

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

Transforming Conflict Management

Presentation to NDU International Fellows: September 14, 2005

U.S. Department of State



Emerging Threats to U.S. and International Security

"We must also improve the responsiveness of our government to help nations emerging from tyranny and war... Our government must be able to move quickly to provide needed assistance."

– President Bush, May 18, 2005

Strategic Rationale

- ▶ Weak and failed states create voids that can be filled by terrorism, organized crime, weapons proliferation, trafficking (arms, people, narcotics), humanitarian catastrophes and other threats to U.S. interests.
 - The most significant strike on U.S. territory was launched from one of the poorest countries in the world.
- ▶ States are most at risk of failure immediately before, during and after conflict.
 - Incidence of conflict is increasing. 55 UN-mounted peacekeeping operations since WWII; 41 since the end of the Cold War – 3x as many.
- ▶ Successful stabilization and reconstruction are essential to an achievable and sustainable transition from military and peacekeeping forces to civilians.

New Operational Realities

- ▶ Must address 2-3 significant reconstruction and stabilization operations concurrently.
- ▶ Most reconstruction and stabilization operations require 5-10 years for success; 50% lapse into conflict in the first 5 years.
- ▶ International community is not currently organized to deal with governance failure.
- ▶ Stronger reconstruction and stabilization capabilities require additional resources.



Mission

In a Cabinet level decision, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was established to:

Lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.



S/CRS Developments

Overview	Update
Interagency: 50 staff from State, OSD, JCS, Army Corps of Engineers, JFCOM, Army, CIA, Treasury, DOJ, DOL	▶ New Deputy Coordinator, and JCS and Justice Reps
Coordinating Mechanisms: Operational Concepts; Policy Coordinating Committee with 7 Working Group	▶ Nearing consensus on operational concepts ▶ New Working Group on Prevention and Mitigation
Mainstreaming Prevention	▶ Conducted 8 policy roundtables and exercises (Cuba, Nepal, DRC, Haiti) ▶ Developing series on closing the gap and other topics
Early Warning: Designed system to identify at-risk countries	Completed 2 nd round of reviews
Response: Database summarizing USG capabilities in progress	Initial recruitment for Active Response Corps begun
Training/Exercises: Partnership with NDU, FSI, Carlisle, NPS, Naval War College, and others	Pilot interagency training session held in June; Future sessions in development
International Partnership: Forging relationships with UN, EU, OSCE, NATO, IFIs, reg'l orgs and key countries; Coordination on strategic planning capabilities	▶ Support creation of UN Peace-Building Commission ▶ PCRU Workshop
Civil-Military Cooperation: Strong partnerships with combatant commands (JFCOM, EUCOM, SOCOM, SOUTHCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM)	▶ Developing Exercise Schedule for interagency participation ▶ Working with JFCOM on MNIG and planning pamphlet
Outreach: Consultations with think tanks, NGOs, practitioners	▶ NGO-mil dialogue on-going; Co-hosted game at NPS



Key Challenges to Preventing and Managing Conflict

- ▶ **Confusion between long-term prevention and imminent conflict**
 - Absence of prerequisites for success: local strategies, leadership, ownership and credibility.
- ▶ **Understanding situational drivers of conflict; unpredictability of triggers of acute violence**
 - Gap between early warning and early response.
- ▶ **Risk of failure**
 - Political and bureaucratic incentives against engaging.
- ▶ **Lack of financial resources targeted towards prevention and mitigation**
 - Difficult to measure progress and success.
- ▶ **Key Requirement: Incorporate conflict analysis into the policy process**
 - Early Warning System: National Intelligence Council Watchlist.
 - Interagency and State policy review.



Understanding Post-Conflict Stages

Stages can proceed concurrently, and may not show consistent forward movement.

▶ **Stabilization**

- Meeting immediate requirements: Ensuring order, public safety, food, basic services, political transitions
- Characterized by heavy international role and high level of attention.
- Window of Necessity: Must start transition from outsiders “doing” to outsiders “enabling”; key to setting country on the right trajectory.

▶ **Uprooting the Causes of Conflict**

- Factors: e.g. Collapsed state economic systems, political exclusion, crony politics, corruption, exploitation of resources.
- Dealing with the past can be destabilizing; long-term stability requires safety nets and political consensus.

▶ **Supply-side of Governance**

- Creation of laws and institutions of a market democracy: Markets, tax and banking systems; underpinnings of participatory politics; judicial systems.
- Defining a new society; must be locally driven.

▶ **Demand-side of Politics**

- Ensuring accountability: Strengthening civil society, rebuilding social cohesion and public confidence; independent media.



Lessons on Conflict

Critical to prepare for post-conflict responses, scale engagement, and manage international political commitment, attention and expectations.

▶ **Takes time to set a country on a sustainable path**

- Elections generally are not an end point, but part of an essential process to create local legitimacy.
- Chance of failure increases when we do not understand and plan in advance for long-term process of transition.

▶ **Tools: We need appropriate tools for each stage of transition**

- What is appropriate in early stages can later become counterproductive.
- Management Perspective: Need capacity to transition from “crisis response” to normal support mechanisms.

▶ **Transition to full local involvement and ownership**

- Outsiders “doing” to outsiders “enabling”.

▶ **Impact of Rapid Response on Reconciliation**

- Fast international responses create a climate of stability and confidence that allows for reconciliation.

▶ **Absorptive Capacity**

- Countries hit absorptive capacity constraints as they move to local leadership.
- Leads to international disillusionment or local disappointment.
- Need Congressional and Executive leadership to maintain a long-term perspective.



10 Innovations in Prevention and Reconstruction

1. Early Warning System

- ▶ National Intelligence Council Watchlist

2. Common Civ-Mil Planning Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction

- ▶ Links goals, essential tasks, and institutional responsibility and resources

3. Deployment of Civilian Teams to COCOMs for S&R Planning

- ▶ Humanitarian Reconstruction and Stabilization Teams (HRSTs)

4. New Interagency Coordinating Mechanisms to Guide Washington Management

- ▶ Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Groups (CRSGs)

5. Constitute Advance Civilian Teams (ACTs)

- ▶ Embed with military at division or brigade level in combat environments
- ▶ Provides immediate civilian leadership for S&R tasks



10 Innovations Continued...

6. Create a Response Corps

- ▶ Diplomatic and technical personnel within State, USAID, and other key agencies.
- ▶ Develop the political, security and technical platforms for assistance programs to work.

7. Develop, Prepare and Pre-Position Technical Capabilities

- ▶ Deliver post-conflict services and transition to building local capabilities.
- ▶ Developing database to capture contracts.
- ▶ S/CRS and JFCOM commissioned a feasibility study for a civilian reserve corps.

8. Coordinate with International Partners to Deliver Effective Multilateral Responses

- ▶ Developing ongoing relationships with international and regional orgs and bilateral partners: UK, Canada, Germany, France, Nordics, EU, UN, NATO, G-8 and Regional Organizations.
- ▶ S/CRS is the focal point for contacts on peace-building.
- ▶ Allows for better coordination in the field and shared responsibility.

9. Capture Lessons Learned

- ▶ Thematic Guides: Developing program to capture best practices on DDR and transitional governance.
- ▶ Seeking to create an interagency evaluation agenda.

10. Create a Conflict Response Fund

- ▶ Allows for quicker movement of resources.
- ▶ More flexible authorities.



Country Response: Proposed Integration of Personnel Sources and Functions

	Sources Function	S/CRS Staff	Embassy and Active Response Corps (DOS)	Implementing Bureau or Agency	Civilian Standby Capability
Coordinate	Planning	Lead	Supplement	Participate	
	Washington Coordination	Lead	Supplement	Participate	Supplement
Diplomacy	Diplomatic Leadership (Field)	Support, Monitor	Lead	Participate	
	Program Design	Oversee	Supplement	Lead	Supplement
Implement	Field Implementation	Support, Monitor		Oversee	Bulk of effort

Strategic Resourcing: Increased Capacity Over Time

<i>Functions</i>	<i>Current Resources</i>	<i>Partial Support</i>	<i>Full Support</i>
Country Response Management	1-2 efforts; limited staffing (Sudan, Haiti)	2 efforts	3 efforts
Prevention	2-3 Consultancies (DRC, Nepal)	5-7 Consultancies	5-7 Consultancies with follow-up
Planning	Consultancy Service	Full support	Full support with lessons applied
Military Coordination	Influence exercise scenarios	Participate in exercises and planning	Full participation in multiple exercises; Test civilian models
International Coordination	Build consensus	Joint prevention and planning efforts Enhance interoperability	Develop capacities in int'l and reg'l orgs and partners
Civilian Response Mechanisms	Development of concepts No Deployment capability	Initial development of Diplomatic First Responders Standby Capacity Developed	Creation of Civilian Reserve Management and deployment of standby capacity

INVESTMENT

\$124.1 m requested for civilian rapid response
\$200 m transfer authority requested for DOD

PAYOFF

Military Operations

Division
Division

Accelerated Withdrawal

1 month
6 months

Savings

\$1.2 b
\$7.2 b

Peacekeeping
MONUC (Congo)

UNMIL (Liberia)

Accelerated Withdrawal
6 months

6 months

Savings
\$524 m (US
share: \$140 m)
\$403 m (US
share: \$108 m)



S/CRS Contacts

For more information, please contact our Public Affairs Office:

- ▶ Melanie Anderton, scrs_pa@state.gov or 202-663-0832

Please also visit our websites:

- ▶ www.state.gov/s/crs
- ▶ www.crs.state.gov

- ▶ *Last updated September 12, 2005*



Back-Up Slides



Strategic Planning Process

**GOAL: Ensure a unified U.S. Government strategy -
*not a collection of individual agency responses***

GUIDELINES:

- ▶ Maintain long-term **strategic** perspective and collaborate with international partners.
- ▶ **Establish** clear strategic goals and common understanding to inform an integrated planning process.
- ▶ **Align strategic goals with USG & int'l tools & resources to achieve unity of purpose.**
- ▶ **Sequence** efforts based on country requirements and available resources.

MEASURE: Create meaningful indicators to measure progress toward or away from goals and adjust policy, programs and resources as necessary



ESSENTIAL TASKS MATRIX: An interagency-generated reference tool for comprehensive planning; You can download copies at crs.state.gov or state.gov/s/crs.



OVERARCHING POLICY GOAL

SUB-GOALS

- #1 -
- #2 -
- #3 -
- #4 -
- #5 -



Effective Civilian Response

Washington Management: S/CRS

- Guide the U.S. planning process.
- Improve conflict prevention capabilities.
- Coordinate central management, and establish means for coordination in the field.
- Focal point for outreach to international community and IFIs.
- Develop in advance the people, resources, training and guidance.
- Establish institutional memory by systematically capturing and applying lessons learned.

Diplomatic First Responders: State Department Active Response Corps

- Deploy as first responders to guide post-conflict efforts crucial to the transition process.
- Engage local communities and governments, and coordinate with international partners or peacekeepers on the ground to promote unity of effort.
- Augment U.S. Embassy presence or establish diplomatic operations.
- Support the Washington coordination group or other task forces that backstop U.S. teams in the field.
- Reinforce ongoing S&R missions as needed.

Field Implementation: Tapping USG and Outside Expertise and Programs

- Global Skills Network of Contracts, Grants, and Rosters to fill gaps; Pre-position skills and resources.
- Jumpstart Response through a Conflict Response Fund.
- Provide skills on the ground in a range of areas (Civ-Pol/Law Enforcement, Civil Society Development, Independent Media, Financial Advice, Stimulating Private Sector, Infrastructure).



Range of Country Engagement

Levels of S/CRS Engagement Vary Depending on Needs and Value-Added.

Preparing Post-Conflict Reconstruction Response – High S/CRS Engagement

- ▶ Sudan: Overseeing implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreement and coordinating overall USG strategy. Co-Chairing first CRSG.
- ▶ Haiti: Role developing; Look at ways to apply the principles of our strategic planning framework.

Strategic Planning Assistance – Medium-level S/CRS Engagement

- ▶ Cuba: Co-hosted a policy roundtable and policy exercise. Supporting regional bureau efforts through CAFC to develop a strategic framework for planning during a post-Castro transition.

Prevention Consultancies – More limited S/CRS Engagement

- ▶ Democratic Republic of Congo: Working with regional bureau to explore issues of conflict prevention and peaceful transitions in Congo/Great Lakes Region. Co-hosted two roundtables with USG, international and non-governmental experts.
- ▶ Nepal: Co-hosted strategic planning exercise to discuss USAID's existing and projected country assistance.

Unique

- ▶ Afghanistan: Working with interagency on a PRT assessment and sustainability of US. investments.



Coordinate with the International Community

Working with international partners to increase global capacity for peacekeeping and peace support activities.

• **Bilateral Partners:**

- UK: new post conflict unit and fund; PCRU workshop
- France: establishing post-conflict unit
- Canada: Considering S&R office
- Germany: establishing skills reserve
- Nordics: building niche expertise
- **UN:** Support creation of Peacebuilding Commission to improve UN/Donor Coordination on S&R.
- **EU:** Coordinating on early warning, cross-training, conflict prevention; for 2007, €550m stability instrument; New European constabulary initiative.

- **IFIs:** World Bank, IMF, Regional Banks creating vehicles to assess and respond to conflict.

- **OSCE:** Exploring ways to increase pool of trained stability police through COESPU.

- **G-8:** Enhancing international peacekeeping and constabulary capacity through train&equip; Deepening support for regional organizations.

- **NATO:** Engaging on stabilization and reconstruction planning and civ-mil coordination.

- **Regional Organizations:** Neighbors bear 50% of costs of conflict, but regional organizations weak; Priority: Strengthen AU

▶ **Early Warning and Prevention:** Coordination mechanisms and joint participation in prevention roundtables and exercises.

▶ **Managing Relations on the Ground**

- Rapid deployment of civilian presence allows field-based coordination of civ-mil operations
- Creates a U.S. civilian base to coordinate with international partners, UN missions, and NGOs



Learning from Experience

▶ **Thematic Guides:**

- Short, topical, “how-to” documents that address key themes of S&R.
- Based on feedback from Expert Group Sessions composed of USG personnel and external experts. (e.g. DDR, Elections)

▶ **Interagency Evaluation Agenda:**

- With USG partners, promoting interagency studies and evaluations (e.g. PRT assessments).
- Evaluation methodology: field visits, review of project sites, assessment of management arrangements in the field and DC, and interviews. Reports will be disseminated widely and incorporated in S/CRS’ developing institutional mechanisms and training curricula.

▶ **Metrics:** Measure progress, not just inputs and outputs

- Measure overall progress towards mission goals, sub-goals, and MMEs to assist leadership and allow for real-time operational improvements.
- Must tell story of overall impact, not just programmatic intentions (input/output indicators) and must include both quantitative and qualitative (perception-level, polling) data.

▶ **Best Practices on Prevention and Mitigation:**

- 50 percent of transitioning countries fall back into conflict within 5 years. Using best practices to better understand the differences between success and failure.
- Link particular policy and programmatic actions with improvements on the ground.



Civilian-Military Coordination

- ▶ **DOD Liaisons on Staff:** Sr. Military Advisor, Joint Staff, JFCOM, Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army and former PRT Commander.
- ▶ **S/CRS Official Points of Contact in DOD**
 - OSD Office of Policy and Stability Operations.
 - Joint Staff J-5 – Deputy Director for International Negotiations and Multilateral Affairs (DD IN/MA).
- ▶ **Substantive Working Relationships**
 - Collaborating on new concept development, exercise coordination, strategic planning, and lessons learned.
 - Joint Forces Command, Joint Staff J-7, Army War College, NDU, Fort Bragg/Civil Affairs, Fort Leavenworth, Naval Postgraduate School
 - Briefed most Regional COCOMs; Working closely with SOUTHCOM.
- ▶ **Civilian-Military Dialogue**
 - Driver of the USIP facilitated NGO-Military Working Group.
 - Collaborating with Naval Postgraduate School's Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies.
- ▶ **Joint Commitment to Civilian Capacity-Building:** In addition to close partnerships, DOD proposed a \$200m transfer authority.
- ▶ **Developing Operational Concepts:** Will provide a Strategic Planning Framework and a Civilian Operational Counterpart.
- ▶ **Draft DOD Directive 3000 will further define interagency relationships.**

