Post Cold War Indian Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific

The intent of this paper is to reflect upon the future directions of Indian foreign policy—especially in relation to the United States and the Asia-Pacific. The difficulty with speculating on the future is that one must by definition say more than one knows. Nevertheless, to undertake this task, the paper examines Indian perspectives on the international setting following the Cold War in which only one state is dominant and how the setting may influence the directions of India’s policy. Though India was a member of the Non-Aligned movement during the Cold War, and as such was not an opponent of the West, they express some discomfort in a world which is so dominated by one country. Many of India’s foreign policy initiatives, bilateral relations with France and Russia, and multilateral initiatives with the ASEAN states, have been explained as contributing to "multipolarity." The paper will conclude with a reminder that Indian foreign policy, like the foreign policy of all democracies, is subject to domestic public reaction. India’s leaders must determine their security responsibilities while still being responsive to their electorate. To fulfill these ends as a nuclear power, India has initiated a National Security Council to contribute guidance and help coordinate their security policies.

Birth at the Cold War

At midnight on August 14, 1947, Britain’s partition of its Indian Empire into India and Pakistan became effective. The two newly independent states came into existence following the Second World War and during the early stages of the Cold War. The international landscape reflected both the devastation of the ending conflict as well as the Cold War divisions. Reconstruction, political, economic, and social, of European and Asian states coincided with a Western determination to "contain" the advancement of Soviet influence. At the same time, the former Soviet Union, pursued its own post-war reconstruction, consolidated its control over much of Eastern Europe, and made policy overtures throughout the world.

As is the case with the political founding of most states, neither India or Pakistan were in total control of the domestic or international conditions in which they came into existence. Neither of the new states were completely satisfied with Lord Mountbatten’s plan for partition. Though India’s leadership was solidly committed to political democracy, there existed numerous disagreements as to how that democracy should be constituted. Though proud of their Hindu inheritance, its leadership was committed to a secular India. Numerous differences existed as to how it should promote the security of freedom of worship for its many religions while still reflecting aspects of its Hundu past. Though wishing to replace English, the language of their colonial past, with Hindi, India’s founders recognized that a significant segment of its non-Hindi population would be handicapped by insisting on making India the official language. These concerns as well as others were resolved by taking into account political necessity. Because political necessity seldom provides complete satisfaction to any side of a dispute, many of India’s early and significant concerns remain sensitive today. It is to the credit of India’s founding fathers that the democratic structure they established has enabled them to maintain their democracy while addressing these fundamental issues as well as other significant economic and political concerns.¹

Domestic politics can be separated from foreign policy only artificially in any regime, especially a democracy, and India is no exception. Indian scholars often reflect upon the relationship of domestic and international affairs. In the years immediately following independence, Indian foreign policy reflected their resentment of a long colonial past. This resentment was reflected in the rhetoric of policy pronouncements. Their understandable resentment of colonialism and with it the concomitant attitude that they have been slighted by the Western powers can be perceived in many of their present day positions. This explains in part why India both celebrates many of their accomplishments in the scientific field, e.g., nuclear arms development, and believes that such advancements deserve to be translated into an appropriate diplomatic status befitting a great power: such as a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council.

India’s Perception of the Post Cold War International Setting

Since independence India has been committed to the principle of non-alignment and remains committed to that principle today. President Narayan’s Republic Day Address reconfirmed this position. In his words, "In the bitter and divided days of the Cold War we proclaimed the essential unity of the world through our policy of non-alignment, and today when the idea of a uni-polar world is being projected we adhere to non-alignment and peaceful co-existence as a policy for a pluralistic pattern for the world."² Air Commodore Jasjit Singh (Retd.), Director of the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis in New Delhi, makes an important point about the nature of non-alignment in the post Cold War period. Singh has argued that during the Cold War period many failed to distinguish non-alignment as a policy option by which to manage regional tensions during the Cold War and advance its national interest from the Non-Alignment Movement. In the post Cold War period, Singh observes, "non-alignment as a policy option has little relevance, and the movement no role."³ Nonalignment--especially the movement-- was criticized by many Western countries as not truly being neutral. The Nonaligned Movement was viewed as primarily obstructing Western policies. The gifted strategic analyst C. Raja Mohan agrees that the idea of non-alignment has "long been morphed into something completely different from the initial conception." He believes the notion of non-alignment was transformed into the idea of a bloc--"an anti Western one at that." Further, he points out, "Towards the end of the Cold War, the dominant interpretation of nonalignment in India emphasized a crusade against the West at the global level and an enduring alliance with the Soviet Union in the regional context"⁴ Because the strategic international environment has changed, the Non-Alignment Movement needs to reexamine itself.

Current discussions of the changing international strategic environment, especially in India’s press, show little evidence of redefinition and still are strongly flavored with resentment towards the United States. The former non-aligned concern for negotiating a neutral position between the Eastern and Western blocs has been replaced by a desire to transform the current power relationships among states . An extreme example is an observation made in an editorial in the December 28, 1992 Hindustan Times which criticizes U.S. raids on Iraq for its refusal to allow U.N. inspectors to visit suspected weapons of mass destruction sites. The editorial describes the rise of "American assertiveness" as a consequence of the disappearance of "the other super power, the Soviet Union, which exercised a sobering influence earlier..."⁵ An article by Ramsujan Amar describes the absence of the former Soviet Union as a "boon for the United States, which has now set out on the course of its imperialistic campaign with a new zeal and vigor."⁶ Less caustic analysts commonly identify the U.S. position as hegemonic and express a concern that an international setting dominated by an unilateral power can endanger the sovereignty of other states.

Indian analysis believe that recent Indian bilateral discussions with France and Russia may help nurture a "multi-polar world." An accomplishment of the strategic dialogue with France, begun in New Delhi on October 28, 1998, was described by the Indian Embassy in Paris as "outlining long-term cooperation between India and France with the goal of contributing towards a multi-polar world, in which India had the ‘authority’ to play an important role."⁷ In late December, 1998, Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov made a much publicized visit to New Delhi. The Indian press highlighted an informal statement made by Primakov that India, Russia, and China might contemplate forming a strategic triangular alliance. Rajneesh Darshan, writing in the Indian paper Jansatta (Delhi) perceived a triangular alliance not as a countermeasure to the strategic western alliance led by the United States, but as "a triangular cooperation attempt for coping with many problems emerging due to the world’s unipolar order." B.P. Jeevan Reddy, writing in The Hindu, found Primakov’s idea interesting because it "would work towards a multi-polar world which alone would provide us more elbow-room and enable us to determine our fate ourselves."⁹

U.S. Post Cold War Perceptions of the International Environment

Mohan has described America’s position in the world as historically unique. "The history of international relations has never seen such a skewed distribution of power in favour of one nation."¹⁰ Most Americans would not go as far as Mohan in describing America’s position in the world but acknowledge that the United States enjoys significant advantages in important elements of national power: military, economic, and political. Such power has carried with it great costs and responsibilities as well. There is significant public sentiment as well that other states should accept a larger share of the security burden that the United States has assumed since the end of the Second World War. Because of the expenditures of the Cold War and a recognition that the antagonisms of the Cold War are gone, both the Bush and Clinton administrations have relied upon coalitional support for peace keeping interventions. Despite comparative U.S. advantages, American leadership recognizes limitations on U.S. capabilities. Of greater importance, the U.S. policy of containment during the Cold War did not seek hegemony or imperial advantage but security for the U.S. and its allies. Like all states in the post Cold War international security environment, the United States has also been required to reexamine its national interests and capabilities.

One of the most respected American South Asian scholars, Stephen P. Cohen, has noted that the United States has not reviewed its South Asian policy since the end of the Cold War. There has been "no comprehensive survey of the several American interests embedded in India, let alone the development of a strategy indicating how pressing interests could be optimized without sacrificing less urgent, but perhaps equally important long-term interests." Of great importance, Cohen later argues, many administrations--not simply the Clinton administration--have failed to properly understand India.¹¹ America’s post Cold War policy, according to Cohen, has been concerned with totalitarian states, culturally distant and hostile states, geostrategically important states and states that have acquired or spread various kinds of weapons of mass destruction. South Asia for these reasons was never at the top of our foreign policy agenda but neither was it at the bottom.¹²

Since the end of the Cold War the United States has promoted democratization and economic liberalization throughout the world--with special emphasis upon Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In large part, the promotion of open-market economies in countries which previously had inefficient managed economies was justified as self-interest rightly understood. The pursuit of one’s own interests, the United States, would at the same time promote the interests of others. Free enterprise would promote economic well being . In those countries whose industries were internationally noncompetitive, foreign investment and monetary guidance by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank would help construct an economic infrastructure necessary to support sustained economic growth. Such growth is necessary if states are to overcome poverty and provide for the well-being of their citizens. Economic growth in these countries ultimately will result in the creation of new markets which in turn will provide benefits to the United States. All states will benefit.

Regional issues which directly affect vital U.S. national interests, the Middle East especially, have dominated U.S. concerns in the post Cold War period. In addition, a category of functional issues commonly described as "transnational" [ for example: terrorism, narcotics, environmental, weapons of mass destruction] received significant attention. Transnational concerns are perceived to threaten many if not all of the states of the world and cannot be addressed by one state alone. International cooperation is required if meaningful progress is to be made in meeting such challenges. Like the promotion of economic liberalization, the U.S. justified its initiatives in these areas as self-interest rightly understood. For example, attempts to restrain the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction--nuclear, biological, and chemical--are understood to be in the interests of the United States. But the restraint of such weapons also is considered beneficial to all states in that the dissemination of such weapons increases the likelihood of accidental use, increases the likelihood of accidents harmful to surrounding regions if not the entire globe, and increases the possibility of their being used by rogue states or terrorist groups.

The Clash of Foreign Policy Priorities Between Democracies

The United States has actively pursued its opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons in international organizations and forums as well as through the passage of domestic legislation. Though proliferation is a global issue, proliferation discussions often are discussed within a regional context, whether South Asia, the Middle East, Northeast Asia, etc. As such, functional issues such as proliferation of nuclear weapons often directly conflict with the attempts to promote bilateral and regional relations. Whether or not a functional issue should be pursued at the expense of harmonious bilateral relations is a question of national security priorities. The attempt to reconcile the United States’s strong commitment to non-proliferation on one hand with its desire to promote cooperative and normal relations with the countries in South Asia on the other hand is an example of the difficulty of weighing national security priorities. The manner in which thoughtful resolutions of conflicting priorities are made is in part a reflection of the quality of a country’s diplomacy and in a democracy in part a reflection of domestic policy concerns.

Despite their promotion of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, the existing five nuclear weapon states still claim that such weapons are vital to protect their own national security interests through deterrence. When such threats disappear, it is hoped that nuclear weapons will vanish as well. With the ending of the Cold War, the principal adversaries have reduced their nuclear stockpiles as well as conventional arms. Obviously, these states are not prepared for total disarmament.

The ultimate determination of the nature of the threat and whether nuclear weapons should be possessed and deployed rests with the state itself. All sovereign states have the right to make such determinations based upon their right of self-defense. The United Nations’ Charter, Article 51, insures that states do not forgo their right of self-defense. The principle of non-proliferation can logically be extended: if the restraint on nuclear proliferation is an objective than the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is a higher objective. But the decision to arm or disarm rests with the state itself. Again, in democracies such judgments reflect not only the views of elected officials and the advice of security officials, but of domestic policy concerns as well. Often concerns other than strictly security factors enter into the final decision-making process.

United States policy towards India and Pakistan in the post Cold War period faces a dilemma which in part is rooted in the very nature of international law and in part is rooted in every day decision-making. On one hand the United States acknowledges the sovereign right of states to assess their national security concerns and to possess the necessary means of defense and the right of states to defend themselves within the framework of accepted behavior. States disagree, however, on the nature of threats, on what means are necessary, and whether policies fall within the acceptable framework of behavior. The institutional mechanisms for resolving such disputes among states are undeveloped at best--especially when contrasted with the institutional means available for resolving such disputes within a state. The lack of an acknowledged promulgator of international law, of an acceptable judicial authority to act on behalf of the law, and of a recognized enforcer of the law are characteristics of international relations. These have been, are, and will probably continue to be the most significant differences between international relations and domestic politics even though a body of international legal conventions and international courts do exist.

Despite these limitations on the effectiveness of international conventions, the United States has been among the countries in the post Cold War period which have attempted to institute a Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, and a Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The attempt to obtain these global nonproliferation objectives indicates the high priority that American administrations have placed on the limitation of nuclear arms and their delivery systems. In addition, the U.S. Congress has demonstrated its commitment over the years not to support states pursuing the development and/or acquisition of nuclear weapons or contributing to their proliferation.¹³ American diplomats, in fact, have expressed concern that congressional enactments allow so little flexibility in U.S. reaction to nuclear arms issues that they hinder diplomatic negotiations which could prove more fruitful than sanctions or penalties.

Though India’s position on nuclear arms is not in agreement with United States non-proliferation policies, India’s nuclear position is logical. Writing in Foreign Affairs, India’s External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh provides a defense of its May 11th and 13th, 1998 nuclear tests.¹⁴ The account which follows is a synopsis of his account of India’s position as stated in the article. Upon independence India consistently called for global disarmament. He emphasizes that India was the first country to call for a ban on nuclear testing, to call for a nondiscriminatory treaty on nonproliferation, to call for the nonuse of nuclear weapons and to call for the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons. These Indian initiatives were consistently rejected by the nuclear weapons states on the grounds that such proposals were idealistic and the dangers of the Cold War required such weapons as a deterrent. Singh states that India’s own security concerns worsened with its 1962 confrontation with China on its Himalayan border. Two years later China became a nuclear power. Because of the dangers to their security, India itself conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 in Pokharan. To further complicate India’s security, India possessed evidence that China was aiding Pakistan’s nuclear program. China, he contends, continued to pass on missile technology and components to Pakistan.¹⁵ Other countries, especially the United States, looked the other way. They were either unwilling or unable to restrain China.

Singh observes that India’s "moralistic nuclear policy and restraint paid no measurable dividens." He asks, if the five nuclear weapon states believed that the possession of such weapons enhanced their security, why would India’s possession of similar weapons be different? Should India "voluntarily devalue its own state power and national security?" India maintains that The Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1974 discriminates unfairly against those states which did not possess nuclear weapons prior to the treaty taking effect. It does not provide for equal security for the entire world. India either will accept "universal, nondiscriminatory disarmament or equal security for the entire world." In 1996, "India for the first time stated that the nuclear issue is a national security concern for India." This was India’s explanation as to why it would not sign the CTBT. India reserved the right to test if it believed such weapons were necessary for their national security.

India, Singh insists, violated no international treaty obligations when it conducted its May, 1998 tests. It had not signed the CTBT nor did it accept the legitimacy of a discriminatory Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In a speech to India’s Rajya Sabha, Jaswant Singh said that India follows only one criterion in determining its policies:¹⁶ "national interest and it is national security alone that will guide our deliberations." Nuclear apartheid was unacceptable. India’s justification for its nuclear testing and becoming a de facto nuclear weapon state rests upon its claims of sovereignty and non acceptance of a discriminatory Non- Proliferation regime imposed by the declared five nuclear weapon states.

On May 28th and 30th Pakistan also carried out nuclear tests in the Chagai Hills in Baluchistan close to the Afghanistan border. Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Muhammd Nawaz Sharif, stated that "Pakistan has been obliged to exercise the nuclear option due to weaponization of India’s nuclear program. This had led to the collapse of the "existential deterrence" and had radically altered the strategic balance in our region."¹⁷ Pakistan’s concern prior to the Indian nuclear tests was with its inability to compensate for India’s conventional arms superiority. India is a much larger country with a much larger population. In addition, Pakistan’s financial problems prevented it from purchasing those weapons necessary to modernize its conventional forces. U.S. sanctions, which had been imposed when President Bush could not make the necessary annual certification that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons, prevented Pakistan from receiving 28 F-16 aircraft that it had purchased from America. At the same time the money, $658 million for the planes and $773 million for equipment, Pakistan had paid for the aircraft had not been released preventing Pakistan from purchasing alternative aircraft from another source. Since the tests, the United States has found an alternative buyer for the aircraft enabling the funds to be returned to Pakistan.

Western reaction to Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests was harsh. U.S. Secretary of State Albright described the nuclear tests as "a felony against the future." On May 12, 1998, the United States Senate passed Senate Resolution 227 which "condemns in the strongest possible terms the decision of the Government of India to conduct three nuclear tests on May 11, 1998," and called upon the President to "carry out the provisions of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 with respect to India and invoke all sanctions therein." Officially, U.S. sanctions were imposed on India and Pakistan on 18 June 1998. U.S. sanctions also froze loans from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. On May 26, 1998, the World Bank postponed consideration of a U.S. $130 million package to support India’s renewable energy program, a $450 million loan to develop a national powergrid and transmission company, a $275 million loan to highway improvement in the State of Haryana, and a $10 million IFC loan to Carraro India Limited.¹⁸ Japan, which supplies the most bilateral aid to India, called off a donor’s meeting of states after the tests.¹⁹ On 9 July, 1998, the Senate voted to exempt agricultural credits from the nuclear sanctions imposed on both countries.

A Joint Communique was issued from Geneva by China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States on 4 June 1998, expressing their deep concern that the tests posed a danger to peace and stability in the region. They promised to cooperate to prevent a nuclear and missile arms race in the area and to bolster the non-proliferation regime. India and Pakistan were asked to adhere to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. "They confirmed their respective policies to prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology" that could assist nuclear weapons or ballistic missile programs. A United Nations Security Council Resolution was adopted on June 6, 1998, which condemned India and Pakistan’s nuclear tests and endorsed the Joint 5 Communique.²⁰ On 12 June 1998, the foreign ministers of the eight major industrialized democracies, the G-8, adopted a Communique condemning the tests and calling for the two states to comply with existing nuclear regimes.²¹

Economic sanctions hurt both countries. India had been in the midst of a major economic restructuring which had been initiated by former Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao’s Administration and strongly "encouraged" by the I.M.F. and the World Bank as well as members of the G-8. The intent was to bring India into the global economy. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, Karl F. Inderfurth, said that South Asia is "beginning to realize its promising potential as a market for U.S. business and investment and is making important strides towards integrating into a regional trading bloc.²²" Loss of loans and aid slowed down major development programs. Because of Pakistan’s debt, the loss of multilateral aid threatened to force the government to declare a debt moratorium, and sanctions on international lending to Islamabad were eased.

Since the United States has imposed sanctions on India and Pakistan, it has conduced eight rounds of bilateral talks with each of the two countries and the parties have agreed to a ninth. The United States neither perceives India or Pakistan as an enemy or a threat. Talks were initatiated to create a positive atmosphere which can normalize relations, remove sanctions, and enable the United States to resume cooperative initiatives with India that existed prior to the May, 1998, nuclear tests. Official contacts between India and Japan to resolve their differences have also begun. In January, 1999, India’s Foreign Secretary K. Raghunath and Commerce Secretary conducted talks in Tokyo. As of February, 1999, Tokyo has still not resumed its Official Development Assistance.

India’s Security Concerns and Initiatives in the Post Cold War: South Asia and the Pacific

Following India’s nuclear tests, Defense Minister George Fernandes was quoted as saying that in India’s view China was the main threat to its security.²³ Chinese President, Mr. Jiang Zemin expressed surprise that India had tested and that he was even more surprised that New Delhi had cited China as a reason for conducting them.²⁴ India has perceived China, with whom it shares a border, as its major long-term strategic threat while Pakistan, also with whom it shares a border, has remained a secondary but significant concern for India’s strategic thinkers. India has had historic boundary disputes with both China and Pakistan (Jammu and Kashmir). China and India signed an agreement in May, 1951, by which India recognized Chinese sovereignty and control over Tibet. The two countries agreed in 1954 to base their relations on "five principles of peaceful coexistence: respect for their integrity and sovereignty, mutual nonaggression, respect and noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, equal and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.

In the mid-1950s a series of border clashes took place in the Ladakh district of Kashmir. In 1959, China denied the legitimacy of India’s claim that the border had been established by the 1914 Simla Convention of the McMahon Line. China denied that any Chinese regime had accepted this determination. China attacked India on October 20, 1962, occupying strategic positions in Ladakh and declared a unilateral cease-fire. India still holds that China occupies 38,000 sq. km. of territory, including the Aksai chin region of Jammu and Kashmir. In addition, India claims that 5,180 sq. km. of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir was illegally ceded by Pakistan to China under a 1963 border agreement.

In addition to the dispute over Ladakh, Chinese-Indo relations were aggravated by Chinese Tibetan policy. In 1959 India granted the Dalai Lama, Tibet’s spiritual and secular leader, asylum along with thousands of other Tibetan refugees. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s China accused India of aiding the Khampa rebels in Tibet and it has protested the diplomatic and moral support shown to the Dalai Lama.

China’s friendship with India’s other major antagonist, Pakistan, has also been a factor which has impeded a rapprochement between India and China. India has accused China of violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty by supplying Pakistan with ring magnets and probably with weapons-grade plutonium. K. Subrahmanyan contends that China supported Pakistan’s nuclear efforts both before signing the N.P.T. in 1992 as well as after According to him,²⁵ China constructed for Pakistan a 40-mw Khushab reactor which produces enough weapon grade plutonium for two bombs a year. In addition, China supplied heavy water for the reactor. Subrahmanyan describes Pakistan’s nuclear program as "for all practical purposes...an extension of the Chinese programme and there is no point in India dealing with Pakistan without China being brought into it." ²⁶

China has been a supplier of conventional arms to Pakistan. It is rumored that Pakistan will replace the U.S. denied F-16 fighter-bombers with Chinese F-7 MIG aircraft. When asked about China’s arm sales to Pakistan, Chinese Foreign Minister spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue was quoted as saying that China followed three principles in arms sales to other countries: "It should be beneficial to the importing country’s defence capability, but should not be detrimental to regional stability."²⁷

China consistently denies that it has supplied Pakistan or any state with equipment or technology that can be used for making nuclear weapons. The Chinese Ambassador to India stated in an interview with The Hindu, ""China has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, it does not advocate, encourage or engage in proliferation of nuclear weapons, does not help other countries develop nuclear weapons, and does not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities."²⁸ Nuclear cooperation with Pakistan, the Chinese Ambassador stated, aimed only at the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.

The United States has had a continuing source of disagreement with China over the supply of missile technology and missiles to Pakistan. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Non-Proliferation, Mr. Robert Einhorn, testified at a Senate Foreign Relations Sub-committee on Near East and South Asia hearing on 13 July 1998 that although Beijing seemed more supportive of U.S. concerns, the issue was not resolved.

China was highly critical of India’s nuclear tests. Shortly after the May explosions, a June 10th edition of a Chinese publication, Ban Yue Tan quoted a Chinese proverb: "it takes more than one cold day for the river to freeze three feet deep." India’s May Tests were a consequence of many years of clandestine nuclear development and not accomplished in one day.²⁹ Many articles in the Chinese Press expressed perplexity as to why India would risk the development of co-operative security in Asia and the Pacific while at the same time inviting universal condemnation. One interpretation of Indian nuclear policy appearing in the Chinese press holds that India once was a great and powerful country. It has always viewed itself as the natural successor to Great Britain in the area and of becoming a world power. Yet, the author goes on, India is a developing country with a large impoverished population. India seeks "hegemonism in the region" but cannot do it economically. Its only hope is to show its strength militarily.³⁰

A more strident and unrepresentative interpretation of Indian intent expressed alarm at the growth in Indian military strength. Such growth "constitutes an actual and potential threat to the security of China’s southwest border and also infringes upon and challenges China’s maritime interests to some extent."³¹ The author does not deny India the right as a sovereign state to build a modern army, to satisfy its security dominance. Since their border clash in 1962, the analysis continues, "India has regarded China as its imaginary enemy in future war."³²

Despite Indian concerns, China continues to deny that it views India as an enemy nor does it pose a threat to it. China’s ambassador to India, Zhou Gang, said that there is "no conflict of fundamental interests between them."³³ China’s spokesman for the Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Hu Chusheng, emphasized the importance that China places on the development of trade relations with South Asia. The eastern and southern parts of Asia, he emphasized, are the key areas for trade and economic relations. China has always placed priority on trade with India. At the same time, Hu Chusheng expressed admiration for India’s advantageous position in software development.³⁴

Efforts by both China and India to normalize relations and resolve contentious issues, including its boundary disputes began in the late 1970s. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China in 1988. A series of confidence building measures were put in place. An Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity Along the Line of Actual Control was signed in 1993. Although the Agreement does not resolve the border dispute, it has provided for generally peaceful borders. President Zemin visited New Delhi in 1996. The two countries had also established a framework by which they could carry on discussions: an India-China Joint Working Group and an India-China Expert Group.

Though relations have improved, India continues to be suspicious of China policy. India is suspicious of U.S. policy towards China as well. One writer describes current U.S. China Policy as a policy of "comprehensive engagement" which hopes "to assist in the evolution of China" into a "non-aggressive state that plays a constructive role in the region and elsewhere."³⁵ This characterization of U.S. China policy is made commonly by U.S. analysts as well. What is interesting, however, is the further description of Sino-U.S. Relations as a "peculiar kind of Cold War," which does not have "the bipartisan or universal support within the U.S., unlike the earlier Cold War against the former Soviet Union."³⁶ This Cold War, the author contends, accepts China’s economic reforms but targets the authoritarian structure. An alliance or bloc, he observes, against China has not developed. Instead, "all the U.S. allies are competing with one another to enter the Chinese market." Because U.S. policy reflects acceptance of Chinese economic reforms but opposes its authoritarian actions, it results in "great bargaining …taking place across the table and the compromise attitude of the U.S. on certain issues."

This argument contends that India is affected adversely by this Cold War. During the 1997 Gujral-Clinton discussions in New York, India was told that Indo-U.S. ties would not be determined by Pakistan’s agenda. Further, disarmament issues would continue to be an important part of the diplomatic interactions between the two states. But the United States, it is pointed out, does not include the "China factor" in the context of disarmament. Because of India’s history of conflict with China, India insists that any discussion of disarmament issues must involve China as well. The U.S. has ignored how the sales of technology and equipment to China adversely affects India’s strategic position. As an example, the U.S. has indicated an intention to implement a 1985 nuclear cooperation agreement which requires presidential certification that China is not selling unsafe guarded nuclear technology or material to countries with clandestine weapons programs. Given India’s contention that China has supplied Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear program, not only will China benefit from U.S. technology but Pakistan as well.

The author assumes that all nuclear technology has military benefits and will further advantage China’s military capability to the disadvantage of India. This assumption is not simply true. Some forms of technology increase nuclear safety and are advantageous for all. Nevertheless, America’s policy towards China is controversial within the United States as well. The U.S. often has criticized China for human rights violations, while at the same time it has encouraged the liberalization of China’s economic policy. To what extent diverse policies, such as trade and human rights, should be linked to each other was a major issue in U.S. relations with the former Soviet Union as it continues to be with China. Furthermore, there are many skeptics who continue to believe that China is aggressive and is in the midst of consolidating power for future hostile actions. Certainly the United States continues to have its differences with China as China does with the U.S. It is not unreasonable, however, to engage China in ways which demonstrate U.S. respect and cooperation for the purpose of advancing common interests. To do otherwise would result in a self-fulfilling prophecy that would ensure that China and the United States would ultimately confront each other militarily. The consequences of such a policy are as dangerous as a policy which naively ignores aggression.

India’s policy towards China faces a similar problem as that faced by the United States. India must provide for its security without insuring that its policies leave no room for encouraging future harmonious relations. Unfortunately, there are no easy formulas to apply to issues and one’s judgments are difficult to divorce from past experiences. India and China will have numerous opportunities to test their relations. There will be future competition to acquire energy resources. Both countries will most likely turn to the Persian Gulf and Central Asia for needed oil and gas. There will be increased competition for investment capital, technology, and markets. Increased differences between the two countries will arise over trade issues. In November,1998, China lodged a protest with India over anti-dumping cases being placed on Chinese exports, especially metallurgical coke, and China threatened to retaliate against Indian exports of iron ore to China.³⁷ As China and India compete in the global market, they will confront demands that they follow international agreements on patents, copyrights, and follow accepted trade practices. Both countries will face continued international pressure to cooperate on global environmental issues.

The Gujral Doctrine, as it has been called, was an India initiative in the 1990s to contribute to the peace and development of the "neighborhood," specifically Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Former Indian Prime Minister Gujral identified five principles: India "gives and accommodates what it can in good faith and trust" without asking for reciprocity; no South Asian Country should allow its territory to be used against the interests of another country in the region; non interference in the internal affairs of another country; all South Asian countries must respect each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; and all disputes should be settled through peaceful bilateral negotiations.³⁸ India undertook numerous initiatives with its immediate neighbors. In 1997 it entered into a treaty with Bangladesh on the use of Ganga waters. A thirty year agreement was signed to share water in 1996.³⁹ The two countries also agreed to cooperate in the battle against terrorism. Both countries have pledged cooperation in preventing portions of Bangladesh from being used by terrorists active in India’s North East. India entered into new bilateral discussions with Pakistan. That same year it entered into a treaty with Nepal on the Mahakali project, which would develop the Maha Kali River.⁴⁰ Nepal and India agreed to cooperate as well on a wide variety of other issues: civil aviation, power resources, development of hydro-electric power through the private sector, trade and transit, supply of medical equipment.⁴¹ A free trade agreement was reached with Sri Lanka. Discussions have increased over establishing a South Asia Free Trade Area. India has also entered into a relationship with Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand—Economic Cooperation (BIMST-EC) which holds the promise of greater economic cooperation among the countries.⁴²

Indian foreign policy initiatives, however, were directed beyond its immediate neighborhood to South East Asia. During the Cold War, India had minimal contact with South East Asian nations. It was preoccupied with Pakistan and had been defeated by the Chinese in the 1992 conflict. India was concerned with attending its immediate concerns. With the end of the Cold War, China was interested in pursuing its policies of multipolarity. Emerging power centers in the post Cold War period were limited: the Gulf states, the European Union, and ASEAN. Though the Soviet Union was no longer of major concern to ASEAN states, China’s development and aspirations became more problematic for the present and the future. India was courted by ASEAN and India was receptive to being courted. Japan’s economy had taken a significant down-turn as had the South East Asian states. India was invited to join the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which is ASEAN’s security platform to "promote and protect peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region through dialogue and consensus."⁴³ at the end of 1995 and became a member the next year. It was the only South Asian state to be invited to join the group. In large part, India is seen by ASEAN as a contributor to the balance of power in the area. ASEAN states also have expressed a desire to increase their economic relations with India. Reports indicate that Singapore pushed within ASEAN for admission of India as a Dialogue Partner. Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei, dominantly Muslim states, had reservations about Indian’s participation within ASEAN in large part because of these countries have had strong ties to Pakistan.

India’s role in ARF has already provided diplomatic benefits. At a meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Australia , Canada, and New Zealand attempted to censure India for their May nuclear tests. South East Asian members, not wishing to embarrass India, prevented the measure from passing. India has also proposed to an ASEAN Regional Forum Ministerial meeting in Manila that it become a party to the Protocol to the South East Asian Nuclear-free Zone. ASEAN had initiated negotiations with the five nuclear power states. These states have denied naming India and Pakistan as a nuclear weapon state.

Future Expectations

India, like all democracies, must be responsible for its national security interests while being responsive to the ultimate wishes of its electorate. Often domestic considerations complicate the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. India is not exempt from this additional burden intrinsic to democracies. Though a young country, celebrating a half century of independence, it also reflects the traditions of a rich civilization. At one time India was a continental power. For some segments of the Indian political community, the country has not fulfilled its responsibilities of reconstituting that tradition. The question of how the inheritance of Hindi civilization is to be manifested in political, economic, and social institutions is a salient issue before the country. How that tradition is to be integrated within the fabric of the democratic institutions that India’s founders provided remains a practical issue.

As a nation which emerged from a colonial past, Indians have understandably resented any manifestations of colonialism or imperialism. They are convinced, with some justification, that they have not been treated as an equal among people. This is one reason why Indians have placed a strong emphasis upon receiving proper acknowledgment for their achievements. Recognition is important—even if that recognition is to be identified as the sixth nation to possess nuclear weapons. Only India can be true to itself and answer the question of whether its motivation was to gain international status. It would be too easy to dismiss Indian nuclear policy as simply a desire to join the club. As discussed above, India can justly point to legitimate security concerns.

Now that India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons the question concerns the responsibilities that fall upon such states. India and Pakistan have shown wisdom in reopening discussions with each other to discuss safeguards against accidental warfare, resolution of past issues—including Kashmir, and opportunities for future cooperation. As both countries are aware, this is only the beginning. One of the dark clouds, however, remains the high probability of a continued arms race. As India modernizes its forces, Pakistan will be forced to assess how such modernization affects their conventional military balance with their larger neighbor. Pakistan must modernize its forces as well. There is a high probability as well that both states will continue to expand their missile programs. Presently, neither side has an adequate missile defense!

In his address at the Brookings Institution (Washington, D.C.) on November 12, 1998, Deputy Secretary Talbott emphasized how important it was for both India and Pakistan to limit the development and deployment of missiles and aircraft capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction. Unless both states show restraint, it is possible that the delivery systems themselves "could become a source of tension and could by their nature and disposition increase the incentive to attack first in crisis."⁴⁴

India and China have shown signs as well of returning to their path of normalization of relations. Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh stated in December,1998, that India desired to improve Sino-Indian relations on the basis of the "Panchsheel" treaty. China in turn indicated that they welcomed such remarks. The Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Mr. Zhu Bangzao said that the "normalisation of Sino-Indian relations ‘complies with the fundamental interest of the people of both nations.’"⁴⁵ One would anticipate that Sino-Indian relations will continue to show signs of continued normalization. As stated above, continued normalization does not mean that Sino-Indian relations will not have its contentious moments—especially if India is convinced that China is contributing to Pakistan’s missile and nuclear weapon capability.

At least one strong indicator that India will continue its initiatives in South East Asia and the Pacific is the attention that they continue to give to its blue water capability. A highly placed source was quoted by The Hindu, "We stand committed to the blue water concept to which the carrier force is Central. They are intending to expand their Coast Guard as well to provide greater security to their coastline and free "the principal combatants of the Navy" so that they can be freed to dominate the high seas. "The force structure and the deployments of the navy are factored around exercising sea control, the domination of an envelope far beyond the coast." We are looking at various options."⁴⁶ Among the options being considered are the acquisition of the Russian carrier, Admiral Gorshkov or other smaller foreign carriers. In addition, The Hindu has reported that the Cabinet Committee on Security approved the building of a 20,000 ton carrier of indigenous design to replace the Viraat. The lead time for the construction of the aircraft carrier is around ten years.⁴⁷ India has placed orders with Russia for new Kilo class submarines which would be the first submarines in their fleet with the capability to fire missiles. Orders for Indian construction of two German Type 209/1500 HDW submarines were given and the submarines should be commissioned sometime in 2001-2002.⁴⁸

India is also in the midst of reexamining the manner in which it formulates and implements security policy. The establishment of a National Security Council to provide better integration of its armed forces and to bring military advice into security concerns is promising. India’s strong tradition of civil-military relations will provide a foundation for taking advantage of their views. The possession of nuclear weapons increases the importance of a National Security Council for India. There are many issues to be resolved, not the least of which is what constitutes a minimal nuclear deterrence policy—an issue that the United States has pushed India to clarify.

Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott has stated clearly that the United States has no desire to infringe on Indian sovereignty. India is not a threat to the United States and we have never identified India as an enemy. Differences between the countries will continue and ways must be found to continue discussions about those differences. The United States believes that India and Pakistan must undertake four steps.

Adhere to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;

Agree to the Moratorium on the Further Production of Fissile Material;

Demonstrate restraint in the development, flight testing and storage of

Ballistic missiles and nuclear capable aircraft;

Strengthen Export Controls.

As this paper suggests, one of the great difficulties of foreign policy is that states often have different opinions as to what is to their country’s interest. Nowhere is this more evident than in South Asia where our differences are with friends and not enemies.

About the author:  Dr. Joseph Goldberg has been a Professor of Political Science at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. since 1990, and has served as its Director of Research since 1994. Prior to joining the faculty at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, he served as Professor of Research in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University from 1985-1990. Before entering governmental service, he was a faculty member at the University of Virginia (1969-1975) and Hampden-Sydney College (Virginia) (1975-1985) where he also served as Chairman of the Department of Political Science. Professor Goldberg has taught at the Defense Intelligence College and was an Adjunct Professor at George Washington University for many years. He is a graduate of the University of Iowa where he received his B.A. Degree, and earned his Ph.D in Political Science from the University of Washington. He did graduate study at the University of Minnesota as well. His professional interests have ranged from South Asian politics, political philosophy, American Government, and Middle Eastern politics with special emphasis on terrorism. He has published in these areas. In 1996 An Historical Dictionary of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Greenwood Press) edited and written with Dr. Bernard Reich was published. Among his articles on terrorism are "Understanding the Dimensions of Terrorism," Perspectives on Political Science (Spring, 1991) and "The Terrorist Threat to Corporations," in Global Corporate Intelligence: Opportunities, Technologies, and Threats in the 1990s. edited by George S. Roukis, Hugh Conway and Bruce Charnov, Quorum Books, 1990).

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