“Long-term Trends and
Cross-Strait Relations”
Phillip C. Saunders
National Defense University
Prepared for the International Studies
Association Annual Meeting
Montreal, Canada
17-20 March 2004
Abstract
This paper
identifies and examines a number of long-term trends reshaping the security
environment in the Taiwan Strait in ways that might
produce a military conflict. Focusing on long-term trends is a useful
analytical approach that highlights the possibility that political leaders may
knowingly take risky actions in response to perceptions that adverse trends are
eroding their security. Taiwan’s
democratic transition and growing sense of a separate Taiwan
identity have changed the political considerations governing Taiwan’s
policy toward the mainland. China
worries about growing pro-independence sentiment in Taiwan,
but lacks the political tools to build support for unification. As a result, China
has sought to deter movement toward Taiwan
independence while developing the military capabilities to deter U.S.
intervention in support of Taiwan.
China’s goal is
to force the United States
to choose between continuing its support for Taiwan
or sacrificing Chinese cooperation on economic and security issues. The
perceived Chinese military threat to Taiwan
has caused the United States
to increase its support for Taiwan,
included increased security cooperation. These trends are gradually
undercutting the basis for the “one China”
framework that has served U.S.
interests effectively for the past thirty years. The paper examines these long-term
trends and assesses their implications for the stability of the security
environment in the Taiwan Strait.
Phillip C.
Saunders
Senior Research
Fellow
Institute for
National Strategic Studies
National
Defense University
Washington, DC 20319-5066
(202) 685-3610
(office)
(202) 685-3972
(fax)
saundersp@ndu.edu
The views expressed in this paper
are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of
the National Defense
University, the Department of
Defense, or the U.S.
government.
The uneasy compromise that has governed Taiwan’s
status since 1972 does not fully satisfy anyone in Taiwan,
the People’s Republic of China
(PRC), or the United States.
Nevertheless, the useful fiction that people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait
all accept the “one China” principle has served the core interests of all three
parties, producing a reasonably stable security environment that has supported
political, economic, and social development in both China and Taiwan. The “one China”
framework has allowed the United States
to enjoy the economic and security benefits of cooperation with the People’s
Republic of China
without paying the domestic and international political costs of abandoning Taiwan.
The desire to avoid making a painful choice between China
and Taiwan has
shaped U.S.
policy since the early 1970s. This delicate balance is mirrored in the key
documents and legislation that govern U.S.
policy toward China
and Taiwan. The
three communiqués explicitly acknowledge the PRC position that there is only
one China.
Yet the Taiwan Relations Act also calls for the United
States to maintain unofficial relations with
Taiwan and make
available the defensive weapons necessary to protect Taiwan’s
de facto independence. Despite the
inherent tensions and ambiguities, the result has proved to be a flexible,
balanced, and remarkable successful framework for U.S.
policy. Policy reviews have repeatedly concluded that the present framework
remains the best means of pursuing U.S.
interests in both China
and Taiwan,
largely because major changes in the policy are viewed as too costly.
Although the “one China”
formula has met the minimal needs of political leaders on all three sides for
the past thirty years, long-term political, military, and economic trends are
gradually eroding the stability of the status quo. Many
of these trends are developing relatively slowly, but perceptions of the point
at which adverse long-term trends become intolerable security risks that
justify extreme action can change abruptly. These potentially destabilizing
trends pose new challenges for the continued viability of the “one China”
framework. The problem is aggravated by the fact that the governments lack the
policy tools necessary to influence (let alone reverse) some of the key trends.
Domestic political incentives have encouraged some actions that may make
conflict more likely and inhibited policy adjustments that might reduce
long-term dangers.
This paper identifies and assesses the potential impact of key
long term trends affecting the security environment in the Taiwan
Strait. Some important trends are obvious: Taiwan’s
democratization, rising Chinese nationalism, and an increasing tendency for
policy on all three sides to be driven by domestic political considerations. But
even when these trends have been discussed, their potential security implications
have sometimes gone unrecognized. Much of the writing on cross-strait relations
focuses on near-term developments and is sometimes heavily constrained by
policy positions. Focusing on long-term trends pushes analysis beyond
day-to-day concerns and illuminates deeper forces shaping the cross-strait
security environment. This paper’s emphasis on long-term trends is informed by a
U.S.-China-Taiwan Track 2 conference that examined events and trends that might
trigger a military conflict. Participants
agreed that accidents or isolated events were unlikely to escalate into
military conflict and that the “red-lines” that might lead to war were fairly
well recognized by key actors. The most likely cause of conflict would be a
political leader deliberately taking a dangerous action in the face of an
adverse trend. If leaders perceive that unfavorable trends will eventually make
their position untenable, they may view risky actions as better alternatives
than doing nothing.
This paper builds upon those findings
by examining the trends shaping the security environment across the Taiwan
Strait and trying to understand how these trends are perceived in China,
Taiwan, and the
United States.
Using long-term trends to assess the viability of current policies provides a
more objective starting point for analysis and policy recommendations. At a
minimum, this research project should make officials and analysts on all three
sides more aware of long-term trends that might lead to conflict and about the
potential dangers of some specific responses to these trends. At a maximum, it
may prompt leaders in the three capitols to consider the adoption of
political/military confidence-building measures that might mitigate the
negative impact of potentially destabilizing trends.
This paper examines seven key trends
in Taiwan, China,
and the United States
and two trends that are affecting all three actors:
Trends in Taiwan
More
democratic and responsive Taiwan government
Increasing
sense of “Taiwan identity”
Taiwan’s “creeping independence”
Trends in China
Increasing
Chinese nationalism
More
pluralistic Chinese foreign policy process
Chinese
efforts to develop a “military option”
Trends in the United
States
More
overt American support for Taiwan
Growing
economic integration
Domestic
politics increasingly driving foreign policy
Trends
in Taiwan
More
democratic and responsive Taiwan government
Taiwan’s
democratization is not a threat per se
to stability, but it has enabled changes in Taiwan’s
policy toward the mainland that may have destabilizing effects. The most
important impact has been to make Taiwan’s
government (and reunification policy in particular) more responsive to the
concerns of the native Taiwanese who make up 75 percent of Taiwan’s
population. (Mainlanders who arrived in 1949 make up 15 percent; 10 percent are
Hakka, a distinctive sub-ethnic group; and 2 percent are aborigines.) Taiwanization
of the Kuomintang (KMT) party and democratization have reduced the
disproportionate influence of mainlanders that characterized Taiwan
politics from 1949 to the late 1980s. Prior to former President Chiang
Ching-kuo’s efforts to recruit talented native Taiwanese politicians into the
KMT, Taiwan’s
political system was dominated by mainlanders who at least rhetorically
supported unification with China.
Native Taiwanese had only limited opportunities within the political system,
and pro-independence views were officially suppressed. As Alan Wachman has
written, the KMT’s suppression of native Taiwanese political aspirations meant
that Taiwan’s
democratization movement and the pro-independence movement became closely
linked. Native Taiwanese politicians successfully used the need to redress the
political dominance of mainlanders to mobilize support for both democratization
and independence.
Democratization means that mainlander
politicians no longer have the ability to impose reunification upon an
unwilling majority, or even to advocate a reunification policy that does not
command popular support. Even though Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian have
shifted Taiwan’s policy toward China in ways likely to postpone unification,
they have been somewhat constrained in efforts to move toward independence by
the need to have a mainland policy that can win popular support at the polls.
The impact of this change has been recognized by the United
States. President Clinton’s February 2000 statement
that any deal on unification would have to have the assent of the Taiwan people
added a significant barrier to peaceful unification, but also explicitly acknowledged
the consequences of Taiwan’s democratization for any future settlement of
Taiwan’s status.
The substantive impact of
democratization on Taiwan’s
policy toward the mainland depends on the preferences of Taiwan
voters and the degree to which Taiwan’s
political leaders feel constrained by these opinions. Opinion polls
consistently indicate that a majority of Taiwan
voters favor maintaining the status quo rather than declaring independence or
moving toward reunification. The latest poll from November 2003 indicates that
approximately 80 percent of those polled support maintaining the status quo for
the short-term rather than immediately moving toward independence or
unification. About 52 percent of those polled support maintaining the status
quo indefinitely or deferring a decision about Taiwan’s
ultimate status to the future. (23 percent favor independence as the ultimate
outcome; 12 percent favor unification as the ultimate outcome; 12 percent do
not have an opinion.)
These figures do not necessarily reflect a free choice since many respondents
probably factor in the perceived consequences of movement toward independence
or unification (e.g. war with China
or possible loss of Taiwan’s
current autonomy) when responding.
In one sense, democratization tends
to stabilize Taiwan’s
policy toward the mainland by reinforcing support for the status quo of autonomy without independence. However China’s
view that the status quo is not an
acceptable long-term solution means that a reunification policy that reflects
majority opinion on Taiwan
may not stabilize the security environment over the long-term. (This was
emphasized by a new condition for the possible use of force—indefinite delay of
unification—included in China’s
March 2000 White Paper on Taiwan.) On
the other hand, the fact that Taiwan’s reunification policy is now more closely
aligned with public sentiment may eventually force Beijing to recognize that its
stated goal of peaceful reunification ultimately depends on China’s ability to
persuade the people on Taiwan that reunification is in their interests. Beijing
has tended to use united front tactics that accuse Taiwan’s
leaders of leading an unwilling population toward independence. This approach
becomes less credible when the actions of political leaders clearly reflect
mainstream public opinion. There are some indications that Chinese analysts and
leaders recognize the need to make unification more attractive to people on Taiwan,
but it is unclear whether Beijing
will place a higher priority on “preventing independence” or “promoting
unification.”
Although public opinion on Taiwan
strongly supports the status quo, the degree to which this constrains Taiwan’s
political leaders from moving toward independence is unclear. Both Lee Teng-hui
and Chen Shui Bian have made public statements stressing their belief that Taiwan
is already an independent sovereign country and have taken a series of symbolic
actions to emphasize Taiwan’s
status as a country separate from China.
They have attempted to redefine the status quo to mean that China
and Taiwan are
currently separate, independent countries, a characterization that China
strongly opposes.
One explanation is that these actions appeal to a widespread sense of political
identity on Taiwan
that is separate from preferences about independence vs. unification.
Another is that presidents have considerable power to act independently within Taiwan’s
presidential system. Although politicians are constrained by the need to appeal
to voters in elections, they have some ability to shape the preferences of
voters and to lead the public in the direction they wish to go. The bottom line
is that Taiwan’s
democratic system now permits Taiwan’s
leaders to take actions that would destabilize the security environment; the
degree to which electoral incentives will restrain pro-independence leaders is
unclear.
Increasing
sense of “Taiwan identity”
Another important trend is the shift
towards increasing consciousness of a Taiwan
national identity separate from China.
The construction of national identity is a complicated social process that
revolves around efforts to create what Benedict Anderson calls an “imagined
community.” This
process is not based on efforts to accurately understand the historical record,
but rather involves efforts to create the historical myths and political
consciousness necessary to bind a people into a distinct nation.
Just as the mainlander dominance of the political system at the expense of
native Taiwanese led to a fusion between democratization and pro-independence
sentiment, mainlander efforts to impose a Chinese identity through education
and national symbols stimulated a backlash. The result is that many activists
have made a conscious effort to define “Taiwan
identity” in opposition to “Chinese identity,” rather than as a supplemental
identity (such as the way local Guangdong
or Jiangsu identities co-exist
with Chinese identity in the PRC).
Democratization and Taiwanization have ended the KMT’s efforts to suppress Taiwan
culture. Groups have consciously sought to reshape the school curriculum to
emphasize Taiwan
history, language, and culture at the expense of the study of Chinese history,
language, and culture. A
recent survey indicated that 58.7 percent of primary school children in Taiwan
considered themselves to be Taiwanese, while only 23.7 percent considered
themselves to be both Chinese and Taiwanese. It
is the perceived fusion between a Taiwan
national identity and support for independence that makes this trend
potentially destabilizing.
Shelley Rigger rightly criticizes
much of the research on the question of national identity and Taiwan
for focusing on national identity as a dichotomous choice between a Chinese
identity or a Taiwan
identity. As she correctly notes, in much of the research these alternative
identities are assumed to be closely correlated with the choices between
reunification or independence, missing the majority’s preference for political
autonomy.
Although the importance of national identity may be exaggerated as a predictor
of individual and group preferences for independence or reunification, many PRC
analysts believe a correlation exists. They regard consolidation of a distinct Taiwan
national identity as a key step towards Taiwan
independence and view factors such as the de-emphasis of Chinese history and
culture in classrooms as indicators of separatist intentions. Chinese analysts
and officials also hold a dichotomous notion of national identity, viewing Chen
Shui-bian’s refusal to reaffirm his Chinese identity publicly as an indicator
of his separatist intentions. If a majority of people on Taiwan
eventually adopt a conception of identity that is exclusive and non-Chinese,
then the prospect of China
persuading the population to accept reunification becomes remote. Chinese analysts
therefore perceive a growing sense of a separate Taiwan
identity as a dangerous and destabilizing trend.
The trend toward a separate Taiwan
identity posed a difficult challenge for China,
because national identity cannot be easily influenced by traditional military
or diplomatic means. If China
wants to influence how people in Taiwan
think of themselves, it needs to find positive ways to appeal directly to them.
One possibility would be to emphasize a shared ethno-cultural identity between
people in China
and Taiwan,
while acknowledging that people on Taiwan
also have a Taiwan
identity with distinctive and different characteristics. China
could promote positive aspects of Chinese culture that appeal to people on Taiwan
(and perhaps even acknowledge its debt to the Republic of China for preserving
Chinese cultural artifacts that otherwise would have been destroyed in the
Cultural Revolution). There is some evidence that appeals to a Chinese
ethno-cultural identity might have appeal on Taiwan, including the fact that a
significant number of people think of themselves as having both Chinese and Taiwanese
identities. If China
proves unable to shape conceptions of national identity on Taiwan,
then it is left with the less attractive (and much more dangerous) option of
using threats and disincentives to prevent Taiwan’s
government from acting on a sense of separate identity to push for formal
independence. This moves China’s
policy in the direction of threats and force rather than persuasion.
Taiwan’s “creeping independence”
PRC officials and security analysts believe that past
president Lee Teng-hui and current president Chen Shui-bian have tried to use
salami tactics to move Taiwan
toward independence. Actions such as dissolving the Taiwan
provincial government and dissociating the Taiwan
government from formal commitments to unification are regarded as steps in a
process that might end in constitutional change and a formal declaration of
independence. Chinese leaders and analysts believe former President Lee
Teng-hui consciously worked to loosen Taiwan’s
ties with China
and to remove or weaken institutional structures and policies that symbolized
this linkage. This perception has been reinforced by Lee’s subsequent role in
founding the Taiwan Solidarity Union (a pro-independence political party) and
his embrace of independence as a goal for Taiwan.
Lee’s “vacation diplomacy” and efforts to increase Taiwan’s
international profile are regarded as efforts to build international support
for Taiwan independence.
This “zero-sum” perception that any international recognition of Taiwan
is a step toward independence makes PRC leaders determined to continue
diplomatic efforts to isolate Taiwan
in every possible international forum.
Chinese suspicions of Chen Shui Bian run even deeper. Chen
has long been an advocate of Taiwan
independence and the platform of his Democratic Progressive Party includes a
call for a referendum on formal independence. Chen’s May 2000 inaugural speech
included five specific pledges intended to reassure China,
the so-called “four nos and one will not.” Chen declared that “as long as the
CCP regime has no intention to use military force against Taiwan,”
he would not declare independence, change the national title from the Republic
of China, push for inclusion of “special state to state” relations in the
constitution, promote a referendum on the question of independence or
unification, or abolish the National Reunification Council. This conditional
pledge of restraint was intended to reassure China,
but has had only limited success. China
responded by saying it would “listen to Chen's words and watch his deeds.”
Chinese analysts see a pattern of continuing steps toward independence, ranging
from small steps such as adding the word “Taiwan”
to Republic of China passports to more significant actions such as the passage
of legislation authorizing referenda (which might eventually be used for a
referendum on independence) and Chen’s announcement of plans for constitutional
revisions in 2006.
Although China has clearly stated a few “red lines”
in terms of actions that would precipitate war, such as a formal declaration of
independence, China
has had difficulty formulating responses to what it perceives as “creeping
independence.” China
typically condemns each individual move, but has not repeated actions such as
the use of military exercises involving ballistic missile firings or threats to
use force in response to specific actions. This reflects Beijing’s
awareness of the high costs of using or threatening to use force, both in terms
of international reactions and the negative impact on the Taiwan
public’s attitude toward China.
Some in Taiwan
regard this as evidence that China
is bluffing, and believe that Taiwan
has considerable room to push the envelope with further steps toward
independence. However actions regarded as innocuous or modest political
gestures in Washington and Taipei
tend to be regarded in Beijing as
part of a slippery slope toward independence. This difference in perceptions
increases the possibility of misinterpretation or miscalculation leading to an
inadvertent conflict. At some point Chinese leaders may decide that the
cumulative impact of Taiwan’s
small steps toward independence requires a disproportionate response to stop
this trend before it becomes irreversible.
Trends in China
Increasing
Chinese nationalism
One widely discussed trend is the
CCP’s increasing reliance on nationalism to legitimate its continued rule.
Belief in communism has waned due to market reforms and endemic corruption.
Chinese leaders have tried to substitute nationalism in order to maintain elite
and popular support. Paradoxically, the regime’s success in obtaining the
return of the former colonies of Hong Kong and Macao
has increased the political importance of Taiwan.
Although PRC leaders consciously promote Chinese nationalism as a means of building
political support, nationalism also provides Chinese elites with an independent
basis for judging their leaders. In this respect, previous efforts to promote
nationalism have increased the political stakes for Chinese leaders of handling
the Taiwan issue
successfully. PRC analysts claim that any Chinese leader who allowed Taiwan
to become independent would find it impossible to remain in power. They also
stress that China
is prepared to fight a war over Taiwan
even if its chance of victory are low.
Although some argue that rising
Chinese nationalism is likely to precipitate a war over Taiwan,
there are also limits to the impact of nationalism on Chinese policy. In a
number of disputes, Chinese leaders have showed restraint in the face of
nationalist pressures in order to preserve economic ties with the United
States and Japan.
Nevertheless, increasing nationalist sentiment could exert a negative influence
in a crisis situation, especially if Chinese leaders felt that the survival of
the regime (or their personal political survival) required a military response.
Widely accepted nationalist goals also allow the Chinese military a means to
criticize their political leaders and exert pressure for increased military
budgets and hard-line policies toward Taiwan. China’s
political environment is asymmetrical, in that the harshest forms of
nationalist criticism are acceptable while more liberal views on the Taiwan
issue are often suppressed. This nationalistic policy environment makes
creative thinking on alternative policies toward Taiwan
difficult and politically risky.
More
pluralistic Chinese foreign policy process
One of the most interesting trends in
China is a
gradual shift toward a more pluralistic foreign policy process. Because
the PRC makes great efforts to present other countries with a unified front on
foreign policy issues, this trend is often under-appreciated. Pluralism
sometimes appears greatest on issues of least significance, because government
censorship (and self-censorship) limits publication of dissident views on
sensitive issues such as Taiwan
policy. Nevertheless, Chinese foreign policy is now more open to a range of
views. Chinese provincial officials and business leaders have a greater role in
foreign policy. This influence is arguably greatest on economic issues, and is
often expressed in efforts to evade central government policies that affect
local economic interests. It is more limited in terms of efforts to shape
security policies and sensitive national issues such as Taiwan
policy. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence indicates that some companies and
provincial officials in Shanghai
and Guangdong lobbied Beijing
for restrained policies in the midst of the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait
crisis.
While increased pluralism is
generally regarded as a moderating influence on Chinese foreign policy, there
is another side to pluralism that is the rough analog of democratization in Taiwan.
The diffusion of political power in China
means that even the paramount leader may not have sufficient stature and
authority to unilaterally alter PRC policy toward Taiwan
and force other leaders and interest groups such as the military accept his
decisions. Where Mao and Deng could temporarily subordinate the Taiwan
issue to other Chinese interests (such as establishing strategic relations with
the United States
or promoting economic development), China’s
current leaders may lack the stature to take similar actions. The inability for
a single leader to dominate the foreign policy apparatus and the military makes
new policy initiatives more difficult and inhibits PRC flexibility. This may be
one reason why China’s policy toward Taiwan still relies heavily on concepts
such as “one country, two systems” that were developed by Deng Xiaoping, even
though Chinese analysts recognize that this formulation has little appeal in
Taiwan. On balance, pluralism is probably a positive trend, but the greater
number of foreign policy actors also make it possible for motivated and determined
actors (including the military) to block new policy initiatives toward Taiwan.
Chinese
efforts to develop a “military option”
China’s
ongoing military modernization program is gradually improving PRC power
projection capabilities and eroding Taiwan’s
technological superiority. Over
the past decade China
has acquired advanced Russian weapons systems such as Su-27 and Su-30 fighters,
S-300 surface-to-air missiles, Kilo class submarines, and Sovremenny destroyers
equipped with advanced anti-ship missiles. China’s
own defense industries, which previously produced outmoded weapons, are
beginning to produce higher quality weapons that often incorporate advanced
foreign technologies. China’s
expanding coastal deployments of M-9 and M-11 ballistic missiles (now estimated
to total as many as 450-500 missiles) are also increasing the PRC’s military
reach. It
remains to be seen whether PLA training and maintenance capabilities are
advanced enough to employ these advanced weapons effectively. Michael O’Hanlon
rightly points out that a conventional invasion of Taiwan
is beyond the PLA’s current capabilities, and will likely remain that way for a
decade. However,
the PLA has begun to train more seriously for the possible use of force in a Taiwan
scenario.
Over the long run, China’s
larger economy is likely to provide the resources and technology necessary to
shift the military balance decisively in its favor. China’s
official defense budget has increased dramatically over the last four years,
while Taiwan’s
defense spending has declined. In April 2001 the United States offered to sell
a range of advanced conventional weapons systems (including destroyers,
submarines, and PAC-3 missile defenses), but Taiwan’s legislature has been
reluctant to allocate money for these weapons, at least in part due to
financial constraints. A 1999 Defense Department report concluded that a
Chinese military campaign against Taiwan
“would likely succeed—barring third-party intervention.”
If the United States
is assumed to be willing to intervene on Taiwan’s
behalf, then the question of the relative cross-Straits military balance is somewhat
less important (although the Taiwan
military would still need the ability to resist until the U.S.
military could arrive in force). The question would then become China’s
power projection capabilities vs. a combination of U.S.
power projection capabilities and Taiwan
military forces. Conversations with PLA officers suggest that China’s
military planning is now based on the assumption that the United
States will intervene in a Taiwan
conflict; the pattern of PLA acquisitions and training suggests an increasing focus
on deterring or delaying the arrival of U.S.
forces.
Chinese analysts frequently stress that China’s
military buildup is intended to deter Taiwan
independence, not to compel reunification. Some of them argue that a military
balance across the Taiwan Strait is destabilizing because
it permits Taiwan
leaders to move toward Taiwan
independence. Taiwan
and U.S.
analysts tend to view China’s
military modernization as a destabilizing effort to compel Taiwan
to accept unification on China’s
terms. Some Chinese analysts and officials recognize that emphasis on the
military dimension of China’s
Taiwan policy
has significant costs in terms of China’s
international image and by reinforcing negative attitudes in Taiwan.
However they often argue that China
has no alternative if it wishes to deter Taiwan
independence.
A key question is whether China’s
civilian leaders have the desire—or the ability—to restrain the militarization
of China’s Taiwan
policy. Chinese leaders probably believe that favorable changes in the military
balance make reunification on PRC terms more likely, and have therefore funded
and supported PLA modernization efforts aimed at Taiwan (and at deterring U.S.
military intervention in a Taiwan crisis). However, Americans increasingly view
China’s
behavior toward Taiwan
as an indicator of whether China
is likely to pose a future threat to the United
States, raising the potential costs of a
military buildup aimed at Taiwan.
It is unclear whether Hu Jintao and other Chinese leaders would have the
authority and willingness to intervene into the PLA’s domain to limit the
ongoing military buildup if the political and economic costs get too high.
Trends in the United States
More
overt American support for Taiwan
Democratization has transformed the
basis of U.S.
support for Taiwan.
When Taiwan was
ruled by the authoritarian KMT government, U.S.
support was based primarily on negative objectives: not wanting to betray a
former ally and avoiding a loss of credibility with U.S.
allies. Taiwan’s
transition to a vibrant, successful democracy created a new positive basis for
American support. Congressional and public support for Taiwan
has grown as the issue has become defined in terms of the need to protect
democratic Taiwan
from military threats posed by Communist China. China’s
1995-96 missile diplomacy and continuing military buildup have increased
American concerns that Taiwan
is at risk.
U.S.
support for Taiwan
has become increasingly overt since the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait
crisis, partly due to the belief that clear signs of American support will
deter China
from using force. Taiwan
officials have emphasized the importance of symbolic gestures that demonstrate
the connection between the United States
and Taiwan.
U.S. support has taken a variety of forms, including loosening restrictions on
unofficial contacts between U.S. and Taiwan government officials, granting
transit visas for Taiwan leaders to travel through the United States,
Congressional declarations, support for Taiwan’s participation in international
organizations such as the World Health Organization, willingness to sell Taiwan
more advanced defensive weapons, and clear indicators that the United States
would intervene if China uses force against Taiwan.
The clearest sign of increasing U.S.
support is the growing security cooperation between the United
States and Taiwan.
President Clinton’s deployment of two aircraft carriers in response to China’s
March 1996 missile tests and President Bush’s April 2001 statement that the United
States would do “whatever it takes” to help Taiwan
defend itself removed ambiguity about the U.S.
security commitment to Taiwan.
The Bush administration’s April 2001 decision to make weapons such as diesel
submarines, Kidd-class destroyers, and anti-submarine aircraft available to
Taiwan authorized the sale of advanced systems that had previous been denied.
Coupled with previous arms sales, the result has been an upgrading of the
quality of American arms sales to Taiwan
that Chinese officials regard as a violation of the 1982 Shanghai
communiqué. In
addition to arms sales, U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation also reportedly
includes strategic defense dialogues, visits by military officers and senior
civilian officials, educational exchanges, observation of exercises, and
assessment team visits.
These activities have taken on greater importance as U.S.
officials and military planners have focused on the practical issues involved
in responding to a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
From China’s
perspective, the United States
is making increasingly public efforts to strengthen its security ties with Taiwan.
Chinese officials argue that these actions violate U.S.
commitments in the three communiqués and infringe upon Chinese sovereignty.
Moreover they see no clear limits to U.S.
military support for Taiwan,
which they believe encourages pro-independence forces to become more assertive.
Bilateral agreements such as the three communiqués have failed to restrain U.S.
arms sales and security cooperation with Taiwan.
Beijing has tried to use its own
security cooperation with Washington
on counter-terrorism and managing the North Korean nuclear crisis to encourage
the United States
to restrict its military ties with Taiwan
and to check moves toward Taiwan
independence. However China’s
most important response to increasing U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation has been
to accelerate its military modernization efforts to raise the costs and risks
of U.S.
intervention on Taiwan’s
behalf.
General Trends
Growing economic integration
One of the most interesting trends
since China
began its economic reform and opening up policy in 1979 is the increasing
economic integration between China
and Taiwan. This
integration has occurred despite Taiwan
government policies and administrative obstacles designed to limit economic
dependence on China.
The Taiwan
government’s successive jieji yongren
(no haste, be patient) and jiji kaifang
(active opening, effective management) policies to limit investment have
largely been evaded or ignored by Taiwan
companies. Because direct trade and investment with China
was banned until recently, Taiwanese investment has often been routed through
third countries (especially Hong Kong), making it
difficult to develop accurate assessments of the total. Estimates of cumulative
Taiwan
investment in China
range from $55 billion to $100 billion, with the total growing by between $5
and $10 billion per year. The
quality of the investment has also changed over time. Taiwan
investment was originally intended to supply the China
market with consumer goods and to tap inexpensive Chinese labor in order to
produce labor-intensive goods for export to developed countries. However Taiwan
companies have recently begun transferring production of high-technology
products such as semiconductors and liquid crystal displays to China,
sometimes evading government limits on investment in China
by routing the money through Hong Kong or Singapore.
Cross-strait indirect trade has also
increased dramatically as Taiwan
firms integrate factories in China
as links in their global production networks. Total cross-Strait trade reached
$44.5 billion in 2002, making China Taiwan’s third largest trading partner.
The Mainland Affairs Council estimates that exports to China
accounted for more than 20 percent of Taiwan’s
total exports in 2002. Taiwan
leaders and security analysts are conscious of the potential dangers of
excessive dependence on China.
Despite government policies aimed at balancing national security and economic
benefits and maintaining long-term political stability across the Taiwan
Strait, economic factors appear to be overriding concerns about
economic dependence.
The opening of the “mini-three links” to allow limited direct trade between China
and Taiwan and
calls by a Presidential advisory group for an “active opening” of direct trade
and investment ties with the PRC suggest that economics may be in command.
A key question is how growing
economic ties will affect the broader political relationship and the
calculations of key individuals and groups. Chinese analysts see Taiwan’s
growing economic dependence as giving China’s
leverage over Taiwan
and making independence more difficult. Some argue that economic dependence
will make Taiwan
independence impossible, allowing China
to be patient in pursuing unification. To date, China
has sought to insulate economic ties from the ups and downs in cross-Strait
relations. Chinese officials dropped hints prior to the 2000 Taiwan
presidential election that Taiwan
businessmen who supported Chen Shui-Bian might encounter obstacles to doing
business in China,
but did not follow through on these threats. China
has quietly encouraged Taiwan
businessmen living and working in China
to participate in Taiwan’s
March 2004 presidential election on the assumption that their economic
interests will lead them to vote against Chen. Taiwan
businesses see trade and investment with China
as an essential aspect of remaining competitive in global export markets, and
have expressed this view to Taiwan
leaders. Taiwan’s
asymmetrical dependence on China
may eventually create opportunities for coercion. If Chinese leaders calculate
that Taiwan’s
economy cannot survive without access to China’s
markets and labor, they may eventually feel able to use economic threats to try
to force Taiwan
leaders to accept reunification.
Some Taiwan
analysts have begun to argue that increasing economic integration with China
may create a situation of interdependence that constrains the PRC’s ability to
use economic leverage against Taiwan.
First, China’s
economy would also be damaged by cutting off imports and investment from Taiwan.
While Taiwan
enjoys a considerable trade surplus with China
(about $25 billion in 2002), many of its exports are intermediate goods that
are assembled in China
and then exported to third countries. If China
cuts off imports from Taiwan,
it will cause significant damage to its own exports (and throw millions of
Chinese workers out of work). Second, Taiwan
and Chinese firms are increasingly integrated into global production networks
that export around the world. Efforts to pressure Taiwan’s
economy would affect companies and countries around the world, producing
international pressure against the Chinese government.
Third, China is
also vulnerable to economic pressure as it becomes more dependent on exports to
the U.S.
market. China
enjoyed a $124 billion dollar trade surplus with the United
States in 2003. China
may be willing to bear high economic costs if the alternative is Taiwan
independence, but the evidence to date suggests that leaders in Beijing
will be reluctant to use economic coercion against Taiwan
unless they are pushed too far. Economic integration may be more useful as a
passive tool to discourage Taiwan
independence rather than as a means of coercion. On balance, economic
integration will increase the costs of conflict and produce incentives for
moderate behavior. However those incentives may not be strong enough to stop
leaders from taking risky actions if adverse trends are perceived as likely to
produce unacceptable consequences.
Domestic politics increasingly driving
foreign policy
Another clear trend in all three capitols is for domestic
politics to play a greater role in foreign policy. In China,
this is reflected in the trends toward increased nationalism and pluralism
discussed above. But this tendency also plays into issues such as
civil-military relations and succession politics. According to Hong
Kong press reports, retired and active PLA leaders have used the Taiwan
issue to press for increases in military budgets and increased military
influence in Taiwan
policy. In the mid-1990s, Li Peng reportedly used accusations that senior
Chinese leaders were soft on Taiwan
as a weapon to reduce the influence of Jiang Zemin and Qian Qichen.
More recently, Jiang Zemin used the argument that experienced leadership is
necessary to resolve the Taiwan
issue to justify staying on as chairman of the CCP military affairs commission
despite retirement from his other government and party offices. The use of Taiwan
for a variety of institutional and individual domestic political goals greatly
complicates Chinese efforts to develop a more flexible (and potentially more
effective) policy. Many PRC analysts are privately critical of their
government’s policy; one analyst stated in 2000 that “there hasn’t been a new
idea out of the Taiban [Taiwan
Affairs Office] in a decade.”
In Taiwan,
Chiang Kai-Shek used the Chinese civil war and continuing state of emergency as
a means of enforcing mainlander dominance of politics in Taiwan,
while the opposition movement used support for independence as a means of
challenging the KMT and promoting democratization. Appeals to ethnicity (which
often have pro-independence undertones) have played an increasing role in Taiwan
politics in recent years. Opposition politicians have used visits to China
to try to weaken Chen’s domestic political position. During the 2004
presidential election campaign, Chen Shui Bian has charged that Lien Zhan, the
KMT candidate, cannot be trusted to defend Taiwan’s
sovereignty against China.
Chen’s successful efforts to place referenda on two aspects of cross-Strait
relations on the ballot on the same day as the presidential election show how
domestic politics can affect the security environment. Chen has used the
referenda to mobilize pro-independence voters likely to support him in the
election, despite the fact that the referenda have produced serious strains in Taiwan’s
relations with the United States
(and an even more negative impact on relations with China).
In the United States,
China policy
has been intimately connected with domestic politics since the 1950s debate
about who lost China.
Although more of a consensus existed in the 1970s and 1980s, domestic politics
still played a significant role. This was often expressed in tensions between
the executive branch (which was formally committed to a one China
policy and often sought to cooperate with China)
and the legislative branch (which was more responsive to Taiwan’s
lobbying efforts and frequently sought to push for greater recognition and
support of the Taiwan
government). A number of Congressmen have found support for Taiwan
to be a useful means of raising funds and electoral support, without
considering the potential damage to relations with China
and to the stability of the cross-Strait security environment. The role of
domestic politics has become particularly important on issues such as arms
sales (which affect domestic economic interests). It also affects U.S.
declaratory policy on Taiwan,
which frequently appears to be aimed at domestic constituencies rather than an
international audience. This introduces an element of instability into U.S.
policy, because short-term political incentives can undermine longer-term
interests.
The increasing role for domestic politics in all three
capitols makes compromise more difficult and has produced a hardening of policy
positions. Leaders primarily concerned about their domestic audiences are less
able to craft flexible agreements that can serve the interests of all parties.
Two examples illustrate this point. During the Carter administration, the United
States was careful to package arms sales to Taiwan
in amounts that did not require a formal declaration to Congress. This gave Taiwan
the weapons it needed while allowing China
to ignore the arms sales. However the Reagan administration deliberately tried
to publicize these sales in order to demonstrate its greater political support
for Taiwan. The
PRC protests which followed eventually resulted in the 1982 Shanghai
communiqué where the United States
agreed to limit arms sales to Taiwan,
arguably leaving Taiwan
worse off. A more
recent example involves leaks to the press about U.S.
defense talks with the Taiwan
military. Although the talks had been held seven times since 1997 without
publicity, they were leaked to the press to demonstrate the Bush
administration’s actions to increase military ties with Taiwan.
Implications
This paper has analyzed nine long-term
trends that are shaping the security environment in the Taiwan
Strait. What implications do these trends have for U.S.
policy and for the overall stability of the security environment? Five points
emerge from a close examination of the trends discussed above:
First, incentives for
restraint are eroding. Although the “one China”
framework has served the core interests of China,
Taiwan, and the
United States
reasonably well, it requires all three sides to make pragmatic compromises and
to tolerate continued ambiguity about Taiwan’s
status. Democratization and the population’s growing sense of a separate Taiwan
identity have both enabled and encouraged Taiwan
leaders to challenge the “one China”
principle and to assert that Taiwan
is already an independent sovereign state. Taiwan’s provocative behavior has
interacted with Chinese nationalism to make PRC leaders and key groups such as
the military less tolerant of Taiwan’s current de facto independence, especially if Taiwan appears likely to move
toward permanent separation from China. Taiwan’s
democratization has provided a new basis for U.S.
support that has prompted the United States
to ease previous restrictions on political interactions and to increase security
cooperation with Taiwan.
In all three capitols, domestic political concerns are reducing flexibility and
sometimes driving policy in dangerous directions. An ambiguous “one China”
framework has played a useful role in stabilizing the security environment for
the past thirty years, but its utility may be declining as all three sides
become less willing to live with the necessary restraints on their behavior.
Second, long-term trends
are interacting in potentially destabilizing ways. Efforts by Taiwan
leaders to move toward “creeping independence” in ways that Beijing
regards as unacceptable have prompted China
to accelerate its military modernization and to emphasize efforts to deter Taiwan
independence. Beijing’s threats
reinforce Taiwan’s
sense of a separate identity and decrease interest in unification with China.
The perceived threat to Taiwan’s
democracy has also caused the United States
to increase support for Taiwan,
including enhanced security cooperation. Increased confidence that the United
States would intervene on Taiwan’s
behalf has encouraged Taiwan
leaders to reduce defense spending and to believe that they can move toward
independence without provoking a Chinese attack. Interactions and feedback mechanisms
can amplify the negative impact of key trends on the stability of the
cross-Strait security environment.
Third, the United States is being drawn into the struggle between China and Taiwan.
The United States
has tried to avoid taking sides in the dispute over Taiwan’s
status while maintaining good relations with both China
and Taiwan. Washington
has sought to create a security environment that would allow Taiwan
to negotiate on an equal footing, declaring its willingness to accept any outcome
that the two sides agree on peacefully. Despite efforts to stay out of the middle,
Washington is becoming increasingly
involved in cross-Strait relations. Both China
and Taiwan seek
to influence U.S.
policy on cross-Strait relations in favorable directions. China
has cited its cooperation in the war on terrorism and in managing the North
Korea nuclear crisis as reasons for the United
States to become more active in opposing Taiwan
independence. Taiwan’s
leaders have used democratization and the military threat from China
to obtain U.S. security
assurances and increased political support. As the military balance across the Taiwan
Strait shifts in China’s
favor, the United States
is becoming more directly involved in protecting Taiwan’s
security. China
now assumes that the United States
would intervene if a conflict broke out. As a result, Chinese military
modernization efforts are focused on developing the ability to defeat Taiwan
quickly while deterring or delaying the arrival of U.S.
forces. The United States
has sought to avoid having to choose between China
and Taiwan, but
the increasing U.S.
security role in the Taiwan Strait will make it hard to
maintain a balanced policy.
Fourth, there is a mismatch
between destabilizing trends and available policy instruments. Chinese
analysts worry that the trend toward a separate Taiwan
identity may make peaceful reunification impossible, but admit that China
has few tools to influence how Taiwan
people think about their identity. China
has emphasized the possible use of force to deter Taiwan
from declaring independence, but Chinese analysts realize that military threats
cannot reverse the trend toward a separate Taiwan
identity (and might even be counterproductive). Some trends such as increasing
economic integration across the Taiwan Strait have a
logic of their own that appears immune to government policy. Government officials
worry about Taiwan’s
increasing economic dependence on China,
but have been unable to fashion effective policy responses to deal with this
threat. Perhaps the most dangerous case is China’s
perception that Taiwan
is steadily creeping toward independence. Although China
has declared some explicit actions that would cause it to use force, Taiwan’s
leaders have cleverly used salami tactics to slowly push toward independence
without crossing these red lines. Beijing
has condemned Taiwan’s
actions, but has been reluctant to respond forcefully. If Taiwan
leaders conclude that high costs make China
unable to use force and continue to move toward independence, Beijing
may eventually feel the need to take military action to send a clear signal
that independence is unacceptable. This could precipitate a full-scale war that
would involve the United States.
More generally, the mismatch between perceived adverse trends and available
policy instruments could prompt leaders to deliberately take risky actions
because they lack alternative means to address security threats.
Fifth, economic and
political trends are moving in opposite directions. Political and security
tensions between China
and Taiwan are
rising even as trade and investment ties continue to deepen. Economic
integration is binding the three economies closely together, as products are increasingly
designed in Taiwan,
produced in Chinese factories using components and technology imported from Taiwan,
and exported to U.S.
markets. The complementarity between the economies provides strong incentives
for deeper economic integration. In addition to raising the costs of military
conflict, trade and investment ties create interest groups that have a strong
interest in stability and access to political leaders. Although the high direct
and indirect costs of a military conflict should make leaders extremely
cautious about using force, the contradiction between robust economic ties and
increasing security tensions cannot be maintained indefinitely. At some point, leaders
will be forced to make choices between enjoying the benefits of continued economic
cooperation and pursuing risky political objectives such as independence or
reunification. The decisions they make when forced to choose will reveal
whether economic or political incentives are stronger.
Conclusion
The “one China”
framework has been a remarkably successful policy that has allowed the United
States to enjoy the economic and security
benefits of cooperation with China
without paying the domestic and international political costs of abandoning Taiwan.
The long-term trends discussed above pose new challenges for the stability of
the security environment in the Taiwan Strait and call
the continued viability of the “one China”
framework into question. Some trends such as economic integration create
incentives for cooperation that may help manage tensions, but most are likely
to cause the security environment to deteriorate. The United
States has long sought to avoid taking a definite
position on the question of Taiwan’s
international status. Continued support for the “one-China” framework in the
face of the trends described above is likely to require the United
States to take much more assertive and
intrusive actions to resist unilateral efforts by China
or Taiwan to
redefine or alter the status quo. Otherwise, the United
States may eventually be forced to choose
between China and
Taiwan, a decision
that would profoundly affect the security environment in the Asia-Pacific in
the 21st century.