A study of history shows us that approximately every
fifty years the world experiences a revolutionary change – a paradigm shift –
in the nature of armed conflict, provoked by sociological, technological or
other external factors. Examples from
the past two centuries would be: the
development of effective mass conscript armies during the Napoleonic wars [c
1800]; the introduction of rapid-firing rifled weapons in the mid-19th
Century; the industrialization of military production and relevant
infrastructure that preceded WWI; and, the development of nuclear weapons and
their global delivery systems during and immediately after at the end of WWII.
It seems to me that we are now in the midst of just
such a ‘revolutionary’ change, ushered in by the dramatic developments of the
last decade and brought into sharp focus on 11 September 2001. The major factors underlying this change, which
is still ongoing, I would tentatively identify as follows:
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The new global power balance which has emerged following the end of the
Cold War, and the consequent impact on the geostrategic significance of states;
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The rapid advances of technology;
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Changing attitudes to the use of armed force in Western societies.
The New Security
Scene
As far as Europe
and NATO are concerned, the specific elements of the above factors which have
the greatest impact on the current security scene are:
-
The uncontrollable proliferation of technology.
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The growing gap between rich and poor countries.
-
The information revolution.
As a result we are faced today with the need to
reassess what constitutes security, what are the threats to security, and what
should be our responses to those threats, including the particular threat of
terrorism.
As is so often the case, it is not a single cause but
the combination of new factors which creates the new security conditions and
which will generate new security threats.
Take, for instance, the issue of technology proliferation mentioned
above. Technological advantage in
warfare is always transient. It would
be unwise to assume that ‘Western’ technological superiority will in all cases
translate into overwhelming military superiority. Today, the rapid proliferation of technology means that even
small developing countries – especially those run by strong dictatorial regimes
– can, by focussing their efforts, acquire weapons and delivery means which can
pose a real threat to major powers.
When this is coupled with fanaticism the threat is even more evident.
Furthermore, the nature of modern weaponry means that,
unless the technology gap is truly enormous [as it was between the US and the
Taliban], a determined and competent defender today could make a ‘forced entry’
too costly for any country to contemplate.
Forces that can be projected and maintained overseas can be ten times
more expensive than conscript forces for national defence. Compare for example, the firepower that
Canada and Israel can deploy for roughly the same defence expenditure. The West’s capacity for military
intervention may be a lot less than is sometimes supposed.
The growing gap between rich and poor countries poses
a potential security problem in many ways, not just when combined with the
problem of proliferation of technology.
This gap is most dramatically evident if we compare the statistics for
population growth and per capita income for the countries of North Africa and
the Middle East with those of Europe, and project these over the next ten
years. It is wrong to blame this
growing wealth gap on ‘Western’ countries just as it is wrong to conclude that
poverty alone produces, or even justifies, terrorism. In fact, in what is now becoming known as the ‘arc of
instability’ stretching from North Africa to Central Asia, incompetent
government, social injustice and lack of democracy are by far the greatest
causes of discontent. But the
discontent and desperation generate such serious security problems as illegal
migration and drug smuggling and create the breeding grounds for fanaticism
that can in turn produce regional instability and terrorism. This is a worsening problem and one that
will have to be dealt with on its home ground by proactive measures [which may
be military, political or economic] as well as by protective or defensive
measures in our countries. This, too,
has important implications for our security policy.
The information revolution is the third general factor
that has so changed the security environment.
This has several aspects. It is
one of the factors which contributes to the proliferation of technology. It can accentuate the ‘poverty gap’ by
making it more evident. In democracies
it has two major implications. Firstly,
reliance on information technology can render a society very vulnerable to
certain forms of terrorist attack.
Secondly, democracies can no longer exert any control over the flow of
information and therefore over the media.
Yet dictatorships can, if they are sufficiently efficient, manipulate
the media to a certain degree and thereby have a considerable influence on
public opinion, including in democracies with which they may be in
conflict. Governmental information and
even military intelligence can no longer compete with the media for speed of
information transit. As a result, every
action which a democracy takes in pursuance of its security, be it a military
operation or not, will in future be played out in a new environment – that of
intrusive media attention. If we do not
take account of this and plan accordingly, then our security operations will
suffer severely.
Added to these general trends we have seen, in the
past decade or so, the welcome collapse of the Cold War confrontation and with
it, the bipolar security system. It is
this which has precipitated the sudden and dramatic shift in the security
environment. We have gone, in a very
short time, from Cold War to Hot Peace.
We have witnessed a significant change in what constitutes security.
Only a decade ago, ‘security’ was synonymous with
‘defence’. East and West faced the
threat of WWIII, characterized in Europe by the threat of invasion which was
feared, with whatever justification, by both East and West. The threat was common, as was the response –
mass armies based, in continental countries, on mass mobilization and conscript
military service. Deterrence was by
conventional defence backed up by the threat of nuclear weapons. ‘Security’ was measured largely in military
strength.
Today ‘security’ means much more than just military
might. In as far as ‘security’ retains
its military significance, ‘deterrence’ is by guarantee of effective
counter-attack [the difficulties and cost of which put a premium on crisis and
conflict prevention]. Otherwise,
security has become a much broader issue.
For most European/Euro-Atlantic countries, security today is primarily
measured in non-military terms and
threats to security are non-military in nature. These threats include – incompetent government, corruption,
organized crime, insecure borders, smuggling [weapons, drugs, contraband,
people], illegal migration, ethnic and religious conflict, proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, shortage of natural resources [eg, water] and; of
course, terrorism.
All NATO and EU member nations face these
threats. But they face them in
different measure, and therefore they will require a different response. This is in marked contrast to Cold War days,
where threat and response were more
or less the same everywhere. The need
for differentiated response is the factor which today most complicates the
evolution of security alliances [NATO and EU CFSP]. If it is to be worthwhile, an alliance must offer each and every
member a clear and unequivocal security advantage. It must repay their financial and political cost. Today, this means that an alliance must meet
the now different security needs of each of their members rather than the
common need of the Cold War.
As security is no longer just a military concern, it
is no longer just the preserve of MODs and MFAs which have to date been the
main ministries involved in security cooperation. It is no longer possible to draw a clear distinction between external
security and internal security. Security henceforth requires the coordination of the ‘external’
ministries [ie, MOD and MFA] and their agencies [armed forces, intelligence
services] with those of the ‘interior’ ministries: internal affairs; education;
finance; overseas development; transport; environment; health; etc., with their
agencies [policing forces, security services, disaster relief agencies,
etc.]. Security today takes in social
development and it demands the involvement of all elements of society in a way
which security in the Cold War days did not.
Meeting these new security requirements demands fundamental reform of
national structures, patterns of investment, systems of government. Likewise it demands the evolution of
international institutions on a truly radical scale.
Whilst security is now a broader concept, it still
contains major military elements. Yet
even here, a security threat will today require a very different military
response than in the past. No longer
can the threat to the defender be dealt with simply by passive defence or
protective measures. These remain
essential, but have changed in nature.
Armies today may have to be deployed in support of domestic police
operations. In addition, our armed
forces will have to go out to deal with the threat in the countries from which
it is generated. Forces today must
expect to be projected – ie, sent abroad – sustained there [perhaps over long
periods] and used. This will not be passive peacekeeping or, as
in the cold war, deterrence by simply waiting.
Troops must expect to fight.
This faces armed forces with completely different
demands than was the case a decade ago.
Most countries in Europe maintained large, mainly static, armed forces,
which deterred just by their existence.
The West never really
expected to have to fight a sustained conventional operation at short
notice. Consequently, in the face of
increasingly costly weapons and manpower, most NATO nations maintained large
national military structures but very low reserves of expensive munitions - an
unrealistic balance. Most countries
could mobilize forces only in the event of total war. The problems European countries had in deploying forces for the
Gulf War and the structural reorganization needed [for example in the British
Army] to make a division viable in the field bear witness to this fact. [Warsaw Pact armies, it must be said,
maintained a much higher degree of military capability – but in doing so ruined
their economies.] When we deployed troops
for peacekeeping we did not expect them to have to fight – merely to patrol in
blue helmets and white vehicles.
Today, the truth is that we are much more likely to
have to deploy troops actually to fight than was ever the case during the Cold
War. As a result, the kind of forces a
country needs to project, maintain and use military power abroad faces most
European countries with the need for a total
reform of their military systems. Very
few of Europe’s current two million men and women under arms can be reckoned
useable in this respect. Put bluntly,
much of Europe’s defence budgets is spent on maintaining the wrong kind of
armed forces for today’s threats. In a
war on terrorism, most of Europe’s troops can be used only for certain limited
tasks.
Most European countries, therefore, face the difficult
challenge of military reform on a massive scale. Armed forces need to be more capable and flexible. This means that they will be more
expensive. Therefore, unless defence
expenditure is to increase dramatically, they will be smaller. For small countries this means that they
will no longer be able to field balanced national armed forces capable of
conducting all the functions needed in an all-arms military conflict. This implies role prioritization which in
turn implies that an alliance approach will be essential. In this respect, NATO and EU CFSP
requirements are identical. EU CFSP
cannot in the foreseeable future provide an alternative to NATO because most EU
members have not reformed their armed forces to provide credible expeditionary
capability. In addition, for
independent actions, EU will have to develop C3, intelligence and
logistics capabilities it does not currently have.
This is the outstanding challenge today facing
European national defence and security establishments and the international
institutions – NATO and EU. Both
organizations will have to evolve rapidly and demonstrate that they can indeed
offer their members some real security benefit in the new era if they are to
survive and flourish. Otherwise, their
member nations will not fund them. If
the tool cannot do the job required, why pay to keep it? Equally, both organizations will have to
collaborate and coordinate their roles, functions and operations. Neither will be able in the near future to
do all the tasks necessary. Here too
there will have to be prioritization and role sharing.
I have attempted to paint this new security
environment in some detail so as to put Terrorism in its proper context. Terrorism is only one of the threats to
security today, and it is considered a much greater threat in some countries
than in others, for obvious reasons.
Terrorism has many manifestations.
It has been with us for a long time.
There are different definitions of the terms, and to counter it requires
actions on many different fronts.
When we speak of the ‘War on Terrorism’ we should
remind ourselves that terrorism is a tactic, a means. Whilst we seek to prevent it, our real target is not the tactic
but the perpetrator. Our enemy is those
groups and movements which seek to overthrow our social order and which use
terrorism and many other tactics [eg, information warfare] to that end. 11 September brought this into focus. The clear distinction between ‘war’ and
‘non-war’ is now blurred. So,
therefore, is the distinction between the role of armies and policing forces
also blurred.
If we liken this new form of attack on our societies,
which includes terrorism, as a disease – say lung cancer - then as we attempt
to treat the disease, we can draw on several sources of help. The armed forces are the surgeons. The security forces [police, gendarmerie]
are the doctors, dispensing medicine, chemotherapy, etc. The overseas aid and crisis prevention agencies
are the health workers who try to stop us smoking and help us avoid the causes
of the disease. The intelligence and
security services are the diagnosticians who should give us early warning of
our health problem.
Just as in medicine, all these agencies have
indispensable roles to play. Just as in
medicine, no one agency on its own will be effective – best effects are
achieved when they all collaborate.
Military power has an important role to play in the defeat of
terrorism. But military force alone
cannot defeat a terrorist threat.
Military force can at least buy a breathing space. For example, it can deny terrorist groups a
safe haven in space or time, as in Afghanistan, without which they cannot
easily function. But this breathing
space must then be used to tackle the problem at its source, or the military
action may come to be ineffective or even counter-productive.
Likewise, domestic protection can no longer be assured
by passive defensive measures alone.
There will be occasions when security can only be achieved by taking the
war into the enemy’s camp. The problem
facing much of Europe, of course, is that it does not have the military option
to do that. It does not have the armed
forces it needs to pursue the War on Terrorism by force. The challenge, therefore, is a manifold
one: [a] to restructure military forces
within an alliance context [virtually identical for NATO and EU] so that they
can play a useful role in this new form of warfare; [b] to develop other
national security forces [police, gendarmeries, border guards, intelligence and
counter-intelligence services, etc.] so that they can cope with the new threat,
and provide for their international collaboration [either through NATO, the EU,
or other agencies]; [c] to develop the inter-ministerial cooperation necessary
to enable the various ministries and agencies [police, intelligence services,
etc.] which now need to cooperate to deal with the threat actually to do so
effectively; and [d] to invest more heavily in crisis and conflict prevention,
including making overseas and planning part of the national security policy.
The armed and security forces themselves need to agree
in concert a framework for tackling the new security threats which breaks down
old barriers to collaboration. The most
widely used framework is a good place to start. This divides the tasks into ‘anti-terrorism actions’,
‘counter-terrorism actions’ and ‘consequence management’.
‘Anti-Terrorism’ is defensive – it includes all
measures taken to reduce the vulnerability at home or abroad of: people [soldiers, civilians, diplomats, and
workers, etc.]; physical objectives; communication systems; social structures,
etc.
‘Counter-Terrorism’ includes all proactive or
offensive measures. These should aim
to: identify and locate; deter;
prevent; stop; terrorist activities, whether internal or external.
‘Consequence Management’ describes all efforts,
preparatory or subsequent, to limit the effect of terrorism; stabilize the
situation; repair the damage done.
Both military and security forces will need new
capabilities for intelligence and new weapons and equipment as well as a much
higher degree of collaboration and training to fulfil these new tasks.
So, how should we begin to address the issue of change
– of rethinking our approach to security?
A good point would be to readdress the fundamentals of alliance
membership in the perspective of new security threats.
To be a good member of an alliance [be that NATO or a
future EU CFSP] a country should be able to do the following:
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Provide an essential minimum of self-protection;
-
Be capable of receiving help from other allies;
-
Be capable of providing help to other allies.
Self-protection no longer means simply
self-defence. Some nations do still
face a potential external military threat and will feel the need to keep
traditional defences in place. For
others, classic defence of this sort is not a requirement at all. For some members, the threat of terrorism is
very high, for others it is very low.
In a modern alliance, there will have to be very significant differences
in how members prioritize threats and allocate resources to dealing with them.
Likewise the kind of help nations are likely to need
from allies will also differ considerably.
It will no longer just be classic military help. Interior ministries and other security
agencies may now have to be prepared to open their doors to outside help in a
way that they have not previously been prepared to do. The concept of what is alliance-related
infrastructure will have to change. So
will the understanding of which allied countries are on the ‘front line’ in
facing new threats. Patterns of
intra-alliance investment will have to change, as well as national investments.
In providing help to others there are limited options,
but much variation within them.
Military options, as discussed above, will require forces capable of
projection, maintenance and utilization.
But armed forces will also have to be capable of being deployed in
domestic situations in support of domestic security agencies. Providing forward basing and logistic
support will also be very important.
However, sharing the burden not only of cost but also of risk and of
casualties will remain an important factor in deciding how allies will need to
contribute to this function. Help,
however, will not only be military.
This does not offer an excuse for not making a military contribution,
but is rather a recognition that [a] a response will no longer be purely
military; and [b] with the best will in the world it will be some time before
many European countries are in a position to make substantive contributions to
a projected military force.
An additional consideration which affects all the
foregoing is the impact that the source of the new threats to security will
have on the evolution of security systems.
In the Cold War the threat came from a clear direction – from East or
West depending on the viewpoint. This
geographical orientation created ‘frontline states’, ‘rear-area states’,
‘flanking regions’, etc., all of which had a fundamental impact not only on
those nations’ national psychology but also on practical preparation for
conflict. The new security environment overturns
this heirarchy. Just as it destroys the
clear line between internal and external threats, so it also throws up a new
Strategic Alignment with a North-South or North West-South-East alignment. Turkey has replaced Germany as the keystone
state for European Security. NATO’s
Mediterranean countries, headed by Greece, follow Turkey as the new ‘frontline’ states. Now on the one hand this will require a huge
effort to avoid political polarization into a ‘North-South’ confrontation and
the creation of a new political and cultural divide. On the other hand there is to a certain extent already a new
geographical imperative and we must all face the fact that some countries will
be playing a more important role in the new security environment than they were
in the old.
The ultimate question now facing NATO and EU members
alike is how to adapt not only their own national organizations to meet these
new challenges, but how to adapt NATO itself and how to build EU’s CFSP so that
they remain [or become] capable of dealing with the new security threats. internal mechanisms for collaboration will
need to be adapted or created to cope with the different security requirements
of members, to provide a framework within which members can develop specialized
military capabilities to contribute to a common effort, and to ensure a
collaboration by non-military security agencies which nations have hitherto
been unwilling to do [as evinced by the EU’s difficulties in developing its
‘third pillar’]. And, as we noted
above, collaboration between the EU and NATO will have to improve considerably.
This is where universities and think tanks such as NDC
now have a most important role to play.
In all our countries, as in the corridors of NATO and EU, the current
pace of events faces civilian and military staffs with enormous burdens of
overwork. There is no longer enough
time to deal with everyday problems and find enough time for conceptual
thinking. After all, the scope of
change being force upon institutions is the greatest that it has ever been in
peacetime.
Consequently there is a great need to generate ideas,
stimulate thinking and debate on all aspects of security reform, to break down
boundaries between different elements of the security establishment and to
expand the frontiers of what is considered ‘security’. There is an equal need to increase the
strength of the ‘security community’ – the body of military and especially of
civilian personnel competent in the new security issues and capable [a] of
filling posts in national and international institutions; and [b] educating the
population to understand the new needs of security so as to ensure their
support through the democratic process.
This is both a short-term and a long-term
requirement. The university and think
tank is now the interface between the brainpower of the academic community on
the one hand and the overworked policy community, which needs intellectual
support, on the other. It is also the
cradle for educating the new generation to deal with the security threats of
today and tomorrow.