Asia-Pacific Region: A Russian Perspective
Evgeny V.Afanasiev; Ambssador of Russia Embassy of the Russian Federation,
Seoul Republic of Korea
Russia's Domestic Development
The financial crisis has forced Russian politicians to focus their efforts on domestic affairs, matters of economic recovery and efficient use of existing mechanisms of interaction with international organizations. The major feature of the Russian economy starting from the early 1990s is transition from a central-planning system, which dominated during the latest 70 years, to a market-oriented economy. This deep structural readjustment has been based on three main orientations of the Russian government policy: liberalization of business activities, macroeconomic stabilization, and privatization. According to the market strategy, the role of government during this transitional period has become less and less important.
As a result of this policy, just in few years—by mid 1990s—the basis of the market economy was created, including its legal framework, liberalized system of regulation of prices, foreign trade, capital market, etc. Private sector began to occupy a central role in the Russian economy in terms of the GDP (70% of the added value and 60% of employment and investment in 1997).
Among specific development factors for Russia the following ones could be named: reach natural resources (which represent almost 80 percent of the Russian export); huge territory (leading to high transportation costs); big population concentrated unevenly mostly in the European part of the country; high educational level of labour in several specific spheres of science and technology (e.g. aerospace and defense industry); huge domestic market; and relatively low export production share.
It is evident that the transformation of such a large and complex country as Russia would be bound to endure problems and setbacks. That is why reforming Russia is not like reforming any other dysfunctional economy, be it in Latin America, Asia, Africa, or Eastern Europe.
If we take into consideration the tremendous transformation from a communist system to democratic pluralism in Russia during the latest 7-8 years, we can say quite confidently that "reforms" is a very mild word for describing what is happening in Russia. In fact, we are witnessing a real democratic revolution in all spheres of political and economic life in Russia. Taking into consideration Russia's huge size and more than 70 years of the dominance of the centrally planned economy, this is an unprecedented event in the world history.
Major Foreign Policy Directions
Russia's preoccupation with internal development problems is a fact of life today. At the same time it does not mean that Russia has relaxed its attention to the development of relations with its priority partners, especially with the big powers and neighbouring countries.
The essence of changes taking place in the system of international relations is regarded by most analysts in Russia being the departure from the confrontation between the two social systems and two superpowers, and the end of the ideological basis of global confrontation.
At the same time, rosy forecasts saying that the end of the all-out confrontation and ideological rivalry almost eliminates all contradictions between countries, proved to be wrong. State and national interests continue to exist, which may not coincide and sometimes do not coincide even with in a group of countries of the same type. Russia believes that the most important thing is to overcome the trend towards another division––this time of the post-confrontation world.
Russia supports the idea of transition to a world with many centres of power, or multipolar world, but by no means links it with the creation of blocs and alliances between various "centres of power". The latter would inevitably result in another polarisation of international relations, which could destabilise the situation.
Russia, due to its size, strength, potential, history, and traditions, has objectively played and continues to play one of the key roles in international relations. Some people say that active foreign policy is beyond the powers of contemporary Russia, because it should first surmount the economic crisis, complete the military reform, and only then show its worth on the international arena. In Moscow's view, recent developments in the international arena have shown that it is difficult or even impossible to tackle world tasks, to manage and do away with the threats that still confront the world community, without active participation of Russia, even though it is temporarily weakened from the point of view of domestic development. Russia also can not isolate itself from the outside world (Asian economic crisis is a good example to this).
Russia's foreign policy has two important priorities. One is creation of favourable external conditions for solving national problems. The other is preventing infringement on Russia's positions in the international arena and excluding the dictate of one or several countries.
Conceptual Debate in Russia
Today Russia is experiencing something of a renaissance of geopolitical thinking. It is making efforts to sum up the past and to comprehend the road ahead in order to find a new role in the international scene conducive to Russia. A concept, which continues to gain sympathies of a growing number of scholars and political elite, is that Russia is unique in being the only true Eurasian country in the world, thus becoming a natural bridge not only between Europe and Asia but also between Europe, Asia and America.
Eurasianist ideology assumes that Russia's cultural, psychological and spiritual roots are the products of a long interaction of peoples, who have inhabited the Great Plain extending from East Europe to the Far East. A famous Russian historian, L.Gumilev, asserted that the traditional ruling elite which played the leading role in establishing the Great Russian Empire in 17th and 18th centuries, comprised 30 to 40 percent of people who originate from Asia—Mongols and Tartars. Therefore, it will not be an exaggeration to say that both national identity and even statehood of Russia emerged on the crossroads of civilisations.
In fact, Russia occupies a strategic place in a continent where the interests of the leading world actors intersect, where major natural energy resources are located, and where major conflict zones emerge. It is noteworthy that these conflict zones are stretched out along the so-called "Great Arch" extended from East Europe to Southeast Asia and the Far East. Such being the case, the geographical location of Russia per se is a vital factor for it to play a meaningful international role.
As it was mentioned earlier, the basic point of Russia's contemporary political thinking is that the world is moving toward multi-polarisation, where no state, irrespective how strong it is, can claim a dominant position in global or regional affairs. Redistribution of economic power in the world followed by dispersion of political strength, gave rise to a new check-and-balance system of relationships which have already been taking shape between the EU, the US, Russia, China, and Japan. The whole picture is becoming even more complicated with the rise of new regional power centres such as India, ASEAN, and Korea, which want to have a voice in tackling important international issues.
In view of this, Russia seeks to maintain and solidify its position as a key global player on the basis of enhancing its economic status, developing balanced and co-operative relationships with major power centres, securing an independent and substantial role in world affairs, and pursuing an assertive and multidimensional diplomacy addressed to both West and East.
As President Yeltsin put it in his message to the Russian Parliament, "Russia has no intention either to come into confrontation with any of the world power centres or to fall into unilateral dependence on one of them… In the years to come Russia's strategy toward those centres will be the strategy of equiproximity.
Today, many political experts in Russia argue that in future the foreign policy of Russia should be based on the concept of "limited globalism". This theory assumes that although Russia is fated to be a global power, it will have to pursue a pragmatic policy and seek to become engaged in world and regional affairs on a selective basis where its vital interests and concerns are primarily located in the regions adjacent to its borders, i.e. East Europe, the Balkans, Middle Asia and Middle East, South Asia (including Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and India), the Far East with its core triangle—China, Korea, and Japan. In view of this, it is quite natural for Russia to develop its foreign policy in three major directions: to the West, to the South, and to the East.
Still another theory gaining strength in Russia, is a "new bipolar world theory". Its essence is as follows. After the end of the "Cold War" the world is moving to a new bipolarity––this time between the developed and prosperous "West" (about one fifth of the world population) and the underdeveloped "East-South" which to struggling for its survival (the rest of the world, in fact the majority of the world population). This contradiction is bound to develop, especially if the "West" will try to impose, if necessary, by the use of force, its political and economic model on the rest of world. The next 10-20 years in this regard are pronounced crucial because of the strong disbalance in force between the "West" and the "East-South". This in turn will force the "East-South" to defend itself and to oppose the "Western" dominance in world politics and economy. Recent use of military force against Iraq and in former Yugoslavia are regarded as just the beginning of what the "West" might do in the 21st century and a reason for the "undeveloped countries" to unite. The authors of this theory believe that the USA and NATO policies can drive Russia, China, India, and other "East-South" countries to even closer "anti-Western" posture in the 21st century than they might normally do. This entire theoretical debate of course will be greatly influenced by the "Western" policies in different regions of the world in the years ahead.
In general, Russia's foreign policy is based on understanding that not just re-grouping of powers is going on the international arena, but rather some principal qualitative shifts are under way. The paradigm of the world history has changed: the inter-system confrontation has been replaced with contradictions between the advanced "centre" and the developing "periphery", which is grouping along the East-West, North-South line, complicated by contradictions between civilisations and confessions; the struggle between objective tendencies towards economic integration and inter-civilisational convergence and subjective separatist aspirations is getting ever harder. As one of the forms of reaction to the situation, a new approach is being formed, aimed at building a model of the future "world order", which is actually forming due to objective developmental conditions in certain countries. It characterises the new historical conditions under which the mankind will live in the coming century. In our opinion, this order must be constructed on democracy fundamentals, principles of the UN Charter, and the main principles of international law. While creating it, we should in full measure consider the values of each civilisation in the world.
Making a Comeback in Asia
Unlike any other European country, Russia has not only an Atlantic but also a Pacific coastline, an immeasurable advantage for developing close political and economic ties in Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific economic area. Two thirds of Russian territory lie in Asia. 30 million people live to the East of the Ural Mountains. A traditional Pacific maritime power, Russia borders several Asia-Pacific countries, including China, Japan, Korea, United States, Mongolia, etc. No matter how objective and timely this observation may be, in reality, after the break-up of the Soviet Union, the new Russia was mostly concerned about a "strategic partnership" with the West and allowed European affairs to dominate its foreign policy. In the aftermath of the Soviet Union's dissolution, Russia's role in the Pacific Asia and its legitimate interests in the region were downplayed and largely ignored by its key international partners.
This situation was unfair and basically unhealthy because the new Russia was an important source of positive regional developments. The diplomatic and political losses that Russia suffered in the Far East, did not endanger its vital interests, territorial integrity, or military security. However, economic security was imperilled, and expectations of a break-up of the Russian Federation and separatist trends in Siberia and the Far East were widely reflected in research papers and articles by the Western experts. Fortunately for Russia, the domestic situation in the Eastern provinces was tolerable (by Russian standards), and the regional environment in the Northeast Asia/North Pacific area became more relaxed.
After several years of economic decline and diminishing political posture in Northeast Asia, Russia's posture in the region is improving. Russia is a member of the APEC, and a "dialogue partner" of the ASEAN. Russia actively participates in the ARF—a multilateral political dialogue in the Asia and Pacific region. We officially applied to join the ASEM. We participate in many unofficial or semi-official dialogues in Asia.
Nowadays, the eastward dimension of Russia's policy is becoming an important priority, tantamount to the westward and southward directions. Noteworthy is the fact that some Russian political analysts go even further by asserting that Russia today is on the verge of a radical shift in its political orientation. They argue that China and Japan will emerge as the most important partners of Russia in the coming century, similar to the US and Germany in the 20th century.
As, the Prime-Minister of the Russian Federation Evgeny Primakov, put it, the priorities of Russia's policy in the Asia Pacific Region are as follows: 1) to develop mutually advantageous or even partnership relations with regional countries; 2) to provide stability and security on the Russian Far Eastern borders; 3) to create favourable environment for economic reforms in Russia, with a special focus on accelerating the economic development of the Far East.
Nowadays, the task is to make use of the rich potential of the Far East in order to provide for the modernisation of local industry and to boost economic development by promoting interactions with the countries of the Asia Pacific Region. The implementation of large-scale and long-term co-operation projects in the Far East, proposed by the Russian side (the development of oil and gas on the Sakhalin shelf, the exploitation of gas layers in Yakutia and in the province of Irkutsk, as well as the construction of a pipeline to supply gas to China and Korea) may contribute to the economic revitalisation of the region as well as to its close connection to the economies of the Asia-Pacific Region countries.
From Russia's perspective, the dynamic structure of relations between Russia, China, and the US-led system of alliances with the ROK and Japan, determine the strategic situation in East Asia. In view of this, Russia regards Northeast Asia as a region of vital importance to its national interests. The political and security situation in Northeast Asia has direct implications for Russia: even in the absence of a specific threat, any abrupt change in the fragile balance may adversely affect the geopolitical environment of Russia's eastern flank. Ultimately, Russia's successful resurgence as an Asian power depends to a large extent on how things will go in Northeast Asia, and how different trends—co-operation, or competition and growing tensions—prevail in this region.
In the foreseeable future, regional countries like China, the Republic of Korea, and Japan, will be most important economic and political partners of Russia in the Asia-Pacific Region.
New Russia's concerns are largely with such issues as illegal immigration in the Far East, poaching in the Russian special economic zone and territorial waters, co-ordination of national and regional development programs, and multilateral problem-solving efforts. On the other hand, only a combination of unilateral efforts, bilateral improvements and multilateral initiatives can help to protect national interests.
It should be noted also that Moscow still proposes to discuss regional security issues in a multilateral setting to promote confidence building, to ensure transparency of military doctrines, and to limit military activities in the area. Whether these proposals are realistic, depends on Russia's partners in the region, but Moscow's regional agenda itself has become more inward-looking and bilateral-oriented.
The Far Eastern region, with its core Maritime Province, which in terms of geographical location is an integral part of the Pacific Rim, had for years remained a closed zone, destined to be a military outpost fully dependent on Moscow in supply of material resources, energy sources and all major daily necessities. The characteristic features of the local economy were its huge industrial military complexes, the underdevelopment of its social, communication and transport infrastructure, and its outdated civil industries represented mainly by the primary processing of some natural resources. In fact, no conditions for positive co-operation and exchange with neighbouring countries in Asia had been established.
The widening gap between the eastern provinces of Russia and the Asia-Pacific Region presents a serious challenge for Moscow's policy in Asia.
Although the Far East of Russia is a relatively small and at the moment troubled part of the Russian economy, potentially it is likely to be an important part of Northeast Asia's economic dynamism and an economic "contact zone" between Russia and Japan, Russia and China, and Russia and other Asia-Pacific countries. Obviously, trade and investment links with the region will be of much higher importance for the Pacific provinces, where the economic opening is in progress and democratic institutions are being created through devolution of administrative power and growing autonomy of local administrations.
Russia's Relations with Major Asia and Pacific Powers
In 1992-1997 the USA were in no hurry in accepting the Russian Federation as a participant of various regional dialogues, and some people in Washington did not even consider Russia as a regional entity. In "1993 State Department Outline for East Asia", Russia received a little more attention than Mongolia but less than Vietnam––a considerable departure from the previous assessment of the Soviet Union’s potential role in the "emerging architecture" of East Asia and the Pacific. North Korea and China moved to the forefront of the US policy in Northeast Asia, further removing Russia from Washington’s Asian agenda both as source of threat and of positive expectations. This was quite in harmony with Tokyo’s views, since Japan has never before really considered the Soviet Union or Russia as a major player.
There were impulses originating both from regional political changes and bilateral dialogues that prompted Moscow to become concerned over Russia’s declining status in East Asia. The expansion of NATO urged Russian policy-makers and diplomats to reassess their European and Trans-Atlantic experiences and stimulated Moscow diplomacy in Northeast Asia. The multipolarity of the post-Cold War international system was adopted as the official foreign policy concept.
From the Russian standpoint, close relations with China can solidly guarantee its independent role in such a system of multipolar international relations. The interests of Russia and China in economic development and international affairs are quite similar, their economies are complementary, and they cannot afford to be at odds. It is quite natural that Russia and China will differ in their approaches to certain problems, but this should not preclude efforts in strengthening peace and security and economic cooperation.
Russian foreign policy aims to ensure its independent role in regional affairs. Currently, there is no power or an alliance of powers, which present a direct threat to Russia’s national interests. The development of Russia-China relations radically improves the security of Russia in the North Pacific/Northeast Asian region. These factors help Russia to open up economically to the Asia-Pacific region, make possible Russia’s participation in regional institutions, facilitate market access, and contribute to the development of Eastern Russia.
Russia-China relations are seen as one of the pillars of stability in Asia and, in fact, they may mark the end of the "era of triangles" in Asia, which existed during the Cold War. Russia-China political relations were recently called an equal partnership aimed at strategic cooperation in the 21st century. The concrete examples of such partnership are agreements on mutual non-targeting of missiles, non-use of nuclear weapons, confidence-building measures; and the reduction of armed forces in border areas between Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, and Tadjikistan––not a small area covering more than 600 kilometers in Asia.
The long-standing territorial dispute between China and Russia has been successfully resolved. The 4,300 kilometer-long border between China and Russian eastern provinces was agreed in full detail and its demarcation finished, leaving only three islands (two on the Amur River near Khabarovsk and one on the Argun River in Chita Region) for future negotiations. These agreements with China may be more than a treaty, it may be beginning of the era of stability in Northeast Asia.
One of the most important goals of Russian diplomacy is the improvement of relations with Japan. Fortunately, Moscow and Tokyo are showing interest in advancing political and economic contracts. Compared with the early 1990s, negative elements have been removed from the dialogue, significantly changed, or faded away. Both sides are expressing readiness to be closer and better neighbors.
The territorial dispute is no longer the point of departure for bilateral discussions. But the quality of bilateral engagement is changing mostly on the political and diplomatic fronts, not in trade and investment or in public perceptions. Economic cooperation and people-to-people contacts are the two major areas for bilateral engagement in the absence of adversarial military intentions, third party threats, or ideological differences. However, two basic questions remain unanswered. What kind of bilateral relationship do the two countries want? And how will they achieve it?
Former Prime Minister Hashimoto’s speech to the Association of Corporate Executives on July 24, 1997, was an impressive step forward in this respect. Through his "Eurasian diplomacy" concept and the "three principles" that apply to Russia (mutual confidence, mutual benefits, and a long-term approach), a window of opportunity was opened. It provided an exit from the stalemate over the Northern Territories and raised hope that both parties can act together to reach a positive-sum solution. This speech symbolized a major shift in political attitudes and encouraged the two countries to move from the phase of post-Cold War political accommodation to one of cooperative engagement. Russian leaders are speaking the same political language, they invited Tokyo to participate in the development of the disputed territories and the economic reconstruction of Russia.
In November 1997, at the informal summit meeting in Krasnoyarsk between President Boris Yeltsin and former Prime Minister Hashimoto, an agreement was reached to try to sign a peace treaty before the year 2000. However, it is clear that both nations need to develop relations in various fields, creating and strengthening mutual confidence and expanding economic and political cooperation in order to solve the most difficult problem––territorial dispute.
Russia sees Japan not only as a neighbor but also as one of the most important centers in the multipolar world of the next millennium. The development of the Russian-Japanese relations can be seen as a breakthrough, and this manifested itself especially strongly during the talks in Moscow in November 1998 between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi.
The stance of the Russian leadership, which was articulated at the November talks, is that Russia and Japan should come to signing a large-scale Peace, Friendship and Cooperation Treaty.
The Russian stance in settling its territorial dispute with Japan is based on four key aspects. A decision settling the territorial dispute shall respect the existing realities, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia. That decision shall take into account the attitude of our public and be approved by the legislatures of the two countries. We think that the Russian proposal is constructive, it corresponds to the real standing and gives good possibilities to continue the work on the treaty, and gives good possibilities to relations in all spheres.
Years ago it became clear that in dealing with the territorial issue power diplomacy will not bear fruits for either side. There is also no "forceful" or quick way to settle the dispute. Both parties must act together in order to work out a positive-sum solution based on mutual benefits and co-operation. A new level of bilateral relations can create new conditions for the settlement and show future alternatives and directions to both politicians and the populace. The issues that test the new policy are the co-operative fishery agreement (that transcends the problem of sovereignty), and how Russia's proposal for joint development of the Northern Territories/South Kurils will be realised. New approaches to the border disputes can facilitate expanding dialogue with Japan, and there is a modest hope that the problem of disputed territories can be transformed into an area of co-operation and mutual economic benefit through joint development.
Russia has been concerned lately with the approval of new guidelines of the US-Japanese cooperation and pronouncements of some Japanese politicians of the involvement of Russian territory in the document’s sphere. There are also concerns with the plans of Tokyo and Washington to create a regional system of non-strategic anti-missile defense. Russia regards as unacceptable the possibility to include its territory within the sphere of operation by the new Japanese-US military agreement. The document, adopted in 1996, envisions a significant strengthening of bilateral military ties in case of emergencies in the regions, adjacent to Japan. The vagueness of this wording worries a number of countries in the region, including Russia: how far do the regions adjacent to Japan, spread and whether they cover the territory of the third countries, including Russia, or not.
Hopefully, the Japanese-US military cooperation based on the revised agreement will have exclusively defensive aims and will not upset the regional balance of forces. Russia’s firm conviction is that it is not the military blocs that have a future, but collective efforts by the international community are to ensure peace and stability in any part of the planet.
Leaders of the European countries, especially Germany and France, during their visits to China, Japan, and other Asia-Pacific countries, have managed to strengthen Europe's positions in the region. It concerns the impressive economic projects as well as the growing political influence of the "Unified Europe" which began regular dialogue about the future of its relations with Asian countries. It appears that the European factor will be playing an ever-growing role in the Asia-Pacific region in the 21st century both in economy and in politics. At present time the "Unified Europe", after the victory of the social-democrats in the elections in Germany, has become prevalently social democratic. For East Asia (China, Vietnam) this factor is very significant for developing further partnership with the UE.
A qualitatively new level of interaction between the European and the East Asian civilisations can be reached in the 21st century with implementation of the grand Trans-Eurasian project––the creation of the economic bridge East Asia–Europe (the new "Silk road"). For Russia it makes necessary to work out a new Eurasian policy which would be based on inter-relation between the European, the Eurasian and the Asia-Pacific strategies in the foreign policy of Russia.
The situation on the Korean Peninsula is important to Russia from the point of view of the problem of national reunification that has not been solved so far, as well as because there is still a danger that the existing contradictions potentially may transform into a conflict near our borders.
That is why we consider the situation on the Korean peninsula as having direct relations to Russia—to the development of our Far East and to the security of our borders. Therefore, it can be said that our striving to play an active part in the inter-Korean settlement is not provoked by humanity reasons only. It goes together with the national interests of Russia in this region.
In these matters the Russian Federation does not have any "hidden" agenda. In the first place, we proceed from the necessity to preserve the armistice on the Korean Peninsula and the strictly non-nuclear status of Korea. In the second place, the Russian Federation considers peaceful unification of the two Koreas as the only possible way. We stand for negotiations between North and South aimed at solving this matter. In the third place, if at present the contour of format of such negotiations is taking a form of "2 + 2" which is two Koreas plus China and the USA, we do not see any reason to oppose it, furthermore, we will be supporting it. At the same time, we believe that extension of the framework of such negotiations at a certain stage—up to calling an international conference—will be very useful.
Russia consistently stands for the inter-Korean dialogue as an optimal way to the settlement of relations between North and South and to the normalisation on the Korean peninsula. We welcome some positive signs which have been seen lately in the exchanges between North and South Korea. Other countries can contribute to this process by creating favourable conditions for inter-Korean agreements, facilitating them, and, in case of necessity, guaranteeing them by their authority.
In regard to the recent North Korean missile test, we stated quite clearly that, first of all, national missile programmes shall not violate the existing international norms and obligations, and that they shall not endanger other countries’ security. Secondly, the above-mentioned fact is a new testimony to the existence of a real potential for mutual mistrust and confrontation in the region. All this makes the realisation of the idea about multilateral dialogue on the confidence-building measures in the region and, in the future, the creation of a regional security system in Northeast Asia, even more necessary.
Russian diplomatic circles believe that some passions have been flared up deliberately and that a threat to the situation in Northeast Asia has been excessively exaggerated with the aim to justify plans made by the US and Japan to create a system of missile defence of the theatre of military operations. The realisation of this programme involves colossal expenditures on the military-industrial complex financed from the state treasury.
We can categorically deny suspicions which arose in a number of countries alleging that Moscow renders assistance to Pyongyang, sending experts and computer equipment to North Korea for implementation of its nuclear and missile programmes. Russia has nothing to do with these programmes.
Primacy of Economics
There were other crucial factors, probably more powerful than Moscow’s own interest in being recognised as a part of the Asia-Pacific region. China was rather forthcoming in relations with its northern neighbour to satisfy certain economic, technological and defence needs. On the part of the US and Japan, concern was demonstrated with regard to China and its future posture in Asia. In this fluid geopolitical environment Russia may be perceived by all of these powers as a partner with limited power nowadays but with growing influence and a stronger role to play in the future.
Economic interests were also a factor. Russian public opinion, local administrations, and the business community are strongly in favour of developing closer economic ties with the Northeast Asia. Russia, therefore, has opened up its market to neighbours transferring more trade to the Asian markets. For example, exports and imports of the Far Eastern provinces became much more oriented towards China, Japan, South Korea, and the US. The regional market and investment opportunities of the Far East, particularly oil and gas resources development, have attracted close attention from the United States, Japan, China, and South Korea. Constituencies supporting closer relations with Russia, have formed in the neighbouring countries.
Foreign investors, particularly American companies, became involved in the Far East, and the Japanese government has shown interest in assisting the economic development of this part of Russia. The US-based multinational and Japanese corporations lead in the development of oil and gas fields in Sakhalin. American companies are the largest foreign suppliers of food, consumer goods, machinery, and equipment to the Far Eastern cities; Japanese trading firms and consumers benefit from imports of fish and crab harvested by Russian fishermen. However, long-term economic links are yet to be built, particularly with capital-rich neighbours.
In the US and Japan, attitudes toward Russia and its role in Northeast Asia are gradually changing. Russia’s recovery is now perceived by many Americans and Japanese to be important to regional stability and economic dynamism. This change in attitudes makes trade and investment ties between Russia and Northeast Asia compatible with the US and Japanese interests. Moreover, Russia’s economic transformation creates markets for capitals and consumer goods, as well as demand for investment and technologies.
There are new opportunities for large-scale export-oriented projects. Russia and China reconfirmed their commitment to develop close links in the energy sector focusing on the Kovyktinskoe natural gas field near Irkutsk, and a pipeline project. It seems that Russia, which plans to build a nuclear power plant in China, considers this neighbour as a huge market for Russian hi-tech products, including advanced military equipment.
In the few years elapsed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has learned a great deal about the main trends in the Asia-Pacific region. Not only diplomats and politicians but the first generation of the Russian businessmen, particularly those who have travelled to the East Asia, have had an opportunity to compare, reflect, and make pragmatic analyses regarding the current status of Russia in the world and the region. Findings about the Pacific Asia are mixed, and feelings and attitudes differ significantly. But Moscow’s diplomacy is becoming increasingly Asia-Pacific and trade- and investment-oriented. This reflects the fact that the Russian foreign policy in the region and its security perceptions towards the East Asia are now better co-ordinated with the domestic interests, pragmatic economic concerns, and development plans.
Although economic links with immediate neighbours are the most significant force for integrating Russia into the region, it is too early to expect strong currents toward "integration" in Northeast Asia. Certainly, key bilateral relations between Russia and China, or Japan and China are developing with relatively good prospects for more economic interdependence. But as far as Russia’s relations with Mongolia and North Korea are concerned, we still see a considerable weakening of economic ties. This trend has to be reversed.
However, Russia still belongs to the group of major powers that has begun to form a new framework for the post-Cold War relationships in the region. From the Russian perspective, new regional relations must be organised on the following principles:
Confidence-building measures, including limited and non-provoking military activities, transparency of military doctrines and strategies, are the important elements of new regional relations. Regular consultations on these and other problems now take place. The ASEAN "post-minister dialogues" framework may be used as a model for the Northeast Asian dialogue.
In this rare moment of history major powers in Northeast Asia are free from open regional rivalry and military confrontation despite certain conflicts of interests. Unless something goes terribly wrong, interdependent economic relations will provide a new pillar for security, stability, and regional co-operation.
About The Author: Ambassador Afanasiev has been Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Republic of Korea in Seoul since 1997. He was educated at the Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations, 1970. He entered diplomatic service in 1970 and was assigned to the USSR Embassy in Beijing, People's Republic of China from 1970 to 1975. He was assigned next to the 1st Far Eastern Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow from 1975 to 1976. . Other diplomatic positions included assignments to the USSR Embassy in Washington, D.C. (1976-1984); 1st Far Eastern Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow (1984-1985); Chief Assistant to the Deputy Foreign Minister in charge of Asian and Pacific Affairs (1985-1987);. Staff Assistant, Secretariat of the Minister of Foreign Affairs (1987); Counsellor, the USSR/Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C. (1987-1992); First Deputy Director-General 1st Asia and Pacific Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow (1992-1993); and prior to his current position he was Director General, 1st Asia Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow from 1994 to 1997.