1. Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: The Free Press, 1995), p.12 and part III.
2. T. J. Pempel, "Japan's Search for a New Path," Current History, December 1998, p.431.
3. Nicholas D. Kristof, "The Problem of Memory," Foreign Affairs, November/December 1998, pp.37-49.
4. See Hendrik Spruyt, "A New Architecture for Peace?: Reconfiguring Japan among the Great Powers," The Pacific Review, Vol.11, No.3, 1988, pp.364-88.
5. The new guidelines describe "cooperation in situtions in areas surrounding Japan" in three categories. The first category, "cooperation in activities initiated by either government," includes relief activities, measures to deal with refugees, search and rescue, non-combatant evacuation operations, and activities for ensuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions for the maintenance of international peace and stability. The second category, "Japan's support for the US forces activities," includes use of facilities by US forces and Japan's rear area support. The latter covers support in fields such as supply, transportation, maintenance, medical services, security, communications. And, the third category, "Japan-US operational cooperation," includes activities such as surveillance and mine-sweeping. For further examples of items of cooperation, see Ryu Yamazaki, "Review of the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation: A Japanese Perspective," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol.IX No.2, Winter 1997, pp.35-8.
6. Tsuneo Akaha, "Beyond Self-Defense: Japan's Elusive Security Role under the New Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation," The Pacific Review, Vol.11 No.4, 1998, pp.471-2.
7. China is known to be the most critical of the strengthened U.S.-Japan defense cooperation. China has repeatedly stated that Taiwan is an internal issue of China's and should not be made a target of U.S.-Japan defense cooperation.
8. Japan has limited the SDF's operational area to "the high seas and international airspace surrounding Japan which are distinguished from areas where combat operations are being conducted." But, the problem is not jurisdiction but reality that entails political consideration.
9. India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests have questioned the meaningfulness of Japan's nonnuclear stance while it remains under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Japan is still highly unlikely to go nuclear. But Japan is interested in another option, or TMD. Yoichi Funabashi, "Tokyo's Depression Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs, November/December 1998, pp.29-31.
10. Christopher W. Hughes, "Japanese Policy and the North Korean 'soft landing'," The Pacific Review, Vol.11, No.3, 1998, p.407-8.
11. In December 1996, the OSCE summit agreed that a comprehensive system of security for Europe must cover more than simply military security. They also recognized that security includes the economic situation, social and environmental issues, human rights and freedom of the press and media. Moreover, the final statement said, "The OSCE comprehensive approach to security requires improvement in the implementation of all commitments in the human dimension, in particular with respect to human rights and fundamental freedoms. This will further anchor the common values of a free and democratic society in all participating societies."
12. Lloyd Axworthy, "Canada and Human Security: the Need for Leadership," http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/foreignp/sechume.htm.
13. Ramesh Thakur, "For National to Human Security" in Stuart Harris & Andrew Mack eds., Asia-Pacific Security: The Economics-Politics Nexus (Allen & Unwin, 1997), p.73.
14. Rory Mungoven, Asia-Pacific Program Director, Amnesty International, "Human Rights and Regional Security: A Challenge for the ASEAN Regional Forum," Kuala Lumpur, July 26, 1997.
15. At the Korea-Japan summit meeting in October 8, 1998, "Japan's Prime Minister Obuchi, looking back on relations between Korea and Japan in this century, humbly accepted the historic fact that Japanese colonial rule inflicted unbearable suffering and pain on the Korean people and expressed painfully deep repentance and heartfelt apology for the ordeal." In response, "Korea's President Kim Dae-jung sincerely acknowledged the Prime Minister's perception of history, expressed appreciation and mentioned that it is a necessity of the times that both Korea and Japan make concerted efforts to overcome the unfortunate past and build a future-oriented relationship based on the spirit of reconciliation and friendship." See Joint Declaration on a New ROK-Japan Partnership for the 21st Century (October 8, 1998). The declaration was also accompanied by an "action plan" which details areas of bilateral cooperation. Concerning the direction of Korea-Japan economic cooperation under the East Asian economic difficulties, see Kim Do-hyung, "East Asia's Economic Crisis and Korea-Japan Cooperation," Korea Focus, November/December 1998, pp.31-47.
16. Kristof, Op. cit, pp.42-3.
17. Japan's passive approach to human rights is explained by its lack of interests and convictions about promoting human rights in Asia; its past aggression in the region; the absence of explicit United States pressure on Japan and the deterrent effect of strong Asian opposition to foreign intervention on human rights. Ming Wan, "Human Rights and U.S.-Japan Relations in Asia: Divergent Allies," East Asian Studies, Autumn/Winter 1998, pp.136-68.
18. Scott Snyder, "Beyond the Asian Financial Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities for U.S. Leadership," A Special Report of the United States Institute of Peace, April 1998, p.18.
19. Morton I. Abramowitz, "The Not-So-Plain Geometry of a Trilateral Relationship" in Abramowitz et als., China-Japan-U.S.: Managing the Trilateral Relationship (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1998), p.39.
20. Sung-Han Kim, "Keep North Korea in Agreed Framework," Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online, January 7, 1999, http://nautilus.org/napsnet/fora/23E_Kim.html.
21. As a near-term solution, North Korea should allow the access to the underground facilities at Kumchang-ri and show its businesslike attitude, while the United States promises to increase the amount of humanitarian assistance and to ease economic sanctions as well as accelerating the U.S.-North Korea normalization process. The Agreed Framework cannot survive, however, if North Korea still imagines itself becoming a nuclear power or tries to keep its nuclear option.
22. Yong Deng, "The Asianization of East Asian Security and the United States' Role," East Asian Studies, Autumn/Winter 1998, p.105.
23. It is said that a recent unofficial survey, that was conducted by the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, on the continued U.S. military presence after the Korean unification has shown that 70% of the Korean people are against it.