Part I
In the span
of fifteen years France has coped with 3 kinds of threats :
-
Regional
terrorism: ETA, Corsican separatists (FLNC).
- In 1986, Iran has practiced an indirect
approach of war through limited terrorist actions. Teheran goals had nothing to
do with Shiite Islam. At stake were economic interests and a merciless showdown
with political opponents exiled in France.
- More recently from 1994 till 1996 GIA/FIS: this is somewhat new: a non-state actor, located in Algeria dominated by radical Islamist ideology
Against
terrorism France can engage three categories of forces: Police, Gendarmerie and
military forces Armed forces, the term "Forces" designates Air, Land
and Navy). Finally, the Special Operation Command (COS) created in 1992
Three kinds
of responses:
-
Dedicated
"action groups" have been able to conduct hard missions outside and
inside the homeland.
- DST (direction de la surveillance du territoire) covers the homeland Gendarmerie which belongs to the armed forces plays a key role in France and for peacekeeping missions in the Balkans. A special force GIGN (groupe d'intervention de la gendarmerie nationale) enjoys high respect because of successful operations in France and around the world.
-
Vigie-pirate
is an example of cooperation between police (Compagnies républicaines de
sécurité), gendarmerie and armed forces. Different levels of alert allow some
flexibility. The psychological impact has been important. So far, it is
possible to argue that the use of such a diversity of means has enabled to
respond adequately in order to protect, counter et prevent. But one can object
that it has been necessary to act solely on a responsive mode, mainly on the
French territory and that the roots and the sanctuaries have not been
eradicated or destroyed.
Here comes the key-question:
Is the traditional approach to counter terrorism still relevant? The
answer is negative because the nature of the enemy has changed. Such
transformation implies that it will use different strategies, requiring
different weapons.
Therefore, we
need a redefinition of the enemy to understand and foresee the magnitude of the
devices it could use.
Is there an
enemy?
A major question
is does France have enemies? In 1994
the Defense White Paper has stated: "France no longer has a designated
enemy." Is that sentence still valid?
- .Can
"terrorism" be the enemy?
Terrorism is not
communism, a tool is not an ideology, and still evil exists.
Today, the enemy
is not a religion it is the perversion of respectable beliefs by intolerance,
sectarianism, violence and disrespect for the human being. It has nothing to negotiate; sometimes he
will accept tactical negotiations (Lenin à Brest-Litovsk) but will keep its
ABSOLUTE goal.
While it pursue
a general aim, it has precise sub-strategic goals that are defined by the
ideology, not by a sense of power, interests
Its strategy is
progressive, step-by-step.
-
Threaten
the lives and interests of Western nations
-
Expel out
of areas they want to control for themselves
-
Destabilize
friendly regimes portrayed as heretics
-
Take over
power
-
Establish
the rule of intolerance in the name of their ideology
Although its
ideology is extremely archaic, the enemy can be a modern strategist. It is very
likely that terrorists are thinking about the lessons of September 11th.
They read what we say. They are inspired by our fears and anxiety.
The enemy knows
about the economy (he is not stupid) and about globalization. He has
established a global network and autonomous cells. He diffuses its ideology all
around the Muslim community. It uses an educational system, which compensates
for the lack of schools and universities in large and high-populated areas of
the world. Its potential recruitment reserves are enormous.
He is ready to
use WMD when it is possible and where it is judged usefull, according to its
strategy.
Because the enemy has changed, its
weapon, terrorism, can change in nature and magnitude.
During the Cold
War, the notion of high intensity conflict (HIC) has designated the likelihood
of the use of nuclear weapons in a crisis turning into war in a symmetric mode
characterized by the exchange of nuclear strikes.
HIT would
suggest a similar likelihood of WMD use including nuclear and radiological to
cause terror and large casualties in an asymmetric mode during a protracted
conflict. In the absence of the warning of an international crisis, surprise
could be complete.
Such changes
bring tremendous operational consequences.
What has worked relatively well should enter a process of reform and
adaptation… Regional-political terrorism will continue to require classic
measures.
Yes what has
worked should continue. There are no reasons to think that separatist terrorism
will change its methods. WMD are unlikely to be used by such groups for
political reasons.
It is not
irrelevant, it insufficient. Against a new enemy new strategy need to be
defined and new instruments must be used.
Traditional
counter terrorism has to adapt and be combined with other action, integrated in
the new strategy.
In this asymmetric
warfare, what will work?
An integrated
long-term strategy will rely upon a combination of Police and Armed Forces and
Psychological Strategy (influence).
Such strategy
should strike a balance between short and long-term goals.
Short term
means: immediate response
Long term
implies an in-depth approach
-
First,
protection of the homeland
The notion of boarders is now very different for two reasons Firstly, we have created in America and Europea large free-trade areas allowing large flows of wealth to circulate including manpower. For instance, France has become an open territory linked to 14 other European countries. Very soon they will become 19. Secondly, because missiles do not care about boarders.
-
Second
mission - protection of our interests and our people overseas
-
Third a
robust support to our Allies and governments which have joined seriously and in
good faith the fight against terrorism.
Good protection
is the result of a combination of action overseas and at home, both requires a
global reach against terrorism to enable different kinds of forces to achieve
their missions.
The gap will be
filled when our countries, working in close cooperation, will retain and
coordinate the following capabilities:
-
Destroy
sanctuaries: armed forces
-
Destroy the
enemy while it is operating: this can be achieved by several categories of
Special Forces (Delta, GIGN, Special forces…etc)
-
Destroy the
enemy cells this require covert action by dedicated police or military forces.
-
Destroy the
enemy logistical infrastructure: law enforcement.
All these
activities require a high degree of intelligence.
One of the major
vulnerabilities of our adversaries lies in its permeability.
Despite their
tremendous impact, the suicide-operations are thwarted by deep penetration of
the Palestinian society by informers, most of them being Arabs
Intelligence
activities will be much easier and efficient if we reach an ultimate goal,
which is
-
Destroy the
psychological influence of the enemy.
To be efficient
counter-terrorism requires the ability to deny the adversary any legitimacy.
Once you have win the war of spirit you can dry the sources of recruitment and
you cut the enemy from its human environment.
In other words, you take the fish out of the water.
Such a goal
requires a psychological strategy (some call it INFLUENCE).
Military psyops
are, by nature and law, limited to wartime. Since the nature of the war has
changed adaptation must follow and psyops should receive wider extended
missions at a higher level.
Psychological strategy should include all
forms of information, communication and
education such as research program, publications, public debates. It
does not have to be organized by the government but the efforts of individuals,
associations, universities, foundations and others NGOs should be supported.
Can we eradicate
terrorism? We cannot eliminate arrows and guns, but we can suppress that
specific threat.
As Defense
Minister Alliot Marie said in Paris on the 11th of September 2002.
This is a protracted war (longue haleine).