Sung-Han Kim (IFANS), Associate Professor, Institute of Foreign Affairs & National Security
Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade

I. Challenges for Japan

More than half a century has passed since the end of the World War II. It is no doubt that Japan is now a free democratic country abiding by the international law and respecting other countries' sovereignty. It is also noteworthy that Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) have strictly adhered to the "peace constitution" and have never resorted to the use of force nor the threat of use of force under any circumstances. Japan remains a non-nuclear power, while joining virtually all the global disarmament regimes.

Furthermore, Japan is cited as one of the high-trust societies that include Germany, which, in contrast to such "familistic" societies as China, France, Italy, and South Korea, have had a much easier time spawning large-scale firms not based on kinship, thereby creating national prosperity.¹ While Japan is suffering from psychological slump caused by economic debilitation and political gridlock, it still seems to be valid to say that Japan has accumulated a social virtue of trust at least within its own society.

However, criticisms toward Japan have been mounting from outside particularly since the Asian financial crisis happened in late 1997. The IMF criticizes that Japan has failed to address its financial sector problems while ensuring adequate domestic demand. This view is also shared by the United States, who has hailed China as a regional stabilizer and condemned Japan as a passive bystander. The sequence of rapid-fire crises in Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia, and Indonesia wove Japan's problems into a regionwide epidemic while the summer 1998 financial crisis in Russia, Ukraine, and Brazil heightened the fear that Japan's continued inaction could trigger a global meltdown.² In the security arena, many countries in Asia are having some skepticisms toward Japan's expanding role, which is mainly attributable to the "problem of memory"³ of Japan's behavior before and during the World War II.

All of these are related with the question whether Japan, who has a desire to be a political power commensurate with her economic might, is "trusted" by other countries. It is uncertain that the answer is surely "yes" at the moment. Then, it is followed by the next question, which is "why?" Is it due to the lack of understanding from neighboring countries or to the lack of Japan's efforts to convince them?

As we approach the 21st century, the greatest diplomatic challenge facing Japan has to do with security policy. The end of the Cold War and the rise of regional conflicts to the global agenda have opened up opportunities for Japan to enhance its international security role. The United States wants Japan to share burdens for promoting peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, while still keeping her under the U.S. security umbrella. On the other hand, Japan has long stressed the importance of the United Nations as an arena for its international diplomacy to increase Japan's political power. Japan's willingness and ability to expand its security role is being tested in the UN arena, particularly with respect to peace-keeping operations. When Japan acquires permanent membership on the U.N. Security Council, it will have an opportunity to reconfigure itself among the great powers and to use its resources for inter-state and intra-state conflict management in a multilateral setting, rather than in an ad-hoc, bilateral manner.⁴ Japan's expanded role at the global level like in the U.N., however, does not mean Japan is waived to contribute to promoting peace and prosperity at the regional level of Asia.

As an outsider looking in, I explore in this paper what future relationships Japan will have with other nations in the region in terms of the regional peace and stability. Its security relationship with the United States, China, and the two Koreas as well as with the region as a whole will be reviewed to see whether Japan can be trusted and respected by other regional countries before taking permanent membership on the U.N. Security Council. In addition, the role of the United States, that will benefit Japan as well as all other countries in Asia, will be searched.

II. Japan and East Asia

1. Japan's Expanding Role: New U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines

The review of the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation was completed in September 1997 with the announcement of new guidelines for bilateral defense cooperation. The new guidelines aim at creating a solid basis for more effective and credible U.S.-Japan military cooperation related to the defense of Japan and its vicinity in the event of an attack on the Japanese territory or a crisis in areas surrounding Japan.

In this sense, the new guidelines have brought about a turning point in the U.S.-Japan alliance. That is to say, the guidelines have enabled Japan to extend more substantial cooperation than before with the United States in the field of rear-area support to the extent that cooperation between Japan and the United States will come close to the level of the U.S. cooperation with its Atlantic allies. This means expanded role of Japan in the military field.

The most controversial issue surrounding the new guidelines is the ill-defined meaning of "situations in areas surrounding Japan."⁵ It is generally understood that contingencies on the Korean peninsula would qualify as "situations in areas surrounding Japan." In contrast, there is no firm common understanding in the government about the application of the concept to Taiwan. This reflects ambiguity in Japan, creates uncertainty in its policy, and generates unnecessary concern among Japan's neighbors.⁶ China⁷ and other Asian nations are paying greater attention to Japan's expanding role under the new guidelines.

Against this backdrop, Tokyo has taken steps to alleviate its neighbors' concerns by sending high-raking officials to explain the background and Japan's positions. In October 1997, Japan sent Deputy Vice Foreign Minister Minoru Tanba to Beijing to explain the new guidelines, although it was not very successful. In addition, bilateral defense dialogue between Japan and China is slowly growing, with the Japanese and Chinese defense ministers visiting each other in February and May 1998 respectively. The two sides have agreed on reciprocal visits by MSDF and PLA warships and more frequent exchanges between high-level defense officials. Nevertheless, China does not seem to be fully convinced yet.

Surprisingly, Russia is supportive of Japan's expanded international security role. Defense Minister Igor Rodionov, who was the first Russian defense minister to visit Japan, expressed support for U.S.-Japan security cooperation in his visit to Tokyo in May 1997. Of course, this may be related with Russia's interest in increased economic assistance from Japan, who wishes to have Russia return "northern territories."

Reactions from South Korea to the new guidelines were somewhat mixed. The commentary by the South Korean foreign ministry noted that "the guidelines have elucidated the basic preconditions that all actions taken by the United States and Japan will be consistent with the basic principles of international law and such relevant international agreements as the UN Charter, and that Japan will conduct its actions within the limits of its constitution and in accordance with such basic positions as the maintenance of its exclusively defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles." Considering the uncertainty of the North Korean situation coupled with the unpredictability of the Kim Jong-il regime, the new guidelines would contribute to deterring North Korea and making the operation in crisis situations of the ROK-US combined forces more effective through Japan's support.  

However, some concerns were voiced about how South Korea would have to see the expanded role of Japan. The expanded role of Japan could produce unnecessary frictions with South Korea unless mutual confidence is fully built up. Thus, specific measures need to be made between the two countries through the security dialogue which is now regularized. South Korea would permit the use of civilian aircraft to evacuate Japanese nationals from Korea in an emergency situation. However, prior consultation among Korea, Japan, and the United States would be needed when Japanese SDF contemplate operations in international waters close to Korea and in the Korea air identification zone. In particular, it is desirable that both countries institutionalize prior consultations regarding mine-sweeping operations off the Korean coast, evacuation of non-combatants, and inspection of ships based on UN Security Council resolutions for ensuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions and activities related to such inspections. In addition, South Korea and Japan should discuss the ways to prevent unexpected frictions that could result from the overlapped areas of military operation since modern wars do not differentiate clearly between front and rear areas of operation. ⁸

2. U.S., China, and Japan after the Financial Crisis

The revision of the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation was immediately followed by the East Asian financial crisis in the latter part of 1997. As to the impact of the financial crisis on the trilateral relationship among the United States, China, and Japan, the Asian financial crisis has tended to reinforce each country's suspicions or concerns about the intentions of the other two, although they have realized they have to cooperate.

Only two countries have emerged from the debris of the financial crisis relatively unscathed: China and the United States. China has managed so far to stave off pressure for a devaluation of the yuan, which would destabilize other currencies, while the United States has been the indispensable co-architect of the financial rescue package put together by the IMF, the World Bank and others.

Yet some in the region have started to fret that China and the United States, bent on rubbing along better after a tricky few years when they almost came to blows over China's military intimidation of Taiwan, might use East Asia's time of troubles to rearrange the regional balance between them. Some Japanese, conscious of the impatience of outsiders at the slow pace of reform in Japan, also complain that the United States and China are ganging up on them. Such resentment may prompt more calls - like that recently from a former Japanese Prime Minister, Morihiro Hosokawa - for American troops to leave Japan, even though the result would surely be a more open rivalry with China. 

On the other hand, China does not give much credit to the recent rapprochement with the United States considering the fact that the United States and Japan have agreed to jointly study the TMD (Theatre Missile Defense) project for the purpose of dealing with the North Korean missile capability.⁹ This is probably because China believes that the TMD will virtually be targeting at Chinese missiles.

Thus, the balance of power seems to be shifting uneasily in Northeast Asia. The trilateral relationship is still unstable with mutual suspicions remaining or increasing. In addition, the term "trilateral" implies a multilateral dimension to relations among the three. But no multilateral institution exists in Northeast Asia, and there is no multilateral dimension to the interrelationships among the three, although institutionalized multilateralism is nascent in the economic field through the APEC, to which all three belong. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization(KEDO) is the closest thing that exists in Northeast Asia to an attempt to deal with certain security issues on a multilateral basis, but that is a long way from multilateralism in security matters.

Against this backdrop, Japan faces dual tasks. One is that Japan should continue to play a major role for economic recovery of the region, although Japan is getting less credit than it actually deserves. When Japan is perceived as a stabilizer, not a bystander, it can be incorporated into the regional community, where Japan will be able to expand its diplomatic horizon as a leader. The other is that Japan needs to develop the constructive relationship with China. The more Japan and China confront each other, the wider the United States has a space in leading the trilateral relationship toward its own advantage. In this sense, Japan should be more cautious in pushing forward the TMD project.

3. Engaging North Korea

Japan has been supporting the engagement policy to North Korea, conducted by South Korea and the United States. President Kim Dae-jung of South Korea emphasized in his inaugural speech that "Inter-Korean relations must be evolved on the basis of reconciliation and cooperation as well as the establishment of peace." Thus, he enunciated three principles to North Korea: 1) no toleration of any kind of armed provocation; 2) no absorption of North Korea; and 3) reconciliation and cooperation between the South and the North.

However, North Korea's launch of a three-stage rocket (or satellite) on August 1998 changed the security environment of Japan both internally and externally. Threatened by North Korea's satellite launch, Japan began to talk about sensitive security issues that had been previously avoided in open discussion. Japan also decided to participate in a joint research on TMD with the United States, which stirred up strong Chinese reaction as mentioned above. After the satellite incident, above all, the relationship between Japan and North Korea took a sharp turn for the worse, and the level of animosity among the Japanese public against North Korea increased. Thus, reopening of Japan-North Korea diplomatic normalization talks, which has been suspended since June 1988, has become harder to take place soon, while Japan has agreed to commit its KEDO contributions.

The Japanese government's engagement of North Korea after the nuclear crisis of 1993-4 has remained hesitant, and in fact the diplomatic partnership with the United States and South Korea, whilst providing mechanisms like KEDO for Japan to assist in the soft-landing of the North, has also created restrictions which can dictate the pace and halt other Japanese efforts to engage North Korea, such as moves to restart the normalization process.¹⁰ While Japan tends to think that South Korea is really the only country capable of rescuing the North Korean economy, it is clear that South Korea cannot undertake the task alone. Japan's support is vital. Thus, the engagement policy toward North Korea can be seen as an opportunity for Japan to use its economic power to contribute to regional and international security. Of course, this presupposes the quick resolution of the "Kumchang-ri issue" between the United States and North Korea, which will be explained later.

4. Resolving the Problem of Memory: "Human Security" and Japan

Many countries have derived enormous economic benefits from the end of the Cold War. Yet, the income gap between the industrialized and developing worlds has continued to widen. This trend has been compounded in some countries by internal conflict and state failure. At the same time, new security threats have emerged, including an increase in transnational crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Armed conflict has taken on a different shape and is often rooted in religious or ethnic discord.

Growing international recognition of human cost of conflict, in addition to other post-Cold War developments, has led the international community to reexamine the whole concept of security. This evolution in the perception of international security has led to the emergence of the new concept of "human security." Human security recognizes that democratic development, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, sustainable development and social equity are as important to global peace as are arms control and disarmament.¹¹

Human security is much more than the absence of military threat. It includes security against economic privation, an acceptable quality of life, and a guarantee of fundamental human rights. At a minimum, human security requires basic human needs are met, but it also acknowledges that sustained economic development, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, sustainable development and social equity are important so that lasting peace and stability can be achieved.¹² The core element of human security is human rights. One example of the trend to marry normative inquiries to strategic studies is the recently revived interest in the "democratic peace" proposition that democracies do not go to war against one another. ¹³

Against this backdrop, it is necessary for Japan to contemplate how to contribute to improving the human security situation in the region. Japan needs to sophisticate its "soft power diplomacy" before seeking "hard power." Human security, most of all, is rooted upon protection of human rights. Human rights and regional security issues are inextricably linked. The security of nation states begins with the security of civil society of which they are composed. The security problems that beset the region - notably in Cambodia, North Korea, East Timor, and Myanmar - are the projected shadow of human rights violations. Conflicts cannot be resolved, confidence cannot be built, and multilateral cooperation cannot be strengthened unless regional security issues are addressed at their root cause - violations of human rights.¹⁴ Thus, the violation of human rights needs to be prevented.

It is noteworthy that one of the reasons for Japan's passiveness toward human rights in Asia lies in its failure to apologize meaningfully for its wartime behavior. Thus, resolving the "problem of memory" is the first task Japan has to tackle. Japan must come to grips with its past if it wants to be trusted by other countries. Otherwise, Japan cannot be trusted by anybody in the region. In this sense, Japan's relationship with South Korea is a role model. Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi's unusually frank show of remorse during South Korean President Kim Dae-jung's October 1998 visit to Tokyo was a good start. ¹⁵

Asia is not the only continent where the past overshadows the present. French-German rivalry plagued modern Europe for decades, making stability impossible until that relationship improved. Like France and Germany in the interwar years, China and Japan now stare suspiciously at each other across a gulf of mistrust. Asia can ill afford such a rivalry. The continent needs a leader, and Japan is the natural candidate. But Japan's failure to address the past has left it unable to exercise leadership or play a full role in world affairs. ¹⁶

When Japan takes the initiative in grappling with the past, and China, Korea and others in the region recognize that Japan has changed, Japan will have a historic opportunity for genuine contribution to the well-being of the region. Japan can talk about human security issues that are to come out on the surface as the economic crisis in the region continues: political and socioeconomic insecurity due to the end of the "developmental state"; intrastate ethnic conflict and involuntary migration that could happen as economic hardships worsen; drug-trafficking and transnational crime; environmental degradation; and land mines and small arms.

The core element of all these human security issues is human rights, which Japan has avoided mentioning.¹⁷ It is difficult for Japanese to act assertively in Asia when they have not resolved the problem of the past. But if Japan faced the past in a wholehearted way, it would become morally qualified to talk about various human security issues. Only through the genuine effort to build trust from other countries, Japan can become a leading country that is respected from the international community. Otherwise, Japan would only be perceived as a hard power-seeking country who has neither historical consciousness nor national dignity. When Japan shows a leadership role on human security issues together with the United States, it would come to possess a wider room for conducting its soft power diplomacy, which cannot be bypassed to become a genuine great power.

III. Role of the United States

1. Leadership Role of the United States

Washington's strategic priority in the post-Cold War international order is to continue to display leadership as the sole superpower of the world. However, this is a heavy burden for the United States to bear alone. In this context, cooperation with other powers is inevitable. But even in this case, not only the United States but also other small and medium-sized countries are reluctant to see anyone other than the United State playing the leadership role. The United States is, thus, required to prevent weapons of mass destruction from proliferating, if it is to play this leadership role, because any country which intends to develop such weapons must be regarded as a challenging force against the U.S.-led international order.

To those who worry about upholding the balance of power in the region, the United States stands out more sharply than ever as the only truly indispensable "balancer." In the Cold War era, the United States had concentrated on checking rival superpowers, but now it has to check all potential forces which are likely to grow as challenging forces. Such potential forces in Northeast Asia may include Russia, China and Japan. Thus, the United States needs to play the role of balancing power among these countries. The United States should refrain from aggravating its relations with Japan and China in order to prevent them from collaborating together in an anti-U.S. move. But it also should refrain them from provoking distrust between them because such distrust may induce them into escalating an arms race, thereby threatening the stability of the region. In order to check such arms races, the United States is required to maintain continuously a security umbrella for Japan.

Above all, the East Asian financial crisis highlights the need for a sustained U.S. security presence in East Asia, both to protect against the renewal of old tensions and to respond to the potential outbreak of new sources of instability. However, the financial crisis has placed new limitations on Japan's and Korea's host-nation support for the U.S. security presence in those countries and on opportunities for joint exercises necessary to sustain strong military cooperation with key allies and friends. ¹⁸

The challenges for U.S. leadership in response to the region's financial crisis are to contain the damage so that it does not cause a round of global economic deflation and domestic instability that could harm regional security and to sustain confidence in U.S. leadership. Despite the limits of its own fiscal capabilities, the United States is expected to help ease the impact of the crisis on impoverished populations in Asia as a way of demonstrating U.S. leadership.

From the U.S. viewpoint, therefore, it is necessary to manage political and socioeconomic repercussions of the Asian economic crisis in the short-term as well as mid to long-term perspectives. Thus, the U.S. is required to engage more actively in the discussion of human security issues since it could prevent domestic dissatisfaction from developing into anti-Americanism. That is why the co-leadership is necessary between the U.S. and Japan.

In this sense, U.S. support for regional cooperation mechanisms such as APEC and ARF is likely to be even more important as regional cooperation is weakened by stresses stemming from the financial crisis. The United States also needs to play the role of the balancer and stabilizer in Northeast Asia, thereby creating the environment favorable for multilateral security cooperation.

2. Making US-Japan-China Trilateral Relationship Stable

Northeast Asia is the region where four of the five major actors in the post-Cold War international system, i.e., the U.S., Japan, China, and Russia, except Europe, are located and their strategic relations are intertwined with each other. Unlike in Europe, a multilateral security cooperation mechanism is absent in Northeast Asia. Thus, Northeast Asia has to rely on the unstable balance of power, thereby resulting in strategic uncertainty.

Since late 1997, the rearrangement of bilateral relations between the U.S., Japan, China, and Russia has been accelerated through the frequent bilateral summit meetings, which is a desirable trend and is expected to contribute to establishing a new regional order. In particular, the U.S.-China relationship characterized by a "strategic partnership" is a positive development toward regional cooperation. Strategic dialogues have been in the right track by the establishment of a strategic partnership between the U.S. and China. These positive trends are attributable to what is called the U.S.-led "new triangular relationship" among the U.S., Japan and China, which has become possible due to the revitalized U.S.-Japan security alliance and to the U.S.-China strategic partnership. The China-Japan-U.S. trilateral cooperation would benefit not only the three partners but also the entire Asia Pacific region.

However, there is no auspicious historical precedent for cooperation among the three countries. Equitable relations among them will be extremely difficult to achieve, as each party tends to envision a nightmarish scenario of the two other nations ganging up on it. A traditional concern in Japan is that the United States may revive its strong affinity for China and form a new China-U.S. relationship, bypassing Japan. Some Americans worry that the two Asian powers may forge an anti-U.S. condominium that might serve as the cornerstone of an East Asian bloc. Similarly, the Chinese are anxious about possible U.S.-Japan collaboration to "contain" China.

At present, although the three countries are not oblivious to the power relationship between themselves, they do not think in trilateral terms. It will be difficult to move beyond the present state of things.¹⁹ Nevertheless, it is expected that shifting bilateral cooperation among the three, depending on issues, would dilute mutual suspicions, thereby contributing to the trilateral and even multilateral cooperation among the countries in the region.

Against this backdrop, the United States needs to play a balancer role between Japan and China to avoid the situation in which their mutual mistrust develops into more open and crude rivalry. However at the same time, the United States needs to avoid utilizing and heightening tension between Japan and China, which could endanger stability of the trilateral relationship.

3. Removing Cold-War Structure on the Korean Peninsula

Another characteristic of the security environment in Northeast Asia is that a volatile situation on the Korean peninsula would have a serious impact on the regional stability. While inter-Korean relations appear to be an intra-peninsular problem, cooperation among all regional countries would be required for stability on the peninsula since instability on the peninsula can develop into a regional one.

As the regional powers in Northeast Asia are heading for rearrangement of their relationship based upon cooperation and real interest rather than on confrontation and ideology, a new environment is being created in a favorable direction toward multilateral security cooperation. Thus, the solution for establishing a new regional order in Northeast Asia needs to be found on the Korean peninsula whose confrontational structure should be removed most of all. The South Korean financial crisis seems to have relieved North Korea's suspicion that South Korea would seek absorption of the North. In addition, the financial crisis has broadened public support in South Korea for the engagement policy toward North Korea while dampening desires for near-term Korean reunification. In the near term, managing the division of the peninsula and promoting inter-Korean reconciliation are located at the top of the priority list.

However, after the discovery of what may be an underground nuclear facility in Kumchang-ri of North Korea, many expressed a deep concern about the sustainability of U.S. policy toward North Korea. This concern grew into frustration when North Korea launched a three-stage rocket (or satellite) over Japan last August. A misfortune can turn into a blessing, however, if we handle it in a wise manner. The current deadlock between the United States and North Korea could be resolved when each tries to understand the other party's interests.

The U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula in general and North Korea in particular is part of a larger framework of global strategic interests. The United States deals with North Korea in terms of maintaining the leadership role of the United States in the post-Cold War era. In order to protect its leadership as the sole superpower, the United States must prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction among the nations which do not possess them already. Thus, the U.S. policy toward the North Korean nuclear problem and missile export is basically premised on this global strategic view.

In contrast with geopolitical interests of the United States, the primary task facing North Korea is to maintain its state system. The Kim Jong-il regime is much more concerned about system maintenance than before since the economic situation is aggravated partly due to the rapid decline of humanitarian assistance from the international community. Thus, the North Korean authorities have been seeking, most of all, improvement in its relations with the United States in order to make the Kim Jong-il regime durable by alleviating the current economic difficulties. For these purposes, North Korea has been observing the Agreed Framework by freezing its nuclear development program.

In light of the structure of their interests, the ultimate solution can be found through the reconciliation of interests. North Korea should alleviate the global strategic concerns of the United States while the United States should find out the ways for North Korea's regime survival. Otherwise, a vicious circle of "muddling through" is inevitable. North Korea will try to muddle through without opening or reform, while the United States and its allies continue to deal with North Korea on an ad hoc basis or in a reactive manner.

Thus, making a comprehensive deal, or "mega deal" between the United States and North Korea would be the ultimate solution. A giant package of economic aid, investment, lifting of sanctions, and diplomatic recognition can be offered in exchange for equally gigantic North Korean concessions such as a buyout of the North Korean missiles and nuclear threats.²⁰ This option, however, presupposes a certain level of mutual confidence between the United States and North Korea. Thus, the United States, together with its allies, can provide North Korea with appropriate incentives, while North Korea implements rightful measures for threat reduction and decides to open up and reform.²¹ In providing North Korea with incentives, Japan's help must be vital.

4. Continuing U.S. Military Presence

One common view that seems to be shared by all regional states is that the United States's security commitment is the indispensable anchor for East Asian security, insofar as it is conducive to peace and stability as well as to preventing an arms race in the region. There is virtually no country that would not like to see a continued U.S. presence in this region. An abrupt and large-scale American withdrawal would leave a power vacuum that is likely to produce intense and destabilizing competition among the regional powers. Japan, who has no more U.S. security umbrella, inevitably will expand its military forces, which will be escalated into an arms race between China and Japan, let alone Korea.

Thus, even China welcomes the U.S. military presence, albeit with much ambivalence. To be sure, Beijing's acquiescence to America's military role in the Western Pacific is predicated upon China not being the target or the victim of the U.S. power. Specifically, Beijing will oppose an American role if the U.S. presence does not prohibit Japan's militaristic tendency or if Washington stands in the way of China's goal of national unification with Taiwan.²²

However, the next problem is whether the United States will need or be able to continue its military presence after Korea is reunified. Most of all, the continued presence of U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula after Korean unification depends on the level of Washington's contribution to the unification effort as the majority of Koreans could oppose even a symbolic presence of U.S. troops in a unified Korea. The posting of even a symbolic number of American forces in unified Korea will likely run against public opinion.²³ Thus, the common sense among Koreans that the United States contributed greatly to unification should be a precondition to the continued presence of American troops in a unified Korea. 

In addition, the existing military alliance between South Korea and the United States should be expanded to a regional alliance after the unification of two Koreas to head off the regional rivalry between China and Japan and to secure safe sea lanes linking Northeast Asia and the Middle East, the source of energy for Korea, China and Japan. The military alliance between a unified Korea and the United States, however, needs to be strictly restricted to Northeast Asia to stave off the possibility of Korea being involved in global conflicts under the U.S. leadership.

The most viable scenario is that a unified Korea would have an optimum level of U.S. naval and air force units and a minimum level of ground forces, less than 5,000, since the presence of the minimum number of ground forces will guarantee "automatic involvement." Automatic involvement should be guaranteed by the United States to help prevent Korea from attempting to develop its own nuclear bombs as a result of an unstable security environment in Northeast Asia.

Lastly, regarding the question of the double presence of U.S. military forces in Korea and Japan, the United States will have to consider the fact that Japan will remain the sole country hosting the U.S. military presence when the United States withdraws its forces from unified Korea. If so, opposing voices in Japan toward the U.S. military presence will be stronger, thereby endangering the U.S. presence even in Japan. This is not the scenario that China wants to happen, since Japan without U.S. security umbrella means Japan which is embarking on rapid military build-up. Thus, the question of U.S. military presence in Korea and Japan should be treated as a single basket.

5. Promoting Multilateral Cooperation

The ARF at least does not deny its intention to be a body not only to talk about, but also to solve conflict that may take place in the area of its concern, namely in Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and Oceania. While it is unwise to tackle all the challenges it faces at present, the ARF foresees a gradual evolution. The evolution of the ARF can take place in three stages: 1) stage I (promotion of confidence-building measures); stage II (development of preventive diplomacy mechanisms); and stage III (development of conflict-resolution mechanism). Despite pessimism over multilateral institutionalization, that has been aggravated since the financial crisis happened, the United States should continue to support the ARF so that it will gradually develop into a region-wide multilateral institution.

In Northeast Asia, bilateral security arrangements will remain the backbone of Northeast Asian security for a considerable period of time. Despite the strategic uncertainty and prevailing bilateralism, Northeast Asia needs to search for such a multilateral setting as the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NEASED) that was proposed by the Korean government in 1994. The U.S., Japan, and South Korea should try to make it feasible and also actively participate in the multilateral activities at the track-II level.

A multilateral security dialogue in Northeast Asia should be based on the following considerations: Firstly, a multilateral security dialogue in Northeast Asia should be seen as a supplement, rather than as a substitute to the system of bilateralism in the region, for a considerable period of time. Bilateralism and multilateralism are not mutually exclusive concepts;

Secondly, a multilateral security dialogue in Northeast Asia should be pursued in a way which is consistent with and conducive to improved inter-Korean relations. As long as inter-Korean relations remain unstable, real peace and stability in the region will be remote. Tangible progress in inter-Korean relations should be the precondition to guaranteeing the stability of Northeast Asia. For South and North Korea, participation in such a multilateral security mechanism could contribute to establishing a solid peace regime on the Korean Peninsula;

Thirdly, a multilateral security dialogue in Northeast Asia needs to maintain cooperative and consultative relationship with the ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF). A sub-regional security dialogue addressing Northeast Asian concerns is fully compatible with the ARF. Although the ARF will continue to include in its discussions some items involving the Northeast Asian sub-region, a sub-regional dialogue will permit the major actors to address these issues in greater depth; and Finally, a gradual approach should be taken to build a common security framework in Northeast Asia. Given the historic realities as well as the differences in political system and economic development among the countries in the region, only a gradual approach based on patience will contribute to building the blocks of a Northeast Asian Home.

IV. Conclusion

From the above analysis, three points can be withdrawn concerning the U.S.-Japan joint efforts to promote peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region. They can be enumerated at three dimensions: human; Korean peninsular; and regional.

First, the challenges for U.S. leadership in response to the region's financial crisis are to contain the damage so that it does not cause a round of global economic deflation and domestic instability that could harm regional security as well as human security and to sustain confidence in U.S. leadership. When Japan joins this effort after resolving the "problem of memory", it will have enhanced credibility from other nations in the region, which will also promote "preventive" regional cooperation for human security. Second, Korean peninsula is still a flash point.

When Japan and the United States make a joint effort to remove the Cold War structure on the peninsula, the whole region will come closer to peace and stability. In order to stop the vicious circle of "muddling through" the Korean peninsula problem, the United States and Japan need to implement a "package deal" with North Korea. Of course, this option presupposes North Korea's willingness to open and reform.

Lastly, the United States and Japan should make every effort to keep the new trilateral relationship among the U.S., Japan, and China stable. To this end, U.S. should not take advantage of Japan-China rivalry, while Japan needs to develop its relationship with China in a future-oriented manner. This means the both countries should take the China factor seriously. In addition, both countries should become convergent allies in promoting multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia as well as in the region as a whole despite the lingering pessimism over multilateralism. "Concerted bilateralism" and multilateralism are not mutually exclusive concepts.

About the author:  Dr. Kim is an Associate Professor in the Department of Americas Studies at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Seoul, Korea. Currently. Dr. Kim is also leaching at the Korea University, Seoul. Before joining the IFANS in 1994, he served as a research fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences and an expert advisor to the Prime Minister's Committee for globalization. A specialist in U.S. foreign policy and international security, Dr. Kim recently contributed articles to scholarly journals to include 'The ROK-US-DPRK Trilateral Relations"; "U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula and Korea-U.S. Relations"; and, "Security Policy of Korea: between Realpolitik and Innenpolitik". Dr. Kim earned a Ph.D. from the University of Texas at Austin.

HOME PAGE