officially open and the group is expected to issue a new document on
combating the funding of terrorism through drug trafficking in the region. The initial budget for the Counterterrorism
Center will be approximately $1.3
million, and will be staffed with some 30 persons, mostly drawn from the
security services of the respective governments. At the June 2004 summit, the SCO is also
expected to publish more formal guidelines for obtaining observer status with
the group. It appears that Mongolia
and Afghanistan
would be among the first to gain such status, perhaps as early as the June 2004
summit.
_______________________________________________________________
BOX 1:
SECRETARIAT OF THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION
The Secretariat of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) was inaugurated on January 15, 2004. It is located
at 41 Liangmaqiao Road in northeast Beijing. Zhang Deguang is the first Secretary General of the SCO. The building was built by the Chinese
government and is available free of charge to the Secretariat. With a budget of approximately $2.16 million,
the Secretariat has 30 personnel, with representation from all six SCO members,
roughly allocated according the contribution member states make the SCO
budget: about 24 percent each for
Chinese and Russian representatives, about 20 percent for Kazakhstan, 15
percent for Uzbekistan, 9 percent for Kyrgyzstan, and 7 percent for Tajikstan.
The leadership of the Secretariat rotates every three
years. China will hold the General Secretary position first,
followed by Kazakhstan. The rotation
is determined alphabetically using the Russian alphabet, meaning Kazakhstan will hold the General Secretary position next. In addition to the General Secretary, there
are three Deputy Secretary General posts, one each for political-security, economic
and humanitarian, and administrative issues, respectively.
The body serves principally as a facilitation and
administrative mechanism for the SCO.
According the charter, the Secretariat “shall undertake organizational
and technical support work and shall put forth proposals for the annual budget
of the organization.” The Secretariat does
not formally take up policy development, though the General Secretary and other
top leaders of the Secretariat provide advice and consultation to the policy
bodies of the group, such as the National Coordinators Council and the Council of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
______________________________________________________________________________
In sum, China-Central Asia relations,
especially when seen through the lens of the SCO, have been highly proactive
and ambitious. Overall, these
relationships have moved in a steadily positive direction, seeing to the
reduction of border tensions, introduction of confidence-building measure,
regularization of senior- and working-level meetings, and the formal
institutionalization of ties across a host of political-, diplomatic-,
economic-, and security-related ties. Remarkably,
these developments have occurred at rapid pace when compared to the usual pace
of diplomacy, and have done so in the face of traditional suspicions amongst
the parties and at a time of considerable strategic upheaval, from the break-up
of the Soviet Union, to the establishment of the new Central Asian republics,
to the U.S.-led war on terror along the group’s periphery in South and
Southwest Asia. The SCO will continue to
be the key vehicle through which China
pursues its interests in Central Asia.
IV.
FUTURE
PROSPECTS
Looking ahead, it appears China
will place greater and greater emphasis on the development of economic- and
trade-related cooperation in Central Asia. Chinese President Hu
Jintao, in his first SCO meeting as China’s
new leader in May 2003, called for an early focus on building transportation
infrastructure, including a call for a multilateral highway transportation
infrastructure. In April 2004, the SCO
Foreign Ministers meeting worked on finalizing arrangements to set up several
new “working groups to focus on such matters as e-business, foreign direct
investment, and customs facilitation.
The SCO is also working toward the realization of the free flow of
commodities, capital, services and technologies across their respective
boundaries.
The 2003 summit also committed the organization to complete
work on agreements on Prosecutor-General and frontier guard cooperation,
initiate new plans to combat drug trafficking, institutionalize mutual
assistance in emergency situations, and begin work on migration issues (at the
request of Uzbek President Karimov, who will be
hosting the 2004 summit in Tashkent). On
the rhetorical side, the SCO looks likely to further tone down its
“anti-hegemony” language, but will still maintain support for a “multipolar” and “democratic” world order, underscoring the
importance of the United Nations in the resolution of international problems. Under the auspices of the SCO, China
held joint border area antiterror exercises with Kyrgyzstan
in 2002, and with Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia,
and Tajikistan
in 2003. Future joint military exercises
under the SCO umbrella are expected.
A related and notable development regarding China’s
future policies toward Central Asia was Beijing’s
quiet request in the spring 2002 to establish a regular security dialogue with
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
That dialogue was announced officially in October 2002 and a first
meeting was convened in January 2003.
One motivation behind this move is the fact that all the members of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, except China,
are members of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. Given NATO’s expanded role in Afghanistan
and in Central Asia, Beijing
seems keen to gauge the alliance’s intentions and regional capabilities through
direct consultations. At present, the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization is still considering the possibility of
formal consultations with other organizations and governments based in the
region, such as the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),
or the expanded U.S.
and NATO security presence in a number of Central Asian states such as Uzbekistan
and Kyrgyzstan.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY AND U.S. INTERESTS
Over the near- to
medium-term, China’s increasing activity in Central Asia does
not present a pressing challenge to American interests in the region. To begin with, it appears Beijing will be particularly attuned to U.S. sensitivities in this region in the post-September
11 environment, will want to avoid negative perceptions of a “rising China”, and seek a productive and cooperative relationship
with Washington in this part of the world, as elsewhere around its
periphery. Moreover, at present, the United States and China share similar goals in Central Asia, particularly with regard to combating terrorist
activity potentially emanating from the region. Even as the United States has moved counterterrorism forces close to China’s border – a fact that has not altered Beijing’s overall Central Asia policy
– China has responded with restraint, taking the public
position that the current circumstances offer an opportunity to improve its
overall relationship with the United States. Beijing recognizes that national priorities require benign
engagement in Central Asia, and eschews balance-of-power games it is certain to
lose when its relations remain at a relatively early stage in the region.
However, looking further
ahead, Washington and Beijing could find themselves competing for influence in
this region as their regional priorities move beyond immediate security
concerns to encompass such fundamental questions as Great Power influence and
diplomatic strategy, political change and reform in Central Asia, and economic development and energy
extraction. Moreover, China maintains a long-standing concern with “strategic
encirclement” by the United States, and Washington remains wary of China’s long-term rise and its implications for U.S. interests.
In addition, China’s emergence in Central Asia has implications that go beyond bilateral U.S.-China
relations. How the outside powers
coordinate their policies in Central Asia and whether there is a common
agreement on the best method to combat regional security issues, which extend
beyond terrorism to such factors as drug trafficking, political unrest,
HIV/AIDS, and border security, will be a central determinant for the future of
diplomatic relations between the United States, China, and Russia and for the overall
stability of the region. Additionally,
China’s continued emergence in Central Asia will have an impact on the ongoing
efforts to rebuild Afghanistan, the success of the Partnership for Peace and
the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the region, the development
and export of Caspian, eastern Russian, and other regional energy resources,
and the future of U.S. relations with the countries of the region.
Given these developments, the
United
States
can pursue a careful policy to engage China in the region and assure China’s emergence in Central Asia is consistent with U.S. interests.
Such an approach might highlight four main aspects. First, it is important that Washington remain engaged in the region as a whole. The United States must remain committed to and engaged with a more
stable and prosperous Central
Asia, and its near
neighbors such as Afghanistan, for the foreseeable future, not least to assure the
area does not allow for terrorist organizations to take root.
Moreover, in the face of
growing Chinese influence in the region and the challenges that could pose, the
United States should remain engaged to assure the achievement of American
political, economic, and security goals in Central Asia, including political
reform, access to natural resources, and regional stability. In this context, it is important to remember
that Afghanistan is not the only source of instability in the
region. Washington should continue to focus its attention on
eliminating the terrorist threat emanating from various nations in the region
and should put increased pressure on Central Asian governments to reform their
governance practices, so future terrorists are not bred in politically
repressive environments. In
the near- to medium-term, the Unites States should play a lead role in
guaranteeing regional security until that task can be handed over to the
Central Asian states themselves. This is
too vital for the United States
to be left to China
and Russia
alone.
Second,
in pursuing these broad goals, Washington
should explore the possibilities of how China
(and Russia)
could be more active security partners in the region. As the Collective Security Treaty Organization Kant
airbase in Kyrgyzstan and the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization counterterrorism center in Tashkent become fully operational,
Beijing and Washington, as well as Moscow, should take
opportunities to coordinate activities and build common goodwill. Coordination could be aimed at
increased counter-narcotic trafficking activities and even intelligence sharing
about imminent threats. With all three
powers operating varying security presences in the region, cooperation in the
security field could prove useful. To this end, the
United States could encourage
the creation of a Shanghai Cooperation Organization-North Atlantic Treaty
Organization strategic dialogue in order to foster greater regional
coordination and reduce suspicions among China, Russia, and the
western allies. This
NATO-SCO strategic dialogue will open a window for Washington
into the SCO while also offering China
a window into NATO, and offer NATO a potentially useful consultative mechanism
for many of its new activities in Central Asia
and in Afghanistan.
In any event, China, Russia, and the United States should increase transparency, particularly at
military installations and security operations they oversee in Central Asia. Russia and the United States need to cooperate on de-conflicting airspace over
Bishkek due to their two airbases.
Additionally, it is logical that with three centers (the U.S. allied base at Manas, the
CSTO base at Kant, and the SCO counterterrorism center) tasked to respond to a
terrorist attack that there could be some efforts directed at a coordinated
response. This could provide the added
benefit of reassuring the Chinese and Russian counterparts about the
longer-term intentions of the U.S. deployments in the region. Also, Washington, Beijing,
and Moscow can encourage Central Asian governments to settle
their ongoing border disputes with one another, particularly those in the Ferghana Valley.
Third, the United States and China (along with Russia) can explore a range of more specific, but low-level
cooperative projects with Central Asian counterparts. These projects could include such activities
as helping build and equip border outposts.
These efforts could also include increasing military-to-military
transparency with the placement of liaison officers at the three security-related
facilities in the region (Manas airbase, Kant
airbase, and the SCO counterterrorism center in Tashkent). At a
minimum, it would be useful for Chinese, Russian and American military attaches
in the Central Asian states to step up consultations and interactions.
Outside of strictly
military discussions, specific cooperative projects could also include conducting
de-mining operations in border areas, sharing intelligence on illegal
cross-border activities such as trafficking in guns, drugs, and people, funding
HIV/AIDS education, prevention, treatment, and care centers, and improving
social welfare infrastructure in Central Asia through establishment of schools,
hospitals, clinics, and employment training centers.
Some initiatives are
underway, though they are usually directed by a single external power. On the issue of border cooperation, some
multilateral cooperation has been observed, including a May 17, 2003 meeting between Russia, the United States, and the European Union on the Tajik-Afghan border
situation. With the porous Tajik border becoming central
to the drug trade and Russia, China, the EU, and the United States all providing assistance, multilateral coordination
and cooperation would be a useful step to take.
In another positive move, China in August 2003 allowed foreign military personnel
from 15 countries – including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, Germany, Canada, Tanzania, Thailand, and Turkey – to observe Chinese military exercises involving
5,000 Chinese troops at the country’s large tactical training base in Inner Mongolia.
Fourth, in pursuit of U.S. interests in the region through its engagement with China, Washington should continue to insist on peaceful political transitions
in Central Asia toward more pluralistic, open, and market-oriented
societies. Washington should avoid the image of colluding with dictators
and repressive governments or it will invite popular backlash, particularly
when the populations gain more freedom or if certain elements begin to openly
rebel. The United States must be very careful in monitoring how its money is
spent and if it is aiding in the repression of Central Asian citizens, even
indirectly. Washington should continue to urge political reform in the
region, and make the case in Beijing that China too will benefit from more stable, open and
responsive governments along its western frontiers.
This approach also applies
to how Washington addresses China’s activities in Xinjiang. Calls for improved human rights and political
reform in the region should also extend to China’s Xinjiang Province, where recent U.S. policies may have undermined support for Washington in some quarters.
When Washington designated the East Turkestan
Independence Movement (ETIM) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, many
interpreted this as providing China a “prize” for its help with the war on terrorism and
an indication that Washington would turn a blind eye to China’s repression of the Uyghurs. In fact, the U.S. government conducted an independent, six-month
review of the ETIM case and has consistently reminded China that the war on terrorism in not an excuse for human
rights violation. Such signals need to
be sustained in order to encourage more open and responsive Chinese measures in
Xinjiang and avoid possibilities of transborder unrest within the Uyghur
populations. This is especially
important given the rising general resentment about U.S. policies among many in the Islamic world.
Washington should also be mindful that China, as well as Russia, could dilute certain U.S. political development goals in the region. China, and, to some degree, Russia, place far greater value over stability
to the detriment and even dismissal of political reform. China and Russia might not accept U.S. sponsored democratic reform if it means temporary
regional instability, loss of their influence with certain regimes, or the
chance that Islamic radicals or separatists could take power. This becomes more troublesome as the Central
Asian states continue to balance their ties with these three external powers,
looking for the best strategic supporter and source of material assistance.
Cooperation between China and U.S. will not be easy, and may not be welcomed by the
Central Asian states which may prefer playing the external powers off one another. However, the United States and China have built up a substantial amount of goodwill in Central Asia over the last several years, and have an opportunity
to devote this political capital to cooperatively promoting regional stability,
integration, development, and peaceful political reforms.
In
conclusion, China’s emergence in Central Asia will continue to grow and may have a more natural
and longer-term fit relative to that of the United States based on a long history of interaction and clearly
defined interests. China has rediscovered its place in the region and it is
developing pragmatic channels to achieve its interests there, with the SCO as
its most important avenue. It is likely Beijing will have considerable influence in some states,
such as Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, but considerably less in others. However, China’s region-wide presence will be most affected by the
actions of the United States and Russia. The United States in the most important near-term ally of the Central
Asian states and can dictate the future shape of the regional security
situation to a significant degree. Russia, too, has enduring importance to the region and can
undermine many of China’s goals if Moscow so chooses.
Much like the embryonic SCO, more concrete diplomatic and economic gains
for China in the region are still in the future.
Overall, China is on the rise in Central Asia and the United States will have to deal with a more comprehensive Chinese
presence in the region in the years ahead.
Diplomatic and strategic hedging by external powers has already begun
and Central Asia has become an important piece on the global
chessboard. This does not yet appear to
be a return to the “Great Game” of the 19th century. China, Russia, and the United States are all too integrated with each other to threaten a
clash over what is still a second-tier priority when compared to more pressing
issues such as North Korea, Iraq, and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. However, given the
intermingling of Great Power interests in this region, some increased tensions
seem unavoidable. With expanded effort, the
United
States
and China should explore their convergent interests and work
together to shape a more secure, prosperous, and stable Central Asia.