South Asia And U.S. Security Policy
K.S. Nathan; Professor of International Relations, Department of
History,
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur
1. Introduction: India in the Context of Major Transformations in Asia in the Late 20th Century and the Changing Balance of Power
At the end of the 20th century, the entire Asia-Pacific region is witnessing significant transformations in many critical spheres of national, regional, and international geo-political activity. In the ideological sphere, regional concerns no longer focus on the ideological battles that were fought at the height of the Cold War between Communism and Capitalism. Indeed, the battles for survival and progress have shifted dramatically to the economic sphere. Regime survival for most Asian countries hinges on the actual delivery of goods and services to the mass publics whose democratic power has grown inversely with the demise of ideology. The end of the Cold War has compelled strategic realignments on the part of regional powers like India--away from pro-Soviet Cold War policies to visible pragmatic internal and external strategies to promote economic development and national security.
Nevertheless, in the political sphere, a mixed picture emerges in terms of the coexistence of both democratic and authoritarian regimes even as the economic rise of Asia is currently being punctuated by the currency turmoil over the past two years. The Asian economic crisis has invariably forced budget reductions for arms purchases, military modernization, and expansion of national militaries.
Institutionally, economic integration efforts in the Asia-Pacific are being manifested by ASEAN economic integration, APEC liberalization, and the liberalization of financial markets and services under the regime of the World Trade Organization--a process that has suffered a setback by the onset of the Asian financial crisis since mid-1997. The admission of the controversial state of Myanmar in 1997, and the anticipated inclusion of the regional entity's 10th member, Cambodia this year--i.e. the concept of ASEAN-10--is indicative of a certain degree of regional assertiveness in the direction of strengthening ASEAN as a major regional force in world politics. However, ASEAN's paralysis during the Asian financial crisis is also evidence of the weakness of regional institutions in responding to crises, and in handling crisis management. India's participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) since 1996 is recognition of the growing economic power and political influence of South Asia in world politics, buttressed as it was by the nuclear blasts by both India and Pakistan in May 1998.
In the military/strategic sphere, the Asian region is witnessing the rapid rise of China's economic and military power, with power-projection capabilities that can alter the balance of power in Asia, especially in the South China Sea--an area marked by persistent clashes over competing territorial and resource claims between China and several ASEAN members. China's strategic links with Myanmar is a matter of growing concern for India, which through Myanmar has a common border with ASEAN. Additionally, the persistence of low-intensity violence as in Cambodia, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Kashmir reflect the existence of flash points, albeit minor ones at present, which can gain potency in combination with the exacerbation of economic, ideological, ethnic, and religious factors. Nevertheless, in Southeast Asia, the virtual absence of intra-ASEAN conflicts breaking out into open war is largely due to the moderating effect of ASEAN, as well as the defense and security cooperation forged by regional states with external powers. Moreover, ASEAN's Dialogue Partner relationships with all major global players, and the ASEAN Regional Forum's Security Dialogue Mechanism underpinned by existing bilateral and multilateral security alliances in the Asia-Pacific: US-Japan, FPDA, US-South Korea, US-Taiwan, Australia-Indonesia, Manila Pact, and ANZUS--have produced a somewhat salutary effect upon regional stability. In short India's security interests are being shaped by this context of a changing balance of power in Asia at the turn of the 21st century. This paper will briefly examine and evaluate the South Asian security scenario in the light of the nuclear explosions, and explore the implications for U.S. Policy in Asia.
2. The Strategic Significance of India at the Turn of the 21st Century
The strategic relevance of India to ASEAN and the wider Asia-Pacific is based on the following factors: (1) India's attempts to forge new political and economic alignments after the collapse of its erstwhile ally, the Soviet Union and the demise of the Cold War;
(2) India's role as a counterweight to the other major powers especially China and Japan; (3) the current economic reforms in India away from central planning and towards greater marketisation and free enterprise, with significant consequences for international trade and investment; (4) the prospect of Indian technological cooperation with Southeast Asian states in the military and civilian sectors, serving as an alternative as well as additional source of purchases of sophisticated military technology and equipment for defense establishments in Southeast Asia; (5) the nuclear blasts conducted by New Delhi in May 1998, signifying its entry into, and desire for recognition as the world's sixth nuclear power after the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and Chin; and (6) the Indian naval presence in Southeast Asia at Andaman and Nicobar, carrying prospects of further development for strategic positioning in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asian waters. India's strategic positioning as well as development of naval facilities in the Andaman and Nicobar archipelago are clearly designed to protect and promote the commercial, maritime and security interests of this rising Asian power in the next millenium.
3. The Nuclear Explosions and India's Security
India's national security concerns as a major Asian power lie at the root of nuclear development policy, especially after the humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chinese in the Sino-Indian border war thirty- six years ago. India, like China, sees itself as a natural leader of the third world or the developing world, which was, and is still, perceived to be at the mercy of the exploitative tendencies of western industrial capitalism. The fact that India has, until recently, been largely ignored by the world has provided additional impetus for governments in New Delhi to restore if not assert the cultural pride of India. Post-Cold War Indian nationalism is premised on the recognition by the world's five established nuclear powers of India's nuclear status and desire for world recognition.
New Delhi's refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is strongly governed by strategic considerations in the context of a changing Asian balance of power after the Cold War. India is concerned about the uncertainties of the emerging balance of power characterized by the rising military and economic power of China, as well as the enhancement of its nuclear capability. Additionally, its sense of marginalisation has "contributed to an evident, if quiet, crisis of confidence".1 In light of India's strategic potential, the India-ASEAN relationship would indeed be governed by the desire to maintain a regional balance of power favorable to both sides. Mutual concerns about the evolving Sino-Burmese strategic relationship could well strengthen security linkages between India and ASEAN. According to India's defense minister George Fernandes, China had built an electronic surveillance base in Myanmar's Coco islands, and was upgrading airfields in Tibet for use by supersonic fighter jets capable of striking at India's borders.2 Through Myanmar, India shares a common territorial boundary with ASEAN. Additionally, ASEAN's apprehensions over China's emergence as a regional military power have thus far been implicitly expressed by the endorsement of the American military presence in the Asia-Pacific. Additionally, the role of the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA established in 1971, comprising Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore) for the defense of the two ASEAN states is still being upheld although Malaysia suspended participation in the annual military exercises last year owing to financial constraints in the wake of the Asian financial crisis.
In any event, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Government seems strongly committed to making India a nuclear power--a desire that was manifested by the five nuclear blasts in May 1998. New Delhi refuses to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on the grounds that (a) none of the 5 major nuclear powers have committed themselves to a schedule of complete nuclear disarmament, and (b) the possession of nuclear weapons is essential to India's national security--an argument seemingly used by the major nuclear powers themselves for not divesting their nuclear arsenals. In the final analysis, regional perceptions of India's role, economic potential, and strategic power-projection capabilities and influence would depend as much on New Delhi's ability to foster internal political and socio-economic cohesion as on articulating a foreign policy agenda that is comprehensible to the major and middle powers of the Asia-Pacific.
4. Indian Democracy and Indian Security
The political future of India will still be shaped by its rather over-burdened political and administrative institutions based on democracy. Indian society's commitment to democracy is rooted in its history and political culture and social traditions--and even a major political or economic disaster is unlikely to alter the political status quo based on democracy. Arguably, national security perceptions and interests stemming from democracy have a greater degree of stability, sustainability, and predictability as strategic policies can only be pursued with success through coalition, consensus building, and democratic debate. This decision-making process, although cumbersome,
contrasts sharply with decision-making processes in many authoritarian Asian states whose policy processes are driven more by personalities than by institutions. Thus, a national security policy that ultimately emerges from democratic debate is less threatening than one whose sources are shrouded in secrecy. India's political system, economic disposition, and social structure collectively make for progress to be achieved on a slow and incremental basis. Official caution against over-enthusiasm about opening up India to international capital, as well as being over-influenced by East Asia's economic dynamism and "miracle" --has enabled India to minimize the negative impacts of the Asian Financial Crisis on the country. India's largely self-contained economic system marked by the coexistence of the traditional and modern economies is yet another factor in the country's "survivability" during crisis. This point is underscored by the rather minimal impact that U.S. sanctions are deemed to produce on India's economy, imposed after the nuclear blasts.
5. Nuclear Weapons and Prospects for Disarmament in South Asia
Firstly, a conceptual problem has to be addressed. Who decides whether India is a South Asian power, an Asian power, or a world power?
The South Asian security problem could well lie partly in misplaced conceptions about India's strategic geography resulting in a failure to comprehend, and therefore respond adequately to Indian security concerns. It is this writer's view that India dislikes being perceived as only a regional power in South Asia. New Delhi entertains pretensions to global leadership as much as the United States, the former Soviet Union (now, Russia), and China--although with a different ideological/political/moral content.
Nevertheless, given the structure of the international system based on the Nation-State, Indian policy makers since Indira Gandhi have virtually abandoned the Mahatma Gandhi-Nehru type idealism in world affairs, and have proved capable of coming to terms with the raw sinews of power. In other words, in the past three decades, Indian foreign policy has more closely resembled postures and strategies characterizing principles and practices of the balance of power. This ideological transformation should, in a sense, make it easier for near and distant neighbors to deal with a country that has divested itself of both cultural and strategic ambiguities.
Since the May 1998 nuclear blasts by both India and Pakistan, the conventional wisdom that South Asia is ever closer to a nuclear war might well be falsified by emerging realities in India-Pakistan relations. There are several reasons to support this line of argument:
(1) The nuclear balance of terror in South Asia since May 1998 has strengthened, rather than weakened deterrence. Incidentally, this was the same argument used to explain the nuclear balance of terror between the two superpowers in the 1950s: USA and USSR. One nuclear power had a democratic model of government, the other reflected dictatorial/ authoritarian features. Yet, a nuclear war has never broken out between the two nuclear giants. How different is the situation in South Asia? Isn’t there democratic control of nuclear weapons on at least one side of the equation? If the US could strike a deal with the USSR, so could India with Pakistan--based on the mutual confidence that there is mutual deterrence.
Secondly, the nuclear scenario in South Asia cannot, and should not be isolated from the dynamics of the strategic relationship between India and China. Indeed, India's nuclear ambitions might well be driven more by the China factor rather than concerns over Pakistan, which India views as not an equal partner in the balance of power game--and therefore less threatening to India's national security than China. If this were the case, New Delhi's rationale assumes a certain credibility on the issue of complete ad total nuclear disarmament: the threat of nuclear weapons to world peace and security cannot be analyzed in bits and pieces but must be addressed in its totality. Such a position would require a comprehensive approach to nuclear weapons and the eventual dismantlement of the privileged 5-power nuclear club. In any event, nuclear security need not be conceptualized in absolute terms, as it is unlikely that the established nuclear powers are prepared to commit themselves to total nuclear disarmament at the present time. In the meantime, surely India and Pakistan can engage in several confidence building measures that can eventually facilitate movement at the global level.
6. The Strategic Rationale for Peace in South Asia
Strategic considerations that are likely to push India and Pakistan forward in reducing bilateral tensions arising from the nuclear explosions include the following:
(1) The political and economic bankruptcy of the current stalemate: neither government is keen on continuing bilateral relations based on the negativism of the past, for it has not produced beneficial results for the two societies in terms of achieving higher levels of socio-economic development and prosperity.
(2) End to nuclear suspicion: following the nuclear blasts, both countries appear more ready to engage in comprehensive discussions regarding their nuclear facilities and capabilities--a confidence building measure (CBM) that could follow the train of events leading to the final acceptance of the NPT regime by Argentina (1995) and Brazil (1998) in Latin America.
(3) The need for movement on the Kashmir issue: this 50-year old problem has been a major stumbling block in bilateral relations, triggering suspicions and animosities in other areas of the relationship. Both sides are increasingly conscious that no solution can be found via a zero-sum game--territorial, political, ideological, religious, as well as other concessions are necessary to break the stalemate, with growing prospects in the post-Cold war era. Moreover, both New Delhi and Islamabad are keenly aware that the "Kashmiri millstone" is self-inflicted and the world will pass them by in light of globalization and other more important strategic priorities engaging the major powers.
(4) The futility of military conflict in South Asia: enough wars have been fought in South Asia between India and Pakistan: in 1948 and 1965 over Jammu and Kashmir, and in 1971 over East Pakistan resulting in the creation of Bangladesh--with the United States threatening military intervention on behalf of its then ally, Pakistan. A future war, albeit conventional, could severely set the clock back for the major participants while decapitating political leaderships and their ability to deliver on the crucial socio-economic front. In this sense, globalization could well be having a positive effect on South Asia in terms of re-ordering national priorities away from conflict and towards compromise in the defense and pursuit of national interests.
7. South Asian Security: Implications for U.S. Policy
For the United States as for all other major powers, India is the key factor in South Asian security given its territorial size, economic potential, democratic government, relations with key neighbors such as China and Pakistan, military power-projection capabilities, as well as its leadership role and newly acquired status as a nuclear power. The U.S. can play a positive role in facilitating CBMs between India and Pakistan on nuclear non-proliferation. Washington is in a position to conduct an even-handed policy reinforced by diplomatic skill and economic incentives. The lifting of sanctions would be one concrete area in which trade-offs can be arranged towards the greater goal of nuclear peace in that region. Based on the successful record of Argentina and Brazil in abandoning the nuclear option in 1995 and 1998 respectively, a whole range of options or CBMs can be identified and made incrementally operational with respect to South Asia--a process in which the U.S. can act as facilitator: (a) facilitate technical cooperation between the nuclear participants, (b) create a joint committee on nuclear policy, (c) debunk nuclear theology, (d) create international incentives for the nuclear rivals by the international community, (e) both sides to resolve national security issues, and(f) prevent deployment of nuclear weapons.3
In attempting to play a constructive role in South Asian security, the U.S. needs to be cognizant of India's security perceptions and strategies. The structure of Indian threat perceptions assumes at least two dimensions: (a) major external threats emanating from China, and Pakistan (essentially of a military nature), and a U.S.-led group of western industrial countries (essentially of a political/diplomatic nature); (b) major internal threats comprising ethnic separatist movements and rebellions which facilitate outside support/intervention from China, Pakistan, and the West.4
Besides dealing with the nuclear issue in South Asia, the U.S. could explore prospects for a mediatory role in the highly sensitive Kashmir issue. The initial and expected reaction from New Delhi is that Kashmir is an internal issue, and any form of interference in India's sovereignty over Kashmir is likely to be rejected. In any event, since neither India nor Pakistan has been able to resolve the issue on their own after 42 years since independence, there is scope for international diplomacy without necessarily denting the national pride of both parties.
The U.S. needs to take into account the fact that India is in the process of major economic transformations--from strong governmental/ bureaucratic control to market-oriented reforms. India's earlier pro-Soviet and non-aligned stance in foreign and security policies is now being strongly influenced by power-political considerations:
(1) the need to balance the rising power and influence of China in Asia, (2) concern over growing Chinese influence in neighboring Myanmar, (3) the need to be more engaged politically and economically with East and Southeast Asia, and (4) India's refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty(CTBT) or to join the NPT until and unless all the five major nuclear powers(USA, France, Britain, Russia, and China) commit themselves to a schedule for complete disarmament. However, in light of the May 1998 nuclear explosions, New Delhi's continued intransigence may well be characterized more by form than by substance. The politics of self-esteem having been settled between the two South Asian neighbors on the one hand, and between India and the other major nuclear powers on the other, the time has probably arrived for serious negotiations in the context of the NPT and CTBT regimes. In this regard, the U.S. more than any other major power, is uniquely positioned by its traditional relationships and historical contacts with both South Asian actors to accelerate the pace of nuclear disarmament in the region. Ostensibly, U.S. leadership will enjoy greater credibility if Washington along with the other nuclear powers demonstrate political will to commit themselves to nuclear rollback.
8. Conclusion: South Asian Security into the 21st Century
Firstly, the continued strategic dominance of the United States is a major feature of regional security at the turn of the 21st century. As the sole superpower in strategic terms, the U.S. will remain influential in shaping the broader picture of Asia-Pacific stability including South Asia, at least for the next decade, as both South Asia and ASEAN attempt to formulate more effective decision-making capacities to strengthen their ability to manage and respond quickly to crises as a collective unit. However, this influence can be limited if not neutralized by conflicts of national interests between the United States, China, and India with respect to the management of the Asian balance of power. Arguably, the United States could do very little in "democratizing" China beyond Beijing's own political and cultural capacity. Where India is concerned, bureaucratic inertia presents a major problem for policy reform. India seems to move at a tempo of its own which may be quite out of step with western notions of efficiency, productivity, pace and performance. Pakistan presents similar if not greater problems--such as persisting ethnic/religious conflicts, bureaucratic malaise, widespread corruption, and democratic governance. These internal problems could cumulatively impact in a negative way on domestic as well as foreign policy formulation in all three capitals: New Delhi, Beijing, and Islamabad--presenting even greater challenges for U.S. policy.
Secondly, America's post-Cold War strategy in the Asia-Pacific focuses on consolidating already established security linkages with Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN. There is no similar emphasis regarding South Asia, as U.S. security ties to that region are not as strong as with East Asia. The pillar of U.S. security policy in Asia will continue to be the U.S.-Japan security alliance entered into since 1951, and was given a new lease of life during President Clinton's visit to Tokyo in 1996. During the 2-day Clinton-Hashimoto summit (17-18 April, 1996), a nine-point joint document called the "Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security--Alliance for the 21st Century" was initialed, pledging Washington's commitment to keep 100,000 U.S. troops in the Asia-Pacific region, of which 47,000 are stationed in Japan. The Clinton Doctrine for Asia is firmly premised on the notion that the U.S. intends to be an active partner in Asia-Pacific stability, growth, and prosperity well into the 21st century, and will therefore remain fully engaged economically, militarily, and diplomatically. Such a strategy of "engagement" is viewed as crucial to preserving America's continued access and influence in a region with growing political, economic, and strategic impact on world affairs. Nevertheless, U.S. relations with Asia will still prioritize China, Japan, Korea and ASEAN, despite growing concerns about the nuclear threat in South Asia.
Thirdly, the U.S. can exploit the opportunities presented by the nuclear explosions in South Asia by clearly articulating its stand on non-proliferation, and the financial rewards accompanying adherence. Pakistan, more than India is under greater economic pressure and the desire of the Nawaz Sharif government for political and economic survival could serve as a strong incentive for Islamabad to accede to the CTBT. Until sanctions are lifted, Pakistan will remain on the edge of financial bankruptcy.5 And for the BJP Government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, its rather shaky mandate could well be strengthened by substantive improvements in relations with neighbors, especially Pakistan. The U.S. should welcome recent attempts to consolidate dialogue between the two South Asian rivals, as evidenced by the historic crossing into Pakistan on February 20,1999 by Indian Premier Vajpayee at the border town of Wagh.6 Both sides now have the opportunity to make progress on the development of command and control systems to protect against accidental nuclear war.
Finally, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the post-Cold War strategic relationships among the major powers in the Asia-Pacific region--USA, China, Russia, India, and Japan--are characterized basically by stability. Nevertheless, the elements of change would tend to be governed more by geo-economic than by geopolitical considerations--a factor that would be increasingly relevant to both India-Pakistan relations as to U.S. policy in South Asia in the 21st century.
About the author: Dr.Nathan was educated in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. He holds a B.A. Hons. (Class 2 Upper) in History, from the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur; a Ph.D. in International Relations from Claremont Graduate School in California; LL.B. Hons (Class 2 Upper) from the University of London, Certificate in Legal Practice (CLP) and LL.M. from the University of London. He was appointed Lecturer in International Relations at the Department of History, University of Malaya, from 1975-1983. He was promoted to Associate Professor of International Relations in 1984, and in 1994, Dr. Nathan was promoted to Full Professor. He was appointed Deputy Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya in 1982, and has also served as the first President of the Malaysian International Affairs Forum, and the Malaysian Association for American Studies, both of which were founded in 1983. Dr. Nathan was also a Visiting Scholar at Harvard University (980-1981); the USSR Academy of Sciences (1984); University of California, Berkeley (1986-1987); the Swedish Institute, Stockholm (1991); the University of Madras (1992); the Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo (1995); the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of the Australian National University, Canberra (1996); and Visiting Professor, International University of Japan, Niigata, Japan (1998). He is also the current President of the Malaysian Association for American Studies. Professor Nathan has several publications including four books (one as author, and three as editor), including Detente.and Soviet Policy in Southeast Asia (1984), Trilateralism in Asia: US-Japan-ASEAN Relations (1986), and American Studies in Malaysia: Current State and Future Direction (1986), and numerous articles. His teaching, research and publications are largely in the area of strategic studies, big power relations in the Asia-Pacific region, ASEAN regionalism, and Malaysian security and foreign policy. He is currently editing a special volume on "North America and the Asia-Pacific: Challenges and Prospects for Cooperative Security Towards the 21st Century," which will be published by ASEAN Academic Press, London in early 1999.