Dieter Dettke

Executive Director

Friedrich Ebert Foundation

A Perspective from Abroad

I.

The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon – key symbols of American power as well as globalization – changed the debate about the central theme of this symposium: the interdependence and inter-twinement of national security and the global economy. It seems that national security and globalization merged so dramatically and so visibly on September 11, 2001 that it will be difficult to separate them ever again. How to protect and guarantee the proper functioning of the institutions of liberal democracy, including the stability of global markets against transnational terrorism; this is – as we know – the central issue. But, the extraordinary scale of the loss of human life, physical and economic damage and the immensely destructive force unleashed with surprisingly low level weaponry transformed traditional security policy and forces us to focus on our vulnerability as an open society on a much broader scale than before, particularly our non-military vulnerability.

It is clear now in a much deeper sense that military superiority alone does not guarantee national security. Terrorists were able to develop an extremely high level concept of planning, engineering and communication and they succeeded in executing their plans with a high degree of precision in last week’s attacks. They were able not only to penetrate and overcome airport security but also to use the very infrastructure and the logistics of a free society for their strategic purposes. Even if this is not World War III – as Thomas Friedman claims it is – there is reason to assume that it is an act of war: most definitely in the minds of the perpetrators. Their perception is that they are victims of the United States and they are tremendously energized by their hate of liberal democracy and everything associated with modernity. The perpetrators believe that the West destroys them and, in their distorted minds, it is even a just war.

· They converted commercial airplanes and their passengers – in their murderous and at the same time suicidal mission – de facto into guided missiles;

· They aimed at America’s way of life and its decision-making centers, including the presidency as well as at the economic lifelines of the American society.

The total damage in addition to the loss of life is still not determined in full:

· billions of dollars of physical damage at the site of the attacks,

· billions of dollars in lost airline business, the travel and insurance industries and several other industries,

· stock market losses of major proportions with one exception: Osama Bin Ladin, who pulled out his stocks in the insurance and re-insurance industry before the attack.

For the first time since World War II the New York Stock Exchange closed for four consecutive business days. There will be longer-term consequences, too, such as stunted economic growth for the fourth quarter of 2001. The attack might well contribute to propelling the global economy into a recession.

II.

Given the level of violence and destruction there is reason not only for the United States to perceive these attacks as an act of war. Among the many victims of the destruction of the World Trade Center in addition to U.S. citizens are people from all over the world. According to the most recent information, more than 50 countries lost citizens: 300 British citizens, 250 Chileans, 200 Colombians, 170 Germans, 130 Turks, 113 Israelis and the list goes on. The World Trade Center was a small cosmos in itself. So it is justified as Chancellor Schröder, Prime Minister Blair and others have stated: “This is a declaration of war against the entire civilized world.”

In an ideal world, globalization would have been the free flow of capital, goods and services, ideas, information and people. Borders were supposed to lose their meaning. That concept was dealt a severe, but hopefully not fatal blow. Terrorists succeeded in exposing open societies as extremely vulnerable. Europe, too, is confronted with exactly the same vulnerability that made the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon possible, and for the first time in its history NATO invoked Article 5, its mutual defense commitment. Neither during the Cuban Missile Crisis nor at the peak of the Berlin crisis did NATO take such a step. The United Nations Security Council also unanimously condemned the attack as a threat to international peace and security.

This worldwide public solidarity is an important political asset for the United States. It is an invitation for the U.S. to provide leadership. There is a good chance that this act of barbarism will help to form a strong and sustainable coalition against terrorism. There are wonderful and touching examples of a unique expression of grief, sadness and sympathy with the victims of the attack and with the American people. Rarely has there ever been so much spontaneous, genuine sympathy all over the world and among every walk of life: churches, unions, factory workers and employers, political parties, the media, etc. Berlin firefighters mourned the deaths of their colleagues killed in action in New York. German athletes and athletes all over the world joined their fellow athletes in America in a moment of silence. There were public events such as the gathering at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, which 200,000 people attended. Similar demonstrations took place in many other capitals of the world. There were also individual demonstrations of sympathy with flowers and notes of sympathy at American embassies and U.S. military barracks. Of course, such an intensive level of compassion and support is a unique moment of solidarity; and it is people to people solidarity, not only official government support.

III.

It is easy both to underestimate the potential of this support for the United States as soft political solidarity – assuming that it might not survive the first hard military actions in retaliation to the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington – and to overestimate its true value. What is important is – as German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer put it – not to overreact and not to under-react. But, the moment of military action will most certainly trigger a debate in Europe, in every European society and among citizens of every single nation. We will therefore continue to have differences for the simple reason that NATO’s Article 5 commitment does not abrogate democratic ground rules. Debate must be possible in order to generate good decisions.

In the United States 88% of the U.S. population supports military strikes against terrorists. That number in all likelihood is lower in Europe. According to public opinion polls immediately after the attack, 57% of Germans supported American military retaliation, but only 37% supported a German Bundeswehr participation in a U.S. military strike. 57% were against German military participation. It is not inconceivable that when the first airplanes and cruise missiles strike at Kabul in Afghanistan or any other country involved in the terrorist attacks, peace demonstrations in Germany will be held. This will hurt the feelings of many Americans, who fought against Hitler for a democratic Germany – and many lost their lives. But, this is what they fought for, a free and open democratic society. Nevertheless, when the decision must be made to participate in a military operation against terrorists or against a country that supports terrorism Britain, Germany, France, Italy and Spain as well as the rest of Europe will stand with and actively support U.S. military operations. This is not, and should not, be an American battle only. It is true, that a debate will take place and there will be people opposing military action. I am sure that a small minority in the United States will oppose military actions, too. There is no doubt, however, that European leaders do have sufficient domestic support for military operations against terrorism. Chancellor Schröder’s leadership is uncontested. Support for his policies is at about 66%. He stated unequivocally that German solidarity is not only with words. Germany will put its money where its mouth is.

The German commitment under Article 5 is firm, but it does not overrule freedom of speech. The German government is required by law to present any decision about the use of German troops to the German Bundestag for approval. The German Bundeswehr is the Parliament’s army, not the government’s. There is no doubt that a majority of the German Bundestag will support the Bundeswehr’s participation in a military operation against terrorists. The extent of this participation will depend on the exact nature of the military operation and on the availability of the appropriate forces at the Bundeswehr’s disposal.

American leaders, the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense have emphasized that this “war” is not conventional. It is a new war, the first 21^st century war. We have to be prepared that classical warfare might not be sufficient in order to defeat terrorism. European leaders know quite well that appeasement is not an option. Appeasement could trigger an escalation, as well. They also know that retaliation should not be the sole form of prevention. For that purpose additional non-military initiatives are necessary. British, French and German qualifications of their declarations of support for the United States state the obvious – and American leaders agree with these considerations:

· that we should do everything to make sure that our military actions do not degenerate into a war of the West against Islam or the Arab Muslim world;

· that our solidarity must rest on our free will and the freedom to make our own decisions;

· that non-military actions must be part of a successful fight against terrorism; and

· that a military operation should be precise, measured and as close as possible to a surgical strike.

IV.

There are voices in Germany that counsel a civilian reaction only. Federal President Rau spoke for them and took up their concerns. Germany will have to go through this wrenching debate, because of our strong pacifist tradition. And, in the end the choice will be clear. It would undermine alliance solidarity to cut off a necessary democratic and pluralistic debate.

The challenge of terrorism is a unique opportunity to forge a new consensus. It will require great leadership skills on the part of the U.S. and on the part of European leaders as well, very similar if not even more demanding than during the Gulf War. At that time, it was necessary to build the broadest possible coalition of nations against Saddam, which included Islamic countries and Arab nations. Today, it is just as important as it was then not to follow the pattern of Sam Huntington’s prediction of a clash of civilizations. On the contrary, a dialogue of civilizations must still be maintained and even be reinforced. The president’s visit to the Islamic Center in Washington is exactly the right signal.

As far as the impact, the surprise and the public sense of violation in the United States are concerned, Pearl Harbor is the proper paradigm. But, on December 7, 1941 the enemy was well known and the U.S. military and political leadership was quite sure about what was needed to be done. This time, it will be much harder to identify the enemy and almost impossible to achieve total victory over a terrorist network spread over 60 states, decentralized and only loosely connected.

Transnational terrorism is a different kind of enemy and military action might not be enough to defeat this new adversary. European leaders point out with good reasons – and this attitude is part of the American discussion, too – that inequality, poverty and lack of education, healthcare and decent social and economic conditions are key factors breeding terrorism. It is essential to stay engaged on those levels, too. The war against terrorism must be a war on many fronts: military, political, economic and cultural.

The very nature of transnational terrorism, in a way, is the negative mirror image of the multinational face of globalization. It offers hardly any clear and useful targets. The decentralized structure of the terrorist network – a network of small cells in 60 different countries all over the world – makes it difficult to deal the organization one fatal blow. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the U.S., Germany learned how quickly any open society can be used as an operational basis for terrorism. It is extremely hard to distinguish between legitimate cultural activities of Islamic groups and a terrorist cell. A legislative initiative to outlaw extremist organizations in Germany is now under consideration. The problem is, of course, first identifying a group as extremist before it can be outlawed. Open societies will always be vulnerable. There are two traps the terrorists opened for liberal democracies: One is to use disproportionate force and display ourselves in a way the terrorists want to portray us so that they can hate the West even more. The other is to sacrifice our civil liberties. Even if a military strike offers itself both for the purpose of retaliation and for weakening the terrorist network, collateral damage must remain a concern of the alliance. As President Bush and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld have stated, a long campaign will be necessary in order to get to the heart of international terrorism. Perhaps even more important than military aid from U.S. allies is intelligence and information sharing. But, there will be difficult decisions to be made. For example, the role of the military and that of the police – deliberately kept separate at all times and necessary to keep separate in the future – will probably change. Their roles might overlap in the future and it will be necessary to establish new rules both on the domestic level as well as internationally. However, it is essential to make sure that the two are not merged. That would be going too far in efforts to fight terrorism.

V.

Part of the reason why there is lingering doubt about the reliability of allied support in the U.S. is the bad start to the transatlantic relationship after the U.S. elections in 2000. It is no secret: Policies of the Bush Administration were not very popular in Europe. Already during the election campaign European governments as well as the general public clearly showed their preference for Al Gore. Public opinion polls usually revealed a 60:40 advantage for him over George W. Bush. However, this electoral opinion pattern is not unusual at all. A sitting president – and vice president – usually enjoy a higher degree of acceptance than the challenger.

A change of government often results in a good dose of instability to the transatlantic relationship. In the past a new consensus quickly replaced such instability. Take for example the change of government in the U.S. after Dwight D. Eisenhower served as president for two terms. Kennedy’s electoral victory in 1960 came almost as a shock for Europe. Then in 1968, after eight years experience with a Democratic administration, Richard Nixon was elected and for the first time after World War II, the counterparts to the U.S. administration in Germany were Social Democrats. What followed in each case was a period of instability and concern, but it did not take much time to build a new consensus and to develop common policies and strategies. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and Ostpolitik are examples of successful consensus building in spite of different concepts and interests here and in Europe.

The Carter and Reagan administrations experienced major difficulties in agreeing on a common strategy with their European allies and in these cases it was not only an ideological issue. Ideological like-mindedness helps – as the relationship between Prime Minister Thatcher and President Reagan or between Chancellor Kohl and President Reagan demonstrated – but it is not always the key to close relations. Witness Helmut Schmidt and Jimmy Carter or Helmut Kohl and Bill Clinton. Brandt and Nixon had a pretty good relationship after initial U.S. concerns over Ostpolitik. Helmut Schmidt and Gerald Ford even developed a close personal relationship in office. But, after the Bush administration took over from Bill Clinton a more fundamental rift and conflict of political outlook seemed to have penetrated the transatlantic relationship.

VI.

Just look at the polling data on the Bush administration in Europe prior to September 11, 2001. In Britain, France, Germany and Italy there was hardly any exception to a rather massive initial rejection of the Bush administration’s policies. There was not only little confidence in George W. Bush to do the right thing. Worse, European leaders seemed to command substantial public support for their criticism of U.S. policies: 59 % in Italy, 64% in Britain and 75% in France did not agree with U.S. policies under George W. Bush. Only in Germany did a slight majority express confidence in George W. Bush: 51% whereas 46% do not.

The reason for European apprehension about George W. Bush’s electoral victory is obvious. Europe expected political continuity from the United States and George W. Bush wanted exactly the opposite: to distance himself as much as possible from the Clinton administration. One prominent victim of the change of governments in the U.S. was the rather unusual Third Way process, which established a consultation process on political and economic issues for governments with an ideological commonality across the Atlantic. Predominantly Social Democratic European governments had, of course, little ideological commonality with the American Republican Party and vice versa.

When Chancellor Schröder made his first visit to Washington after President Bush had been sworn in, a joint declaration by Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and President George W. Bush mentioned openly a major policy disagreement: how to protect the earth’s climate. Germany emphasized once again how indispensable the Kyoto Agreement is to effectively combat global climate change. The United States, on the other hand, opposed the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts many countries from compliance and would cause harm to the U.S. economy. It is rather unusual to display openly such a disagreement during an official visit. Both the chancellor and the president must have had important domestic reasons to state their differences in the open.

The other issue that Chancellor Schröder and President Bush addressed without agreement was Missile Defense. European leaders have hesitated to lend their support to a program whose final architecture and therefore its full implications for Europe are still open in many respects. European concern increased when the new administration declared its willingness to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, unilaterally if necessary. In Europe the ABM Treaty as well as other multilateral arms control agreements are seen as pillars of peace and stability – in the future as well – and not as a relic of the Cold War. Abrogation of the ABM Treaty unilaterally – Europeans fear – could give Russia an opportunity to withdraw from other arms control agreements essential for European security. Chancellor Schröder emphasized that he is not opposed to Missile Defense in principle and Germany clearly has an interest in the development of missile technology.

After the terrorist attack, Missile Defense has to be seen in a different light of political priorities. It is true: you do not want to throw out your fire insurance when your house is flooded, but the issue must now be discussed in a different context of security priorities and necessities.

VII.

In U.S. foreign policy, important consensual policies such as the Balkan engagement, UN peacekeeping and multilateral arms control agreements were put on hold and subjected to an agonizing reappraisal if not even marked for extinction. To be sure, not everything the new administration planned to do differently was actually done differently. The U.S. Balkan policy is one important example. There was continuity after a short period of uncertainty. In the context of the crisis in Macedonia the new motto for America’s Balkan policy is “In together and out together.” The consensus has been re-established, at least for now. European Defense and Security Policy is now also part of an alliance consensus. Initial American reservations – the famous 3 D’s of the Clinton administration

· no decoupling

· no duplication

· no discrimination

are no longer serious concerns. It is now up to Europe to deliver.

Other foreign and security initiatives of the new administration, in particular vis-a-vis North Korea and the Middle East were also inspired by an effort to do things differently from the previous administration. In Europe, these initiatives were perceived as a disengagement signal. America’s ally, South Korea, suddenly did not get the expected support for its sunshine policy vis-à-vis North Korea, although this policy was in essence triggered by the Clinton administration’s agreement on nuclear policy with North Korea. The European Union took the U.S. withdrawal of support for the South Korean sunshine policy as an opportunity to step in where the United States left in an effort to support rapprochement on the Korean Peninsula.

In the Middle East, the Clinton administration brokered a peace agreement and it fell to pieces as a result of a dramatic change in Israel’s domestic policy. The complex land-for-peace agreement in combination with a higher level of recognition of the Palestinian Authority by Israel as well as by the international community did not get the necessary domestic support within the PLO and in Israel. Instead of trying to revive the peace process, the new administration first tried to avoid any active participation in the peace process. The result was quite disastrous: Increased violence on a level that amounts to a second intifada. As is the case of America’s distancing itself from the unification process on the Korean Peninsula, the United States now faces other nations’ initiatives and their efforts to ensure continuity. In Korea, the EU stepped in, in order to keep the sunshine policy going. In the Middle East, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer helped organize new peace talks after the new administration gave up its active role to facilitate peace in the Middle East.

America’s new foreign policy – at least to some degree – was perceived in many capitals of the world as a deliberate disengagement or as an act of self-isolation, opening up the possibility for other actors to step in where America left. In the Middle East, the new role for Joschka Fischer might well be a temporary one, if the United States decides to step in more forcefully in the future. But, in the absence of U.S. engagement in the region a completely new dynamic might evolve: that the EU takes over where the United States leaves.

VIII.

The World Bank and IMF cancelled their meetings scheduled for the end of September as a result of the terrorist attacks. Most definitely these meetings would have revealed a number of differences in development policies under the conditions of globalization. For Europe a pro-active strategy of development is considered to be necessary in order to reduce poverty and enhance sustainable economic growth. Three objectives in particular determine the European position:

· Poverty reduction and, in particular, the objective to reduce global poverty by half by 2015;

· Containment of the destruction of the environment; and

· Democratization of the state and the society as well as the strengthening of civil society institutions.

The United States prefers a more market-oriented approach. As President Bush suggested in his speech at the World Bank, the new administration wants to achieve global prosperity through pro-growth policies that encourage productivity growth, reduce taxes and maintain fiscal responsibility. The second priority is to create a more open world trading system. This should be the principal objective of a new round of global trade negotiations. The third priority is fighting illiteracy, disease and unsustainable debt. In this context the new U.S. government suggested to provide more grants rather than loans to the poorest countries.

Globalization requires governance and shaping global governance in the face of large-scale anti-globalization forces will be the main challenge for Europe and the United States in the future. However, there is uncertainty about whether the new U.S. administration is willing and ready to take on the enormous task of providing the necessary leadership. In Seattle, President Clinton made an effort to channel the globalization backlash into a more rational debate between governments and multilateral institutions such as the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, on one hand, and the protest movement on the other. The former president was willing to take globalization concerns seriously, in particular those of U.S. workers. Core labor standards were put on the WTO agenda as well as more general concerns about equality, the needs of developing countries – particularly the least developed countries and necessary poverty reduction programs – and the fight against AIDS.

The perception is that the new U.S. administration is much more skeptical of any government initiatives to “regulate” the global economy. Even emergency economic intervention is difficult to contemplate in an administration that is so committed to let market forces take over. From that perspective, there is little government or international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank can do to influence the economic process in one way or another. Poverty reduction, a crucial objective of both the World Bank and the IMF, is more difficult now as a common strategy. In the spirit of the Meltzer Report, President Bush promised recently that the World Bank and IMF begin extending performance-based grants to poor countries instead of loans that they have little chance of repaying. This sounds compassionate, but could actually lead to a substantial reduction in funds available for poverty reduction.

Sustainable peace needs a solid economic foundation, for economic failure can undo military and political successes. Little is being done, however, to prepare for crises that require not only military actions, but also political and economic assistance as well as institution building. The United States is, as David Rothkopf concluded in a recent study on economic intervention, “financially, institutionally and sometimes temperamentally ill-prepared to face complex crises.” His conclusion is that the U.S. needs an economic rapid response capability and that economic considerations should be integrated into plans much earlier and their consequences and possibilities weighed more carefully.

Conclusion

From a European perspective the most important immediate result of the terrorist attacks on the United States is the return of multilateralism. Even a superpower cannot win the war against terrorism alone. It will be essential to seek not only the broadest possible and sustainable coalition of states against terrorism, but to initiate cooperation on a practical level. If it becomes necessary to use ground troops to invade Afghanistan – and air strikes might not be enough to get through to Osama Bin Laden and his groups in Afghanistan and elsewhere – then America will want to be in a coalition with other countries to do that. The UN resolution condemning the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon provides an important legal basis for such military operations. The logistical demands of such an initiative will be extraordinary. It cannot be done without the support of Afghanistan’s neighbors and the assistance of other countries in the region as well as in Europe. NATO’s Article 5 commitment provides the foundation for military support from European NATO members.

Europe can also contribute a lot on the economic front of the war against terrorism. In order to stop the money supply for terrorism a particularly close international cooperation of financial institutions will be necessary. Europe and the United States represent the biggest share of the world economy and control most of the international financial transactions. The cooperation of their financial institutions will be critical in an effort to dry out terrorism. To add an economic dimension to the war against terrorism would also help to isolate terrorist groups and their individual cells.

The economic weight of the United States and Europe in international financial institutions is particularly critical in assisting countries in their fight against terrorism in case they fear economic losses. This is true for Pakistan, for example, and might be effective in other countries, too. Pakistan could easily end up in a civil war like situation in case of a large-scale military confrontation with the Taliban regime. The tragedy of Afghanistan is that the country and the people of Afghanistan fell victim to a cult of religious fanatics who neither represent Islam nor do they represent the Afghan people. It will be important not to add to the suffering of the people of Afghanistan, which is still crippled by the aftershocks of Soviet occupation and the fight against Soviet domination. The West should try to make sure that punitive actions against the terrorist network of Osama Bin Laden do not alienate moderate Islamic states whose cooperation will be necessary in the long struggle against terrorism.

In addition to re-engaging NATO, the UN, international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, regional development banks and individual countries surrounding Afghanistan, a renewal of U.S. engagement in the Middle East will be crucial. The Middle East dimension of the sources of terror stands out as the heart of the matter. The long battle against terrorism must also include a commitment to actively promote U.S. peace making in the Middle East and European-American cooperation would increase the prospects for success.

With a renewal of multilateralism as the ground rule for European-American relations, Europe and the United States will be in a much better position to deal with their differences. This is true for most of the trade conflicts, but also for other issues such as Missile Defense and European Security and Defense Policy.

There is much concern today in Europe about a potential overreaction in the United States and that an initial broad strategy to fight terrorism might backfire in the Muslim world. On Tuesday (September 18, 2001) French President Chirac expressed his concerns about doing too much too soon instead of focussing more narrowly on Osama Bin Laden even if it takes a little longer to bring him to justice. He hesitated to use the word “war” in the context of the fight against terrorism. But, the French president left no doubt about Europe’s total solidarity and its willingness and readiness to “fight by your side this new type of evil.” Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and Prime Minister Blair will argue in the same direction. Of course, Europe wants to be consulted and NATO’s Article 5 commitment provides the proper consultation process. Consultation is not an obstacle to military action, even swift military action.

For those who know the United States, the fear of overreaction is mitigated by the simple fact that this multi-ethnic, universal nation has an in-built self-commitment to fairness. It stems from the need to respect its own citizens, who are of Christian, Muslim, Jewish, Buddhist and many other religions. America is the home of every ethnicity and religion and even in a crisis over terrorism the civilian protection mechanisms will work – including for Muslim and Arab-Americans.