

**LATIN AMERICAN PARTICIPATION
IN PEACE OPERATIONS IN HAITI:
LESSONS FOR FUTURE
COOPERATION**

**FORCE COMMANDER'S
EXPERIENCE IN HAITI**

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
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OUTLINE

- **INTRODUCTION**
- **CHALLENGING STRATEGIC ACTIONS**
 - **STRUCTURAL**
 - **OPERATIONAL**
 - **LEADERSHIP**
- **LESSONS LEARNED**
- **CONCLUSION**

HAITI

A POLITICAL,
SOCIAL,
ECOLOGICAL,
AND MILITARY
PROBLEM



**80% OF THE PEOPLE WITHOUT A FORMAL JOB
70% OF THE PEOPLE EAT JUST ONCE A DAY
50% OF THE PEOPLE IS ILLITERATE**

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MAIN CHALLENGES

→ **STRUCTURAL**

→ **OPERATIONAL**

→ **LEADERSHIP**


MAIN CHALLENGES

→ **STRUCTURAL**

→ **OPERATIONAL**

→ **LEADERSHIP**

MINUSTAH ORGANIZATION



LACK OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

- THE MOST VISIBLE PART OF THE MISSION IS THE MILITARY FORCE DEPLOYED IN THE FIELD.
- SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENTS ARE ESSENTIAL IN ORDER TO GIVE HOPE TO THE HAITIAN POPULATION.
- OTHERWISE, THE PRESSURE ON THE TROOPS WILL RISE, AND CHANCES OF SUCCESS WILL DIMINISH.



AVAILABLE STRENGTH



SECURE AND STABLE ENVIRONMENT



**MILITARY FORCE
7200**

MAIN ACTORS



UNPOL 1922




HNP: ABOUT 5000 (?)



MINUSTAH TIMELINE

- * 30th APR.2004 – RESOLUTION 1542
- * 1st JUN.2004 – BEGINNING OF MANDATE
- * 25th JUN.2004 - TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY MIF-MINUSTAH



DATE	01 JUN 2004	01 JUL 2004	01 AUG 2004	01 SEP 2004	01 OCT 2004	01 NOV 2004	01 DEC 2004	01 JAN 2005	15 JUL 2005
TROOPS	524	1569	1941	2765	3090	4078	4790	6007	6265
%	8	23	29	41	46	61	71	90	93

REDUCED NUMBER OF TROOPS, UNPOL AND HNP

MILITARY TROOPS IN HAITI (DAILY)

7000 – 2100 (LOG TASKS) – 1400 (LEAVE) = 3500

TOTAL: 3500 / 2 = 1750

OPERATIONAL TROOPS IN PORT AU PRINCE (DAILY)

MILITARY TROOPS:

BRAZIL (1050) + JORDAN (1500) + SRI LANKA (750) +
PERU (200) = **3500**

3500 - 1000 (LOG TASKS) – 600 (LEAVE) = 1800

1800 / 2 = 900

+ UNPOL: **300**

+ HNP: **800**

TOTAL: 2000

MAIN CHALLENGES

→ **STRUCTURAL**

→ **OPERATIONAL**

→ **LEADERSHIP**

THOUGHTFUL SELECTION OF SECTORS

**“ADJUST OF NEW TROUPS”
30th JULY TO 7th AUGUST 2004**

FORCES ON THE FIELD

- ARGENTINA	1 BN.	2 COY	450
- BRASIL	2 BN.	6 COY	1.165
- CHILE	1 BN.	2 COY	450
- PERU		1 COY	200
- URUGUAY	1 BN.	3 COY	550



DEPLOYMENT IN NOV 2006



-  M
-  MP
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-  MP
-  M
-  MP
-  M
-  MP
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-  M
-  MP
-  HQ



F



LACK OF A RELIABLE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

- **RELIABLE INTELLIGENCE IS VITAL IN CONDUCTING URBAN OPERATIONS.**

UNEFFECTIVE TACTICAL AVIATION SUPPORT

- UP TO NOW, TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT HAS BEEN UNEFFECTIVE, UNDER STRICT DPKO RESTRICTIONS:
 - FLIGHT ALTITUDE – ABOVE 3,000 FEET
 - LANDING SITES – SEVERE RESTRICTIONS
 - NIGHT FLYING – FORBIDDEN



UNITY OF COMMAND



- IN THE SAME OPERATION WE CAN HAVE FOUR COMMANDERS.
- DPKO KNOWS THE PROBLEM BUT IT DOESN'T FIX IT.

MAIN CHALLENGES

→ **STRUCTURAL**

→ **OPERATIONAL**

→ **LEADERSHIP**

TO KEEP THE BEST ENVIRONMENT AND THE INTEGRATION AMONG THE STAFF MEMBERS



**TO KNOW VERY WELL
THE CONTINGENTS'
MISSIONS AND LOGISTIC**





TO BE PRESENT IN THE MOST IMPORTANT OPERATIONS



**TO KEEP A GOOD
RELATIONSHIP WITH
THE GOVERNMENT**


**TO RELATE WITH THE
PRESS PERSONALLY AND
WITH PRIORITY**



TO RESPECT THE CONTINGENTS' CULTURE AND TRADITIONS



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LESSONS LEARNED

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- **INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS ALONG WITH THE MILITARY OPERATIONS**




ROADS IMPROVEMENTS & REPARATIONS





FOOD SUPPORT



SCHOOL REBUILDING



CHANNEL CLEANING



SUPPORT TO HNP

WELL'S DIGGING



LESSONS LEARNED

- ENGINEERING TROOPS WITHIN THE CONTINGENTS



CLEANING SUPPORT





STATION BAPTISTE DU FORT NATIONAL
DE LA 1^{RE} EGLISE BAPTISTE DE PORT-AU-PRINCE KI 121

LESSONS LEARNED

- TRAINING TROOPS ACCORDING TO THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT OF CHAPTER VII






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LESSONS LEARNED

- MAKING USE OF
NON-LETHAL
WEAPONS



LESSONS LEARNED



- **TEACHING THE TROOPS THE LANGUAGE OF THE COUNTRY WHERE THEY WILL BE DEPLOYED.**

LESSONS LEARNED

An aerial photograph of a densely packed urban area, likely a slum or informal settlement. The buildings are small and closely packed, with many having corrugated metal roofs. A central courtyard area contains several trees and a paved area. A road or path runs through the middle of the settlement. The overall scene is one of high population density and limited open space.

1 INFANTRY
COMPANY

**OCCUPYING
PERMANENTLY
STRONG POINTS
INSIDE THE
CRITICAL AREAS**

LESSONS LEARNED

- EMPLOYING SPECIAL FORCES UNITS.



LESSONS LEARNED




**BEING PROACTIVE IN HUMANITARIAN
AND CIVILIAN ACTIONS**

LESSONS LEARNED

- OFFICERS AND NCO`s BEING AWARE OF THE HISTORY AND CULTURE OF THE COUNTRY.





LESSONS LEARNED

- IMPROVING FIRST AID TRAINING.







**PEACEKEEPING IS NOT A JOB FOR SOLDIERS,
BUT ONLY SOLDIERS CAN DO IT.**
Dag Hammarskjöld (Former UNSG)



CONCLUSION

19 12:40PM

ABOUT THE LATIN AMERICAN PARTICIPATION

- THE CONTINGENTS ARE VERY WELL PROFESSIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PREPARED ;
- VERY GOOD UNDERSTANDING OF THE MINUSTAH'S OBJECTIVES ;
- THEY HAVE REACHED THE CONFIDENCE OF THE POPULATION ;
- HIGH STANDARDS OF DISCIPLINE AND RESIGNATION ;
- FAMILIARITY WITH THE HAITIAN PROBLEMS ;
- HIGH FEELINGS OF SOLIDARITY AND TOLERANCE.

FINAL THOUGHTS

- IF THE MINUSTAH'S FORCES WERE NOT PRESENT IN HAITI, THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE WITHIN THE COUNTRY WOULD BE OUT OF CONTROL.
- HAITI HAS TO BE SUPPORTED BY SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MEASURES.
- OTHERWISE, AS SOON AS MINUSTAH FORCES LEAVE, THE SITUATION WILL DEGRADE AGAIN, AS IT HAPPENED MANY TIMES BEFORE.

FINAL THOUGHTS

- WE SHOULD NOT MAKE THE SAME MISTAKES OF THE PREVIOUS MISSIONS;
- TO GET THE HNP BACK IS CRUCIAL;
- HAITI'S PROBLEMS EXIST FROM MORE THAN 200 YEARS. IT'S IMPOSSIBLE TO SOLVE THEM IN THE SHORT TERM.
- IT IS NECESSARY TO HAVE PATIENCE AND PERSEVERANCE.
- IT IS NECESSARY TO MANAGE A LONG AND SUSTAINED PROCESS!

FORCE HQ

THANK YOU



AGENDA

➤ INTRODUCTION

➔ BRAZILIAN PARTICIPATION

➤ MAIN CHALLENGES AND HOW WERE THEY ADRESSED

➔ STRUCTURAL

➔ OPERATIONAL


➔ LEADERSHIP

➤ LESSONS LEARNED

➤ CONCLUSION

BRAZILIAN PARTICIPATION

BRASIL HAS THE MILITARY COMMAND OF THE MINUSTAH AND THE BIGGEST CONTINGENT OF THE MISSION (1200 PERSONNEL) DEPLOYED IN PORT-AU-PRINCE, THE MOST DIFFICULT AND MAIN AREA OF THE COUNTRY.



A photograph of a flooded slum in Haiti. The scene shows several makeshift buildings with corrugated metal roofs and walls made of brick or concrete. The ground is completely submerged in muddy, brown floodwater. A woman in a long, patterned dress stands in the water, looking towards the camera. In the foreground, there is a large, dark, cylindrical object floating in the water. The overall atmosphere is one of poverty and environmental hardship.

HAITI

A SOCIAL, ECONOMIC,
ENVIRONMENTAL,
POLITICAL AND
MILITARY PROBLEM