# RELATION OF THE ARMY AND NAVY MUNITIONS BOARD TO INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION PLANNING

8 January 1946.

46-2

CONTENTS

Page

Introduction—Brigadier General Donald Armstrong, Commandant, The Army Industrial College . . . . . 1

Major General S. F. Spalding, Deputy Executive Chairman for the Army, The Army and Navy Munitions Board. . . . . 3

Rear Admiral Roger W. Paine, Deputy Executive Chairman for the Navy, The Army and Navy Munitions Board. . . . . 8

Colonel William H. Hutchinson, Army Secretary, The Army and Navy Munitions Board . . . . . 11

# RELATION OF THE ARMY AND NAVY MUNITIONS BOARD TO INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION PLANNING

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GENERAL ARMSTRONG:

Gentlemen, many things were touched on yesterday by the distinguished speakers who addressed us. One of them was the relationship between the Industrial College and the Joint Staff College, which we hope to see extremely close. In fact, the concept--and this is more or less restricted information--is that we shall some day have a University of National Security; it will consist of a number of colleges. There will be the Industrial College, which, of course, will drop the name "Army." There will be the Staff College, which will be concerned with the joint strategy, there will be an Intelligence College, and there will be one or two other agencies, possibly a college from the State Department to insure a close integration of the diplomatic, as well as the military, naval, and industrial, components of the war-making powers of this country.

Before we get to the speakers this morning, I want to read something else. Yesterday you heard from General Eisenhower. When I asked General Ike to come down here, it was because General Ike is a graduate of the Industrial College. I might say he has an honorary degree from this establishment, because he worked exceedingly closely with the College through a year and a half or two years in 1930 and 1931, when I happened to be here.

When I came back here a year and three months ago, I began looking through the archives in an effort to get some more background on these things; and I discovered a very interesting paper. If I had had time yesterday at that meeting, I would have been glad to read it. But, not having had the time to do it yesterday, I want to read to you what is so characteristic of that remarkable General Eisenhower, which shows that even in 1930, when he was Major Eisenhower, he had a breadth of vision which certainly, as you look back on it, indicated the type of man that he is.

He says; "I believe that the Army Industrial College, better than any other existing institution, tends to inculcate in its students an appreciation of the fact that war is a business of the entire nation, a business which cannot be successful unless it functions as well on the farm and in the factory as on the battlefield. I am becoming convinced that any officer from any branch who spends a year in the study of the economic and industrial factors affecting war, of the difficulties to be met in the production of modern munitions of war, of the principles

applicable to modern industrial operation, and of the need for mutual understanding between the Army using munitions and the industrial establishments producing them, will be more than repaid for his effort and will increase materially his value as a war-time leader."

That, I think, is certainly indicative of what General Eisenhower personally thought of the Army Industrial College in 1930. And his experience as war leader, as he made abundantly clear yesterday, has merely confirmed him in his earlier-expressed views.

Now, gentlemen, I should say that the sequence in which the talks are given you here has been worked out most carefully, not only from the viewpoint of pedagogy, but from the viewpoint of the psychological influence or effect that we hope they will have on the members of this class.

We had our introduction yesterday. You heard those remarkable talks by the four outstanding leaders of this country in the field in which we are concerned. You heard the leading soldier and the leading sailor tell you what industrial mobilization and the work of this College mean. You heard the civilian officials who were responsible for industrial mobilization tell you what they signify.

Now, the reason that we go on D plus one to the Army and Navy Munitions Board is that that organization, which was mentioned yesterday by several of the speakers, is the organization which we in the Industrial College are trying to serve. There is also a Planning Division in the Under Secretary of War's Office and probably in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy and in all of the technical services and bureaus; and what we do here will influence and profoundly affect the work that is carried out in all those agencies. But on top is the Army and Navy Munitions Board; and you should hear, therefore, from them what they are, what they expect to do, and what their interests are in the work of the ninety officers in this class.

Now, the speakers here this morning are the two representatives on the Board from the Army and the Navy. Then there will also be a civilian head of the Board. The Army and Navy Munitions Board will, I think, be different from what it used to be in time of peace. The Army and Navy Munitions Board, it seems to me, is going to be a vastly more important agency in the years to come than it even was in 1940, and that was exceedingly important.

We are here to accumulate information to assist the Army and Navy Munitions Board in carrying out its functions. We, therefore, welcome this opportunity to hear from the heads of this organization, General Spalding and Admiral Paine, this morning what they hope to accomplish.

Now, gentlemen, I can assure you of one thing. You will never hear me make an introduction as long as this again as long as I am with the Army Industrial College. My introductions ordinarily are as brief as the ones I gave yesterday. I do not mean to infringe on the time alloted to these speakers; and I say to General Spalding and Admiral Paine that they may have all the time they want. We may take an intermission and come back here. But I did have these things that I wanted to say to you this morning, which I had no opportunity to say yesterday.

General Spalding is a member of one of the best organizations in the United States Army, that is, the Ordnance Department. He has had an exceedingly distinguished career. I am sorry that I did not bring in the documentary evidence to prove that. I sent it up to him the other day and he has not returned it. I suppose he has put it in his files. But there is a book called "The Secret History of the War," by Mr. Root, of which already two volumes have been published and I had the galley proofs of the third volume, which spoke of General Spalding's outstanding work as assistant to General Dean in Russia.

I am not going into General Spalding's past service except to tell you that it has been a very distinguished contribution to the Ordnance Department and to the United States Army. What he is doing today is what he will describe to you this morning. Gentlemen, General Spalding.

GENERAL SPALDING:

General Armstrong and members of the class: The coming of a new class to the Army Industrial College fills me with real appreciation, for I am thoroughly of the belief that the part taken by graduates of the past classes in this war was of much greater utility because of their having been here. The college filled an even greater need, because the studies that were made and the thinking that was aroused had a strong effect on the minds and the thinking of not only the graduates, but of those who came into the services and into the civilian agencies, the men who actually carried out the work of industrial mobilization.

It is a tradition of this College that each new class takes what has been developed and builds to the industrial mobilization plan. Yours is a much more important task than usually falls to new classes, for it is your duty to analyze the procurement industrial mobilization that took place in the greatest war of all history and to come up with conclusions and make recommendations that all of us can use for future planning.

We in the Army and Navy Munitions Board are very glad that you are here and are hopeful for the aid that you will give us.

Many of you in the past few years have been associated with the Board or the operations connected with it. You will remember that its peacetime function was to plan for industrial mobilization. In the years before the war, the College assisted the Board in the formulation of various revisions in the Industrial Mobilization Plan. Various committees composed of students reviewed existing plans and made new ones for approval, dealing with wartime controls of manpower, fuel, power and other services.

With the declaration of war the work of the Board changed to staff and operating problems in various fields, including priorities, material controls, tooling up industry, and construction controls. Up until the spring of 1942, when the major reorganization of the War Department took place, the Board continued to be very active and occupied a very important place in the over-all picture. In the meantime the war agencies were being organized, getting shaken down, and becoming more effective. Also they were all gaining a sense of power. By the summer of 1942 the Board had transferred most of its power and responsibilities to the super-agencies—mostly to the War Production Board. It continued to act in certain matters of clearances and priorities for the War and Navy Departments.

In 1944 it took on renewed activity in connection with the strategic stock pile, which is now a very important function. As the end of the war approached and the disintegration of the superagencies was foreseen, both the War and Navy Departments felt the need for a reconstitution of the Board, to plan for the coordination of procurement between the War and Navy Departments and to plan for industrial mobilization. So in August 1945, as was pointed out yesterday, the President, as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, signed an executive order reconstituting the Board.

The reconstituted Board consists of the Under Secretary of War and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, with a civilian chairman. The reasoning behind the civilian chairman is that he will act as a neutral in the case of a conflict of ideas between the Army and the Navy, and that he will bring to the Board the civilian and industrial viewpoints.

Any Army and Navy organization is frequently attacked on the ground that it represents a narrow military view and does not represent the viewpoint of the civilian economy and of industry. So we have the civilian chairman. But that is not enough, for in addition we have the civilian Under Secretary of War and Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

In the whole fabric of this industrial mobilization plan there must be woven the realistic pattern of industry as it is. Its very substance will depend, of course, on a lean but adequate economy for the civilian. So, in planning on any commodity, or for the utilization of any industry, we must always set aside a reasonable allocation for the civilian.

We aim to accomplish this desired effect not only by having the civilians on the Board, but by the Resources Advisory Council, with representation from other governmental agencies and from industry and labor. We also propose to organize working committees from industry and, where appropriate, from other governmental agencies. These industrial committees will assist us in formulating plans and in giving us constructive criticism on the plans that we make.

Then there is the Policy Committee, which consists of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, the Commanding General of the Army Service Forces, a general officer of the War Department General Staff designated by the Chief of Staff (G-4 has been designated), a representative of the Under Secretary of War; and their counterparts in the Navy—the Chief of the Office of Procurement and Material, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air); an officer of flag rank designated by the Chief of Naval Operations; and a representative of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. This committee will consider and make recommendations to the Board upon all matters of naval policy and any other matters that are submitted to it.

As noted in this chart here, there is an Executive Committee, composed of the Executive Chairman of the Board at the head, with a Deputy Executive Chairman for the Army and a Deputy Executive Chairman for the Navy. Admiral Paine is the Deputy Executive Chairman for the Navy and I happen to be for the Army.

The General Counsel is to advise on legal matters pertaining to the Board.

The Secretariat performs a coordinating function and also has a planning division to supervise and coordinate the planning work of the various divisions.

There is a small administrative unit performing the ordinary administrative functions.

There is a statistical unit, which is not contemplated will dig up original statistics, but will compile facts obtained from other governmental agencies, for the presentation of any problems that may arise.

While as yet no Deputy Executive Chairman for Air has been formalized, pending legislation now before Congress, General Sorensen, from the Army Air Forces, as a Special Assistant, is performing in practice the duties of Deputy Executive Chairman for Air.

The main divisions are Materials, Products, Service and Procurement. The Materials Division estimates the requirements for materials in a major mobilization; organizes plans for their procurement and for the supply of these materials, such as steel, aluminum, copper, and so on; and is also charged with the development of the strategic stock pile.

There is legislation pending in Congress taking away this last activity from the Army and Navy Munitions Board to a certain extent. But, of course, the interest of the War and Navy Departments must always be present; and the Board will carry out that function even though responsibility for the stock pile does not reside within the War and Navy Departments.

Right now we are accumulating a very considerable amount of strategic material from the declaration of surpluses that are being made. There is a certain amount set aside for civilian needs, and the surplus over that is flowing into the stock pile.

The Products Division compiles military, naval and civilian requirements for manufactured products in time of war; and devises plans for the production of such products, for the construction of new facilities, and for the allocation of facilities to a particular use.

The Service Division is organized under the subjects of transportation, power, manpower, price fixing, and so on--the services which become the duty of superagencies in time of war.

The Procurement Division carries on what is to become a new function of the Board, that is, the coordination of current procurement as well as procurement in time of war between the Army and the Navy. It is charged with the prevention of duplication of effort and with the standardization of design, contract procedure, and specifications.

It is not expected that these divisions within themselves will make the detailed plans, but rather that they will coordinate and supervise the preparation of plans made by the various committees drawn from the War and Navy Departments and, where appropriate, from other governmental agencies, and also that they will be assisted by working committees from industry.

While in your studies you will examine critically the experiences of this war, I hope that you will do so with an open mind, for next time there are bound to be different conditions, different timing, new weapons--different foundations from which to start.

Looking back on what happened this time, it would have been of inestimable value to have had initially a set of requirements, to some degree of the magnitude and of the types which finally became the objective even early in the war. We constantly had to change our vision. So it is of the first importance that we obtain the best possible list of requirements from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and then determine what can be expected from industry to meet this list. We must then point out to the Staff the delays that will be encountered and ask it to establish priorities, so that we can make schedules and avoid as many conflicts as possible.

Of course, the big thing when war breaks out is to get the orders placed as promptly as possible with the most promising sources, and to put the load on industry. Used properly, our industry has tremendous strength; its results in this war were a marvel to all the world. The total productive output of the country, according to the Krug report, went up fifty percent. The raw materials output went up sixty percent, and manufacturing trebled.

Once orders are placed, bottlenecks, in spite of the best-made plans, will develop; and controls for manpower, materials and the civilian economy have to be set up. The more we can anticipate these bottlenecks, the better and wiser the controls that are established, the more effective progress we can make.

And here is where your work can be of the greatest value—in determining and recording the bottlenecks of this war, and in pointing out the way they could have been minimized. Also in analyzing the controls that were set up, where they fell down, and determining what controls we should use at the start of another war. But—and this is also important—do not overlook the great accomplishments of this war. See that they are properly analyzed and recorded. Perhaps they are more important than the mistakes that were made.

Thank You.

GENERAL ARMSTRONG:

Thank you, General Spalding. Before we have any discussion of what General Spalding has told us, I think we will hear from the Deputy Chairman for the Navy, Admiral Paine.

The only thing I have against the Army and Navy Munitions Board is that they took Admiral Paine away from the Army Industrial College. But I do not blame them.

Admiral Paine is, like General Spalding, an officer with a remarkable varied background. I think his principal claim to fame is the remarkable job he did at Pearl Harbor. But that was on the repair and maintenance side. He is now on the procurement side. It is a pleasure, gentlemen, to present to you the Deputy Chairman of the Army and Navy Munitions Board, Admiral Paine.

ADMIRAL PAINE:

Good morning, gentlemen. General Spalding and I both appreciate this opportunity of appearing before you this morning as the service members of the Executive Committee of the Army and Navy Munitions Board to discuss very briefly the relationships that exist between the Board and the Army Industrial College.

General Spalding has covered the background of the College and the characteristics and responsibilities of the Army and Navy Munitions Board so thoroughly that it would be only repetition if I were to speak further along that line. I can add nothing to what he has said.

I would like to say that I was tremendously impressed yesterday by the charge which was placed on the College and on its students by the distinguished speakers who addressed your convocation. Knowing General Armstrong and his staff as I do, I feel certain that the words that were uttered yesterday will be picked up as a banner and carried by you of the student body.

As for the Army and Navy Munitions Board, it faces, too, a tremendous responsibility. It is responsible for the industrial mobilization planning in the interest of national security. And, as a second feature and correlative with it, it is responsible for the supervision of joint bodies, organizations, and committees of the War and Navy Departments which concern themselves with joint procurement.

Gentlemen, that is a large order. It is beyond the capacity of any particular organization to carry such a load unassisted. The Board must depend per force on the talent that it can bring to bear from all sources within the War and Navy Departments equipped with specialized knowledge in order to carry out its mission.

By its very purpose and scope, the Army Industrial College is ideally suited to be a means of support to the Board in the mission that it must accomplish. I would say that such support divides itself in my mind into three parts. In the College there is an ideal group to which research problems on industrial matters can be presented as they arise, and which the College can then deal with and advise the Board. The College is made up of a group which has been selected in such manner that inevitably they will be able to furnish us with advice, information, and suggestions. The staff and students will be of immense assistance

in developing ideas which must be formulated into the final plan. And, last of all, the College by virtue of the development of informed talent in the officers who will graduate from it, will constitute a pool available to the Board from which members of its permanent staff may be drawn to carry on its work.

General Armstrong has promised to give the members of the Board a chance to participate in revisions of the College curriculum. I trust he will carry out that promise. The Board will follow the course and the progress of the College with the keenest of interest; and I assure you that what is done here will be of infinite value to the Board in the conduct of its mission.

Gentlemen, I wish you well.

GENERAL ARMSTRONG:

Thank you, Admiral Paine.

In order to start the questions, I shall ask General Spalding if it is a proper concept to look on this Army and Navy Munitions Board as a joint industrial staff corresponding on the industrial side to the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization. Would that be a proper concept?

GENERAL SPALDING:

I might pass on to you what General Eisenhower brought up to me the other day. He thought it was very important that there be a place where all questions can come within the War Department and the Navy Department for answer; and he suggested that our Board have a very close tie-in, especially the secretariat, with the secretariat of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; so that between them they could cover the entire field of the War and Navy Departments; that subjects pertaining to the industrial side, the procurement side, would be passed on to the secretariat of the Army and Navy Munitions Board; and, of course, the operational and strategic matters would be handled by the secretariat of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. So in a way the answer to your question would be yes.

Of course, the Board has to grow. We are just beginning and learning how to speak now. We have a long way to go. It is up to us with your help to establish a position of dignity and accomplishment in this field.

GENERAL ARMSTRONG:

My question was meant to be really a hope that, as you develop, your development would be as a staff of that sort on the industrial side, with as much prestige in that phase of warfare or preparation for it as the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Now, one other question before we hear from the members of the class.

We are accustomed down here in the Industrial College to analyze the industrial potential, the economic war potential, of a country as manpower, as our raw material resources, as our manufacturing resources, as our service organizations and utilities, and then finally the organization that we have to deal with, the military and naval organization, the organization of the Government, the organization for industrial mobilization, and the controls that Captain Lovenstein was leading up to this morning.

It seems to me that the present organization you have here omits one of the most essential elements in the war potential in the planning work of the Army and Navy Munitions Board. I refer, of course, to manpower. It seems to me that manpower was probably one of the greatest sources of malpractice or abuse of resources in the entire war.

We have in the Department of Research a Manpower Group, which is organized to study the use of manpower in this war, not only in this country, but in all countries, to see why the best that we could ever do in the United States was to put fifty percent of our manpower into the factories, as compared with the recorded eighty percent put in by the Germans.

In other words, gentlemen, you must study fundamentally, it seems to me, the proper utilization of the manpower resources of the country. So I want to ask General Spalding if he contemplates establishing a personnel or manpower division, which would, it seems to me, be a proper staff study for the Army and Navy Munitions Board. General Spalding, what do you plan to do about manpower in this organization? You mentioned it probably, but I did not understand that you had an organization to take care of it.

GENERAL SPALDING:

That is one of the functions of the Service Division here. Manpower is one of the subjects that presumably in time of war will be handled by a superagency; and that division is the custodian of and has the responsibility for initiating studies along those lines.

GENERAL ARMSTRONG:

Do you not think it would probably be important enough to be put up here, with Materials, Products, and so forth, instead of being put under the Service Division?

GENERAL SPALDING:

For the present we decided that it belonged there, with the other superagency functions.

GENERAL ARMSTRONG:

I do not mind being critical of the prewar Army Industrial College because I formed part of it for about five years. I think that one of its great errors was the failure to study manpower adequately or even to approach it. If you look back at the curriculum of the prewar Army Industrial College you will see that in all of the ten months of the course manpower was studied by one committee of three or four officers for a matter of three weeks. It is a basic and fundamental thing. It seems to me one reason that manpower was so badly handled was just exactly because we did not give it enough consideration in the old days.

Gentlemen, any questions from the floor of either of the speakers?

QUESTION:

This is probably repetition, but you mentioned some legislation in Congress that would probably take away a function of the Board. I would like a little more information on that.

GENERAL SPALDING:

I think I will refer that to General Hutchinson, who is the Army secretary of the Board and who has been handling the stockpiling question.

COLONEL HUTCHINSON:

The present law, which was passed in 1939, provides that the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Interior, acting jointly through the Army and Navy Munitions Board, shall determine which materials are strategic for stockpiling for use in time of war, and the qualities and quantities of the materials which shall be stockpiled. That is the existing law, and the way that we are functioning now.

But under the proposed legislation, which passed the Senate about two weeks ago and is now in the House, there is a Stockpiling Board set up, which is composed of the Secretaries of State, Commerce, Treasury, Agriculture, Interior, War and Navy, with a chairman of the Stockpiling Board who will be appointed by the President. The Board will be lodged in such government department as the President shall designate. The chairman of that Board would have all the stockpiling functions if that bill were passed, and the War and Navy Departments would have just one representative each on the advisory board, and the present functions related to stockpiling would be taken away from the Army and Navy Munitions Board.

QUESTION:

Is not that sort of a dangerous thing to do? One of the principal things that we had trouble with this time was something that was not known to the general public. If you have an item which is important, such as the atomic bomb, which takes quite a bit of material, and have it planned for by civilian planning, and take it out of the Army and Navy Munitions Board, are we not apt to run into a production problem that will take a tremendous amount of some of our critical materials that we have not planned for or stockpiled against?

GENERAL SPALDING:

I think it can be handled either way. I think, since the Army and Navy Munitions Board has the responsibility of seeing that the general needs of industrial mobilization are met, we may accomplish the same purpose. In this new organization we may enlist the help of other agencies, so that in the end we will be just as well off.

It all comes back to the question of getting appropriations from Congress for procurement of strategic materials for the stockpile.

DR. HUNTER:

May I ask a question? As I recall it, your Board was the creation of the Secretaries of the Army and Navy and responsible to them when the war emergency first arose. Then, as the war emergency developed, by executive order the President made the Board responsible directly to him. Will the Board revert to that old status as we get back to normal conditions, or will it continue to be responsible directly to the President?

GENERAL SPALDING:

Do you remember how that is stated in our present charter?

COLONEL HUTCHINSON:

So far as our present charter is concerned the Board reports to the President, when necessary, through the Secretaries of War and Navy. The presidential military order of July 1939, which states that the Board shall exercise its functions under his direction was never followed by him so far as I know as I never heard of the Board actually reporting on any specific matter to the President or ever being requested by him to report on any matter.

GENERAL SPALDING:

Of course, as I remember this recent charter, the Board will report, when necessary, to the President through the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.

COLONEL HUTCHINSON:

When the War Production Board was established the presidential order provided that the Board should report to the President through the Chairman of the War Production Board. Then in 1943 that was changed so that it reported to the President through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

ADMIRAL PAINE:

I believe that matter is largely a theoretical one. The charter having been signed by the President, the presumption would be that the Board is directly responsible to the President. However, if you take a look at the constitution of the Board members, they are so directly under the two secretaries, War and Navy, that inevitably they are going to take their directions from the top side of the Army and the Navy. The matter of appeal to the President is an extremely improbable contingency.

A STUDENT:

I want to come to the sixty-four-dollar question. I wonder if Admiral Paine, who seems to be getting off so easily here this morning, would tell us briefly some of the defects of the industrial mobilization plan that seemed rather ineffective at the beginning of World War II.

ADMIRAL PAINE:

I know exactly what the Captain is talking about. Of course, it is a tremendously interesting problem to all of us. It so happens that when I first got back to Washington about a year ago, I came over to the Army Industrial College, and one of the things I was particularly interested in was the answer to that question; and I got as much information as I could out of General Armstrong. His staff pulled together for me a considerable amount of information bearing on the whole question.

Generally speaking, my reaction was that at the time of the outbreak of the war, a rather comprehensive and excellent mobilization plan had been devised. Yet almost with the outbreak of the war it went into the ash can and was used only in part or in fragments from that time on.

It has seemed to me that the reason this happened was something that is almost inherent in our form of political government. We had set up a tight military organizational plan to be binding on industry. While it is true that in the courses of the Industrial College industry had been called on to participate, and representatives of industry had talked and in a way helped formulate the details of the plan, still it was not a civilian-sponsored and looked-out-for plan. It was a military plan. And inevitably, when we go into a cataclysm such as the country faced at the outbreak of the war, the civilians are going to step in, men with influence, power and ability, and they are going to attempt to establish, to their satisfaction, some method of meeting the situation which they face.

Psychologically, they were not particularly interested in a military plan. It just did not make any difference how good it was. They would not give the time and the thought to following it through. The consequence was that there was a period of six months where as a Nation we sparred around trying to find some method of doing business and getting the country's industry geared up to the necessary speed. We finally came out with the War Production Board, which essentially was the thing that had been proposed by the military initially as a basis for the military mobilization plan.

This lesson of the need for a civilian "front" is one that I think is well-worth-while registering definitely and positively. We can make the best plan in the world, as military men, but we have to bear in mind that civilians are going to execute it and carry it out under our supervision; and whatever we do come up with has to be sponsored and backed up in war by the civilians who happen to be running our Government at the time that the crisis takes place.

GENERAL ARMSTRONG:

Thank you very much, Admiral Paine. I want to say that you summarized very effectively the answer to that question.

There is even more to it than what the Admiral has said. It is not only the civilians, gentlemen, who were responsible for the failure to adopt the industrial mobilization plan. The Army and the Navy themselves have a very great responsibility, and I will tell you why.

General Eisenhower spoke yesterday about the difficulty of getting anybody above the grade of sergeant to come and address the Army Industrial College in the old days, and he was really right. The Army Industrial College in the old days had about as much prestige as some kindergarten out here in town. That is an exaggeration, of course.

But within our own Army and Navy the business and the importance of industrial mobilization were not recognized. The man who concentrated on that was just an unfortunate or a damn fool or something of that kind, because when the war came he got about as much credit for helping to win the war, particularly in the initial stages, as somebody who was never in uniform.

Now, I can prove the point about the prestige of the Army Industrial College by merely telling you that before the war, or before I came here, the College had never had an officer above the grade of colonel as its commandant. It was the only Army or Navy college, so far as I know, headed by an officer who was not a general officer or a flag officer in the Navy. And that, gentlemen, is why I say that the Army and the Navy themselves can take a great deal of the responsibility for the failure of the industrial mobilization plan.

We are now doing something about these things. We are not merely looking back and griping about those unfortunate things that happened to us in the industrial mobilization in this war. The great thing is to get industry and labor and the people in the social sciences supporting everything that we do here in the College and everything that we do in the Army and Navy Munitions Board.

Almost a year ago I started setting up industrial advisory committees to the College. That was before the Army and Navy Munitions Board came into existence. We have them from the steel industry, copper, magnesium, etc. We have about twenty-four committees already set up. Eventually those committees should serve, it seems to me, both the College and the Munitions Board, which provides for them here on their organization chart.

But I want to tell you gentlemen right now that we have had the most constructive meetings. We had the committee from the iron and steel industry here a few weeks ago. We have had committees from the machine tool industry and the antifriction bearing industry. We have had other industrial groups here. We propose to bring labor groups and social science and engineering groups, all of whom through these media will be in touch with the work of the College and the Army and Navy Munitions Board.

We will no longer work in a military and naval vacuum. We will see to it that the same reasons that prevented the adoption of this plan after Pearl Harbor do not arise again so far as we can help it. And we can help it a great deal. It is going to be part of your mission, gentlemen, to see that we discover by your analysis all the reasons why our planning went for almost nothing in this war. We have learned a great lesson.

So in behalf of the College, General Spalding and Admiral Paine, I want to thank you for your contributions here. I hope that this is only the initial meeting with you gentlemen, and that you will be with us again on other occasions when specific problems of the relationship between the College and the Munitions Board and the specific problems of the Munitions Board itself can be discussed and studied in your presence and with your assistance. Thank you very much.

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