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UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION

7 March 1946.

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GENERAL ARMSTRONG:

Gentlemen, I am going to try to sell a book here this morning. My salesmanship is going to consist of telling you if you want to get a good book on universal military training, here it is. It is by a certain Colonel Edward A. Fitzpatrick, who happens to be the gentleman who is going to speak to us. That, incidentally, is the way I got to know Colonel Fitzpatrick, because eight or ten months ago I was sent the galley-proofs of a book on universal military training, which I found so excellent I gave it a superior rating to the Book-of-the-Month Club but it was not quite along their line for selection. However, I think it has had a very successful sale, fortunately. It is now going to go into its second printing, which is very unusual for a book of this sort.

I want to read several paragraphs that will indicate why this book appealed to me so strongly.

(Reading)

"A courageous constructive policy for the industrial mobilization needs to be taken by those who plan for war including; (a) a full utilization of the 'work or fight' principle under the Selective Service System; (b) a partial or complete utilization of the national service principle as necessary in a total war; (c) a national point of view characterized by justice, fair play, and no special privilege, raising above special interests of classes, groups, and organizations, and above all actual realistic, specific policy and program."

Incidentally, Colonel Fitzpatrick provides that policy in the course of his book.

Finally, I would quote this:

(Reading)

"The selective Service System of manpower procurement has as its basic problem the maintenance of the military-industrial balance of manpower."

That, gentlemen, is the thesis on which the manpower work of the Industrial College must be carried out, as I have emphasized repeatedly in the past. To have that confirmed by a man who has given such careful thought to the whole problem of manpower in war was most gratifying.

Dr. Fitzpatrick, otherwise known as "the Colonel" is a Ph.D. from Columbia University. He was a major of Infantry in the First World War. He has been interested in this problem for many years. He does not come to it without very thorough preparation.

He was Dean of the Graduate School of Marquette University and since 1928 has been President of Mount Mary College for Women.

His subject, "Universal Military Training and Its Implications for Industrial Mobilization". Gentlemen, Dr. Fitzpatrick.

DR. FITZPATRICK:

General Armstrong and members of the class: It is a very queer coincidence that I centered this paper around the very passage which, unannounced, General Armstrong has selected. In fact, I am even developing it, at the very end of my paper, into a more definite statement than the one that was made.

When I was asked to discuss this subject I wondered who had discovered the relationship between universal military training and industrial mobilization. No reference has been made to it that I can recall in official War Department discussions of the problem, nor in the widespread public discussion was there any indication of any relationship. The hearings before the Committees on Postwar Military Policy developed nothing on this subject; nor did the Congressional hearings on the very inadequate bills now before Congress. President Truman did have a reference to it in his speech of 23 October 1945. This is the commercial: In my book on "Universal Military Training" I threw out for discussion a number of suggestions about some relationship but never developed them. That I shall try to do today.

The question proposed for today's discussion is particularly interesting as revealing a broader character of military thinking than is usual. Things are ordinarily not seen in their relations but as the philosophers say as things-in-themselves. In the Army we break down problems and duties,--and I would not excuse the Navy entirely from this--and we assign these problems and duties, so the language goes, to "desks." That takes care of everything because we think in our naivete that all we have to do is to assign an officer to a desk--and no matter what his preparation or what his previous experience or even his I.Q.--he is endowed by virtue of the assignment with all the knowledge, insight and skill necessary to solve the problems that pass over that desk. But in any case it is not unfair to say, we muddle along. As applying it to what Mr. McDonald said, both the Army and Navy and O.D.T., when it was established, certainly muddled along in the beginning of this war on the needs of our manpower. There was no clear-cut policy and there was no concept of what the ultimate utilization of personnel was to be in the railroad industry. Probably we ought to reject the concept of the omnicompetence of military personnel. I see that did not get any response from you.

I suppose one of the best illustrations of that is industrial mobilization before the war so far as the public plans go and so far as they have come within my knowledge unprotected by those miraculous words, "restricted," "confidential," or "secret". A great deal of the prewar planning of the industrial mobilization proceeded without any serious consideration of the manpower problem. At a meeting as far back as 1924, or thereabouts, Dwight L. Davis made a speech to the Wisconsin manufacturers

at the Pfister Hotel in Milwaukee at which I represented the Scanlan Morris Co. of Madison, and I called his attention to this defect. He was very much interested in it at the time, but nothing happened. Several years later, Major General Mosely came over to a Selective Service Conference in Washington and discussed the industrial mobilization plans. At the time he was asked, at various stages in his speech, three questions relating to manpower. His reiterated answer was "I cannot answer that question but someone in my organization can." Is it not delightful to be as comfortable as that and as certain of the omniscience of your organization? I may add--I got it privately so as to steal General Armstrong's thunder--he was a member of that organization.

There was an even more striking illustration of what I am saying. The Industrial Mobilization Plan of the middle thirties (about 1934) provided for a labor administration to be set up in wartime. It had a National Director, as I recall, a State Administrator, and a local official, who presumably was to have power to determine deferments though not a part of the Selective Service System. Upon accidental discovery of the plan, though the chart containing it was not too definite, a representative of the Selective Service System--a reserve officer--went before a Council in the General Staff and then seemingly was getting nowhere until he said that he wished now to speak as an ordinary citizen of the United States. He spoke as an aroused individual citizen. The plan was changed. I may say I wonder whether you fellows have nerve enough really to discuss the labor problem in its relation to military organization and military policy. But there was a case where, prior to the war, this officer, who happens to be in the room, discussed this problem and went in and actually had the thing changed.

Could there have been any more colossal blunder on manpower than that? Such a control of manpower sources from outside the Government, or clothing a private interest with governmental power, and outside of the military authority would have been fatal, and the intoxication of labor from its irresponsible power acquired in recent years as a reaction against the former irresponsible power of management, indicates what might have happened if such a policy had been initiated. Moreover, the Selective Service System plans made in G-1 of the General Staff were absolutely opposed to such a program--in fact such a program would have completely nullified and destroyed the Selective Service System, violating as the proposal did the autonomy of local boards, the choice by neighbors, and the requirement that the system be self-integrated. Any outside agency could furnish information whatever, but decisions must always be reserved for the Selective Service boards themselves. The proposal as made was revised, but there were vestigial remnants.

The Selective Service System itself perhaps did not provide adequately for the industrial mobilization. It always regarded the paramount necessity the furnishing of military manpower, though it regarded as a secondary function the maintenance of a balance between the military and the industrial-agricultural demands. But the care of the industrial-agricultural needs of the Armed Forces and of the civilian population was residuary. The military authorities did not think of an Armed Force of 12 million. They were thinking of an Armed Force of four million. Military-industrial

balance was easy in that situation but with the usual preoccupation of military planning, of fighting the last war, the scope of the problem had not been anticipated and was not planned for, hence the amount of improvisation.

Unity of organization may be a good thing, but it only deals with machinery. What is really needed is unity of thinking, and I take it that the subject assigned to me is a recognition of that fact. Instead of talking about Universal training as a thing in itself, of industrial mobilization off in its little cubbyhole of its own, and of Selective Service working in a little office in G-1 the three phases of the problem must be related. If they are related, the relations must be taken into account, and they must be taken into account in the planning stage, and not left to improvisation in the fighting stage. So let us see what we mean particularly by universal military training and industrial mobilization, and then try to state the interrelations or implications, trying to avoid the compartment-mindedness of the past.

The nature and character of universal military training I have stated in the commercial already given you. I state here only its main conclusions since there is at the moment no official plan that has actually worked out the actual administrative setup, the character of the administrative process, the content of the training in any significant detail that has been made available to the public or given to Congress.

"Universal military training" is the program for providing a reserve of trained military manpower, and of having available an immediate trained force in addition to the Regular Army and the National Guard for the common defense. The plan is to train annually the men of a single age group--presumably the 18 year olds. These men would be conscripted, drafted, or to use the euphonism of the war, selected. Those mentally or physically disqualified in a major way would not be taken, but physical standards would not be war standards, so that a larger percentage of the 1,200,000 men reaching 18 years of age would be trained. The fact that the War Department proposes using the wartime Selective Service machinery for the peacetime program shows they have not thought through the problem and analyzed critically the Selective Service machinery. The object of this training is solely military training in the infantry, armored division, quartermaster, ordnance, medical, dental, air corps, and all the work of the ground, air, and service forces. Any educational, social, and physical results are incidental and not the direct objectives. These social, educational and physical health objectives do not and cannot justify universal military training. The only valid justification of universal military training is the need of the common defense of the Nation in the present international situation.

Let us just look at a problem that confronts Congress as the program of Universal Military Training is up for decision. One of the most important problems to be decided is the age at which the training shall be given. The purely military requirements which after muddling along in this war would indicate the earlier the training can be given the better. It seems desirable, therefore, for the age to be 18, for example, rather than 23, or to permit a spread of ages. The moral problem incidental to training has caused a great part of the religious leaders of the country

to oppose universal military training. A single age group--18 year olds--would seem to be wise in this connection. Is this also the best age for the industrial mobilization point of view. Just over 36 percent of the 18-year age group will be in school, the remainder 63 percent plus will have already begun work in factories, shops, offices and in the fields.

The proponents of industrial mobilization might properly say "Wait a minute! Where do we get our share of these men? After 10 years you will practically have everybody in the Armed Forces. Must we confine ourselves to men over 30?" There is an answer to this in the universal military program as proposed, namely, that the program is one for training only, and no one will be placed in organized reserve. That makes it possible for the Selective Service System, or its total war equivalent--a National Service Act--to determine who should go into the Armed Forces and who should remain in industry because of their industrial training or skill, or their industrial education or because of their industrial importance. And the same for agriculture. That will prevent the tragic conditions such as existed in England in World War I especially when its young industrial leadership and skilled workers volunteered for service and ultimately had to be called back. It is an indication that in another war "National Service" will very likely replace "Selective Service." This means too that the industrial leadership of this country and particularly of this Army Industrial College should be critical of any amendments to the proposed legislation affecting a reserve. This applies also to the enrollees in the National Guard.

However, there is a suggestion in the President's message of 23 October 1945 on this subject. He suggests that persons not qualified for military training be given industrial training related to war. He says:

> "All men should be included in the training, whether physically qualified for actual combat service or not. There should be a place into which every young American can fit in the service of our country. Some would be trained for combat, others would be trained for whatever war service they are physically and mentally qualified to perform."

And he adds:

> "After the first few months of training selected trainees who are not physically qualified for military service could be trained in certain skills, so that if war came, they could take their places in shipyards, munitions factories, and similar industrial plants."

As against the need of the Military Forces for young men there is no need of industrial mobilization that would change the designated age for training for military service. For those who have already entered industry or agriculture it would seem that every social and individual consideration would indicate that the earlier the military training is begun the better. They will not have become too important in their industrial or agricultural labor, and the wider contact and broader experience should prove beneficial, and would cause the least interruption of their industrial career. This is also true of those continuing their education. The period at the end of the high school course furnishes a convenient point for the military training. A year's additional maturity

plus the social contact and new interests will enrich the continued educational training and experience. To have this interruption while the student is in senior college or in the professional school would result in educational loss through the interruption, the loss of the years continuing the the educational momentum, and the period after resumption of studies to catch up.

Moreover, it will be a great gain for industrial mobilization--as it will be for military strategy and tactics--to have the American public know something about war, its weapons, its conduct, its tactics, and some of its strategy, its relations to politics, and the biography of great generals and admirals. As the industrial worker at his bench, the scientist in his laboratory, the manufacturer in his shop cannot help but to recur to this experience, and may stimulate the inventiveness of these men and the application of his experience to military organization and technique in ordnance or quartermaster or the other numerous service forces needs. You have, in short, generally in the male population after a number of years training the motivation and the basis for invention, better forms and techniques of organization, and better utilization of resources.

As contemplated the universal military training process will not provide for any agricultural and industrial deferments. This would seem to be a disregard of the needs of industrial mobilization. An advantage of the widest diffusion of the knowledge of military art has just been indicated. If I may interrupt a minute, one of the worst things we did in this war was to grant deferments to these youngsters, in 1940, and let them in that way accumulate experience which ultimately became the basis for deferments and continuous deferments and which took away a very useful source of manpower, while at the same time we were putting in men in the older age brackets who would have been much better in industrial mobilization than in the military power and our hospitals would not have been so full. There is no real loss in refusing deferments at the 18-year age period. Practically no one would have a professional or technical training advanced enough to warrant deferment. The professional, technical, and skilled workers who will be needed for war production in a situation of actual war will be deferred by the regular Selective Service System in operation in time of war, particularly if the period of reserve duty--if there be any--is relatively brief. This experience of actual military training will be for these men an excellent means to have them understand the need of the services in wartime and to keep them on the job for maximum production. If the industrial mobilization is more intelligently planned than between the World Wars, these skilled, technical, and professional workers will be definitely marked so that they will not be called to active duty from a reserve status if they are needed for war production. They might be required to do what F.B.I. agents did at the beginning of the war, give up their commissions, if they are in the reserve, because their value to the Nation was regarded as greater in the F.B.I. than in the Military Forces.

It would seem, therefore, that there is no need to provide for occupational deferment in the system of universal military training. This is true also regarding food-production problems. If there should be any shortage in any particular areas and the numbers involved do not seem to require occupational deferment, then the various methods used in wartime

could be used to supplement the agricultural forces in such an emergency, but in no case does there seem to be any real necessity or provision for making the agricultural deferments necessary in wartime.

Obviously the industrial mobilization should be interested very much in the kind or content of the training received during the year of universal training. There is no indication in any statements I have seen that those in charge of industrial mobilization have interested themselves in this problem. This is a part of the compartment-mindedness of departmental organization. Obviously in training for the service forces those in charge of the industrial mobilization should be in contact with the most advanced in the developing industrial and commercial experience. Just as I suggested that the Regular Army (also the Regular Navy) should be a continuing maneuvering Army in possession of the best experience of the world testing them out in actual maneuvers, so the industrial mobilization group in continuing intimate contact with the most advanced industrial and agricultural experience should be transmitting the benefits of this knowledge to the training groups in engineering, in ordance, and the Quartermaster Corps. This would apply by way of illustration to improved transportation methods, warehousing, better and simpler systems of records, supervisory techniques, better food processing, better methods of packing, better bridge building, new construction techniques, and through the thousands of processes and techniques which the service forces of an army needs.

No determination of the content of the training in the universal military training can be adequate--even intelligent--unless there is worked out in advance an industrial mobilization plan as well as a strategical plan not a mere organization chart or blueprint. This applies also to Selective Service, and the explanation of much of the muddling in the first year of this war was due to the fact there was no relation between the Selective Service process and any plan that may have existed at that time. This is true also of the deferment policies and the improvisations which took the place of an industrial mobilization plan. This is the same relation that universal military training will have to industrial mobilization. There must be an industrial mobilization plan at the basis of the actual training program. This should be an adjustable evolving plan but to be helpful it must be definite at whatever stage it is.

The preceding statement furnishes an opportunity to call attention to a position frequently taken by opponents of universal military training and proponents of a diluted training. The whole question is just shoved aside with the statement: "The day of mass armies is over. What those men need is technical training." Before answering this assumption it may be noted that there is no suggestion that the armed forces to be raised is to be a mass army as the term is used. The day when mere numbers of human beings were the determining factor has been gone for sometime. And the President, himself, in his message of 23 October 1945, pointed out the fact that we could not take the flintlock off the wall and just run out and start shooting; that it is necessary to have a knowledge of aeronautics, ballistics, radar, electronics, meteorology, and all the other subjects. Military Strategists talk about "fire power"

as determining. Infantry soldiers, ground forces need a whole lot of technical knowledge. Naturally, so do enlisted men in the Corps of Engineers, the Ordnance, in the Transportation Corps and in the varied services of the quartermaster department and the service forces generally. If this technical knowledge is to be used not only in the school of the soldier, but must be applied to larger unit training including division and "army" training, in cooperation with air and ground forces and in amphibious and triphibious campaigns, then we cannot wave out of the picture with a slight-of-hand movement, the actual military problems that confront us, including universal military training. This need is most frequently associated with information on the time it took to train replacements to go into organizations, presumably well organized and well trained, which would sustain the replacement and continue his training if he was not killed. That the organizations which the replacements joined were not always of this character is part of the fortunes of war.

Or are the opponents who use the "mass army" argument trying to say that such large numbers as the mass army implies are not needed. There is a reference here to General Marshall's report to the Secretary of War on what was needed in connection with dropping the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Obviously in total war the most widely distributed the technical knowledge needed for war in its specific applications, the better it is for the conduct of war, for the industrial mobilization, for civilian defense and for the maintenance of the civilian economy in wartime. Who ever denied that such knowledge was military knowledge which would be given in the universal military training program and will constitute the proportion of the training which in the judgment of the real, rather than the amateur and hot-stove strategists, is necessary. Who has nerve enough to assume that only "squads right and left" and just shooting a gun was all there was to military training for total war in an atomic age? It is really surprising the number of bold and daring military strategists there are in the civil life of this very unmilitary Nation!

The function of the universal military training will relate to the whole conduct of war, not merely the "fighting war," though in the last analysis everything is related to that, and must be. The rest of the Armed Forces and the industrial mobilization are the "overhead." So we turn to the general population facts now in relation to the actual conduct of war. If a war should occur in 1966 there would be 20 classes of men in the universal military training system. Taking a rather conservative figure,

800,000 would be in training.
800,000 would be less than 1 year from their training.
800,000 would be less than 2 years from their training.
800,000 would be less than 3 years from their training.
12,800,000 with the training 3 years or more.

There would be 8,000,000 men between the ages of 17 and 38 (not allowing in this calculation for deaths) who would not have received the universal military training. It is a serious question whether the physical standards, which is the most vital factor here, could not be reduced in order to bring more within the military training program.

A strictly universal training program would provide an equivalent training for these eight million men who did not receive the military training. This problem has not been considered and somebody in the Army Industrial College might at least do some exploration work on it on the present assumptions of Selective Service, but much more significantly in relation to a program of "national service."

In the assumed situation of a declared war or a war begun without any formalities there would be 16 million men between 18-38 who had undergone military training. Let us assume first that all these men are reserved for military service. That would leave available for the industrial mobilization

4,000,000 men 18-38
20,000,000 women 18-38
6,000,000 men 39-45
6,000,000 women 39-45
14,000,000 men 45-65
14,000,000 women 45-65 (These are approximate figures).

These are the people who are available--not forgetting the possibilities of the younger people for agricultural help, nor the older people in a great many ways--for the industrial mobilization, for civilian defense, and for the maintenance of civilian life.

Let us assume a more realistic situation of an actual war. Of the persons who were trained under the military training program many will not be fit for military service and many others will render a more important service to the Nation and to the fighting forces in the industrial mobilization than in the Armed Forces themselves. This will include young industrial leaders, many managers of enterprises, many scientists in industrial laboratories, in government and in the universities, many highly skilled workers and foremen. It might be proposed after 1940 and 1941 muddling that when the war occurs then men in training and the men in the two or three previous classes should be considered exclusively for the Armed Services. That would be the 18 year olds, 19 year olds, 20 year olds and probably 21 year olds. These, with the Regular Army and Navy and the National Guard (also sifted for personnel essential to the industrial mobilization) should be an adequate protective force and an initial striking force.

What shall be done with the 12,800,000 or 13,600,000 persons who have had military training. To them should be applied the standards or principles of classification of a selective service system or the principles of assignment of a "national service system." Having the basic military needs provided for in the impact of war, the selection or assignment of personnel essential to the managerial, technical, scientific, productive, or inspectorial aspects of the industrial mobilization can be selected from the group liable for military service, in the higher age brackets as well as from those not liable and from women.

It will be observed that the Selective Service System, and occasionally national service, has been frequently referred to throughout

this paper. The gap between the universal military training system and the industrial mobilization must be bridged by either of these systems. The military authorities loudly called for the national service system in 1944 and probably late in 1943. England had under Mr. Bevin a national service system in the Ministry of National Service.

It has been pointed out that if all the men who are trained were placed in a reserve the industrial mobilization plan could be seriously affected. Some process of selection and assignment of such men and of all the remaining adult population (at least over 18) must be provided for in total war for an orderly industrial mobilization. Certainly for men and women in the Armed Forces and in the industrial mobilization there will be need for a more intelligent, and, therefore, more effective utilization of manpower. It must not be left so much to accident, to personal acquaintance, to bureaucratic red tape or to the machinations of intrenched personnel at the moment.

The need for effective utilization of personnel in wartime both for military service and for industrial mobilization would seem to demand a National Service Act. This will require in America's thinking a rather completely new orientation, and a plan in accord with America's justice, fair play, and equal obiligation must be worked out. There is a nice job for you.

In short, we need a definite manpower policy for the industrial mobilization that is directed both in relation to universal military training of a particular age group, and a selective service or national service policy directed to the whole population at least above 18 years of age.

A policy will make impossible uncertainty and muddling during the war about "work or fight" orders under selective service, the compromises, the deviations from law and good administration, and the partial substitutes for national service. Moreover, the national interest must be made the supreme interest of the Nation in wartime and no coddling or subterfuge, or "little monarchies" should be even considered as possibly interfering with it. It should be one nation, indivisible, with justice for all, even in wartime. This is a necessary supplement of the universal training and requires as I elsewhere phrased it, the passage which General Armstrong read, but which I now develop into a fuller statement.

If this statement which was read were to be further developed in the light of the foregoing discussion it would be worded as follows:

A courageous constructive manpower policy for the industrial mobilization as an indispensable part of all war planning particularly concerned with the intelligent rather than haphazard utilization of both military and civilian personnel, and some more definite and specific means of locating trained personnel and of more impersonal methods of assignment. This policy should include the maximum conservation and utilization of the trained military personnel for military purposes; the utilization for industrial mobilization of the wide knowledge of the military art as a result of the universal military training program; the continuing interchange of knowledge of manufacturing and control

techniques, processes, and forms with those responsible for the content of the training of the universal program; ways of utilizing for industrial mobilization persons within the military training age who are not available because of physical or other reasons; the techniques and methods of a National Service Act in view of the requirements of total war, rather than the less drastic and less inclusive "work or fight" principle of Selective Service; the utilization of women and all men not liable for military service for industrial mobilization or civilian defense.

GENERAL ARMSTRONG:

Thank you, Dr. Fitzpatrick. Would you care to answer some questions?

DR. FITZPATRICK:

Being Irish, yes.

GENERAL ARMSTRONG:

I am going to let the class ask them this morning because I am sure that members of the Manpower Group are very anxious to put some questions to you.

However, I would like to say that in the present organization of the Industrial College I do not have quite the confidence of my old boss, General Moseley. I think this is a well-selected group, but I question whether they are as omniscient as we used to be. So, gentlemen, in order to increase your omniscience, ask the expert.

A STUDENT:

Dr. Fitzpatrick, it is a real pleasure to listen to an educator who recognizes the value of universal military training and has the courage to speak out; so that my question may be somewhat a comedown.

I was interested in your expression about age. As I got it, you indicated the specific age of eighteen. As I understand it, from the expression of your views, you stated the age of eighteen was the time you felt the youths of the country should receive military training. My memory is that over 90 percent of the youths that graduate from high school fall into the three years, 17, 18 and 19. Now, from the educational viewpoint, purely and simply, would it not be wise to have universal military training tied up not with an age but with graduation from high school, provided the youth was not beyond his twentieth birthday, with the further provision he could go in at seventeen with his parents' permission?

DR. FITZPATRICK:

There was a suggestion made in the book that if he finished high school he could go in at the 17 age; if he is in his senior year and his eighteenth year, he should be permitted to finish that year.

I think, generally speaking, the religious leaders of this country are very much opposed, or practically universally opposed to it, although sometimes they use weasel words to express their real attitude. What they are so afraid of is the moral problem. If there should be a homogeneous group of around 18 or 19 that problem could be handled more effectively than could be done with a greater difference in age. The Federal Security Agency, apparently, has an evaluation of all communities in the country near camps, which states exactly the extent of the cooperation; how wide-open the towns were; to what extent the police and others cooperated with the military authorities.

So, I think if that opposition could be removed by confining liability to 18 years of age, it could be done. If the boy is not a senior in his eighteenth year, then I think he probably ought to have his military training. As you say if he is not in his senior year at that age he very likely will drop out in that year because the year before 60 percent of the boys under 18 years of age (white boys) are in school. It does not say what kind of school. The next year enrollment drops to 36 percent and the next year there is a more nearly complete drop.

So, really there is, first, a slight deviation, then a considerable drop and then a greater drop the next year. Of course by 20 years of age they are mostly college people.

A STUDENT:

What do you propose to do with Quakers and other people that fall into the class of conscientious objectors?

DR. FITZPATRICK:

Personally, I recommend that as a matter of American tradition we should frankly recognize the fact of conscientious objection and defer them. After all, you can put them in the Medical Corps and in the Sanitary Corps. You see, there are two groups of them: There are those that are absolutely opposed to war in all its form; that is the group where the real problem is.

The Quakers are ordinarily in the second group, those who will accept service but will not be armed and will not shoot. I may say that some of the most heroic incidents of 1917-1918 and in this war have been done by conscientious objectors of this group.

Of course, the most amazing achievement in this war of the conscientious objector is in connection with the guinea pig experiments. I saw them, for example, injected with malaria, the violent type of malaria. I saw them go through all these experiments at Welfare Island, in New York, where they sat in casts for days, not ill, merely to show what the physical effect of being in a cast for weeks will do.

I also saw them put in chambers where the altitude was simulated by control outside. They tried all kinds of food experiments. I think

you are going to be thoroughly amazed at the extraordinary scientific results that have been achieved by these conscientious objectors used as guinea pigs.

We do not know as yet how to handle the absolute conscientious objector because he will not cooperate. He will not go into the Army; he will not put on the uniform. He will not do anything. He thinks he ought to be left where he is, doing what he will. England, to some extent, with their tribunal, actually recognized that situation. We never did.

A STUDENT:

Do you think the objection on the part of some of the religious leaders to universal military training is based, to some extent, on the interruption of the religious training of the men who are going to be clergymen?

DR. FITZPATRICK:

I think that is also a factor. The great problem there is, here is a Jesuit being trained to go into the priesthood of the Roman Catholic Church. It takes him fifteen years to go through that training. He is recognized early in the game. He is taken away from his home. He is given the black robe and I think that is all the clothes he has. He is given his food regularly. He has absolute security, in most cases.

Then over here are Jehovah's Witnesses that endow you, from the Holy Ghost, with power immediately to preach the Word of God.

Then here is a teaching conception, a man trained in--I will not say which--the Episcopal ministry with long training following more or less conventional techniques.

Here is another person who goes to your door, puts his foot inside, turns on a phonograph and sells you a pamphlet. That is "preaching the Word of God." That is "carrying the Word of God."

There is an extraordinary range as to what is meant by "theology students." I am sorry to say the subject was never defined adequately in World War I or World War II. In World War I there was a very simple principle. The conscientious objector had to be a member of a certain church, these so-called "peace churches" and a few others. He had to be a member of the sect. In World War II he had to show that by religious training and experience he was in this group. Religious training and experience were never definitely defined. The test of membership in an organization, which was definite, had been dropped.

We actually do not have a base. There is no possible common base to determine who is really a "theology" student. If a professional student in theology is taken as a definition of a "theology student," we could take this Jesuit over here, for example, he goes into a novitiate for a couple of years and he gets the equivalent of a Bachelor's degree; then he goes into philosophy for three years; then he goes into theology four years; then he goes into special training for one year and is ordained a priest.

I saw a case in Milwaukee where some visitor with a gift of gab, came in and one of the denominations took him in and immediately conferred upon him the power to preach the Word of God. They found out in about three months, with all the bills he left behind, he was a good racketeer and nothing else.

That is the main difficulty in this whole situation. There is no common denominator. If a "theology student" should be defined in terms of professional training, as we do, say, for medicine, such class would be limited. Without this definition we have this whole group--from very adequate training to the simplest kind of training, and to just a mere conception that the Holy Ghost visits someone or is conferred by contact with some group of people who put him in the special group. When a name gets on the theologian's list, they are supposed to confer with National Headquarters of Selective Service; then when any of those boys come up, they can be deferred. That is where the difficulty comes.

There are also various questions, such as whether Christian brothers in the Catholic schools are entitled to deferment, or whether Lutheran teachers in the Lutheran schools are entitled to deferment. The statute merely said theology students, ministers and regularly and duly ordained clergyman could be deferred.

A STUDENT:

Does your plan for national service include national service across the board, for everyone, for labor, industry and the entire country? The objections I have heard to it are that it would be impossible to administer such a setup. Can you say something about that?

DR. FITZPATRICK:

Commercial No. 2: I wrote a book on conscription in America. It has a chapter at the end which contains all the experiences of Barney Baruch and Hugh Johnson in World War I. Perhaps I can give you an experience in connection with this.

In the last months of 1945 I was in France for the Foreign Economic Administration. The great question came up, What is a collaborator? As a matter of fact, all the French people are collaborators, because the Germans very skillfully came in, and they had information about the plants; they knew what the production was; they also knew what the personnel was. All they said was, "You, stenographer, keep doing shorthand." "You, painter, keep painting", and so on. In other words, what they were after, which is what I would be in favor of, was not administration by government of the industrial resources of the country, but control of these resources. If we want to know how to control the industries of a country, the German techniques are probably the most refined that could be found.

But, in general, that is all we did in this war. Whenever we took over plants, even when we carried Mr. Avery out, we let the Montgomery Ward people run their own plant and we kept control. Now what we have to do, depending on the nature of the war, is perhaps what Mr. Bevin did, and say, "We are going to maintain these ten plants and transfer the workers." We have to transfer workers from city to city. We have all the problem which they had in England, where war was right there on top of them. There was a blitz; there was Dieppe; there was imminent danger of absolute conquest, but only the supreme faith of the British people could possibly have believed they could have won. What they had to do in their situation was almost pretty complete control.