Source Note: This article is based on parts of a book manuscript by the author entitled, Post Cold War Regional Dynamics in East Asia and their Implications for the United States (Rowman and Littlefield, forthcoming). Source material for the China section can be found notably in China’s Future: Implications for US Interests, an US National Intelligence Council Conference report of September 1999 providing in-depth articles and shorter commentaries on Chinese political, economic, social, military, and foreign policy trends and prospects. Sources for the East Asian section can be found notably in East Asia and the United States: Current Status and Five-year Outlook, an US National Intelligence Council Conference report of September 2000 providing in-depth chapters and shorter commentary dealing with trends in major East Asian countries and what they mean for overall regional dynamics and their implications for the United States. Both these conference reports, along with a major National Intelligence Council study on the prospective impact of globalization, Global Trends 2015, are available on the Council’s website www.cia.gov/nic.
East Asia
Globalization is one of several major factors determining China’s future development and the broader course of regional dynamics in East Asia. In general, Chinese leaders are in line with a broader recent trend among East Asian government leaders. These leaders tend to be nationalistic and non-ideological. Their legitimacy rests heavily on their ability to meet the material needs of their people and to pursue economic development needed for conventional nation building. As a result, they are willing—sometime grudgingly—to conform to the international economic norms supported by the western free market states, and they accept the growing interdependence that comes with this economic globalization.
At the same time, however, the Chinese and many other East Asian government leaders endeavor to curb and channel some of the disruptive side effects of economic globalization and the free flow of information associated with such globalization. Using national means as well as cooperative measures under the auspices of regional groups, notably ASEAN Plus Three (the ten ASEAN members along with China, Japan, and South Korea), they seek to keep the western powers at arms length while coming up with mechanisms allowing Asian governments to manage the consequences of economic globalization on their own terms, without direct outside interference.
China, Malaysia, and other non-democratic governments also endeavor to regulate information flows seen challenging these regimes. They resist western-led pressures to open more to these kinds of information. More democratic East Asian governments often support such resistance because these government leaders tend to oppose outside interference in regional internal affairs and oppose the sometimes-serious disruptive consequences of such information flows. For example, few leaders in East Asia—whether in democratic or non-democratic governments—wish to see a repetition of the collapse of Indonesia’s authoritarian regime in the face of pressures from western-led economic globalization and pressures for democratic change.
Chinese government priorities important to the United States are dependent on globalization among a number of key internal domestic and external variables the civilian majority and wonder if the military will be able to muster sufficient support for its modernization programs. Regime survival remains the core concern of China’s leaders. The balance sheet of challenges facing the regime and strengths of the regime argue for its continuing in power, though there is great debate among specialists about the future and directions of China’s rulers. The array of political, social, and economic pressures facing China’s authoritarian regime seriously challenge the regime’s legitimacy and survival. However, the Communist regime’s residual power, coercive capabilities, and other strengths still outweigh its weaknesses.
The sweeping structural changes necessitated by the World Trade Organization (WTO) entry and the broader demands of economic globalization and the information revolution generate significantly new levels and types of social and economic disruption that add to an already wide range of domestic and international problems. The cumulative impact of these steep challenges seriously test the capacity of China’s system and the competence and unity of a leadership already stressed by and the competence and unity of a leadership already stressed by maneuvering for the 16th Chinese Communist Party Congress in 2002. Developing succession arrangements and policies that sustain leadership unity, advantageous economic growth, and a modicum of popular support is essential to regime continuity.
The Communist regime will retain important strengths that
it will exploit to manage this increasingly complex and growing set of
challenges:
· Generally pragmatic leaders under Jiang Zemin are in the process of passing power to equally pragmatic and technologically knowledgeable successors.
· The Communist leadership maintains the command of strong military, police, and other security forces, and uses them against dissident political and social movements, the Falungong, and other perceived opponents.
· There is no clear alternative to Communist rule, and there remains strong popular and elite aversion to fragmentation or chaos that could accompany regime change. Popular acquiescence to regime authority also comes from the positive performance of the economy, which continues to grow amid an off-again, on-again revival of Asian economies following the regional downturn during the late 1990s. China’s economic management has been sufficiently sound so as to provide the regime the basis for maintaining a degree of legitimacy.
These strengths, however, are arrayed against the party’s
growing weaknesses and challenges:
· Jiang Zemin’s reported intention to remain in a senior leadership position while seeking the retirement of many of his Politburo Standing Committee colleagues heads the list of potentially fractious succession issues. Leadership tensions over these issues will be highest in the period leading to the 2002 Party congress.
· Decisions on economic opening and reform required by the WTO will benefit some Chinese groups while disadvantaging others, increasing the risk of leadership divisions. Other economic problems will include massive debt, lagging reforms of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), financial sector weaknesses, rising inequalities, large-scale unemployment, and the inadequacy of the national welfare system. These problems will remain interlocked, with reforms in one area while having negative consequences in others, thus offering no easy solutions.
· Though the Communist Party has been able to recruit some talented newcomers, ideological commitment will remain very weak despite recent efforts to reinvigorate ideological training and propaganda. Rampant corruption at all levels of party and state authority will add to widespread disaffection among elite and popular opinion.
· Economic change will go hand-in-hand with social changes, producing increasing pressure on the regime to adjust its policies. The flexibility of the regime in adapting to new trends will be tested, with high potential for further dissonance between citizens and government and greater instability in both urban and rural areas. Aggrieved and disaffected groups present in all parts of society will continue demonstrations and work stoppages. Democratic activists and religious believers outside official channels will continue to push the limits of the regime’s tolerance for their behavior.
Seeking continued economic engagement with the rest of the world, PRC leaders will continue to try—with little success—to control entry of perceived adverse outside information and other sources of pressure that come with greater economic openness and information exchange. Taiwan’s separate status and democratic example will fundamentally challenge regime legitimacy and add to leadership debate, as to a lesser degree will the example of Hong Kong’s greater freedoms. U.S. and other international pressure in support of principles championed by ethnic and democratic activists in China will combine with the strengthening U.S. strategic posture to appear to Beijing as a challenge to regime goals.
Over time, certain factors could cause China to become more stable or less stable. Any one factor by itself probably would be insufficient to produce significant regime change, but a combination could.
1.
Leadership
Leadership unity probably is the most important factor. Tests of the leadership will be particularly acute as many top leaders are slated to retire and pass power to the next generation. A failure to accomplish this transition smoothly—or to choose a competent core of new leaders who inspire some level of popular confidence—would increase greatly the prospects for political crisis. Various forms of divergence will continue to challenge China’s leadership, including:
· The ease with which the transition in 2002 and 2003 is accomplished. If some third-generation leaders resist a genuine transition and insist on retaining power, the potential for stalemate or open airing of differences would grown.
· To what degree the PLA should be involved in formulating policy and participating in personnel appointments.
· How to manage economic growth and development and their uneven effects, as well as, how to adjust internal economic policies to accommodate the WTO.
· To what degree to use force or persuasion in dealing with Taiwan.
· How to deal with the outside world, including pressures from the United States and Japan. For example, leaders may diverge on how to respond to U.S. decisions on the deployment of Theater and National Missile Defenses.
An ability to minimize the destructive effects of factionalism and limit its disruptiveness to policy would be evidence of a stronger and more cohesive China. On the other hand, economic decline and external pressures could be catalysts for unconstrained factionalism, which could lead to violent strife.
2.
Economic Change
Economic growth could be significantly faster or slower than in recent years. Rapid economic growth could:
· Lead to opportunities for the regime to build greater popular support by creating new jobs and achieving a distribution of wealth that reflects well on government policies.
· Enable new economic elites with control of resources to emerge, which would sharpen class distinctions.
· Shift the debate between the center and the provinces over the control of budget spending.
· Lead to inflation, a catalyst for mass protests in the past. Moreover, if rapid growth were the result of a return to unsound government investment and forced bank lending, existing problems with SOEs and the financial sector would worsen.
Slow economic growth probably would:
· Increase joblessness and contribute to social tension by heightening the anxieties of “have-nots.”
· Limit the ability of the government to reduce poverty levels in urban and rural areas.
· Sharpen conflict among the leadership over priorities for scarcer budgets, including competition between the center and regions for revenues.
Although low economic growth is bad for the regime, better-than-expected growth is not all good, mainly because of the authoritarian nature of the regime. Much would depend on how well the growth or decline is managed by the government. For example, good growth could produce structural shifts in the economy and rising expectations that include political liberalization and demands for greater leadership accountability. Such pressure could negatively affect political stability.
3.
The Impact of the Information Revolution
China will continue to experience profoundly the effects of the information revolution. Telecommunication is growing rapidly. According to Chinese data, China had 45 million cell phones in use at the end of 1999 and expects to have 70 to 90 million (as compared with about 20 million wired telephones) by the end of 2000. In January 2000, there were nine million Internet users in China. By 2003 the number probably will have grown to 30 million. Communications analysts believe the rapid growth of wireless access to the Internet will expand dramatically the next few years. Despite efforts of the Chinese government to control access to the Internet, the amount of information flowing freely in China will increase exponentially. Some business publications predict that on-line commerce will grow rapidly.
The challenge to the government’s ability to control information is unequivocal. For example, the China Democracy Party organized some of its activities in 1998-1999 by cell phone, Internet, and fax. Government propaganda machinery and controlled media increasingly have to compete with other sources of information for public attention.
The social and political consequences of the development of the Internet, though not entirely predictable, further weaken authoritarian controls, but the Chinese government must encourage increased communications as the price of economic modernization. As the party recruits technical specialists, they are likely to press for changes in the party’s policies toward information management. How rapidly the party adjusts to this reality will influence its control of the nation.
4.
The External Environment
Changes in the external environment will cause shifts in Chinese domestic policy. Particularly important will be how China perceives the threat from abroad. Although they no longer see a major military threat to China’s national security, Chinese leaders see influence from the outside world as constituting a major threat to China’s stability, although many of their comments are exaggerated rhetoric designed to justify a firm party grip. This perception of threat could intensify and have important implications for domestic priorities. China also is concerned about the influence of Islamic countries on ethnic minorities in Xinjiang and other parts of northwest and southwest China.
Growing tensions across the Taiwan Strait, in the territorial dispute with Japan, the South China Sea, or other areas near China increase China’s perception of threat and result in more coercive security policies at home. Strengthened disputes with the United States probably would have a similar effect. Beijing probably would be even less constrained in using force to crack down on internal dissidents or suppressing public discussion of foreign policy issues without regard to foreign reaction. The use of nationalistic propaganda is likely to become more evident.
Other external developments also could have a significant
effect on China’s internal stability:
· Foreign economic developments could help or hinder China’s economic growth. An increased ability to absorb China’s exports would foster growth, but recessions in China’s key trading partners or a significant drop-off in foreign direct investment could hurt growth and contribute to social problems in China.
· Cultural change abroad will spill over into China. China’s opening to outside cultural influence, including television, music, and other media, will amplify dissent, especially among youth, if the regime does not permit greater openness and pluralism.
· Chinese efforts to host international events such as the Olympics will be a source of pride and nationalism but also will risk further opening to outside influence.
Globalization
and East Asian Regional Dynamics
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war coincided with a marked upswing in East Asian economic power and political assertiveness. Though dampened by setbacks during the Asian economic crisis later in the 1990s, regional initiatives and leadership continue, mainly through national governments. Government leaders generally have endeavored to meet growing popular demands for greater economic development and nationalistic respect through balanced nation-building strategies that place a premium on encouraging economic growth beneficial to broad segments of their societies. Most tend to eschew radical ideologies and to emphasize conventional nationalism. Military power develops in tandem with economic power, but few regimes have emphasized the former at the expense of the latter in the face of international opposition and domestic pressures for more effective development of overall national power (North Korea and Burma are exceptions).
· Regional government leaders remain well aware that failure to meet domestic expectations could result in being voted out of office in democratic states or widespread demonstrations and violence leading to regime collapse in authoritarian states.
· People of the region generally recognize that national governments are important in advancing and protecting their interests, and that national governments need to be accountable and effective in pursuing goals beneficial to citizens of the state.
East Asia remains the world’s most diverse region with a wide variety of cultural, historical, and other differences.
· Unlike Europe, Latin America, and even Africa, there are few established mechanisms for substantial intra-regional political, security, or economic cooperation;
· The region has only recently begun to experiment with such mechanisms, and will continue to do so.
Specialists have identified salient global trends that will affect developments in East Asia and the Pacific, along with other parts of the world. In general, East Asian governments are dealing with these trends pragmatically and effectively with some exceptions as noted.
Population trends. East Asian states generally have pretty good control on population growth. It remains a serious problem in Vietnam and the Philippines. East Asia also is not facing serious problems posed by an aging population, except for Japan. There is some labor migration among states but it is carefully controlled by national governments determined to preserve their sovereignty. Communal tension and minority issues are serious problems affecting countries like China, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia and these problems are likely to grow as information exchange increases but authoritarian rule persists, notably in China. Infectious diseases, notably AIDS, are and/or will become big problems in Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, and perhaps elsewhere.
Food, water, energy. Food security is generally adequate in the region though there are bottlenecks and sometimes-serious difficulties in some places (e.g. North Korea). China will not consume world grain reserves--it can meet most needs with increasing imports that are not likely to cause major upset in world markets. The same is true with energy, with the vision of a major fight over energy in East Asia looking relatively unlikely. There is growing interdependence due to international pipelines and wider use of gas. The water problem in North China is serious but it could be resolved if the pricing/water usage system were changed to make the cost of water conform to the market—the PRC is moving slowly in this direction.
Economic growth. East Asia probably will follow the path seen globally toward greater integration and greater growth. The splits between haves and have-nots in some countries, notably China, will be a serious problem. There will be more migrants in the cities and gaps between rich and poor that will challenge some polities. Given its overall assets, East Asia is likely to grow in importance in the overall world economy.
Permeation of science and technology. Information empowers greater civil society and enables economic growth. Because of the latter, even authoritarian East Asian governments will go along with this trend, though North Korea, Vietnam and perhaps some others may lag behind.
Nation state power will erode? The ability of East Asian states to promote authoritarianism and especially a corporate control of social and economic as well as political life is in decline. The examples of Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Indonesia manifest this trend. Global business, NGOs, international organizations, and others challenge the nation state. But nationalism is not declining and the East Asian states are not giving much authority to International Organizations, though they seem prepared to conform, sometime reluctantly, to international norms. The nation state will be an essential vehicle for nationalism to be brought to fulfillment. Thus, the very vibrant future for nationalism and the nation state in the region remains.
U.S. dominance? If U.S. power does wane in East Asia there will likely be serious problems between China and Japan, and possibly over Korea. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger premised their opening to China on a gradual decline in U.S. power and influence. Paul Kennedy was particularly articulate in arguing for U.S. post cold war decline, along with others touting Japan, China or others as the new powers in East Asia. The record shows a remarkable resiliency of US power, and U.S. power and interest in East Asia are likely to continue—they have been a central feature of U.S. policy since 1941. Thus, while many in East Asia are looking for signs of U.S. withdrawal, they are more likely than not to be disappointed.
The main determinants that
affect the recent policy environment in East Asia relevant to U.S. interests
and policy are:
· Reactions to changes in major regional power relationships. These changes include China’s rising power, Japan’s continued economic stagnation and political weakness, and Indonesia’s weakness and leadership drift.
· The off-again, on-again thaw in tensions between North and South Korea.
· Regional concern to sustain economic growth amid growing challenges of economic globalization
· Challenges posed by the freer flow of information
· Regional concern over U.S. security, economic, and political policies and objectives, including perceived U.S. unilateralism and pressures, and U.S. intentions to stay involved in the region.
With the exception of the Korean factor, these determinants are not new, though all have become stronger in recent years. They have led to more fluid security and power relationships in East Asia than at any time since the cold war, and have strengthened the priority regional governments generally give to effectively managing economic and political challenges. Their relative importance depends on circumstances and the priorities of regional leaders. Security determinants are of particular importance on those occasions—like the thaw in North-South Korean relations during 2000-2001 or the 1996 U.S.-China military face-off over Taiwan-when regional leaders focus on the evolving balance of power in East Asia. Globalization and the information revolution are of key importance when regional leaders face economic crises or social-political instability brought on by these forces. Taken together, the determinants provide impetus for greater activism by East Asian governments to foster their interests in an increasingly challenging and fluid environment.
East Asian governments are
watching carefully and taking measures to deal with several major changes in
regional power relationships:
· The rise of China as an economic and increasingly capable military power. This rise is likely to remain among the most important regional changes for years to come. It raises angst particularly in Taiwan, Japan, and in several Southeast Asian nations. The implications of Beijing’s political power and influence, developing in tandem with its economic and military power, coincide with widespread concerns over Chinese internal stability. The authoritarian regime faces numerous internal problems associated with WTO accession, economic reforms, and political and ethnic dissidence fed by freer flows of outside information.
· The implications of Japan’s continuing stagnant economy and political weakness for its regional leadership aspirations and capabilities, especially in comparison to China. The combination of China’s rise and Japan’s stagnation has strengthened Japanese government competition with China for influence in the region, among other things.
· Heightened tensions over Taiwan—posing the risk of a conflict or confrontation between China and the United States, and possibly Japan.
· Indonesia’s drift adds to ASEAN’s weakness and uncertainty in Southeast Asia. China and Japan are stepping up competition for influence there.
Other developments affecting regional power relationships include Russia’s efforts, especially under President Putin, to work with China; the efforts of North Korea and others to gain more influence in regional politics; the more active role of India in security dialogues, exchanges, and other interaction with Japan and Southeast Asian countries; the enhanced effort of the European Community over the past decade to develop greater regional influence largely to foster advantageous economic interchange; and the growing prominence of Middle Eastern and Central Asian countries in long term East Asian economic and security calculations related particularly to energy security.
Most East Asian governments were surprised in April 2000 by North Korean leader Kim Chong-Il’s positive response to South Korean President Kim Dae Jung and his policy of accommodation with the North. The success of the North-South Korean summit of June 2000 and the related flurry of positive North Korean international activity – notably high-level negotiations with the U.S. Clinton administration-- prompted widespread reevaluation of what had heretofore been viewed mainly as a dangerous military standoff on the Korean peninsula. Prospects for North-South détente nonetheless remain unclear, adding to regional uncertainty.
Thus far, the shift in North-South Korean relations has prompted diplomatic initiatives by Russia, China, ASEAN, and others to influence Korean affairs. High level Clinton Administration-North Korean contacts invigorated bilateral relations but were suspended by the George W. Bush administration during a protracted policy review in 2001. Not to be left out of decisions affecting Korea that have broad implications for regional stability and security, Japan has endeavored to deal with public bilateral differences with North Korea and to renew engagement with Pyongyang. The shift in North-South relations also has led to some decline in South Korean popular support for the current large U.S. troop presence there, and focused new attention and prompted diverse reactions in Japan about the size, scope, and mission of U.S. forces based in Japan.
The upswing in most regional economies after 1999 was a source of optimism to government leaders, but it failed to mask continued anxiety about future performance. The previous model of government-directed, export oriented growth faces growing challenges from economic globalization and a downturn in U.S. markets. A variety of reporting shows that Japanese officials are particularly concerned about how to reform in order to generate growth after a decade of stagnation. China’s ostensibly good growth figures are seen by Beijing as the minimum required to sustain social stability, placing a heavy imperative on continued growth. Impressive recent growth in South Korea and other economies often comes without significant structural reform, possibly setting the stage for another downturn like 1997-1998, according to some economists.
The Asian economic crisis not only hit regional economies hard but also seriously undermined social stability, challenged the standing of political regimes whose legitimacy rests heavily on providing economic growth, and weakened national security. It was a leading factor in the collapse of the Suharto government in Indonesia. It also prompted widespread popular and elite resentment over economic globalization and IMF rescue efforts. Years later, media reports and polling data show that Thai leaders and public opinion still harbor some resentment over the perceived belated and poorly conceived IMF effort to assist Thailand when it fell victim to the economic crisis in 1997. Malaysia’s leadership also continues to be critical of economic liberalization proposals of the IMF and others, favoring stronger government control.
Nevertheless, governments in the region are commonly staffed by technocrats educated in the West, who tend towards pragmatism in economic policy. Most governments also accept the need to accommodate to norms on ownership, markets, trade, and investment. To seriously resist those norms could jeopardize economic development and thereby undermine domestic political support for the East Asian leaders whose political legitimacy rests heavily on their effectiveness in promoting economic growth and overall national power. Thus, although Chinese officials support Malaysia and other regional governments that attempt to diverge from Western development patterns, they also recognize that those patterns have an increasing influence over regional leaders.
Regional states in general are likely to accommodate the freer flow of information needed to modernize their economies, open markets, and promote common efforts to improve the environment and fight international crime and disease. To do otherwise risks economic downturn and stagnant development; these in turn could undermine the legitimacy and popular support of East Asian governments that depend on improving economic conditions and living standards to support their continuation in power.
The freer flow of information stemming from the global communications revolution nevertheless is likely to promote development of greater political pluralism, democracy, and respect for human rights that challenge East Asian authoritarian regimes. Several of these governments are seeking to control the Internet and other forms of information exchange, but to little avail. They probably will continue to attempt to monitor and curb information to secure their political control.
· Chinese authorities will continue broad efforts to curb the use of the Internet by the outlawed Falungong movement and other movements seen to challenge the rule of the Communist Party.
· A wide range of dissidents, separatists and political extremists in Indonesia will continue to use available channels of communication to promote their respective messages to the detriment of Indonesian cohesion and stability.
· Despite strong efforts, Malaysia’s government could not block popular exposure to the highly critical international media coverage of the trial of the former vice premier, reflecting the growing inability that leaders everywhere are likely to face in trying to control information.
Regional authoritarian governments will seek to preserve their prerogatives of power and resist trends toward democracy. They are likely to find support from other regional advocates of conservative “Asian values,” and to develop common ground with other authoritarian regimes throughout the world under similar pressures by emphasizing their right to defend state sovereignty against outside interference. Conservative Chinese leaders used this line of argument in developing a close relationship with the conservative leadership of President Milsovich in Yugoslavia. Even less authoritarian East Asian governments probably will resist outside pressure to open to information flows deemed detrimental to national cohesion and sovereignty.
In many respects, enhanced public access to a much broader range of information also will complicate the past decision-making processes in democratic countries like Japan that previously had been dominated by political elites. Public officials increasingly will have to take account of a broader array of opinion that can be brought to bear with expanding speed and effect on any given issue. For example, Japanese politicians who engage in sexual harassment will be held more accountable to their constituents influenced by international media critical of such practices.
Most governments—authoritarian and non-authoritarian-- will remain concerned that the Internet and other means of communications can be used by ethnic, regional, religious, or other groups that challenge national identity and control and weaken the ability of the state to establish cohesive policies and programs.
After the cold war, many countries in the region feared a U.S. withdrawal. Although still present in some quarters, this concern has been superseded by regional uncertainty over U.S. regional objectives and angst over U.S. unilateralism. At the start of the Kosovo crisis in 1999, East Asian observers did not expect the United States to use political, economic, and especially military power and influence to achieve goals that they did not see as warranting such a strong U.S. effort. Polling data and a variety of other reporting show that the U.S. intervention in Kosovo reinforced uncertainty in East Asia over U.S. objectives and perceived U.S. unilateralism.
The U.S. decisions in early 2000 to seek amendment of the ABM treaty and move forward with a National Missile Defense (NMD) program in conjunction with stepped up Theater Missile Defense (TMD) programs in East Asia divided the region. The subsequent U.S. deliberations delaying final decisions on missile defense has reduced to some degree the urgency of this issue in East Asia, though divisions and debate continue. China and Russia strongly oppose the U.S. missile defense plans, though China gives more emphasis than Russia to opposition to TMD in East Asia, and Russia may eventually agree to a compromise with the United States on amending the ABM treaty—a step China opposes. Although Japan has reservations about U.S. NMD program, Tokyo nevertheless is continuing to move ahead with Washington to jointly develop TMD for Japan. South Korea, particularly sensitive to China’s opposition, avoids endorsing the US missile defense efforts. ASEAN governments, feeling Chinese pressure, have mildly criticized the US plans or refrained from comment.
Perceived U.S. unilateralism and unpredictability add to difficulties Japan and South Korea have in balancing U.S. basing requirements with domestic pressures to reduce or adjust the U.S. military presence. They add to forces prompting the Asian powers to seek ways to work out important international security problems on their own, or in conjunction with other regional or outside powers, giving less attention to the United States. In addition to South Korea’s successful opening to North Korea, the recent improvement in South Korean-Japanese security relations, the increase in their respective security dialogues with China, Russia, and India, and Japan’s recent efforts to engage more closely with Southeast Asian countries on some regional security issues are part of this broad trend.
East Asian governments, including allies in Japan and Thailand, resented what they perceived as heavy handed or unhelpful U.S. demands for reform and other measures during the Asian economic crisis. There is broad regional opposition to U.S.-backed labor and market liberalization plans—highlighted by President Clinton at the aborted World Trade Organization summit in Seattle in late 1999—that are seen to negatively affect regional economies. Regional academic and media commentators note that East Asian governments remain anxious that a decline in U.S. economic growth would prompt a shift in U.S. policy in favor of greater protectionism that would hurt their interests.
The East Asian governments also tend to view U.S. efforts to foster political issues and values such as human rights and democracy as driven by often unpredictable U.S. domestic interests that come at the expense of the national sovereignty of regional states. Even the closest U.S. ally in the region, Australia, has voiced frustration over how perceived U.S. domestic interests influence U.S. policies in these areas and has differed to varying degrees with the U.S. posture on human rights and democracy in regard to Burma, Cambodia, and China.
Globalization and the associated free flow of information have combined with the important security and political determinants noted above to prompt a variety of general and specific regional trends, and important implications and issues for the United States. In general terms, they have led to regional security, economic, and political trends that diffuse regional leadership and power, adding to the unpredictability of the types of tactical alliances and ad hoc blocs that may emerge on specific issues. The increase in policy initiatives coming from East Asian governments has been based more on insecurity and uncertainty over growing challenges and changing regional trends than on careful long term plans. Regional security and economic trends push power relations in East Asia in various and often complicated and seemingly contradictory directions and a static bloc of countries that dominate East Asian affairs is unlikely to emerge, though an increase in Asia-only forums as an outgrowth of intra-regional interaction is evident.
· While staying engaged with the United States for economic and other benefits, China will continue to seek to diminish US influence in order to enhance its own power and prominence. Beijing has endorsed Japan-led regional economic measures that ignore or are at odds with US policy, but it also has continued to guard against rising Japanese influence as a result of those measures.
· Japan continues to seek to strengthen its regional influence by solidifying the US alliance while promoting initiatives often at odds with or in disregard of US policy.
· Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore continue to seek stronger demonstrations of US support but they also continue to be inclined at times to join with China in criticizing US policy, and with Japan, South Korea, China and the EU in pursuing economic initiatives that ignore or oppose US interests.
Sometimes significant developments will cause reactions and initiatives by individual countries to converge, leading to a broader pattern of cooperation. The impact of the Asian economic crisis and the failure of the WTO summit in Seattle prompted initiatives by regional and other countries seeking trade, financial, and other arrangements. The result has been movement toward some Free Trade agreements, and arrangements under the ASEAN Plus Three and other auspices of currency swaps, currency monitoring arrangements, and greater regional financial cooperation. The regional powers also will continue and probably increase reaching out beyond their immediate neighbors in seeking leverage from expanded exchanges with Russia, India, and powers in Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia.
The policy initiatives from East Asia continue to come from individual governments and the majority has been confined to specific areas (e.g. security, economic, political). But they often have broader implications for regional trends.
· Kim Dae Jung’s successful opening to North Korea not only eased tensions on the peninsula but set off a spate of regional maneuvering for advantage on the Korean peninsula.
· Japan’s efforts to encourage movement toward an Asian Monetary Fund appeared to shore up Japan’s overall influence in the region in the face of China’s rising power and other challenges
· Russian President Putin’s visit to north Korea prior to the G-8 summit in Japan in 2000 had less to do with Russian-North Korean relations than with Russia’s determination to play a more influential role in East Asian affairs.
All regional powers continue “hedging”—using more diversifies diplomacy, military preparations and other means to insure that their particular security interests will be safeguarded, especially in case the regional situation should change for the worse. All powers will want generally positive relations with the United States, but seek diversified ties to enhance their security options. They continue to differ on a strong US regional security presence, with China notably encouraging a gradual weakening of the US position as it seeks expanded regional influence, while others back a strong US presence. The major flanking powers—Russia and India—will use diplomacy, military exchanges, military sales and other interactions to heighten their respective influence in regional security affairs.
While generally recognizing the need to conform to international economic norms, East Asian governments seek to block or slow perceived adverse consequences of economic globalization by greater cooperation with similarly affected governments in and outside the region in existing organizations like ASEAN, APEC, and WTO, and in emerging regional and broader groupings, notably ASEAN Plus Three. Annual ASEAN Plus Three summits began in 1997, and ministers and senior ministers meet on a regular basis. In May 2000, for example, economic ministers met in Rangoon, finance ministers in Chiang Mai, and senior officials met in Bangkok. The Chinese, among others, appear satisfied that ASEAN Plus Three cooperation on economic, finance, and foreign policy matters—as reflected during the ASEAN related meetings such as those in Bangkok in July 2000—will strengthen in the future in the face of US and global pressures.
National rivalries and other regional differences are less of an obstacle than in the past to East Asian multilateral economic cooperation. These rivalries and differences remain more of an obstacle to multilateral cooperation over more sensitive security issues.
· The Japanese government is making progress in continued efforts to foster greater economic cooperation in Asia excluding non-Asian powers. Japan leads initiatives by East Asian governments toward regional financing arrangements, and some Japanese leaders continue to work to establish a regional monetary fund.
· Many East Asian countries pursue bilateral and regional free trade agreements with one another or with countries outside the region, especially in the wake of the failure of the US-hosted WTO negotiations in Seattle in fall 1999. ASEAN plans to have a regional free trade area in place by 2010 for its most developed members, and Singapore, South Korea and others pursue pacts with several countries.
· The ASEAN Plus Three regional economic policy coordination is growing. Rising intra-regional trade and investment add impetus to its emerging efforts to create more active regional finance and monetary mechanisms.
· Closer East Asian-EU collaboration continues to be a hallmark of the bi-annual summits and related meetings under the ASEM group comprising the EU and most East Asian countries.
· Dependent on Middle East oil, Japan and others are loathe to follow the US lead regarding economic sanctions against Iran and seek to coordinate on international economic issues with the Middle Eastern and other energy suppliers.
Opinion polling, focus groups, and other reports indicate that government transparency and accountability, the free flow of information, democracy, and an open society are generally supported by many Asians. But reporting also shows that regional governments continue to strongly oppose outside pressure for political rights and democracy that come at the expense of national sovereignty and stability. Firm in their own convictions, regional powers—including US allies—consult with one another at the UN general Assembly, the annual UN Human Rights Commission meetings in Geneva, and in other forums in finding independent paths for dealing with regional human rights and other political issues. Some have appealed to nationalism—a powerful force in many of the newly emerged regional states—in efforts to mobilize their populations against the perceived outside pressure and domination.
Economic globalization and the important security and political trends affecting regional dynamics in East Asia support an overall forecast that envisions a diffusion of leadership and influence in which the United states will face greater challenges in promoting certain policy objectives, but in which the US will remain the pivotal security actor and the most important economic partner.
· Most regional states generally will support a continued active US security presence in the area.
· Regional states will seek and depend on access to US markets, investment and technology
Challenges for US policy include
the following:
· China’s differences with the US over security issues in East Asia and especially Taiwan will complicate US-regional relations. Not even US allies are prepared to align solidly with the United States in opposing China in a military confrontation over Taiwan.
· Opposition by Russia, China and others to US missile defense plans also divides the region and reduces support for the United States.
· The United States failed to have much impact on the decay in Indonesia following the demise of the Suharto regime, and it appears poorly prepared to deal possible decay or collapse in other authoritarian regimes, notably North Korea and China.
· The Bush administration gives pride of place to managing alliance relations, but the fact remains that the arrangements are challenged by the changing situation in Korea and the keen sensitivities of elite and public opinion in both Japan and South Korea to crimes and other incidents involving US service personnel.
· US efforts to foster greater economic globalization and freer flow of information are likely to continue to meet with an ambiguous response from East Asian governments.
Perhaps the most important challenge for US leaders as a result of post cold war globalization, information, and security trends involves the greater influence of US domestic concerns on US foreign policy. The collapse of the anti-Soviet strategic focus in US foreign policy during the cold war has opened the way for a variety of domestic US interests to pursue their concerns in foreign affairs. In East Asia, the greatest impact has been on US policy toward China. A wide range of US groups with sincere or ulterior motives press for changes in US policy toward China concerning a wide range of security, economic, political, and values issues. US policy makers are hard put to balance these multifaceted domestic concerns with the need to establish and effective policy approach to deal with Asia’s rising power.
US domestic groups pose similar but much less extensive problems for US policy makers dealing with Korean issues, Japan, and some Southeast Asian countries. A broader US problem, especially regarding Southeast Asia, involves sustaining consistent high-level US attention to the region. During the Clinton administration, high-level leaders’ attention was episodic at best and often involved posturing on human rights and other issues that appealed to domestic US groups but was not complemented by constructive, lasting, and meaningful US initiatives to the countries concerned. The Bush Administration promises to rectify this situation, but logic argues in another direction. If as appears likely US policy makers remain domestically focused, they will tend to seek to engage their limited attention to foreign policy in areas of vital importance to US interests, areas of high salience to important US constituencies, or areas promising US leaders the opportunity to have a substantial positive impact that will redound to their political credit at home. The intractable difficulties in Indonesia and the fragile economic and political situations in much of the rest of the Southeast Asian countries are unlikely to meet these conditions, suggesting that US leaders will not be consistently engaged in the region. As a result, the United States will be somewhat less well integrated and positioned to deal with regional developments and its influence will be somewhat reduced.