The Future of Sino-Japanese Relations
Yoshihisa Komori, China Bureau Chief, Sankei Shimbun, Beijing
The Sino-Japanese relationship is an eminently dynamic and vastly complex exchange that can determine the security for the whole of East Asia for the 21st century. Since Japan and China established full diplomatic relations in 1972, the bilateral relationship has greatly expanded and matured, though it remains stirred by historical friction and serious modern-day problems. To make any prediction for the future of this bilateral relationship, it is imperative to first examine the current state of affairs in the relations between these two countries.
The economic component is perhaps the most positive and best-established part of the overall relationship. For China, Japan is the single largest trading partner. China’s imports from and exports to Japan for 1997 amounted to more than 63 billion U.S. dollars, constituting nearly 40% of China’s total external trade. Japan, too, trades with China more than with any other country except for the United States. Japan is one of the top investors in China, with roughly 2 billion U.S. dollars of direct investment in 1997, alone.
Another significant yet un-highlighted feature of the economic relationship between the two nations is the huge amount of Japanese economic assistance being provided to China. Japan’s Official Development Assistance, known as ODA, to China amounted to almost 2 billion U.S. dollars in 1998. The assistance that began in 1978, has now cumulatively totaled 30 billion U.S. dollars. The main part of the Japanese public funds provided through this ODA have gone into the building of China’s infrastructure, such as railways, highways, airports, bridges, government buildings and power plants.
On the diplomatic front, China and Japan are also fully engaged. They exchange visits by their respective heads of state and other government leaders, declaring on each occasion to maintain peace, stability and friendship between the two nations. This is an outgrowth of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1978, which called for joint opposition to any power seeking hegemony in the East Asian region.
Within the diplomatic dialogue there continues to be the unresolved territorial dispute between the two countries over the Senkaku Islands. However, this issue has been relatively quiet for several years as other aspects of the bilateral relationship have been accorded elevated importance.
Politically, China is a one-party dictatorship and Japan a liberal democracy. Yet, this dichotomy has not seriously disrupted the bilateral relationship. One political factor that does disrupt the relationship from time to time is the so-called history issue. Specifically, certain interpretation regarding the history of the Sino-Japanese war that is accepted and articulated by some Japanese leaders invites Chinese denunciations. (Contrary interpretations articulated by some Chinese leaders rarely, if ever, receive criticism by Japanese leaders.) Nevertheless, the overall political interlocution between the two countries has so far been relatively smooth, perhaps due to the Japanese inclination to show flexibility in response to the history issue friction. Thus, the state of the China-Japan relationship hitherto can be described in the main as cooperative and stable.
The most recent turn of events, however, indicates that some significant changes in the relationship are in the offing. These changes, if they fully realized, would be critically important for the prediction of the future of this bilateral relationship. To shed light on the signs indicating a possible change, examination of the forces in Japan that affect attitudes and policies toward China is in order.
The general attitudes of Japanese toward China can be characterized by at least five major factors. They are:
These various factors are sometimes mutually reinforcing and other times in serious conflict, vastly complicating Japanese attitudes, and therefore policies, toward China. Japan’s security policy provides a good example of this. As these five factors all color the Japanese government’s China policy in one way or another, each should be addressed more specifically.
Cultural and historical affinity is almost self-evident. The two countries have had a history of cultural exchange dating from ancient times, with Japan absorbing more from China than the other way around. To cite a few examples, the Japanese use Chinese characters as an essential part of the Japanese written language. Chinese style calligraphy is practiced by millions of Japanese as a cultured art. Chinese proverbs and tales are a part of Japanese daily life.
Economic interest is also self-evident as demonstrated by the extent of Japanese investment and bilateral trade ties. The level of Japanese economic interest has been steadily heightened by the economic reform policy changes instituted by China since the late 1970’s.
As for ideological reactions, both positive and negative attitudes can be seen among Japanese toward the People’s Republic of China under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party. The Japanese "left" has traditionally allied itself with the Communist Chinese on the ground of ideological solidarity. Outside the avowed circles of Socialists and Communists, sympathy and understanding are often expressed for Beijing’s ideological line. Even some of the major newspapers have often manifested such sympathetic ideological inclinations. On the other hand, many Japanese observers and policymakers look at the one-party, non-democratic Marxist-Leninist nature of the Beijing government with serious skepticism and caution.
Despite the favorable factors keeping Japan and China close, a sense of rivalry also is a fact of life on the part of the people of both nations. With their interests often diverging, Japan and China are the two principal players in the geopolitical settings of Asia. This has led to conflicts and even wars in our unfortunate past. Contemporary Japanese, while harboring basically friendly and positive feelings toward the Chinese, nevertheless proceed with a sense of restraint built upon these historic rivalries and competition.
The last, but certainly not the least important factor is the Japanese sense of guilt for the actions the Japanese military took in China during the Sino-Japanese war. The guilty conscience on the part of Japan was one of the primary driving forces for pushing the normalization of relations with China in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. These guilt feelings still prevail in some political, academic and journalistic quarters. China for its part never seems to cease in its efforts to remind the Japanese people of the acts of invasion and atrocities conducted by the Japanese military in this sad chapter of the Sino-Japanese history. It should be stressed that this particular intangible factor regarding the Japanese sense of guilt and the domestic debates stemming from it often carry a surprisingly heavy weight in the process of Japan’s overall China policy making.
Against the background of this complex set of factors affecting Japanese attitudes toward China, at least three unique features emerge. The first is that reference to the Chinese government’s oppression of human rights and democracy is conspicuously absent in the Japanese dialogue with China, both on the official and private levels. Japan, for example, remains completely silent about the recent harsh sentences handed down to the democratic activists who attempted to form a political party in China.
This is in significant contrast to other world democracies that place heavy emphasis on the human rights and democracy issue in their dealings with China.
The second distinct feature is Japan’s inclination to be reticent about China’s military activities, including the country’s involvement in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Japanese government has never defined the seemingly ambitious Chinese military undertaking of recent years as a potential threat or even as a destabilizing factor for the national security of Japan. The 1998 Defense White Paper issued by the National Defense Agency refers to China’s vigorous efforts to modernize and strengthen its nuclear, naval and air forces in detail in a matter-of-fact way. Yet it makes no mention of the implications of these moves for Japan. Throughout the Sino-Japanese intercourse, very few Japanese representatives ever mention Chinese military activities in any critical way. They simply do not talk about the subject. The Chinese representatives in such discourse, however, rarely fail to criticize Japan’s self defense policies.
The third feature of significance here is the Japanese government’s consistently benign, if not totally muted, response to the seemingly ceaseless criticism and denunciation launched by the Chinese government and its controlled media. The subjects of Chinese reproach vary from Japan’s defense alliance with the United States to a Tokyo High Court decision in a libel case on a book about wartime atrocities to such Japanese domestic policies as education. China moreover continues to accuse Japan of reviving the pre-war style militarism. In response to these unceasing allegations, many of which appear to derive from political calculations rather than factual knowledge or analysis, Japan’s government has simply "explained" the case in point to China’s representatives without protesting the erroneous aspects of the Chinese accusations.
The Japanese government has further extended its taciturn response to Chinese government policies and actions that deeply concern Japan and exhibit the potential for harming the Japanese national interest.1 Again, this contrasts starkly with other democracies, and particularly the United States, where the exchange of bitter criticism and even physical expressions of displeasure are a normal part of the Sino-American intercourse.
Analysis of Japan’s taciturn approach to issues arising in the Sino-Japanese relationship is not very complicated. Japan’s reticence about China’s undemocratic practices can primarily be attributed to the Japanese sense of guilt and shame deriving from the wartime history. Japan’s reluctance to address the issues related to China’s military activities is not only because of the war guilt problem, but also because of Japan’s general aversion to military affairs. Japan has long been inclined to let the United States, its senior security partner, handle all the regional military issues.
In spite of the abstention from comment on the part of Japanese representatives, it is a fact that many Japanese defense observers are closely watching China’s steady and significant increase of its military expenditures and the consequent expansion of military capability. These observers are further identifying China’s military growth as a threat to Japan. The dichotomy between these Japanese observations and behavior was underscored in a statement made by the former chief of staff of Japan’s Maritime Self Defense Forces. In a speech given in Tokyo in November 1998, the retired Admiral said that "China’s military is clearly a threat not only to Japan but also to other nations of Asia, but we find it difficult to say so."2
Against the above-described longstanding frame of reference for the Sino-Japan relationship, the most recent events show signs that significant changes may be occurring. The most demonstrative case is the visit of China’s President Jiang Zemin to Japan in November 1998, and the consequent Japanese reaction. Objectively, Mr. Jiang’s official visit to Japan generated more displeasure and resentment among the Japanese public than any other visit by a foreign dignitary in recent decades.
Mr. Jiang and his delegation first attempted to make the Japanese government explicitly write into the joint communique Japan’s apology for the country’s wartime military activities against China. Secondly, Mr. Jiang’s delegation pressed the Japanese government to clearly state the "three no’s" regarding the Taiwan issue.3 Thirdly, Mr. Jiang, who traveled extensively in Japan, criticized the Japanese for not acquiring the proper historical perspective on the last war. He mentioned the "history" issue consistently on every single public speaking occasion during the visit. The banquet hosted by the Emperor was no exception; there Mr. Jiang remarked in his speech following the Emperor’s welcome that Japanese militarism caused suffering to the Chinese people and that Japan should "forever" be reminded of this historic lesson. Fourthly, he did not thank Japan, but merely "recognized" Japan’s decision to provide new economic assistance to China amounting to ?390 billion (approximately 3.6 billion U.S. Dollars).
The cumulative effect of the Chinese President’s actions and utterances brought about unparalleled negative reaction from the general public as well as from politicians and media in Japan. Japan’s Prime Minister, Keizo Obuchi, declined to put the "apology" demanded in writing, contending that the previous Prime Ministers and even the Emperor had already apologized and acknowledged the wrong aspects of Japanese wartime activities.4 The Prime Minister also declined to make a statement on the Taiwan issue, noting that Japan had already made its position clear in previous communiques and statements. Significantly, no politicians, including the opposition leaders, criticized Mr. Obuchi’s decision. Neither did any major media express disapproval of the Prime Minister’s handling of the Chinese demands. This unanimous backing of a firm stance against China is unprecedented in the post-war period. Under similar circumstances in the past, an attempt by the government not to agree with China on any major issue would have been harshly criticized by pro-China forces within Japan and most often nipped in the bud.
This time, however, no Japanese opinion leader defended Mr. Jiang’s approach. Quite the contrary, such scathing denunciation of his deeds and words as the one terming them as "an extremely coercive posture with an intention of making Japan apologize and kneel down all the time" abounded.5 The new reaction seems to indicate that significant changes may be taking place, altering the Japanese public’s attitudes toward China and consequently the government’s policy toward this important neighbor.
As the history issue has figured prominently in the Sino-Japanese intercourse and will likely continue to do so, it merits further elaboration. The Japanese military invasion of China, including atrocities committed in the 1930’s and 40’s, was revealed in detail after the war. Those held responsible were tried and punished by the Tokyo Military Tribunal and other numerous War Crimes Tribunals that were held throughout Asia, including China, in the immediate post-war period. Several thousand former Japanese military officers and soldiers were subjected to harsh sentences, with approximately one thousand two hundred of them executed for the crimes of which they were convicted.
Many cases of Japan’s wartime atrocities were uncovered by the Japanese themselves. This led to severe self-examination and self-condemnation among the post-war Japanese. Japan’s Emperors and Prime Ministers successively extended apologies not only to the Chinese but also to the peoples of other Asian nations upon which the Japanese military had inflicted injury and suffering. All Japanese school children have learned this sad history in their classrooms as well as through the news media. However, most contemporary Japanese feel that by now, more than 50 years later, justice has been done and that enough apology has been expressed. Thus, when China still demands an apology on the occasion of every formal bilateral meeting, most Japanese feel "apology fatigue."
This "apology fatigue" stems from a sense of exhaustion and desperation that, no matter how far Japan goes in trying to accommodate China’s wishes by way of extending repeated apologies, expressions of remorse and by providing enormous amounts of economic assistance, China will only continue to demand more. It is this reaction that was observed among all sectors of Japanese society in response to Mr. Jiang’s calls for further apology and repeated reference to the "history lesson" during his November visit.
Another aspect of the history issue is yet more complicated. While most of the post-war Japanese criticism of Japan’s wartime past was genuine and spontaneous, some part of it was politically exploited by the Japanese left. The Communists and Socialists often significantly magnified the stories of atrocities and used them as political leverage to attack the conservative government. At times this was done in tandem with China. In this political process, the leftists equated the atrocities and militarism with the pre-war Japanese sense of values and of national identity in general. They condemned any Japanese tradition or heritage as the evil soil for militarism and rejected them all. Some went so far as to denounce the whole process of Japan’s modernization as corrupt capitalistic exploitation and attempted to advance the Marxist historical view of modernization. The Japanese national anthem and Japan’s flag were also rejected as symbols of militaristic wrongdoing.6
Added to this picture are the factually murky accounts of Japanese atrocities provided from yet other predominantly outside sources.7 These frequently sensational accounts were often cited by the Japanese left. Any Japanese who expressed doubt about the factual accuracy of the atrocities as alleged by the Chinese was automatically labeled as a "right wing militarist" by both the Chinese and Japanese "progressive forces." In the 1980’s, many Japanese began to feel that this simply had gone too far, perceiving the trend at the time as an excessive political campaign to deny even the positive aspects of the Japanese national heritage. Attempts to swing the pendulum toward the center followed.8 Some political leaders started asserting that distinction be made between the atrocities and the act of war itself, let alone the modernization process.9 Some scholars began reexamining the factual basis of the alleged atrocities and in many cases found inaccuracies or exaggerations in the original claims.
This aspect of the Japanese perspective regarding the history issue has received virtually no mention by the western press. Rather, the attempt to seek a proper balance unfortunately has often been misinterpreted by the outside world as "Japan’s brazen effort to gloss over the past wrongdoing."
It is important to note that President Jiang’s visit to Japan also coincided with other significant new trends in the Sino-Japanese relationship. In 1998, the economic ties between the two countries that, heretofore had been the most cooperative part of the overall relationship, started showing signs of weakening. The bilateral trade for 1998 plummeted from 63.8 billion U.S. dollars to 56.9 billion U.S. dollars, recording a 10.8% drop. This is the first decline in the Sino-Japanese trade volume since 1990, the year after the Tiananmen Square Movement. The Japanese direct investment for the first half of 1998 also dropped by 28% from the same period of the previous year.10
The dramatic contraction of the economic ties is attributable not only to Japan’s deepening economic recession, but also to the Chinese economic slowdown. China’s economic problems seem far less serious on the surface than Japan’s problems, but as such Chinese leaders as Premier Zhu Rongji candidly admit, the structural imbalance and distortion of the whole economic system are deeply rooted.
The precipitous drop of Japanese investment into China is a reflection of the growing awareness of these structural pitfalls on the part of Japanese companies doing business in China. Some Japanese corporate representatives in Beijing list as reasons for caution against further investment their deepening concern for the lack of rule of law, lack of transparency, rampant corruption, pressing unemployment problems, and inefficiency involving state-owned enterprises in China.
Japanese banks began to drastically reduce new commercial lending to China in the latter half of 1998 because of fear for the mounting bad loans on the part of Chinese financial institutions, particularly non-banking institutions. After the government-sanctioned International Trust and Investment Corporations in Guandong and Dailiang collapsed in January, new loans from Japan became virtually nonexistence.
Some long term members of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry in China bluntly admit that most of the Japanese firms operating in China are not making any profit at all and that many are now scaling down the size of their operations. Their poor performance is also attributed in part to China’s lack of rule of law, strict but inconsistent regulations and extensive corrupt practices that are seen as pervasive in the current economic system. These industry representatives argue that China’s problems have always been there, but that they did not constitute much of a barrier against foreign business activity during the period the whole Chinese economy was growing from an extremely low plateau.
The Japanese government, in another signal that all may not be well in the economic relationship of the two countries, decided in 1998 to revise the basic framework whereby economic assistance is provided to China.11 While assistance had been given for the past 20 years as 5 or 6 year packages, making China a unique and special aid recipient, the newly adopted system calls for year-to-year scrutiny and implementation of aid packages to China. This change was adopted against the background of increasing skepticism among Japanese observers about the objectives of the gigantic amount of taxpayer money given to the Chinese government without any open policy debate.12
Perhaps the most important of all the recent trends indicating change is taking place in the Sino-Japanese relationship is that China has stepped up its criticism of Japan’s national security policies. The latter half of 1998 witnessed China sharpen its opposition to the new defense guidelines that Japan agreed to implement with the United States. During the same period, the Beijing government also escalated the rhetoric of opposition to Japan’s new joint undertaking with the United States for theater missile defense (TMD).
China seems particularly unhappy about the defense guideline under which Japan agrees to provide logistical support for American forces in the event of contingencies in "surrounding situations" of Japan. China asserts that this would be tantamount to interference into the internal affairs of China, unless Japan declares that the guideline would never be applied to the Taiwan area. With regard to Japanese-American TMD, China contends that the deployment of the new missile defense in Asia would invite a new arms race in the region and thus destabilize Asian security. The Beijing government further heightened the level of verbal opposition to these Japanese policies after President Jiang’s visit to Japan.
Through these increasingly strong and articulate sets of statements, Beijing has begun to make its opposition to the U.S.-Japan alliance clearer. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, China has never supported the alliance, but also has never outrightly opposed it. Now, through its explicit displeasure against the U.S.-Japan defense guidelines and TMD, China has expressed its clear disagreement with the American military forward presence in Asia, and also to Japan’s defense alliance with the U.S., which is based on such military deployment.
The above-mentioned new economic and security trends provide an important perspective on the current state of Sino-Japanese relations. The strain that seemed to have been caused by Mr. Jiang’s visit was certainly also affected by these recent trends and not exclusively the result of the visit itself.
One certain prospect indicated by these new dynamics is that there is heightened uncertainty about the future between the two countries. In the wake of the Chinese President’s visit, Japan clearly seems less willing to accommodate China’s wishes and is more assertive about adhering to its own agenda. Although China has intensified its campaign to press Japan on the various issues raised during Mr. Jiang’s visit, Japan has not shown any sign of making such concessions. This is a distinct departure from the pattern of the past. It remains to be seen, however, whether Japan’s current firm posture will endure over time. Even if it continues only for a short period of time, an assertive Japan is something China has never faced during the post-war era. This alone is bound to alter the atmosphere of future Chinese-Japanese intercourse.
What sort of substantive changes will occur in the bilateral relationship hinges first on the outcome of the current economic realignment between the two nations. When China values its economic relationship with Japan highly, it usually moderates its posture toward Japan on security and political issues. China’s approach to the territorial dispute with Japan over the Senkaku Islands is one of the most illustrative examples, which underscores this correlation. When the economic exchange with Japan tends to be more fruitful, China softens its complaints about Japan’s claims to the Senkaku Islands. Therefore, if the present weakening of the economic ties with Japan continues to the extent that China no longer considers Japan a valuable economic partner, China can be expected to begin pressing Japan far more vigorously on other issues, especially security issues.
As the 21st Century opens, we will almost certainly see further reduction of the importance of economic ties as the primary basis for the bilateral Sino-Japanese relationship. Indeed, further contraction of the economic interdependence between China and Japan is projected to continue for some time to come, due to the negative factors in the two domestic economies and in the Asian regional economy. Even if these economic factors change in a favorable direction, Japan and China may very well proceed to become economic rivals rather than partners in Asia. Indeed, Mr. Jiang’s visit to Japan and its subsequent fallout have given impetus to the rarely enunciated yet longstanding view among Japanese observers that China is set on a course to seek regional hegemony in its quest to become a great power in what China now refers to as the "new multi-polar world of the 21st Century."13 Developments along the lines of this scenario would certainly generate increased tension between the two countries.
We can also expect to see a more assertive Japan, without the overwhelming war guilt and sense of shame that have dominated Japan’s international behavior during the last half of this century. This, however, may have a positive impact on the bilateral relationship as China generally shows more respect for decisiveness than for abstention.
More broadly, while Japan is essentially a status-quo power, China is not. This alone creates a whole set of inherent divergence, if not outright conflicts of interest. China’s pursuit of economic interests vis-à-vis Japan and Japan’s benign posture toward China has hitherto magnified only the converging interests of both countries.
CONCLUSION
The foundations of the Sino-Japanese relationship are changing. Even if the two countries overcome the complications of their history, other problems have risen in prominence and it will not be easy to remedy the factors behind these recent strains. As a consequence, it can be expected that Sino-Japanese relations in the first decade of the 21st Century will be marked by turbulence and instability. As the dynamism of this bilateral relationship is inevitably and significantly affected by the United States, which remains an eminent player in the Asian geopolitical arena, U.S. policy toward Japan will have a profound impact on the Sino-Japanese relationship.
In the process of advancing its own security and military agenda against Japan, China would be reluctant to confront Japan’s senior security partner, the United States, beyond a certain point. The logical consequence from this prospect would be for China to attempt to distance Japan from the United States. The weakening of the American-Japanese alliance would be beneficial for China’s Taiwan strategy, too. The equally logical response for Japan under this scenario would be to opt for reaffirmation of its defense ties with the United States and take measures to strengthen them. It is the continued unfolding of this triangular power play among China, Japan and the United States that will figure most prominently in the east Asia arena during the first portion of the 21st Century.
About the author: Mr. Komori became the China Bureau Chief of the Sankei Shimbun in 1998, and has been Editor-at-Large since 1994. He was assigned as the Washington Bureau Chief from 1989 to 1994 and the London Bureau Chief from 1987 to 1989. Mr. Komori was Senior Political Correspondent of the Mainichi Shimbun from 1983 to 1987. His other positions with the Mainichi Shimbun include Washington Correspondent (1976-1980 and 1982-1983); Saigon Correspondent/Bureau Chief (1972-1975); Political Correspondent (1968-1972) and General Assignment Reporter (1964-1968). He was a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 1981. Mr. Komori earned a B.A. in Economics from Keio University (Tokyo) and did Graduate Study in Journalism at the University of Washington. Mr. Komori's most recent publications include Japan Analyzed: Views of Young American Japanologists (Bungei Shinju Publishing Co. - 1999); Shadow Forces in America (PHP Publishing Co. - 1996); Looking at Japan: American Viewpoint (The Japan Times - 1995); Vietnam Memories: War, Revolution and People (PHP Publishing Co - 1995). He has published numerous other books and periodicals.