Korea: An Opinion From Japan
Hajime Izumi; Professor of International Relations,
University of Shizuoka, Japan
Changes in Assumptions
The security of the Korean Peninsula has clearly reached a critical stage. Since last August relations between the United States and North Korea have slowly deteriorated. Currently the standoff remains confined to the rhetorical level, but North Korea has been issuing openly bellicose statements, and Washington has been countering with moves aimed primarily at deterring Pyongyang, issuing strongly worded warnings and taking a harder line than it has for years.
Behind America's new stance are changes in two key assumptions concerning North Korea. First, many experts no longer believe that for the international community but for North Korea, allowing it to dodge international criticism and pressure while continuing to secretly develop nuclear arms and advance its ballistic missile program. Concerns based on this reading have been steadily growing in Washington.
The second key assumption that has been challenged relates to the Kim Jong-il regime's domestic and foreign policies. In 1994 a fair number of observers in the United States believed that North Korea might choose to pursue a course of domestic reform and external opening. But since the death of Kim Il-sung, the new regime has made no serious moves to adopt reform and open-door policies despite the severe deterioration of the economy and increasingly grave food shortages. Furthermore, it has shown virtually no sign of working to end the nation’s isolation in the international community; it has continued to display little enthusiasm for North-South talks, and it has failed to move toward compliance with international norms
. For the United States, the purpose of the Agreed Framework was not only to prevent nuclear proliferation but also to encourage North Korea to become a responsible member of the international community. But Washington's hopes have been betrayed by the lack of results over the past four years. As a result, the U.S. assessment of the Kim Jong-il regime has coalesced into the view that it is irresponsibly ignoring the collapse of the economy and that it refuses to respect international norms. The widespread distrust of North Korea among Americans has consequently deepened.
The changes in America's assumptions about North Korea have been affected the specifics of Washington's stance toward Pyongyang. The Republican-controlled Congress has demanded that the Clinton administration take a firm, uncompromising approach toward North Korea on the issue of suspect underground construction, and the administration has in turn strongly pressed Pyongyang to allow inspections of the suspect sites. The administration had also responded to congressional demands with a full-scale review of its North Korean policy.
Behind Pyongyang's Hard Line
We must not overlook Pyongyang's own reasons for stiffening its line toward the United States, a move that is not merely a reaction to Washington's toughness. There are good reasons behind its move.
For one thing, the Kim Jong-il regime has heightened its military coloration. When the Supreme People's Assembly was convened after a long hiatus last September, it revised the constitutional provisions concerning the nation's top leadership. The presidency was abolished, and the top post became that of chairman of the National Defense Commission; this title was reassigned to Kim Jong-il, who also holds the posts of general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and commander in chief of the Korean People's Army. The reorganization has created an apparatus headed by Kim Jong-il that is a military government in name and fact. It is no surprise that a regime that has created such a military-centered structure has been demonstrating a hard line in external relations.
A second reason behind Pyongyang's increasingly provocative stance toward the United States is the regime's strong dissatisfaction with the results of the Agreed Framework. The North Koreans presumably had considerable hopes for the light-water reactors that were to be provided by the international community under this framework, seeing this as finally offering a way out of their country's serious energy crisis. But over the past four years, construction of the reactors has been delayed repeatedly, and this has caused a sharp decline in Pyongyang's expectations, as is shown by the recent upsurge of work on small and midsize hydroelectric power facilities.
A statement released on December 2, 1998 by the spokesman for the general staff of the Korean People's Army provided a revealing glimpse into Pyongyang's frame of mind. Not only was Japan identified as a target of attack, but also North Korea declared for the first time that it might conduct a "surgical operation" or preemptive strike. This shrilly-worded statement was highly belligerent and provocative. Given that North Korea now had a long-range missile capability, its intimation of possible preemptive strikes poses a clear threat to Japan, the United States, and South Korea.
The immediate cause of this outburst appears to have been a story by Richard Halloran in the December 3 issue of the Far Eastern Economic Review. Halloran reported on a counteroffensive strategy being drafted by the U.S.-South Korean joint command, according to which U.S. and South Korean armies "will not only repel the invaders, but will push into North Korean territory, capture Pyongyang, demolish its Korean People's Army and destroy the regime of Kim Jong-il." What is particularly noteworthy about this new strategy is the shift in assumptions that it reveals, namely, that U.S. and South Korean military strategists judge that the North Korean army has weakened.
The North Koreans' bellicose rhetoric appears to reflect their sensitivity to the idea that the Americans are increasingly seeing them as militarily weakened. This is presumably why they make deliberately provocative statements and threaten to use their long-range missile capability, which continues to pose an extremely potent threat despite the general diminution of their military power.
For now, the North Koreans appear content to limit themselves to verbal bellicosity. But it will be a different matter o they move from rhetoric into action. For example, if another Taepodong missile purportedly carrying a satellite is fired without advance notice, we will clearly enter a more dangerous stage.
Consider the following scenario: The North Koreans fire another Taepodong missile, drawing a strong reaction especially from the United States and Japan. These two countries' legislatures thereupon freeze funding for North Korea's heavy fuel oil and light-water
Averting a Crisis
Needless to say, we must prevent a recurrence of any such crisis at all costs. But the task of doing do is by no means easy, and the time is limited. Narrowly we view the situation; two difficult problems confront us.
First is the problem of the underground construction of a suspected nuclear facility. The United States had demanded that North Korea allow unconditional and prompt access to the site, but Pyongyang has refused, demanding compensation first. With neither side yielding, the situation has turned into a stalemate.
In order for the bilateral talks on this issue to produce a settlement, the North Koreans will have to agree to (1) withdraw their demand for compensation, (2) receive food assistance from the United States without any linkage to the underground construction issue, (3) accept that the main type of food provided will not be rice but wheat and other cereals, (4) allow access to the underground construction site, and (5) allow nuclear engineers and other specialists to participate in the U.S. inspection team. In addition, (6) the North Koreans will have to agree that if the site is proven to be nuclear facility or potentially convertible to a nuclear facility in the future, they will either cancel construction and close the site or provide ongoing verification that the site is not being used as a nuclear facility through monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
These conditions no doubt represent very high hurdles for the North Koreans. There is also a limit on the amount of time they have left, before American patience runs out. Should North Korea adopt delaying tactics and raise tension levels in an attempt to draw concessions from the United States, the Agreed Framework will be seriously jeopardized. The hard-liners are liable to gain the upper hand in the Republican Congress and elsewhere, and it is quite possible that the Clinton administration will be forced to go along with them.
The second problem is the possibility of another Taepodong missile launch. Since early last November, there have been frequent reports of suspicious activity around the launch site, including the movement of missile parts. If another missile launch occurs, public sentiment is likely to turn even harsher against North Korea, especially in the United States and Japan. As I noted earlier, the legislatures of the two countries might well suspend funding for the light-water reactors and heavy fuel oil supplies that are essential elements of the Agreed Framework, at least until Pyongyang shifted to a more positive stance. This might spell the end of the Agreed Framework. I believe that the North Koreans realize this, but even so I suspect that they may repeat the launching in order to further enhance their long-range missile capability.
It is quite plausible that the North Korean may see the flaunting of their missile capability as effective not only in deterring a possible strike against them by the United States but also in restraining the United States and its allies from retaliating against them if they invade South Korea.
Furthermore, missiles like the Taepodong and Rodong (Nodong) missiles can also serve as bargaining chips in negotiations with the United States. For example, Pyongyang reportedly demanded annual payments of several hundred million dollars for a number of years in return for halting its exports of missiles to the Middle East and elsewhere.
Given the various motivations for missile launching -- ensuring national security, building an offensive capability against South Korea, and strengthening the effectiveness of the missiles as a bargaining ship -- we cannot dismiss the possibility that Pyongyang will fire off another Taepodong. In the worst-case scenario, this would be followed by the collapse of the Agrees Framework and resumption of North Korea's nuclear weapons program with the aim of building devices small enough to arm the Taepodong or Rodong. Once its ballistic missiles are armed with nuclear warheads, Pyongyang will have a very strong bargaining chip indeed.
What Should We Do?
Under these circumstances, blocking the further development of North Korea's long-range missile capability is becoming an increasingly urgent and crucial imperative. But what should we do?
Relying exclusively or excessively on either the carrot or the stick is not likely to produce favorable results. We need to make all the necessary preparations for both approaches and to be ready not just to use the stick if it becomes necessary but also to hold out the carrot of a deal offer if so required.
Taking these conditions as given, we must do three things: first, convey Japan's positions, views, and claims to the North Koreans and determine their views; second, strengthen our deterrence and self-defense capabilities; and third, work at diplomacy. If the second item is the stick and the third item the carrot, the first item is an appropriate blend of carrot and stick. It is crucial that all three items be integrated and advanced simultaneously.
Regarding the first item, I believe that Japan most of all needs to establish a direct channel of communication with North Korea so that we can communicate our intentions. Presently, our only channels of communication with North Korea are via the United Nations and the United States. Given the subtle differences among Tokyo, Washington, and Seoul in their approaches to Pyongyang, the lack of opportunities for Japan to convey its views directly to North Korea and similarly to hear North Korean views is liable to result in the magnification of mutual misunderstandings. Japan should strive to quickly create a forum for direct consultation with North Korea.
On the second point of strengthening deterrence and self-defense capabilities, Japan should take every opportunity to emphasize that it will take resolute measures to defend itself against the contingency of a North Korean ballistic missile attack. Japan has maintained a consistent stance on this point ever since the February 1956 announcement of the government's position by Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama. Should Japan come under a missile attack, if the only way it can block this is by striking the aggressor's missile bases, then doing so is within the scope of Japan's legitimate self-defense. We should repeatedly stress this point whenever the opportunity arises, especially toward North Korea.
Of course, merely delivering this message is not enough. We must also hone our ability to exercise the right of self-defense should the need actually arise. For instance, approval must be granted for the installation of extra fuel tanks on F-15 fighters to extend their flying time. Installation is a technically easy task that can be completed promptly once the decision is reached. If this is done, there will be no great rush to introduce air tankers. This is an issue that should be addressed in the Diet as soon as possible. Based on the above efforts, a strong appeal should be made once again to reaffirm confidence in the Japan-U.S. alliance and strengthen it further. It is of the utmost urgency in this connection for Japan to enact the necessary legislation to implement the new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. In addition, the advancement of Japan-U.S. joint technical research on ballistic missile defense is highly significant. On the first issue, there has been a clear lack of effort by government. Providing a legal backing for the bilateral guidelines would forcefully convey to the North Koreans that if they attack South Korea, U.S. forces in Japan would immediately participate in a retaliatory attack.
In any event, simply displaying anger at North Korea without bolstering our deterrence and self-defense capabilities is liable to send the wrong signal to Pyongyang. We need to make it entirely clear to the North Koreans that we will take decisive measures to defend ourselves against any adventuresome on their part. We must remember that sending a clear signal in itself is a way of enhancing deterrence. In particular, it is imperative that we further solidify the Japan-U.S. alliance and leave no room for North Korean misunderstanding of the U.S. commitment to "extended deterrence" -- that the United States will retaliate against any attack on Japan.
The third item, namely, diplomatic efforts, includes many possible methods, but one issue that we should promptly begin to study is whether there is a need to make some sort of deal with Pyongyang even if it entails massive costs. As we study this point we should also consider the deal to which we have already committed ourselves -- the financial contribution toward construction of light-water rectors under the Agreed Framework. We need to ask what we have gained and lost from this deal and create a balance sheet of the pluses and minuses. Personally, I think that the Agreed Framework has been of positive value even if only to constrain the size of North Korea's nuclear development program (on the hypothetical assumption that they have been secretly conducting one) over the past four years.
Of course, if we agree to a deal, North Korea might then seek a bigger payoff by creating a new threat or increasing tensions. This concern, which many people share, is quite understandable. But in a worst-case scenario, a stance that continually rejects negotiations out of this fear could lead to a sudden flare-up in military tension. Keeping this dilemma in mind, we need to seriously consider the pros and cons of bargaining with Pyongyang.
My own position is that we should pursue negotiations with Pyongyang. The costs incurred should be considered security costs in the broad sense of the term. Japan's planned $1 billion contribution for light-water reactor construction, for example, is a relatively inexpensive outlay compared to any one or combination of the following: Nuclear arms development by North Korea and possible proliferation to South Korea; severe effects on the South Korean economy from rising military tension; damage to the South from actual military conflict; postwar reconstruction costs; and the costs that would arise from the North-South unification, including the burden of building a new economic structure.
The work of negotiating with Pyongyang will probably be distasteful to many people. But without the resolve to see negotiations through despite any unpleasantness, it may be difficult to ensure the security not only of the Korean Peninsula but also of Japan.
Future of Two Koreas
It is difficult to estimate the future of the Korean Peninsula. Perhaps, the only thing one can definitely predict is that unification of Korea will not become a reality in a couple of years. Why this can be said? There are several reasons.
First, the Kim Dae Jung government of South Korea is not thinking to achieve unification in a hurry. What South Korea is aiming at now is building a permanent peace structure on the peninsula based on reconciliation and exchange between the North and the South. The Kim Dae Jung government calls it de facto unification.
Second, it will probably take some more time for South Korea to reconstruct its economy. Even if South Korea sees a turn to a positive economic growth, little possibility exists for the South Korean economy to grow at the rate of 7 to 8 percent as in the past. Perhaps the growth would stay at the level of 2 to 3 percent. Therefore, economically, South Korea will have no room for absorbing North Korea, and most of the South Korean public will not wish an abrupt unification of Korea.
Third, there is an observation that the Kim Jong-il regime in North Korea is not likely to abruptly collapse in the near future. Since January 1999, North Korea has almost stopped praising Kim Il-sung for his achievements or emphasizing his "Yuhun" (Guideline or Teaching Left Behind). Kim Jong-il has stopped relying on his father's authority. This strongly suggests that Kim Jong-il's power has become stable.
Fourth, since January, either, North Korea has scarcely mentioned the unification policy of Kim Il-sung. It does not refer at all these days to his "Koryo Confederate Republic" unification formula. Instead, it only puts stress on national unity. This implies that Kim Jong-il has virtually given up unification. It comes as no surprise, considering that his greatest objective is the maintenance of his regime.
For these reasons, unification of Korea will not materialize for the time being, unless war broke out. It is not clear, however, that North Korea and South Korea may or may not enter a relationship of institutionalized peaceful coexistence, even if not unified. The most likely scenario is an "unstable relationship" in which neither unification nor peaceful coexistence would take place.
Korea's Future Relationship with Other Nations
In such circumstances, South Korea basically will be going to develop further its favorable relations with Japan and other major peripheral countries. President Kim Dae Jung knows very well that secure friendship with the major peripheral countries, especially the United States and Japan, is of great importance for the security and economy of South Korea. Kim Dae Jung's foreign policy toward those countries is highly pragmatic.
Speaking of the South Korean relationship with Japan, Kim Dae Jung's visit to Japan in October 1998 opened a new page in history of bilateral relations. He stated that South Korea would put an end to the "historical issue" between the two countries, and Japan received it with a deep good feeling. The Joint Action Plan set up between Japan and South Korea on that occasion specifies future cooperation between the two in a comprehensive area covering politics, economy, security, culture, etc. It is important that the possibility that the bilateral cooperation may develop even in the area of security has increased with this as a turning point.
What is anxious about for the moment is the coordination of Japanese and South Korean policies toward North Korea. Although Japan shows its understanding of the "Comprehensive Engagement Policy" that the Kim Dae Jung government is trying to promote toward North Korea, there is no climate that Japan has the intention of falling in with that policy. If the Japan-South Korea relations went wrong in the future, it would probably be centering around each other's "policy toward North Korea" -- not around the "historical issue" between the two.
What relationship does North Korea want to build with the major peripheral countries, on the other hand? Their views are hard to read from the outside. It can be known, for example, that Pyongyang attaches importance to its relationship with the United States, but whether they are serious about improvement of relationship with the United States is not clear. As to China and North Korea, they will have the 50th anniversary this year of their formal establishment of diplomatic ties. Kim Jong-il's visit to China would be a natural event that can be considered, however, judging from the course of the past 5 years, it is possible that Kim Jong-il may not visit China this year. A high possibility exists vis-a-vis Russia that a new treaty of friendship will be concluded this year. However, North Korea's relations with Russia may not be improved drastically by that.
At present North Korea takes a rather hostile posture toward Japan and keeps on insisting that "compensation" should be given priority over normalization of relationship. Unless a fundamental change occurs in this attitude of Pyongyang, it can hardly be conceived that Japan would positively tackle the improvement of relations with North Korea. South Korea has recently come to recommend Japan to improve its relations with North Korea, but there is no sign yet that the Japanese stance is going to change in the near future.
U.S. Roles
Needless to say, the first of the U.S. tasks is maintaining solid security relations with South Korea and Japan in order to prevent the recurrence of war on the Korean Peninsula. In this regard, the United States will continue to develop its alliance with the two countries to play an important role in the security field. However, North Korea's threat will not be completely removed or dissolved only by the strong defense system and deterrence. Dissolving the "fear in security" that Pyongyang has and thereby stopping North Korea's development of mass destruction weapons is necessary to actualize arms control on the Korean Peninsula and eventually reach arms reductions in the future. For this, at least the following two conditions seem to be essential:
First, with the full consent of South Korea, a Peace Treaty should be concluded between the United States and North Korea, apart from a Non-Aggression Treaty between North and South Korea. If South Korea accepted this concept; North Korea's sense of fear will be diminished a great deal. Optimistically, it can be considered that Pyongyang may become constructive about arms control on the Korean Peninsula if it sees the possibility of concluding a Peace Treaty with the United States.
Second, food support to North Korea should be promoted. Since the beginning of this year, the Kim Jong-il regime has been taking a new policy of providing the general public with potatoes and wheat instead of rice. Therefore, if the future food support from the international society to North Korea consists of potatoes and wheat, it may reach even the lowest class of people who are suffering severely from the shortage of food. In regard to this food support, obtaining Japanese cooperation would be a prerequisite. The method that Japan imports wheat from the United States and ships it out to North Korea is worth considering.
About the author: Professor Izumi is a Professor of International Relations and Korean Studies at the University of Shizuoka, and concurrently the chairman of the East Asian Security Study Group in Japan. He received his undergraduate education at Chuo University in Tokyo and his graduate training in International Relations at Sophia University in Tokyo. He conducted research at Yonsei University in Seoul, South Korea between 1980 and 1982. He has been a senior research fellow at the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) in Tokyo and has taught at the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. He was a visiting scholar at Harvard University from 1991 to 1992, at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne in 1992 and at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in 1995. His most recent publications include: "North Korea and Japan-Russia Relations," in Vladimir Ivanov and Karla Smith, eds. Japan and Russia in Northeast Asia: Partners in the 21st Century (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, forthcoming), "The Present North Korean Situation and its Implications for Japan," (The Korean Journal of National Unification (Vol 6, 1997). He has also written numerous articles for major journals.