

Luigi R. Einaudi
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This is a difficult moment in the history of the world. In fact, the magnitude of the difficulties elsewhere is so great that the Western Hemisphere is often overlooked, so your combined presence makes this an unusual opportunity for which I thank the Symposium organizers and the NDU.

I will make three points and offer four conclusions and one comment.

My first point is that the Western Hemisphere is a strikingly peaceful part of the world and this fact alone should give it great potential. Its countries share many common experiences, and if their common colonial legacy includes unjust treatment of the indigenous and the practice of slavery, it also includes the frontier's sense of freedom and future. And if some of their failings are similar and painful, the fact also is that the hemisphere's countries are democratizing and modernizing. The world's oldest system of international cooperation is that of the Americas, with the Organization of American States at its center. The oldest international defense and security organization in the world is the Inter-American Defense Board, founded in 1942. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known as the Rio Treaty, signed in 1947, provides that "an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States." This formula is the legal foundation for mandatory collective action against aggression and is the model on which NATO was founded in 1948. Since then, South America has banned Chemical and Biological Weapons; Latin America and the Caribbean have become a nuclear free zone recognized by the United States. Mass movements of people have become controversial, but they take place peacefully for the most part, driven by the search for opportunity rather than by the despair of war, disease or famine. Power remains concentrated asymmetrically in the United States, yet the US depends on other Western Hemisphere countries for more than half of U.S. energy imports and 20 percent of US steel imports.

These cultural, political and economic assets suggest that the countries of the hemisphere could be a secure strategic anchor and mutually supportive foundation for each other in an uncertain world. Energy and steel were the foundations of the European Coal and Steel Community in the 1950s. A hemispheric agreement could be negotiated today along these lines and qualify as a sectoral regional agreement under Article XXIV of the GATT.

Yet we all know this has not happened and is unlikely to happen soon, if ever. Even the much less ambitious FTAA process lies stalled, paralyzed by resistance to globalization, genuine economic differences, and malaise over Iraq. *And this is my second point: the promise of the New World is saddled with the weight of unfulfilled expectations, diverging interests and mutual distrust.*

Resistance to outside intervention in the internal affairs of a state, and in particular to the possibility of US military intervention, led the writers of the OAS Charter in 1948 to ignore the existence of the Inter-American Defense Board, creating a schizophrenic structure that persists to a great extent to this day. The OAS has not authorized intervention since the Dominican Republic in 1965.

Several other developments from the 1960s to the 1980s raised questions about both the desirability and reliability of military cooperation. Guerrilla warfare, fratricidal conflicts, disappearances, and human rights violations stigmatized security institutions and relations. At times there appeared to be two separate universes, one military and one civilian, and sometimes communication between them seemed lost. The prevalence and shape of such factors varied considerably from one country to another, but the whole region was tarred with the same brush.

In 1982, the United States, which had accepted the Rio Treaty's use against Communist threats, dealt a harsh blow to the treaty when it denied military assistance to Argentina in its conflict with the United Kingdom over the Malvinas Islands. By the time Mexico withdrew from the Treaty twenty years later, its rejection of the mandatory collective system seemed almost a formality.

Responding to terrorism has also been a problem. Terrorism has been experienced in the Americas in many different guises, not just as the unadulterated exercise of sheer terror that we witnessed on September 11, 2001. Political violence, state repression, criminal gang warfare and the rise of private armies in the absence of an effective state monopoly of force are hard to put into the same policy basket.

These different experiences, currents and interests combined with the end of the Cold War and the acceleration of globalization to underscore the need to look at neighborhood with different eyes. Gone forever are ideas of the Monroe Doctrine, Fortress America, or a new Maginot line against drugs, terrorists or even migrants. Gone also are ideas of closed regionalism. Diversity has become the cue, within the region as and beyond. Openings to Europe, South Africa, India or China are eagerly sought. Regionalism if it is to survive must be open and compatible with universalism. Not all countries have the same interests, particularly at a regional level. Cooperation should be voluntary, not mandatory. Recently in fact, much effort and dynamism has gone into sub regional cooperation among immediate neighbors -- in the Caribbean, Central America, the Andes, the Southern Cone, South America.

Most discussions of security issues at a regional level over the past decade reflected a drop off in bilateral tensions and military expenditures, and a new focus on development. In 2003 in Mexico, a Special Conference on Security identified what the member states all agreed create "multidimensional" threats. The priorities of the largest countries, such as the United States, were included (cyber security, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, drugs and related matters), but so were the concerns of the sub regions: in the Caribbean and Central America, nuclear waste and natural

disasters; in Central and South America, extreme poverty and social exclusion.

The Special Conference on Security also declared that “representative democracy is an indispensable condition for the stability, peace, and development of the states of the Hemisphere” and explicitly reaffirmed their commitment to the Inter-American Democratic Charter, thus establishing a direct link between democracy and security in the Hemisphere.

This brings me to my third point: that, without replacing the Rio Treaty, a new security system is gradually emerging on a case-by-case, issue-by-issue basis. It is less unified and binding than the Rio Treaty’s collective security system, but perhaps better tailored to today’s realities. This new system is made up of confidence-building measures like the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions and a variety of juridical instruments addressing specific security concerns. Decoupled from the Rio Treaty, the Inter-American Defense Board has been buoyed by the accession of Canada, developed new roles in disaster relief and facilitated important progress in de-mining, and received a cautious political blessing from the OAS.

In 2000, drawing on my experiences during the conflict between Ecuador and Peru, I promoted the establishment of an *OAS Fund for Peace*. This fund enabled the General Secretariat to provide the services of a technical expert of the Pan American Institute of Geography and History to resolve technical demarcation problems encountered by El Salvador and Honduras. The final marker was erected last February. An OAS team, which included an Argentine and a Brazilian military officer verified the absence of troop movements near the border between Honduras and Nicaragua. The Fund also made possible confidence-building measures in the territorial differendum between Belize and Guatemala.

Following the attacks of September 11, the countries of the Americas negotiated, signed, and brought into force an *Inter-American Convention against Terrorism*. The Convention recognizes that no one country has all of the answers for improving security against the threats posed by terrorists, who seek to exploit the rules of civilized society. Its answer, however, is not to abandon the law, or to wink at abuses of the rights of suspects. The Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE) provides a legal framework enabling counter terrorism cooperation and capacity-building.

The *Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission* (CICAD) was established in 1989 and has helped strengthen professional ties (though more at the level of Ministries of the Interior than Ministries of Defense). Importantly, CICAD developed a Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism to facilitate anti-drug cooperation on the basis of plans by national authorities, thus making it easier to avoid the tensions resulting from unilateral conditionality.

The *Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA)* was proposed initially by Mexico in the Rio Group, achieved regional consensus through the OAS, was signed in 1997 and entered into force on July 1, 1998.

The proliferation of arms in the hands of criminals and other unauthorized parties, however, remains a massive problem. In Haiti, small arms threaten governance, democracy, and the population as a whole. They are easy to come by. Everybody is armed: politicians and criminals, businessmen and the poor, and both legal and illegal militias. Not to mention the drug traffickers and former members of the armed forces. Everyone is armed, except for the State, which has no army and but 3,000 policemen in a country of eight million inhabitants. New York City, which has eight million inhabitants, has 60,000 police officers. Even MINUSTAH, ably led by Brazil and with forces from other South American countries at its core, has a strength of only 8,000 military and police personnel.

In Central America, small firearms and light weapons have proliferated since the end of the armed conflicts of the 1980s and facilitated the spread of criminal gangs. According to the National Police of Colombia, 85 percent of murders in that country are committed with small arms, many of which are smuggled into Colombia by drug traffickers, insurgents, or members of paramilitary groups.

But there are no OAS helmets similar to the blue UN helmets worn by MINUSTAH in Haiti. The ghosts of the past still mandate that, in this hemisphere, any direct use of force be reserved to the United Nations. The remaining options for military and security cooperation, as well laid out by Jay Cope in issue 42 of the *Joint Force Quarterly*, are less ambitious but no less important. Put most simply, the way ahead is to work together to address specific shared concerns in a low key manner and primarily on a sub regional basis.

If the security architecture of the past was developed top-down through Foreign Ministries acting in the immediate post-World War II period of US predominance, the security architecture of the future seems likely to evolve bottom-up, on a sub regional basis, and with broader inter-ministerial participation.

What lessons can we draw from this history?

I suggest four conclusions. The first and second are essentially caveats. The third and fourth are best understood as building blocks.

First, a legal framework is essential. The law, not might, must frame what can be done and how. The Declaration on Security in the Americas and Article 4 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter both call for “The constitutional subordination of all state institutions to the legally constituted civilian authority and respect for the rule of law on the part of all institutions and sectors of society.” Bilateral, sub regional and other multilateral agreements can legitimize elective cooperation even without a mandatory

collective instrument. But the key reality is that while a legitimate legal order must if necessary be backed by force, the use of force without legal legitimation is inevitably counterproductive.

Second, the socio-economic context cannot be ignored. If democracy is the Americas' pride and glory, social injustice, poverty, and exclusion are its Achilles heel. The military and other security forces cannot appear to be the "watchdogs of the oligarchy." In defending the law and equal opportunity rather than privilege, they must neither replace political leaders nor abandon their military professionalism. Including too much under the category of security risks the blurring of important traditional distinctions limiting military roles. The answer for the armed forces is not to ignore social issues, but to be careful to engage in roles supportive of civilian institutions as determined by inter-ministerial or inter-agency consultation.

Third, professionalism is vital, and must be developed, not assumed. The success of our quest for security depends on our military and police authorities, who must, I have argued, act professionally, intelligently, and in close coordination with legitimate civilian authorities. And even that is not enough: success depends on broad participation, a deepening of democracy, and more abundant opportunities for all. These are tall orders indeed. Operational interoperability also depends on professional skills that cannot be developed without effective training and mutual trust. A culture of cooperation is indispensable. And that in turn depends on shared training and experiences that cannot be improvised. All countries should reserve some billets in military academies and advanced schools for officers from neighboring countries. But even this is not enough: Given the asymmetry of the power in the hands of the United States, the US should do much more to provide training and other resources to enable cooperation, for example, by supporting the Inter-American juridical instruments that have developed in recent years to address specific security concerns. This support should not be defined as "assistance" but rather as cooperation necessary to ensure the institutions and relationships needed for the common defense.

My fourth and last conclusion deals with what I call the need for "Permanent Consultation." Even if we succeed in being legal, careful, and professional, we still need the ability to understand one another across and beyond our borders. This symposium is an excellent opportunity to promote such understanding. But we all need to do much more. Because it is both strong and wealthy, the United States has a particular responsibility to listen to others and find ways to respect and advance their interests. But our Latin American and Caribbean neighbors sometimes give up too easily on the United States. Mechanisms are needed to encourage and reward cooperation and information-sharing at every level. Knowledge shared multiplies, and when it is shared among partners, it increases trust and the common good. The US should increase openings for exchanges of officers and encourage the posting of liaison officers. So too should other countries to the full extent of their abilities. One possibility would be to provide the OAS resources and opportunities to channel through CARICOM, SICA, The Andean Pact, or Mercosur.

Finally, my comment is to our friends here from Latin America and the Caribbean.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review makes very clear that the senior leadership of the US Department of Defense is not only open to, but very much wants, improved alliance and coalition partnerships. Moreover, the review talks about “building partner capabilities.” A JFQ article by the Assistant Director of DOD’s Office of Force Transformation argued that “the capabilities gap [with] many allied and coalition partners is widening” and referred among other things to the costs of keeping pace with technological change. “Some level of intelligence-sharing, operational and tactical planning, and perhaps command post or field exercises will be essential to ensure adequate preparation.”

To return to the theme of the Symposium, having been thrown together without choice by geography and history, we may not always be partners of choice. Even so we can choose to be partners, and if we do so carefully, there are many things we can do together to deal with problems that we cannot deal with alone. This time of global difficulties may be just the time to quietly strengthen regional capacity and cooperation.

Thank you very much.

leinaudi@oas.org