

246-42
PLANT SECURITY,
1 March 1946.

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Introduction--Brigadier General Donald Armstrong, Commandant, The Army Industrial College	1
Guest speaker--Colonel Alton C. Miller, Director, Provost Office, Office of the Provost Marshal General	1
General discussion	10
General Armstrong	
Students	
Colonel Miller	
Lt. Colonel Walter B. Koch	

PLANT SECURITY,
1 March 1946.

GENERAL ARMSTRONG:

Gentlemen, among the points that were important in World War II that I think will be infinitely more important in the revolutionary period in which we live, in which ideologies play such an important role, the subject on which we are going to hear an eminently qualified speaker this morning is of the utmost importance. Sabotage and subversive activities are possibly a greater menace to our country today and in any future warfare that we must anticipate than even the atomic bomb.

You know how we have already brought out the fact that some of our most essential needs were met in this war by a single plant. That sort of thing must be brought out and some kind of remedial measures adopted. The thinking of this Class must be directed along that line.

We must realize the great danger to industrial mobilization plans and to the effective use of our facilities at the outbreak of any future war by what can be done by people who are loyal to a foreign government rather than to our own Nation. Obviously, without mentioning any names, you gentlemen realize that is a factor we must consider.

The speaker this morning has been on duty in the War Department in this particular function for a great many years. Without going into the details of his career in that activity I can assure you that there are few officers who can speak with the competence with which he can address you this morning on this subject. He is at present in charge of this work in the Office of the Provost Marshal General.

Gentlemen, it is a privilege to present to you Colonel Alton C. Miller, whose subject is "Plant Security." Colonel Miller.

COLONEL MILLER:

General Armstrong and gentlemen: I note two signs here. I am going to have to keep alert to see which one is held up. One says, "QUIET" and there is one over here that says, "LOUDER PLEASE." (Laughter)

As I cover the subject for today, please keep in mind that I am always thinking from the angle of security and from no other angle. If there are any comments which I may make which would appear to be stepping on somebody's toes, remember that I am looking at the building from only one angle. (That is simply for my self protection.)

The more I have learned about internal security and plant protection, the more incompetent I feel, as an individual, to do a great deal about it. It is so big and so large that it just astounds me. It makes me afraid, very often, of the future.

We started, initially, without a great deal of precedent, without too much on which to go. So, today I am looking at the matter, first of all,

historically. I have made an outline for you, with a few errors in it, which I shall correct as I go through, mainly to point out, first, the scope of the problem, and also to point out that a great many errors were made. We will not have time in the future to grope as we did in this present war. That is one thing that must be kept in mind. We dare not-- I repeat that: for our own future security, we dare not be entirely guided by the past, because, in the light of new developments, the past has no precedent for the things that we must do for the future.

Also, we must look at the entire problem in the light of its detailed components, because it was only when we began to break down plant security in all its phases, into its detailed components, that we really began to understand that we had to take a more or less scientific approach. We cannot understand a problem, or begin to solve it, until we can see the differences between its various elements. Therefore, we must look at it as many an artist has to contemplate a great masterpiece. We see it from a distance so that we get the impression the artist wished to create; then, we step forward and look at it closely to see its detailed composition.

This study that is being conducted today on this problem must be continued. I repeat that: it must be continued, because I am fully convinced that never again will we have the chance, or the opportunity, or the time to go through all the errors we went through during this war.

My whole talk today, therefore, since I cannot begin to cover the 30 or 40-some pages of the brief outline--and I wasn't being facetious--follows along the notes which I believe have been made available to you. I could only hit the main points. There are, however, in the Historical Division several monographs covering each one of the subjects as they are broken down in this outline, complete with footnotes. I can direct any individual who is interested in any particular phase to any one of the monographs, where an entire story is given, objectively pointing out the errors as well as some of the good points.

In the outline, "Fire Protection and Prevention" was offered first, with malice aforethought, because, in the beginning, there were too many people who thought and felt that if something could not burn up it was not important. Therefore, initially, there was entirely too much emphasis on fire protection and not enough on some of the other programs, which resulted in just the same amount of, if not greater, importance to the over-all picture as fire protection and prevention.

Keep in mind that the mission of internal security was to insure uninterrupted production of materials necessary for national defense, including physical features, installations, equipment and everything else connected with it, against all hazards. You can have no perimeter around your thinking when you mention "against all hazards."

I have marked on the first page of "Fire Protection" a few things which carry over to the others; for instance, the Plant Protection Division, in the Office of the Assistant Secretary and then the Under Secretary, started to pave the way through the use of inspection report forms. That form was later to become one of the first features of plant protection inspections. It was constantly revised and the chronology is given in this first part of the outline.

32

Paragraph 14, likewise, refers to a "Master Inspection Responsibility List," which played an important part.

In just considering plant fire protection, the things that gave us difficulty were not always mountains; they were molehills, over which we constantly tripped. There was more discussion about the policy concerning automatic sprinklers than perhaps anything else. I do not need to go into all the details, but it was a difficult point, because somebody had to have inspection responsibility and somebody had to say if the inspector of the inspection agency had to have an automatic sprinkler. So you can let your imagination run on from that point and see what kind of technical discussions resulted from that.

Jurisdiction of the inspecting agency, which I will cover a little later, was a constantly harassing problem. It was originally assumed, for example, that there would be one agency responsible for one plant; but, normally, there were as many as six to eight War Department agencies and perhaps an equal number of other Federal and quasi-Federal agencies interested in the same plant, or in the same product. Sometimes, the important product was not the one in a particular plant where other products were manufactured; it was not the one with a three and a half million to eight million dollar contract, but was an insignificant, unimportant \$50,000 contract without which we could not have continued to fight very long.

The old personnel problem cropped up. There was the question of inspection personnel, qualified men. Everybody wanted them. All the procurement agencies of the Army, all the procurement agencies of the Navy, other agencies, wanted them. The Army wanted to draft them. So we constantly had to meet the problem of inadequate and untrained personnel by a process of training and indoctrination. We never intended going into a training field, but we found that it was necessary.

One of the greatest difficulties encountered early in the game was the lack of a central, over-all evaluating agency. That point I will stress several times during the talk.

The protection people wanted to know, "What shall we protect?" That was the first question. The procurement agencies would give us lists of the important contracts they had, but they always withheld the secret and confidential ones as being none of our business. They gave us the large monetary contracts that we found were already protected with adequate guard forces, adequate sprinkler systems, and even down to the removing of subversives and a very careful control over plants manufacturing canvas cots.

We had to beg, insist, plead, argue for an agency that would evaluate the importance of every single product in terms of every other single product, and every plant in terms of all of those products that it manufactures, and of every element in terms of the things into which that element had to go. That problem we found one of the most important. Unfortunately, the protection tail of the dog had to wag the production dog.

Protection agencies should have nothing at all to do with the evaluation; but we had and we had too much to do with it. It was most unfortunate. Primarily, we had to get into the field of evaluation, because we could not protect without the evaluation. I will touch that point in several places.

The last main difficulty was the protection of critical stock piles against fire; there, again, as an indirect relationship to an over-all evaluation agency. So far as the protection group was concerned, we could not find out where the stock piles were or what the ratio of demand against the stock piles was in relation to the output of production or the intake back into the stock piles; yet, we were stressing certain things, such as rubber. We found out to our amazement that nobody in the country knew where the rubber was, or how much. Not even the Rubber Supplies Corporation knew it. For the future, there should still be, in this and all other plant protection activities, centralized control and, wherever possible, complete decentralized operations. There must be, if the problem is to be efficiently solved, a central over-all, evaluating agency.

The second thing which I touched upon in my outline is the Alien Employment Program. The basis for it was sound, but the reasons behind it were unsound. You see, it was thought, initially, that if we had any trouble from the standpoint of sabotage and espionage that we had five million or more aliens to blame; that they would be the ones principally who would engage in sabotage and espionage. Well, strange as it may seem to you, the reverse was quite true. Most of our difficulty came not from the aliens, but it came from good old-line American families. Now I am not going into any of the reasons. I merely state that came as a complete surprise to us. Consequently, we had to change some of our planning to meet the situation.

In the Alien Program, we found for the first time a need for coordinated action between the Army and the Navy. The Alien Program, primarily, was the first instance where there was joint action between the Army and the Navy, and, at a later date, the Army took all responsibility for Navy plants, except Naval Shore Establishments, although there were detailed in my office, in FMGO and on the Industrial Employment Review Board, officers from Op-30 in the Navy. It worked out very well. At the decentralized level, with just one or two unfortunate instances in the field, the situation between the Naval Districts and the Army Service Commands worked out very smoothly.

The big difficulty with the handling of aliens was, first, that there were so many; second, that the F.B.I., following the Alien Registration Act, was to investigate every alien, but it was a slow process. There were too many of them. So the F.B.I. eventually said, "we quit. We have too many investigations to make where an overt act has been committed or where there has been an instance which may lead us to believe that there was an act of sabotage." So we found that the investigation of aliens prior to approving them for work on classified aeronautical contracts became one of our babies. It is touched upon later on again in the Loyalty Investigations Program.

The question of citizenship was also very difficult. Unfortunately, a good old Kentucky mountaineer had no way to prove he was an American. Without being able to prove he was an American, the plant in many instances said, "Well you must be an alien." We asked, for example, one plant in Texas how many aliens they had. They said, "Seventeen: Four from Pennsylvania, 11 from New York and two from Maryland." (Laughter) They were all minor problems, but they gave us a lot of headaches in the early days.

So we finally came to the conclusion that the best thing to do was to send this thing out to the field, to let them run it and to tell them how. And that was not an easy job either, because we had almost 150,000 files set up entirely wrong, because they were set up by companies. We had to break them all apart and set them out by individuals.

The assignment of responsibility for the enforcement of Army and Navy regulations and the Federal statutes was very difficult. The Ordnance Department of the Army or the Bureau of Ordnance in the Navy had contracts in Plant A. Signal Corps and perhaps some others had contracts with the Bureau of Ships, Bureau of Aeronautics. They both wanted to take care of a particular alien, or later on, subversive. That again ties in with the Master Inspection Responsibility List where, eventually, we spelled out and said just who was responsible. We designated the agencies, so that there would not be an overlapping. That program still continues.

The principle of decentralization should continue. I do not know how we will work it out. The Service Commands have asked me for the past two weeks, "What will we do with the alien files when we revert to four, five, or six Army areas?" I said, "I do not know; hang on to them; we'll tell you later."

In the light of present labor movements in this country, we think we should have more legislative relief. Today, the War and Navy Departments are protected only on aeronautical contracts and aeronautical accessories. They are not protected on their classified contracts, unless it is written into the contract. We should have legislation which would protect all classified contracts against aliens and secret and top-secret contracts at least against individuals who should not be allowed to work on that type of contract.

I believe that if we do not get that legislative relief, the day will come when the manager of a plant will have to take Joe Doakes into his plant--Joe Doakes being furnished by Labor--whether he knows that Joe Doakes is basically subversive or not. The basis of proof will have to be furnished by the employer who, in many instances, will not be in a strong enough position.

The next one is Visitor Control and Identification, an important part of the over-all picture. It worked well where it was so wanted by the management. The main difficulty there came solely from a minute definition of, "What is a visitor?" I still do not know, because there are all types of individuals going into a plant. For instance, a General Motors' serviceman; he has nothing in the world to do with the plant. Actually, the only

thing he is thinking of is the General Motors equipment. Then there would be an individual sent in by Turkey, for example, to study plant operation. The Turkish officers, as in many cases they were, were sponsored by their government and also by our own government; but they really had no business in the plant.

So, the question of citizenship and the definition of a "visitor" again gave us plenty of headaches.

Then there is the Master Inspection Responsibility List. It took quite some administrative machinery to keep that thing operating. It took the joint action of the Army, the Navy, War Production Board, Army Air Forces, O.C.D., and the Provost Marshal General's Office to provide the basis for it, which was the evaluating agency. That is where, I repeat, the protection tail was wagging the production dog.

Primarily, the establishment of the MIRL was an attempt to set up satisfactory controls of evaluation. It was difficult to determine, if we had to furnish some men, whether we should furnish them to a roller mill or a tunnel. It is almost as bad as saying, "Which do you like better, the Ohio river or ice cream for dessert?"

It was also, later on, used as a basis for justification of the use of personnel on just such a function. When the need came for reducing personnel wherever possible, because of manpower shortages, we were able to justify any particular product, any particular area, any particular element, in the light of the things into which it was made. We could state the approximate amount of work one given man could do in a given area in a given time. In some cases we found, yes, there were too many personnel; but not many.

Under Paragraph 8 of the section on Master Inspection Responsibility List, I said, in the second sentence, "PMGO was now charged with the responsibility for determining the facilities which were to be assigned to the MIRL." In my opinion, that was still an error. We should have had nothing to do with stating which facilities or plants should go on the MIRL. When we made that statement, it was misunderstood to mean that we should not state what protection should be afforded a given facility. We were the ones who were charged with protection. Therefore, we said that we are the ones to state what type of protection will be given to one facility, but we should not be the ones to state which facility should receive protection. I do not believe that the policy on that is, as yet, clarified.

Facilities at one time numbered over 16,000. That was too many. There were not that many facilities, the loss of which individually would materially affect the war or cause us to lose it. After a better evaluation was made of all the facilities, the number was reduced, by November of 1943, to some 4600 facilities.

The evaluation was one of the greatest headaches. As to recommendations for the future, I have two. I will just read the last sentence of the first one: "The deficiencies of present war evaluation reveal the necessity for evaluations based on total production capacity."

So far as the protection men were concerned, there were too many production boys thinking solely in terms of the end product. They could not see that a simple little plant, manufacturing something (that apparently nobody bought) for use in the war, was considerably more important and

more vital than many of the end products without which we could have gotten along if we did not have them.

That evaluation should be continuous and current. It should not be made by anybody connected with protection. If I were out of my field, I should also say it should not be made either by anybody concerned with production.

The next program deals with the removal and suspension of subversives. We began to get reports, in the early days, about subversives. We did not know what to do with them. We found, however, that there was sufficient legal authority to take action. The action, initially, was taken by all the various bureaus in the Navy, individually, and by the various Technical Services or Supply Services in the Army. Eventually that was drawn together into the Provost Marshal General's Office, where it was handled entirely too academically. We could not see how dangerous the employment of Joe Doakes was in a given facility, because we had no idea, at the time we got the report, what the plant was manufacturing, what the man was doing in the plant, or even if he had the mentality or the means to do any damage or give out any information.

It was difficult to decentralize, but it was decentralized and it worked a thousand percent better after it was sent down to the various Service Commands and Procurement Districts of the A.A.F. From there on out, we had few headaches. We had a lot of lawsuits, but no real headaches. There were fewer changes during this program than in any other program.

Under Paragraph 17 of the third page of that one, the first sentence should read, "The determination of the importance of the facility to the war effort was one of the most difficult obstacles to efficient application of the program." The Under Secretary of War gave special attention to the monograph on this program and unofficially stated it was one of the most important. Remember, it came along as an after-thought, when we discovered that most of our subversives were not aliens but were good old-line American citizens.

The Fingerprinting Program was a mistake, but it was a good one. As I say, we made a lot of mistakes. We are glad it happened, because the country is fingerprint-minded today. Back in 1941 and early in 1942, there were about twenty government agencies all yelling for the same kind of national registration that Argentina had. But everybody wanted to run it; therefore, the baby died because everybody was giving it too much love.

The Army, in an attempt to weed out criminals, put in the Fingerprinting Program; the Navy agreed. It eventually died of its own weight. I, personally, was glad to see it die. But it achieved certain things: it weeded out the worst type of criminal. In some places it weeded them out where we did not want to, because we found in a magnesium mine out West we could either get fingerprint cards or get magnesium; we could not get both. So we did without the fingerprint cards.

It has a great psychological effect, generally. It added to our overall central files of F.B.I. some 30-plus million--we did not know how many--cards which they would otherwise not have had and which will be of great benefit in the future. It did break down the general feeling of distaste on the part of the public for being fingerprinted.

The Key Personnel Program was a most misunderstood phase of plant protection. When we started, we did not know how to find out who were the

good boys and who were the bad boys in a particular plant. So we tried all kinds of schemes, the most successful of which was the Key Personnel Program, but nobody in the field understood it. We were glad when we were able to accomplish the same thing through the media of production security and personnel security inspections, and subject the entire plant personnel roster to a screening rather than just those people whom we were trying to define as "key personnel." Unfortunately, we found ourselves in the position, under this program, of having to investigate the vice-president, the president, treasury, secretary and a few other officials, and they thought that was something awful.

Then, too, the mechanics of it were very difficult. Form NNI-140, which was first used, was cumbersome and complicated. It had to be made out in duplicate, so we were glad when we finally got rid of that form.

"Federal Coordination," I just offer you. There is a need in the future for having one agency responsible for all types of internal security. For example, the Provost Marshal General's Office was the coordinating agency, but not necessarily the responsible agency. You will notice I listed under paragraph 6 a lot of individual programs, and put at the end "(And some 50 others)," all of which had to be coordinated.

Then I pointed out in paragraph 7 that a lot of little, apparently small, programs were not even included in the others, such as the BW program, Bacteriological Warfare; a program to protect milk and milk products; food dehydration; K-Ration; crude rubber; Fire-fly Program (forest-fire fighting and prevention program); the Big Inch and Little Inch, ad infinitum.

In connection with emergency protection, I gave you the latest law. I gave it to you in full without the tabs. I will be glad to furnish any individual the tabs referred to in this. I do not have them, but if you desire them, I will see that they are made available. So many people do not understand the whole program on emergency protection. Here is the law. It is the latest word. It needs no explanation; it is self-explanatory.

The Loyalty Investigations Program was the largest, from the standpoint of numbers of personnel involved in its operation and from the numbers of personnel affected by its operation. I wrote on my notes 3.5 million and my secretary translated that into 350 million. So that is really 3.5 million loyalty investigations, approximately, that were made during the war.

That program, I might say, was factual only. The group which I had on investigations was constantly hard-pressed to resist an effort on the part of other agencies to get them to tell them who should be investigated. That savors of gestapoism. If the investigative agency has the power to state who shall be investigated, I think we are headed in the wrong direction. The agency responsible for the protection of a given installation, or for safeguarding a military installation, should be the one to state what investigations are necessary. The experts are then the ones who would conduct and perform the investigations.

The rest of this is factual. It merely cites how rapidly and how many different types of investigations were necessary. It covers almost everything across the board, in both the Army and Navy programs.

I could not help but point out that the men who were down on the ground doing these investigations were the finest group of men I think you could possibly find anywhere in the country. The requirements to become one of

these investigators were far above those which were required of me to become an officer. Those men were good officer material. We were unable, in the Army, to get them anything higher than a Master Sergeant--and few of those! They were district judges, country judges, all types of attorneys and they were some of the best old-time investigators we could find, plus many skilled technicians of all types.

The Auxiliary Military Police Program is one program that cost us hardly a nickel but, for the amount of money put into it, we got the greatest return. There were over 200,000 plant protection men, mostly guards, who were federalized and still paid by the company. Now I do not say here that the Government still paid for it, because in many instances that company never even had any contracts where they could collect under a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract. Basically, it was paid for out of the pocket of the man at whose plant these guards were stationed.

The Safety Program continues. It started latest, but the farther we go the more impetus there is given to the program. Safety training, safety supervision, safety reporting procedures have made more progress in the last eight months than they did during the entire course of the war.

The Japanese-American Program was specialized. It combined all the other features of internal security, inspection and personnel security activities with reference to a particular minority group that the Caucasian hardly ever understood. Fortunately, we were given all kinds of assistance by experts in the Department of Justice, F.B.I., O.N.I., and even from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, where my good friend, Bill McGovern, helped us out personally in many instances. It is one of the most specialized subjects with which we had to deal. We never know, but what we may have to deal with other minority groups, so the experience gained in handling one type is excellent. We still have fragments of that particular program existing.

Now, to conclude this discussion, I want to point out that the Provost Marshal General at the present time is given a study and there are two questions asked. One question is, "What should be done to defend against enemy action directed at civilians?" The second question is, "Who should do it?" Those are big questions. It is in the light of that particular study that I wrote this "Conclusion" in here for your thought.

We believe that plant protection is vital to the progress of any war, whether it is a defensive war or an offensive war; that we will not have any time to plan after the next war has started; that, initially, at least, when the next war starts, the safest place to be will be in the Army or in the Navy. We believe, therefore, that the first attacks which may be directed against us would be at some industrial area, which will take people, stock piles, plants and homes; which will affect production, materiel, morale and anything else you want to add.

We believe, therefore, that while civilian defense was set up and conceived as something different in the past war, if civilians and their activities and their production are vital to the defense of any nation, then there can be no difference in future planning between something like plant protection, internal security of a nation, and civilian defense. Basically, it is all one problem. I leave that thought with you. I am not going to attempt to evaluate some of the conclusions at which we might arrive in the accomplishment of that study, but I just want to leave that thought with you.

General Armstrong, from here on out my time is yours. I will attempt to answer any questions you may have.

GENERAL ARMSTRONG:

Thank you very much, Colonel Miller. Any questions, gentlemen?

A STUDENT:

Early in your talk I understood you to say that the old Americans were more suspicious characters in the matter of sabotage and espionage than aliens. May I ask why.

COLONEL MILLER:

There is a slightly different connotation there. I did not say they were more suspicious characters, because if they had been more suspicious we would have planned for them. We felt, initially, that the aliens would be the ones who would attempt to commit espionage and sabotage. But unfortunately, and to our amazement, the reverse proved true. Most of the cases of suspected sabotage and espionage were actually, as a matter of fact, perpetrated by good old-line American citizens and, so help me, one of them had his ancestors come over on "The Mayflower."

Why this condition existed, I do not know. I say it was to our amazement.

GENERAL ARMSTRONG:

Colonel Miller, were these ideological reasons that caused these men to do that?

COLONEL MILLER:

General, I would presume so. We found time to just try to trace the family history in one or two instances and we found that usually the individual during his college days, or among his associates, got a warped ideology somewhere along the line which made him disgusted with the world and with American life in general, and particularly with the efforts of this country to overcome Germany. Now in many cases they had never been to Germany. They apparently had no ties at all with Germany.

We could not convict them because we could not prove that they were agents of a foreign government. We were left in the peculiar position of having to do something but not being able to pin them to the cross and say, "Now, see here, you have to take the punishment." I really do not know why.

A STUDENT:

They were younger people, then, were they not?

COLONEL MILLER:

There seemed to be no age bracket. We have had them as old as 69, and the youngest, I believe, was about 18.

A STUDENT:

In the field of subversive investigations, how did you delineate the responsibility between the F.B.I. and the Office of the Provost Marshal General?

COLONEL MILLER:

That was a difficult problem. We were in this position: If we suspected that an individual was subversive, we were to take that case to the F.B.I. and say, "We think this fellow is subversive." The F.B.I. was supposed to investigate. In the meantime we did not want that man in the plant, so we would kick him out.

We were then faced with not being able to justify our reasons. The F.B.I., having so many of these cases, was unable to furnish us an investigation report for six months or nine months. So they said, "Well now, for heaven's sake, when you give us the name of an individual as a suspected subversive, give us some facts." We said, "Well ours isn't the investigative responsibility." So they then agreed, and there was written (as we call it) "the little agreement," wherein we investigated any suspicious individual to determine whether the War Department should take action to remove him. If we found any substantial evidence, we would stop the case. I might say in one instance it worked so well we, unfortunately, suspended the F.B.I. undercover agent. (Laughter)

A STUDENT:

Colonel, can you define for us "subversive activity" as used by the Provost Marshal General's Office? What is it?

COLONEL MILLER:

That I would not attempt to define any more than I would attempt to define a successful man. Labor, Civil Liberties League, Loyal Federation of German-Americans, and hundreds of other agencies, attempted to get us to put down exactly what we meant by a "subversive" individual. It cannot be done. It can after the overt act has been committed; before, it cannot.

But we did set up certain ground rules. For instance, we said that if an individual has apparently been very friendly with known subversives, we had better look at him and see if there is any other evidence. If an individual was educated after 1933 in Germany, we had better look at him. Then, by a summation of all things, which led us to believe that the individual was not to be trusted, we would then brand him with the statement "suspected subversive" and get him out of the plant.

There was unfairness, lots of unfairness, and there was discrimination. But we had an Industrial Employment Review Board. The man in the field had to protect the plant and he was forced to act in the interest of security and not in the interest of the individual. That was for the Review Board to determine later on when they had plenty of time to look at all the facts, study all the records, and talk with the man and find out why he did these things. In many cases he was able to defend his position and explain satisfactorily, clearly, logically, frankly, why he did certain things, and we said, "We're satisfied. You're all right. You go on back." And we reimbursed him; but the plant was protected in the meantime.

I did not quite answer your question, I know, but you see how we had to act.

GENERAL ARMSTRONG:

What are you doing today, Colonel--if we should have another war you will have a list of the plants to be protected, will you not? I mean right now what is the status of that?

COLONEL MILLER:

General Armstrong, I am afraid that there is nothing being done right now. We made two studies pointing out the necessity for a continued evaluation. We even went so far, in the first study, as to stick our necks out and say that a particular agency should have that function. I think someone should be continuing that evaluation.

GENERAL ARMSTRONG:

That is the point I wanted you to bring out here for the benefit of these students.

A STUDENT:

Colonel Miller, could you tell us about how many bona fide cases of sabotage occurred during the war? Could you give us just a rough figure on that?

COLONEL MILLER:

Unfortunately I am not allowed to give out that information.

A STUDENT:

You are not allowed to give out that information?

COLONEL MILLER:

No, sir.

LT. COLONEL KOCH:

I was wondering about your experience with civilians who had prison records; and we had to employ them at Military Establishments, in the motor shops and in the armament shops. What was your experience with individuals with past prison records?

COLONEL MILLER:

I will put it this way: Where the War Department was monkeying with the Fingerprint Program we had to state to Labor that those fingerprint records were not to be given out to management. When that was set up we found that five corporations already had a fingerprint program: Hercules, DuPont, Shell Oil, Wheeling Steel, and Ford. So we did not put our fingerprint program in those five.

The first time labor discovered that, they got us on the carpet and said, "Here, management gets these records." We said, "Yes." (We were never in any of those plants, but we were in a very peculiar position.) So we said, "All right. We're not going to argue with any Labor-Management problem. We'll step out of the picture, discontinue our program, and let the plants conduct their own." About 98 percent of them did, too.

Now where the War Department got those records some of the history was bad. In one plant just because a man was convicted twice for forgery was no reason he could work on a particular contract. He just loved to trace somebody's signature. (Laughter) So when he forged one of the plant's checks and made himself twenty thousand easily, he said to the War Department and the plant, "Why, it's your own fault. You took my prints. You knew I was a forger. You should not have put me in the finance section." And the man was right. The company finally withdrew its prosecution, put him in a different position, and the man paid the amount back.

Now where the plants did it--such as those five I mentioned--if a man had a history of petty larceny, he was not put in any position where he could pick up little items. If he was convicted of rape, he was not put in a shop where there were mixed sexes. Therefore, we believed that the sound thing to do was to restrict and eliminate only those with a history of malicious destruction of property; a history of arson, and a history of mental instability. Imagine our amazement when we discovered one of these Park Police guarding a door at one of our buildings--I think it was either War or Navy--with a gun loaded, two days after he got out of St. Elizabeth's.

Normally, most of those criminals could produce. I believe that the value in the Fingerprint Program came after the War Department stepped out; that then the plant management gave it its full attention and was able to really place the men where they would not yield to their temptations.

Did I answer your question, Colonel?

COLONEL KOCH:

My question really was more--let me word it another way: On the average, did you find that the men or the women with prison records were loyal?

COLONEL MILLER:

Yes, a large percentage of them were. Most of those were perfectly loyal. There is surprisingly little correlation between so-called crimes of passion, for example, and certain other crimes and absolute disloyalty to the country. Even though those men in some of the magnesium mines were some of the most-hardened criminals in the country, escaping from practically every prison and jail in the United States, they were perfectly willing to produce, break their backs, for the war effort until we walked up with a fingerprint card.

COLONEL KOCH:

Then the general policy seems to be that as long as a man indicated on the application form that he had a prison record, we were to take him.

COLONEL MILLER:

That is correct.

COLONEL KOCH:

Then if we hired him and later on learned he had a prison record, even a minor offense, we had to discharge him.

COLONEL MILLER:

I do think there was a lot of discrimination.

GENERAL ARMSTRONG:

Thank you, Colonel Miller. We are very much indebted to you for a most interesting talk.

oOo

(24 July 1946--200)S