Japan’s New Global Engagement

A Paper for

The National Defense University

Seminar: Meeting U.S. Security Challenges in a Changing Asia

Panel on Key Changes in the Geopolitical Structure in Asia

April 22, 2004

By

Yoshihisa Komori, Editor-at-Large

The Sankei Shimbun

On his most recent trip to Asia in mid-April, Vice President Dick Cheney gave a major speech in Tokyo where he noted the significance of what he termed “Japan’s willingness to take on increasing responsibilities” for security matters. He specifically gave favorable mention to such recent actions as Japan’s unprecedented deployments of Self Defense Forces to the Indian Ocean and Iraq.

Mr. Cheney, needless to say, is not the only American observer who pays heed to Japan’s new direction in the field of security and defense. In fact, Japan’s current movements in this regard have attracted domestic and international attention, emerging as a subject of serious scrutiny for policy studies among many observers.

While the American Vice President welcomes Japan’s new efforts, concerns and reservations have also been expressed. Typically, for one, some Chinese official critiques pronounced Japan’s moves to be a potential step toward the revival of Japanese militarism. Among American observers, for another, some have suggested they could be a destabilizing factor in the East Asian security calculus. Within Japan itself the measures have been largely welcomed but with some unease because both the security threats and the reaction represent a departure from the pattern of the post-WWII years.

In order to understand how these changes might affect Japan’s external posture and the U.S.-Japan alliance, it is important to first examine Japan’s new security-related movements and the dynamics behind them. Actions of significance most recently taken by Japan, in chronological order, include the following.

1. In November 2001, Japan sent Maritime Self Defense Forces ships to the Indian Ocean to support the U.S.-led coalition forces engaged in the removal of the Taliban regime and Al Qaeda from Afghanistan. In December 2002, Japan also sent a MSDF Aegis destroyer to join this fleet.

2. In June 2003, Japan tackled a heretofore taboo subject: the Diet enacted a an emergency national defense law that enables the Self Defense forces to exercise special rights in the use of lands and transportation in the event of an armed attack.

3. In December 2003, the Japanese government took the decision to introduce the American missile defense system into the Japanese defense structure, starting it off for the first year with an allocation of 1 billion dollars in the 2004 budget for the deployment of the ship-launched Standard Missile-3 and the ground-based Patriot Advanced Capability-3.

4. In February 2004, Japan dispatched a contingent of Ground Self Defense Forces to Iraq for non-combatant support roles for the coalition forces, marking the very first time in post-World WarⅡhistory that Japan has sent its troops to a country where combat is ongoing.

5. In March 2004, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party officially started the process of drafting a new Constitution with the aim of announcing the final proposed version in November 2005. As dramatic as this sounds, the opposition Democratic Party had already decided in 2003 to study the possible revision of the Constitution.

6. In April 2004, Japan’s LDP introduced legislation designed to authorize the government to ban certain North Korean ships from entering Japanese ports. If it becomes a law, it would constitute a powerful tool for economic sanctions against North Korea.

These measures and movements taken together might give the casual observer an impression that Japan has embarked upon the path of assertiveness, readying itself to undertake a new regional or possibly global military role. The reality, however, is different. The new security-related measures are more appropriately characterized as an effort to fill longstanding gaping holes punctured into national defense mechanism than an attempt to build any new protruding military architecture.

Post-war Japanese national defense efforts were severely constrained by its pacific Constitution and restrictions emanating from its provisions in the way no other modern sovereign nation’s defense effort has ever experienced. The depth and scope of the legal and psychological constraints for Japan in this regard are perhaps far greater than international observers might assume.

To cite a most recent and demonstrable example, the Self Defense Forces unit stationed in Iraq was not allowed to be engaged in rescue missions for the three Japanese citizens who had been abducted and held hostage in an area not distant from the unit. The reason is a ban, deriving originally from the Constitution, imposed on the SDF’s missions including any rescue attempt for Japanese nationals that might entail combat. An armed force that is institutionally prohibited from engaging in rescue missions of its own citizens is an anomaly to say the least.

The origin of this constraint is the famous Article 9 of the Constitution, drafted by the staff of General Douglas MacArthur. Article 9 states that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.” It also states that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potentials, will never be maintained” and that “the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”

If you read this literally, you would come away thinking that Japan is deprived the right not only of using a force overseas but also of maintaining any armed force to begin with. Yet, in reality, Japan has a kind of armed force called Self Defense Forces totaling in number 240,000. The legal rational on the existence of SDF is the interpretation of Article 9 that it does not deny Japan as a sovereign nation the inherent right of self-defense and that use of force as a means to defend the country against an armed attack does not violate the Constitution.

Only for the purpose of this narrowly defined inherent right of self-defense has Japan allowed itself to have armed forces. The constitutional constraint has been strictly interpreted to bar the SDF from engaging in any combat-related activities except for strict self-defense against attacks on the territory of Japan. It has also barred Japan from possessing any offensive capabilities and constrained Japan from exercising the right of collective self-defense. Given the fact that no other nations have such a ban, Japan institutionally is the most pacifist country on the face of the earth and also an abnormal entity as opposed to an ordinary or normal member of the international community. Former U.N. Ambassador Hisashi Owada, once explained this by calling his own country “a handicapped nation.”

The initial aim of this constitutional restriction was apparently to disarm Japan permanently lest it should ever reemerge as a military power. It suited the post-war Japanese pacifist inclination and enabled the country to concentrate on its “economic betterment” single-mindedly. For the nearly five decades leading up to the 1990s, the overwhelming majority of Japanese favored keeping the Constitution as it was.

Externally as well it suited the security environment for Japan’s defense against armed attacks from the outside to be guaranteed by the United States, the senior partner in the bilateral defense alliance.　During the Cold War, the threat to Japan was clearly the Soviet Union, but the U.S. undertook the main task of deterring it, relieving Japan of most of defense burdens. Thus, Japan felt no need to be concerned about its own defense and security.

However, in the post-Cold War world, the international security situation in general and the situation surrounding Japan in particular have changed drastically. Potential threats and destabilizing factors to Japan have become more diversified, more direct and sometimes more imminent. While Japan’s alliance with the United States has remained firm, the new security-related developments unwittingly have highlighted Japan’s inherent anomalous security problems and its institutional inability to cope even with minor security threats on its own.

As a consequence of a series of incidents that highlighted this weakness, both Japanese leaders and the public came to develop an uncomfortably deep sense of vulnerability and apprehension about their own national security. This in turn helped to raise the national consciousness in support of a stronger security and defense.

Among the developments that brought about significant changes, the following deserve special note.

A. North Korea clearly tops the list.

The decade of 1990s began with North Korean missile tests into the Sea of Japan. The tests were followed in short order by a series of other alarming events for Japan, including the 1993-94 nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, the 1998 Taepo-Dong missile launch over Japan, North Korean spy ship intrusions into the Japanese territorial water that resulted in an unprecedented shootout, October 2002 nuclear crisis, more North Korean missile firing into the Sea of Japan and, April 2003 North Korea’s declaration that it has nuclear weapons.

On top of these military moves, the North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, admitted in September 2002 that his country’s agents had abducted innocent Japanese young men and women from their own territory over many years to use them to train North Korean spies and to steal their identities for the spies. Although five of the abductees acknowledged by the North Korean government were allowed to return to Japan after some 20 years, their children are still held. Japanese investigators believe that the actual number of the abductees may exceed one hundred.

The Japanese sense of vulnerability and concern resulting from the North Korean threat was exacerbated further by developments in South Korea. South Korean leadership under President Kim Dae Jung began to take a benign posture under the banner of “Sunshine Policy” toward North Korea. His successor Ro Moo Hyun went even further and refused to consider his Northern neighbor as a threat at all. This change has been perceived by many in Japan as a loss of an important ally against North Korean, creating in the Japanese public a broad sense of need for more solid national security measures.

B. Secondly, China’s vigorous military activities in the region also deepened the Japanese sense of vulnerability and alarm.

For nearly twenty years, China has been steadily increasing the open part of its annual military expenditures by double-digit percentages. China has deployed approximately 500 ballistic missiles in the area near the Taiwan Strait. While most are clearly targeted at Taiwan, many can strike Japanese territory as well. Chinese willingness to use missiles for one purpose or another was demonstrated repeatedly at the times of Taiwan’s elections.

Recently Chinese officials warned Japan that Japanese deployment of missile defense in conjunction with the United States would weaken China’s deterrence against Japan. This was as close to an admission as we have had that China is actually targeting Japan with its missiles, creating concern and surprise among many Japanese.

Territorial incursions also continue. China has sent military vessels of various sorts on numerous occasions into Japanese territorial waters as well as Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Most recently the Chinese government also “allowed” seven so-called “non-government activists” to land onto Japan’s Senkaku Islands.

What looms behind all these tangible activities is China’s longstanding opposition to Japan’s defense alliance with the United States. For the past year or two the Chinese leadership has moderated this position rhetorically, yet it does not fail to continue expressing clear displeasure to any move taken by Japan intended to strengthen the alliance.

C. Thirdly, America’s new policy and attitudes have helped Japan translate a sense of vulnerability into a heightened awareness for national security.

Although successive American administrations urged Japan to do more for defense, none encouraged Japan either to become able to exercise the right of collective self-defense or to revise the Constitution. In fact, the opposite was the case for most of the post war period. When asked, some officials of the Clinton Administration, for example, expressed concern about or opposition to Japan heading in that direction. They frequently cited China’s negative reaction or claimed that such a change might lead to a revival of Japanese militarism. The oft-mentioned “the cork in the bottle” remark made by a U.S. commander in Okinawa is an example of this school of thought.

The Bush Administration, however, departed from this longstanding position and stated both publicly and privately that Japan without the existing defense constraint would be a better and more efficient ally and partner. From a Japanese perspective, for the first time the U.S. government had started encouraging Japan to become “a normal country” within the framework of Japanese-American defense alliance. This new paradigm on the part of the Bush Administration was first enunciated prior to the ascendancy of the administration in the October 2000 report: U.S. and Japan: Advancing Toward A Mature Partnership, guided by the now Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage. Under this new policy, Administration officials have unhesitatingly urged the Japanese government to retain the right of collective self-defense and have even suggested that Constitutional revision would be fine with the U.S. or more precisely with the bilateral alliance based on the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. This was welcomed enthusiastically by Japanese “normal country” proponents.

Japan’s current efforts to normalize security and defense aspects of its national mechanism have clear support of the majority of Japanese people. In a way it is only natural because pursuit of these policy changes was initially prompted by the apprehension and frustration of a broad segment of the Japanese public.

Desire for change is also clearly evident in the National Diet. The emergency national defense legislation that was enacted in June 2003, for example, was approved by nearly 90%, an overwhelming majority of the members of both Houses of the Diet. It was a phenomenal change compared to the situation 10 years earlier when a brief attempt by the ruling party to introduce such a bill was met by fierce opposition from other political parties and a good part of media.

Proposals to consider revision of Article 9 of the Constitution, which had long been regarded as sacrosanct, are now widely supported in the Diet (depending on the survey, more than 60% or more than 70% of the Diet members support such change.) This does not mean that the Japanese Constitution will be revised within the next couple of years, but measures to reduce the extent of the defense-related constraint definitely would be promoted further in the years to come.

It is important to note that Japan’s pursuit of new defense measures and policies is proceeding in tandem with the strengthening of its defense ties with the U.S. Increased military activities by both North Korea and China have clearly contributed to this trend. While Japan’s increased awareness of threat and sense of vulnerability have supported its own new measures, they have also raised the level of support for the alliance with the sole super-power.

Currently all political parties in Japan except for the Communist Party support the bilateral alliance. This is significant, because until 20 years ago the only party that unequivocally supported it was the ruling LDP. Overwhelming majority of the public also favors the alliance with opinion polls consistently showing more than 70% approving its continuation.

Japanese government’s speedy decisions to support the U.S. in its wars against the Taliban and Hussein regimes were in large part prompted by a concern not to do harm to the alliance to the U.S. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, when asked to explain why he had announced his endorsement of American military action against Iraq, said that it is only natural for Japan to support its ally. He punctuated his answer by adding that the U.S. is the only country in the world that will come to the defense of Japan, “if and when” Japan comes under attack from a third country.

Against this background it is easy to understand Japan’s new security-related undertakings as reasonable responses and not a cause for concern. For one thing, all of the measures are reactive, prompted by the changes in the external security environment, and best described as an effort to fill the holes. No measure calls for development of power projection capability or possession of offensive weapons. Contrary to some American press reports of two years ago, Japanese political leaders and policy makers consider nuclear armament out of the question so long as Japan has the benefit of the American nuclear umbrella. Charges that they will lead to a revival of militarism are also groundless in contemporary democratic Japan where aversion to militarism has been so firmly imbedded.

Japan’s government and people clearly consider maintenance of the alliance with the U.S. as the primary underpinning of Japanese national security policy and envision continued American presence as the key regional Asian power. There is no interest on the part of Japan to turn into a new assertive regional military power on its own. Any new security measures Japan may take will continue to fully remain within the U.S.-Japanese security framework.

The bottom line is that Japan’s trend toward normalcy and new defense-security consciousness make it a stronger force of regional status-quo, not a destabilizing regional player.