

615

MILITARY MANPOWER

10 April 1946.

246

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Introduction--Brigadier General Donald Armstrong, Commandant, The Army Industrial College	1
Guest speaker--Major General Lewis B. Hershey, Director, Selective Service System	1
General discussion	10
Colonel Robert W. Brown, Assistant Commandant, The Army Industrial College	
Students	
General Hershey	
Colonel Fitzpatrick	
Mr. John W. Swaren, The Army Industrial College	

616

MILITARY MANPOWER
10 April 1946.

GENERAL ARMSTRONG:

I think that most of us are agreed that in the atomic age the military manpower in being and the military equipment in being are going to be vastly more important and represent probably much more of the Army and the Navy than what we can acquire after any aggression against us. Nevertheless, you know full well the importance that we in the Industrial College attach to the problem of manpower and its efficient and effective utilization.

The speaker this morning is going to talk on "Military Manpower". I do not think any introduction is needed; a great many people are familiar with his name; I think he sent "greetings" to some millions. And in my office a few minutes ago, when I suggested that probably some people in this country considered him public enemy No. 1, he said that was not enough; he was one, two and three.

Gentlemen, it is a privilege to present to you the very famous gentleman of the U. S. Army who has had charge of the Selective Service operations in the United States, Major General Lewis B. Hershey. General Hershey.

GENERAL HERSHEY:

General Armstrong and gentlemen: The things I am going to say I will try to keep under about four headings. I will give you these four headings so you may know when I have gone off the subject, which I expect to do quite often.

I am very glad to be back again at the Industrial College. I rather flatter myself that it is about the only institution that ever had me talking to them with any regularity.

I would like to say a little something about military manpower importance. Of course, we **cannot** talk about military manpower without talking about the uses we make of it. First, a little bit of historical background of the country; second the subject of manpower from an organizational standpoint; third, **some** of the things we did operationally; and fourth, if you are not exhausted and I am not exhausted by that time, I would like to say a little something about what I thought was good and what was not so good; then if you still have the same principles that used to apply--free and unlimited speech--after that comes the real part of the discussion, when you do most of the talking and I try to answer your questions or avoid them or talk long enough to wear you out.

Now on this historical business, I would like to say two or three things. I think it is presumptuous to tell a group of this kind some of the things that I am going to say, but, unfortunately, my experience has indicated that if we go on the assumption that a great many people do not know too much, we do not miss it so far as one might think. And secondly, even if you had known it at sometime, it may be in the background of your memory

so that for the purpose of this act--as they say on the Hill, "for the purpose of this law"--we will bring it up into focus. I do not want to be presumptuous, but I hear now, many times, people talk about the fact that it is un-American to have any sort of compulsion. Many people say it is un-American to have it even in wartime, but there are others, much more numerous, who say it is un-American to have it in peacetime.

I do not know whether you gentlemen know that the colonies, in the 150 years that they existed before we were a nation, passed 616 laws compelling military service. There were 101 laws passed in the Colony of Connecticut alone and eight, the least, in little Delaware; as someone has said facetiously, two countries at high tide and three countries at low tide. Of those 616 laws, 81 of them were passed in peacetime and provided for the training of people in peacetime. The rest of them were passed during Indian wars and some other uprisings that came along. So anyone who knows anything about the Anglo-American part of our background is just simply completely off the beam when he tries to say that there is anything un-American about our colonial approach to the responsibilities of a man defending himself and finding the necessity of fighting the Indians.

There was a time when almost every one owned a rifle, especially if he lived on the frontier; he had to be able to shoot rather accurately with it; and at times they had to have a great deal of physical agility and the "kids" that could not climb the trees in the early days were eaten up by the bears. First of all, their parents had not been entirely paternal, and, second, there is no use bringing up a "kid" that is so slow on foot that he can not get away from the bears anyway. We were dealing with a different type of people then from the present type, due to the fact that we have the automobile and other things.

Now the Revolutionary War. I do not need to tell you, gentlemen, that no matter if we did start it with some people who came more or less voluntarily, we resorted to compulsion and because the compulsion was put on by the states and colonies, it was only for the reason that the Federal Government was so weak that it could not put compulsions on people to get them into the service.

The war of 1812 was nothing to talk much about. Anyway, of course, the capitol burned. I think somebody told the story that "Pa" Watson said to Churchill, when he was here with some British marines pacing up and down in front of his room up in the East Wing of the White House, "I don't like the looks of these fellows around here". And Churchill said, "Why?" "Pa" said, "Because the last time they were here they burned the building down". And so the most you can say about the War of 1812 is that the Capitol was burned down. We first burned theirs down in Canada. The compulsions were there; they were administered poorly by the states; but merely because something is done poorly, it does not in any way belittle the fact that the principle of making people fight was there.

The next was rather short and the adversary was not so heavy in weight and we did not have to resort to any sort of compulsion. We did have an Army that went half way into Mexico and then they had to wait until they got some more men down there, which might have been avoided if they had written their enlistment contract differently and had some compulsion.

I am not going to spend much time on the War between the States, using that title so that no one here will be disturbed by the use of the word "civil". And in that, we messed up manpower procurement from the military standpoint, on both sides. There is no question about it. General Oakes' report shows what they did in Illinois, which is a fair example of what they did or did not do in the Northern States; and Professor Moore, from the University of Alabama, has written a report which shows how they messed it up down there. Those are two pretty good texts.

We had about the same things that always exist. They deferred school teachers, and school children were in demand because one had to have eight students in order to be a teacher. I have seen some things in the last six years that are not materially different.

When they got short of druggists and deferred druggists in the South, during the late unpleasantness between the two parts of our country, drug stores sprung up everywhere. I can point out to you that we had some things like that in this war; we still had the same kind of human beings who tried to find a place to get out of heavier responsibilities.

In World War I, we had the pattern that we followed rather faithfully in this war. We got away from the hunting down of people who were to be registered. In registering the people in the War between the States, it was the responsibility of the military to go out and see to it that all the people registered--they had already been engaged in hunting deserters. If you were approached by an officer for the purpose of registering your son, you might shoot him because you felt that he was insulting you by having the neighbors thinking you were harboring deserters. That did teach us. In World War I, we required each citizen to register which avoided the necessity of hunting him down. It was the first war in which we had sufficient and suitable men available.

We also had the scandals of the shipyards, the thing that will always exist if human beings are permitted to write affidavits and then give them much credit. I suppose if we could lay all the affidavits of the last war end to end you would have the highest structure this world has ever seen. If all of these men were half as good as their employers said they were when they were trying to get them deferred, there should not be any trouble now in getting their jobs back. But be that as it may, World War I was the proving ground that gave most of the things that were good to the present Selective Service System. Most of the things that have been bad this time we were warned of in the other war; we knew they would be bad; and one of the tragedies of being an administrator is to see things happen that one knows are going to tend toward that which is not good and yet be absolutely impotent to do anything about it. We had some of that experience. So much for the historical approach to it.

I will not wear you out too much on the organizational end, but as was true in World War I, and as was true in this war, we were set up on a national, and state, and local basis, the importance of these being in reverse order. In other words, the important place is the local. The next important is the state, and the least important is the national. That was true in both wars.

On the national level there is an organization that presumably sets the policy, sets the compass bearing, tries to talk the Congress into enacting satisfactory laws--finding some financial means, distributing the quotas and the calls that come out of the services--divide the money you get, divide the calls you get and pass almost 98 to 99 percent of the responsibility you have down to somebody else. Now that is what is done nationally.

The state has the job of supervision. The operation is done at the local level. After a law is passed, a million pieces of forms have to be distributed to a hundred and twenty-five thousand places and you have to recruit a million registrars to help register sixteen million five hundred thousand people; obviously there is some activity that we must have, national and state and otherwise. But once you assemble your organization, then, if you are wise, you will let it run.

I do not think it is any different in Selective Service from what it is in the Army. I have seen some of the best batteries in the world rendered practically impotent because you had Majors, Colonels and Brigadier and Major Generals who did not have enough sense to supervise without meddling. The result was that they tried to command the battery and that, of course, was not what the Major General's duties were set up for; the result was that he did not do the divisional job and kept everybody else from his job. Having spent a little time in the Army and 17 years in the grade of Captain, I know a great deal about the interference one gets from people who are Majors and up.

In Selective Service, our successes have been when we had enough sense to organize our board, train its members, provide them with some direction--but not too much. We failed many times because of giving too much direction. We succeeded when we resisted pressure groups on the national level. When we were at our best, that was what we did. When we were at our worst, we listened to the pressure groups, wrote some mealy-mouthed things which meant very little and felt that we would have to suffer the losses that came from those local boards that did not have good sense and ignore the advice we gave. And I think that one of the successes of our operation was that the farther we got toward the end, we got some people on this level to realize that that was something one better let alone, even if someone in your organization or factory had to go.

We had, at the most, upon this level, which included running a statistics outfit in Philadelphia, at the time the Manpower Commission was running, twelve regional offices; we had an allowance of 749 officers from the Army but never quite filled that allowance. We spent two or three years getting such a high and entirely unnecessary amount of men to run an organization such as that which had about 200,000 people in it. Of course, I think there are that many people engaged in recruiting in some service areas, at the present time, but that, of course, is quite another matter. They get at their best a hundred and some thousand. The Navy was good enough to let us have, at the most, 140 officers and the Marines somewhere around 50 or 60. At the present time, we do not have half that many and we still have the same number of basic outlets.

613

We ran 54 state headquarters. Of course, you gentlemen know there are not that many states, but we do have 48; we have the District of Columbia; we ran the City of New York separately for a lot of reasons; we have Puerto Rico, Alaska, Hawaii and the Virgin Islands, two local boards in the Virgin Islands and one Appeal Board; but it does make 54.

We have 6,443 local boards scattered everywhere from Puerto Rico to the Southern Virgin Islands and into Hawaii, and almost everywhere in the United States. I think we have some local boards in Alaska, over 3,000 miles from Juneau. That gives you some idea of our distribution. There are some 24,000 local board members in those 6,443 boards.

We have from 17 to 20 thousand men engaged in trying to get people's jobs back. We had at one time 32 thousand doctors who gave somewhere over 14 million physical examinations for nothing; and if you do not believe it is an accomplishment to get doctors to do something for nothing consistently, try it sometime. We had 8 to 10 thousand dentists and we had probably 13 to 14 thousand lawyers working as government appeal agents. The rest of the people functioned as registrants' advisory boards for the purpose of trying to help registrants make out eight-or ten-or fifteen-page questionnaires that occasionally get out to people when you deal with the Government. That is about what we looked like organizationally.

What did we do? We registered somewhere around 48 million, total. That included the youths who should not be torn from their mother's arms, but should be going to school, from what I read in the papers from the old buzzards in their middle 60's, who probably could not do much if they did get them in there. At least they were registered. We inducted ten million; I am not including the three or four million that we frightened. You know, we were in the frightening business completely until 7 November 1942. At that time, the President said, "You could no longer frighten adults; you could only scare those who are under 18". So we stopped enlisting anyone except those under 18 or over 38.

Ten million were, of course, processed--that takes about 45 days unless they make too many appeals. You cannot handle manpower like you would a wheelbarrow; sometimes the services thought so. The services, at times, asked us to raise induction by several thousand on very short notice. You remember, of course, that after you register a man, he must have ten days to make out his questionnaire after it is sent to him; he has ten days in which to appeal his notice of classification; ten days to get a notice before he goes for a preinduction examination; and ten days to be notified before he is inducted. He has the right to ask for a hearing, and he has a complete right to appeal to the Appeal Board. If any one member on the Appeal Board goes along with him or he can pressure the State Director or National Director, then he appeals to the President.

Fortunately we have only had 70,000 presidential appeals. You think that is a large number, but when you remember that we ran a good many months when we made two and one quarter million changes each month in the status of registrants, then 70,000 seems like a number so small that it can almost be ignored. And we ran month after month, when we had to produce three or four hundred thousand by induction. We lost two or two

hundred and fifty thousand during each of the same months by enlistments of men who had either been ordered for induction or notified that they were in 1-A. We had five million people rejected. We had to furnish enough people to not only meet the call but compensate for those who were rejected physically and for those who enlisted after they were ordered for induction. You can see what a very simple thing it is to keep books. These things lead to the question of what you ought to do in any future handling of men.

Our big time was in late 1942 and early 1943; that was our heavy period of the movement of men in the Armed Forces. It was rather small before Pearl Harbor. We got in, altogether, by enlistment and induction, somewhere around a million men before Pearl Harbor. I do know that we had more men in the Army, Navy and Marine Corps at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack than we ever had when we started any other war, for whatever that may be worth.

One of the things that bothered us was the five million unaccepted. When we have only 22 million men between 18 and 38 and after we induct or enlist 13 or 14 million and reject five million, it does not give us very much additional outside of those two categories; then add the Tydings Amendment which defers anyone who can prove that he is necessary on the farm and cannot be replaced. Of course, there are people in industry--if they were taken out of industry, the padlocks would be on the doors so they say. You can see then that the three million remaining is not a very large number.

Now I am not going to say much more about the operation. However, I might say that in the spring of 1944, starting, in fact, in the autumn of 1943, we had quite a little public talk about how the Armed Forces were not getting men into the Army. President Roosevelt, in the latter part of February, issued a memorandum to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission and Director of Services saying that the the Army was languishing for men and men it must have. Well, we got quite a fair start and it was not very long, in fact, during the month of March we went up about two million in 1-A. I got a telephone call on one of the first three days of April saying, "Can you stop all inductions?" That all happened in six weeks. We inducted only a few thousand in February so therefore whatever was true at the time President Roosevelt was led into seeing this great need for men was still true in April. Now those are some of the things that probably are unavoidable. When one has lots of money he can reach into his pocket, grab a handful and throw it out; but if he ever gets short for money, he cannot have all that nonsense.

Now let us go on the affirmative side first. I think the principles of Selective Service are absolutely sound; I think the American people still have enough guts so that we can get people locally who will make the decision as to whether or not a man has to go.

We can get a lot of intelligence on this level, but we will never get enough so that we can write things that will help much in letting the local boards make the decision. A decision should be made as to how many people will be needed in the services and how many people will be needed in industry.

If the Selective Service could possibly be given any indication of whether airplanes or battleships were wanted, whether carriers or landing barges were wanted, or a dozen other things that I could enumerate, it would aid. If a newspaper could be published in which those things were shown thereby getting that information out to the public and to the local boards we would come very nearly getting what we want. But if we try to visualize what the conditions are out in San Francisco or down in Los Angeles or some other place, we are just simply attempting what I do not believe can ever be done.

The big things that are very bad on public morale have been the attempts of pressure groups going out and saying, "Now we can't take a man out of this plant", and, at that time, so help me, they had at least anywhere from 25 to 40 percent nonutilization. Not only that, but our local board members who worked in the plant knew and everybody else knew around there that if they would take out 10 percent, the rest of them maybe could get enough elbow room to do something.

Now we had the question of repair; we had to go all out on repair. Of course, we have to repair ships, but I can remember when one battleship was brought into a certain place to be repaired and so many workers got on it that they could not move. Of course, they could not get anything done.

Those are some of the things we have to think about, and they get tied right in with delegation. We can teach a man how to run a ship and also do a lot of other things, but when he is sent out, there comes a time when we have to say, "I hope he knows all the things I taught him and I hope he uses good judgment". If he does not, there is nothing we can do about it. We should not pull his arm and say, "What are you doing now?" That is just our nervousness and all we are doing is messing around with a guy who might win the battle if we let him alone.

The same thing happened with our local boards when we told them that we wanted men, but we did not want certain kinds of men; the only thing to do was let them do the job. Of course, that is true in the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps, in business, or anywhere else. But we all have to be "fuddy duddies" and we have to start saying, "Do you understand this?" and "Is this the way you look at it?" and a lot of other things. The operator has no time to listen to you; he has to fight a war and the same thing is true on the local level. I believe that one of the smartest things ever done in 1917 was to delegate to the people of the local level. The times I have made mistakes were when I messed around trying to tell the local boards what to do, because I merely confused them more if they were confused in the beginning; if they were not confused, Lord knows, they did not need any of my advice. I will say, to the glory of our people on the local level, that 90 percent of the time they had enough sense to ignore the things that we sent out to them that they should ignore. They threw them in the wastebasket, which was a good thing. The thing that we have to get somehow, in the Army, Navy and Marine Corps, the Air Corps and industry--I do not know how you are going to do it--is enough leadership so we can come somewhere near getting people we need and utilizing the people we can get. In the first place, we only have so much manpower that is available to fight and we have to properly distribute that supply.

Candy-loving "kids" cannot be permitted to go around and grab handfuls of the peppermints when there is a lot of other hard candy to be used.

Obviously I have not been anywhere much except in Washington and a few other places. I generally had to stay here and keep people from stealing my building. Therefore, I do not know anything about what went on but I expect, from what I saw, that you had different branches that had made an issue of the fact that everybody had to be a college graduate to do certain things, and I am quite sure that we had enough college graduates who could have made officers; but a certain percentage of people have to do a certain thing, I do not care whether it is in the Navy or Air Corps or Artillery, to which I was attached for pay purposes, for many years. I do not care what you are talking about; just because they need some brains, they cannot possibly be allowed to use that as an argument that they must have brains everywhere because in the first place, there are not enough brains to go around; and, second, a lot of brains will only stay in some of these subordinate positions about so long and then brains get to be a disadvantage rather than an advantage. I had 11,000 conscientious objectors on hand, give me the one that had not been to college; he is not half the trouble; and if he is an A.M., he is worse than an A.B.; and if he is a Ph.D., he is impossible. So we must somehow or other, at the top, control the distribution of military personnel so that everybody takes a part of the cream; so that they get some of the good milk, some of the indifferent milk and some of the dregs. We must cut our manpower that way and one of the things it comes into is this question of recruiting.

We just cannot afford to let a lot of liars go around in the name of these different services telling these youngsters that they ought to get into the Air Corps, Navy, or Marine Corps or somewhere else; we just cannot afford that in wartime because when we get them, we will not let go of them. That creates a terrific morale problem and it is reflected back home when an appeal is received from someone saying that he was promised the world and then when not more than one continent can be delivered, he wants to know where the other four continents and oceans are; and when he is transferred to something else, there is a problem.

We have the same thing in industry. One of the things that I am up against now is to try to find a place for a lot of fellows who are supposed to be moulders. How did they get to be moulders? Well, they went to work for a company, we will say, for argument's sake, and they were assistants; they could not get their pay raised because they were at the top level. Let us say, they were Moulder 6, Moulder E or something else and they kept getting pay raises. Probably one of them moulded this corner (indicating corner of speaker's stand) but he was drafted. Now he is back wanting his job as a moulder and we have just literally thousands of moulders.

I talked to a personnel director the other day, and somebody said, "John, you didn't tell these fellows, did you, that they were permanent employees?" And he said that he told them they would be on the board of directors of these plants, because of the demand, the bidding and the hiring away from somebody else. Some of this goes back to the services. You have to remember the old fellow with the striped pants and tall hat is in the war all over not just his big toe or his little finger, because if the Government does not set the example of looking at the whole picture, how can you expect anybody else to do so?

In the early days of the emergency, labor was relatively easy to hire; and many employers, including several agencies of the Government, hired more than they needed or anticipated they would ever need. They believed there would come a time when employees would be hard to get. They did not have to worry about the cost of too many employees, as the Government was paying the freight and they felt very much like our "kids" do when gambling with each other and with our money. They are most free to raise each others bets. Why should they worry? These fellows were playing with government money, and the procurement people were often saying, "Get the goods done on time", and few worried about the amount of labor or how or where the contractor found the labor. Many forgot that all the United States was fighting the war. Many times we would think that if we did not have a certain type of landing craft or a certain type of plane or something else, the war was simply going to stop. And many times we had to use pretty hard language in order to induce anyone and so often employers said, "We'll have to lock up our places" if you take another man. And we could only say you had better get padlocks because we are going to take many of the men, otherwise we would not have had any Armies. And again I repeat, the utilization of manpower is the key to the problem.

Now another thing happened. We had a lot of fellows that were in warehouses and doing a lot of other jobs that civilians could do. The services became efficient. Military duties were reclassified as civilian. Some of the men released by this method were combat soldiers, but many of them were not. One of the reasons why a lot of them were on these duties was because they were limited service people. We went on a crusade and reclassified thousands and thousands of jobs and then we examined and discharged the men in them because there was no longer any military job that that man could do because we had reclassified it into a civilian job. Sometimes we were lucky enough to hire the discharged soldier for his old job as a civilian at quite a lot more money, more housing and more of everything else. Many times he disappeared because in the first place he was discharged and he could thumb his nose at everybody else because the Armed Forces had said he was unfit for military service and he could not be threatened with reinduction, as a result some old man or woman took the job and that place was left unfilled in a laundry or grocery or some other so-called nonessential occupation. Then of course workers could not buy groceries or get their laundry done and they quit work and went elsewhere or became absentees from war work to do their laundry or to wait in line to buy food.

I do not believe in trying to run a lot of things with limited service men. I say frankly that if we do not get a national service law, we had better use limited service men where possible; and I can think of some places right now, not too far from here, where we had a lot of negroes that we could have inducted to do a certain type of work in a certain city, whereas if civilians were hired there was a housing problem; there was a congestion problem of every kind. Those negroes could have been put in barracks, but it happened to be that the service, at that time, was not engaged, on a very large order, in taking negroes; they did not want them and did not take them, so we struggled with housing down at that particular base.

Now we will have to, somehow or other, get better utilization; it would not make any difference if we had an inexhaustible supply of men, but we do not have. Near the end of this war it had begun to pinch and under those conditions poor utilization in the services or industry cannot be tolerated. Now, as the preacher said, "When you don't save souls in 20 minutes, you might as well let them go to hell anyway". And I am already twice over the 20-minute mark.

Now I shall try to answer frankly any question. If I do not know the answer, I will try to make you think I am answering it. A man once said that when he was asked a question and did not know what else to do, he gave a speech on Soil Conservation.

COLONEL BROWN:

I tried to get General Hershey to get up and take a bow, but he would not do it. The only way, I suppose, to get him up again is to open up with a battery of questions.

QUESTION:

Colonel Brown, I think I should like to get first chance.

COLONEL BROWN:

All right, but you are not a Field Artillery man.

QUESTION:

General, I am "a spy in your elevator" at your place, and I made a talk sometime ago on Selective Service and I think yours is a great deal better. But I do have a question, in fact, I have two questions.

The first question is : When you received the call in April 1944 to stop inductions--you did not tell us why.

GENERAL HERSHEY:

A Representative of the War Department stated that the Army was above its allotted strength.

QUESTION:

Was that due to the fact that somebody lost three hundred thousand men in the Army that they did not know they had?

GENERAL HERSHEY:

This is off the record. (Discussion off the record)

QUESTION:

The other question is: You said you kept deferments on the local level in 1917. In 1917, only the Appeal Board could pass on occupational deferments, and during this war, the local boards passed on occupational deferments; which is the best policy, having all occupational deferment requests going to an appeal board first or the local board?

GENERAL HERSHEY:

Local board. In this war, we had enough trouble when Congress passed a law saying if a registrant worked outside his local board he had to be passed on by the local board of the area of his registration, and/or the appeal board where he worked. This tended to delay classifications and hence inductions. Selective Service worried more about delay than the registrants did.

In the other war--I do not want to say anything against the operation of the other war and do not intend to--Colonel Fitzpatrick was in the middle of it --but during the last war, the number of occupational deferments was pretty small in comparison to the number that we had to handle in this war. Remember mobilization in World War I by the draft was somewhat less than three million, so you can just multiply most anything we did the other time by three or four. In the first place, I do not know all the reasons why they handled occupational deferments in district boards in the last war; perhaps, because they did not think people in the lower echelon understood those complicated things. I will give you my word that I try to be objective about it, I do not want to involve too much, but I have found few local boards that had as little conception of what we ought to do in individual cases as most of the people I met in conferences with other agencies and nongovernmental groups in Washington. When an individual case was presented to a group here we would argue for three or four hours and then finally go home when it was time to eat. Local boards had to settle a dozen cases in the same length of time. We could afford to spend more time because we received far less cases and were paid for our time.

If you cannot teach the local board enough to use judgment, you cannot teach the American people enough to understand and the American people are not going to stand indefinitely for things they do not understand. When one fellow is sent out and he gets killed another fellow is kept at home, I do not care how good the reason is, there is a problem of education; and if we cannot educate the local board, we had better get busy.

COLONEL FITZPATRICK:

In 1917 and 1918, the local boards were required to make recommendations to the district boards, so they partially went back into the system of what ultimately became the system in this war.

QUESTION:

In regard to carrying out a little more on what Commander Saunders said, I might add that when I had been asked by the board to give them some

additional information about men for whom we were asking deferment, the local boards said, "But, after all, we have to live with these people". There was a tremendous amount of local emotional pressure placed upon the individual members of the local boards by their neighbors, because John Jones was in the service and Mrs. Jones did not like it because Jim Smith was working in a war plant and was getting a deferment. Now I wonder whether it would have aided any to get rid of that pressure, which I felt very strongly and especially did I feel it from the ex-service men from the First World War, the Legionnaire boys, they wanted to throw everybody into the service; I think, being a Legionnaire myself I could appreciate it, but still I was on the other side of the fence. But would it be possible, if you took a city and took your board members from an adjacent district to pass upon the young men in a district, in which they do not live, so that they are not quite so pressed by this emotional approach, and yet they are living down on that level and know how everybody thinks, instead of living right with the parents whose boys are going into the service?

GENERAL HERSHEY:

I probably cannot say that you are wrong. You happen to be diametrically opposed to what I believe. The very thing I favor is making your citizens do the unpleasant thing. Is anybody fighting a war without emotion? After all, which would you trust, honest emotion or intelligence? There is no question in my mind because anybody can rationalize himself into larceny or anything else and you got to have something below the intellectual level.

I do think that if we are going to have armies, if we are going to have mass inductions, then we are going to have to keep, unfortunately, the emotional pressure so that the man who goes must get something that the man who stays does not get, otherwise why should anybody go? If all one will receive for going is, as I hear now from certain people, as much seniority as he would have had he stayed, why should he go; why get yourself shot; why should anybody living in the community, or not, say to this fellow, "You get shot", and say to the next registrant, "You stay and get wages that probably are far too much", which is again the basis of what you get into by letting the fellow at home have more food than ever before and the fellow in the Army less food many times. I think that if we are going to have a democracy, first of all, we must put the nasty jobs down and make the people do them. When a person participates in the actions of the Government, he will support it; if he does not participate in it, then why should he support it? One time one of our Presidents, years and years ago, after a certain Chief Justice made a decision, said, "All right, that is his decision; why doesn't he enforce it?" The President did not.

There is another side, and perhaps a very good one, but I just do not happen personally to belong to it. I believe in placing responsibility on our people to cause them to govern themselves. That means community pressures for each to do his share. Emotional, yes, but the intellect tells each to keep out of danger. The pressure must always be to make people get into the service and if we ever lose that pressure, if we lose it so that the majority of the public wants no one to go, we will have a vacation of inductions in wartime instead of the one we are faced with now.

We have now a situation where no one should do anything. We are going about it pretty intellectually. Why should an 18-year old "kid" spend a year and a half in the Army and quit his college for that length of time. Less than a year ago 18-year olds were old enough to get killed, even 17-year olds if they volunteered. Of course, it is all right now for the poor and willing 17- and 18-year olds to miss college and be exposed to life.

There is a lot of friction caused in the country by the quotas of the draft boards in Service Commands, and they not having enough to fill that quota, on the classification involved, had to dig into other classifications and get the surplus from other boards of the country.

GENERAL HERSHEY:

The farther we get from any point--the farther we get from Washington--the more people are left. I know about how many men there were and where we had them because at every local board meeting there is a report rendered and I get it punched on a card; I generally know around the tenth of the month how many men there were in 1-A and 2-B and so on and so forth on the last day of the preceding month.

Now there is no question about the fact that there is going to be a certain percentage of errors and not only that, but there are going to be people put in 2-B--especially in the early days, if they use a cabinet officer's stationery, if they write to the local board on that stationery, quite a few of them might be influenced because a cabinet member signed the letter.

(Discussion off the record)

It is a very difficult thing to try to keep the thing balanced. In the first place, we have to lay our calls 60 days ahead of time. It takes 45 days at the best to process men, so we are always trying to guess what somebody has got, by state.

Another thing we get into, of course, is the rejection rate. We sent people to one induction station and they did not take them and at another they took them. Doctors pretend to be doctors, but they are human beings first and last. Their judgment as to a registrant's fitness for service has individual variations and in addition the individual judgment varied from what it was at other times.

The next thing on this quota system is that in a state, for instance, where there is a high percentage of negroes, there is a high percentage of illiterates.

(Discussion off the record)

We tried to balance off a little bit on fellows who were really trying to do their best and get behind the laggards; but not only that, in your industries we had to take people out of certain industries at times when we just could not take them out of other places. We stuck by the coal miners. England had a national service law. I think there was one fellow

who once went into a coal mine because of it. I do not want to be quoted on it. They went around getting men out of the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy and permitted them to go back to mine coal. There was no fairness in it. A fellow who has never been in a coal mine has some obsession about doing it and the fellow who has been in there is about the only fellow to mine coal.

QUESTION:

In spite of our experiences with taking this cream and just recently talking to somebody about topside planners, I still find that they want only certain types of engineers and college graduates; how do we intend to go about indoctrinating them with the idea that it is not necessary to have graduate electrical engineers in every job in the Army?

GENERAL HERSHEY:

I do not believe we should indoctrinate them in that way. They should be told that unfortunately there were too few exceptionally trained men and that they could expect only the irreducible minimum of this type. I do not like to use an escapist's tactics. When I was a battery commander, I needed a First Sergeant, a supply Sergeant, a Mess Sergeant, and so many Corporals, so many cooks, and so forth. Did I close the kitchen when I did not have any cooks? Did I shut up the kitchen when the Mess Sergeant did not show up because he went off drunk, or deserted, or something else? Did I close the issuing place when I had no Supply Sergeant? No, I took somebody and said, "You are a Supply Sergeant". He said, "I am not". And I said, "Don't tell me you aren't; you are". I do not blame everybody for grabbing everything they can, but I do think that somebody has to say to these fellows, "You can have only a certain percentage of the skilled people". I have four "kids" and when I cut the pie in six pieces, I tell them that there is only one piece for each; do you or do you not want it?

QUESTION:

In the continent we hear a great deal about industrial mobilization, planning and studying of the record as to why you people have, back over the years, done a lot of worrying about manpower mobilization planning. We think we do a lot of straight thinking here, and I think all our predecessors have done some very straight thinking in drawing up plans. I have read a number of them and they are pretty sound. No doubt, in your line, your planning is very good; I think you have achieved one thing that we have not achieved here and that is the fact that you have made your plans stick; you were able to go into a war and pretty generally follow your plans. In industrial mobilization, that was not true. That was due to lack of legislation and for other reasons certain laws were not adopted; I think that maybe we might learn something from you people. I have often expected that the one reason why the Selective Service plan was allowed to stay in existence and not be mutilated too much was the fact that the job of the Selective Service Director was such a "hell of a job" that nobody wanted it and consequently they had no reason to throw out the old plan and come out with a new one; how can we in industrial mobilization planning come up with another good plan?

GENERAL HERSHEY:

I would like to say this. In the first place, you have a more difficult job than planning manpower for military service. Military service ought to get together and have a standard on what to take and what they should not take; it ought to be lower than it is now. That is not too big a jump because at the most you are going to work for only three or four different people and some of them may wear a grey suit sometimes or blue at other times. I have a boy in the Navy and one in the Marine Corps, so there is nobody in our family worth a damn in the Army any more. The situation for those who are taken into the services is very similar. Pay, food and clothing are furnished and rights and obligations are rather definitely established.

It is much simpler to plan how to put people into that sort of thing than to place them in ten, fifteen thousand, or a hundred thousand industries. Some people have good housing, some have poor, some places have ventilation, some do not, some jobs are dirty, some are good jobs, some are near bombings and some are not. The placing of people in industry is a very much greater job than the planning for it; make no mistake about that.

The thing that worried me back in 1939, 1940 and 1941 was the fact that there seemed, for a lot of reasons that I do not know yet, rather a hesitancy to use all the plans that the Industrial College had made available during those years.

We had the good fortune to operate without too much interference, in fact perhaps we were ignored at times. There are a lot of people interested in the industrial end. Selective Service gets into the State-national fight, but you are right in the industrial fight; you are right in between labor and management before you even get started. You get into the question of wages, housing, transportation and a thousand other things.

Now I happen to be--and I do not say this off the record because everybody knows that I opposed a National Service law; I do believe in the principle, but I was just cowardly enough to believe that we did not have the capacity to operate it; and there is no use in providing by law for something that is ideally the best in the world unless it can be operated, because after all operation is about 90 percent.

One of the things that helped us was good planning. I should have mentioned that one of the outstanding things was good planning; secondly, it was the training of people beforehand; and thirdly, the good luck to have those people be allowed to run it, and not only that, but to try to take them from groups that somebody else did not want so you did not have a turnover all the time which is the curse of any organization.

Here in Washington I spent a lot of my time just getting acquainted with the people that happened to be running some organization for a week. Each new organization and each reorganization of agencies mean an educational job for Selective Service. Especially in the field of decentralization. We were in the indoctrination business every day. Why? Because we had to get along with those folks and it took about so long to convince them.

One of the things we are both up against, both in planning for industrial mobilization or for manpower mobilization, before World War II, was a feeling that if somebody found it out, they might think we were trying to promote war; and, therefore, the public was caught not knowing what the score was, and in a democracy you have to start out, and, how well I know, somebody has to catch "hell" by announcing something at a time it should not be announced.

I had an experience--I think it was in the fall of 1942--I went over to Asbury Park, New Jersey, to talk to the State Convention of the American Legion and let my enthusiasm get away from me. When they were asking questions, I said, "We should look forward to mobilizing thirteen million men". A number of people did not appreciate that, not then, but we came to the fact that we mobilized more than thirteen million. Well, what did I gain? At least we put thirteen million into the vocabulary of your people at least they began to talk those words perhaps only to say, "Isn't that a stupid idea?" But at least something was gained.

I would say, first, plan; and, second--if we possibly can--keep our public informed as to what we are doing; and if they do not like it, then let us do something else. I feel that way about all these alleged terrible things that happen in the Army such as the caste system. If we do not like the caste system, let us have something else.

QUESTION:

Unless I misunderstood some of your earlier remarks, General, you said that Selective Service could not be bothered with differentiating between the various requirements of the different branches; some are obviously more technical than others. If the Infantry needs five hundred thousand men, is it your opinion that you would deliver five hundred thousand warm bodies and let them worry if they are ditch diggers or expert machinists. I have seen an Infantry man, who had been for 15 years an expert milling machine operator, sitting up on the hills waiting for an invasion that never came in. On the other hand, two miles from that place would be a Fourth Echelon Ordnance shop training a rookie to operate a lathe.

GENERAL DEERSHEY:

I think you said the thing that I should have taken up in my early speech. In the first place, the Selective Service System, if you let it work where it should work, will mobilize your manpower; it will bring in the men. I have never had any faith in special calls, the reason being that unless we go to doctors or dentists, or two or three other occupations, identification is never complete. When we start out looking for some certain type of worker, there is no one in the room who can tell to his own satisfaction, how to recognize one of those fellows. I think that if identification is to be applied nationally, it must be written so well as to include everybody that should be in and exclude everybody that should not come in; also so the ordinary man could understand it. If everybody is going to be used to the best advantage, obviously the Armed Forces will have to get wise enough to classify the men they get, so they can use them intelligently.

What you are saying here is that the Selective Service System should do something about classification. The system was criticized during the war by the public because the Armed Forces did not use men we had inducted to their highest skills. The system did not and should not have any responsibility for utilization in the Forces. Of course, the public felt that the Selective Service System should not reject men for many reasons they did. The public could not understand acceptance at one time and rejection at another. I am under some pressure now over a celebrated case of a football player who was rejected for duodenal ulcers two or three times and the Army has now decided he is acceptable.

I agree with you wholly. If we are going to ask industry to utilize people, we will have to ask the Army and the Navy to utilize people. In regard to the fellow sitting on the hill and the other being trained to operate a lathe, well, Selective Service sent them both and if there had not been any real need for them, neither one of them would have been there. In war, we are going to have need for people who have some qualifications but they did not get all the necessary qualifications in civilian life; they will be taught certain things. Another thing, when there is a burglar down stairs your wife says, "I think there is a burglar down stairs". As you are the only man who knows how to defend the world against atom bombs, you say, "You go down and put him out because the world would lose all that is known about the defense of the atom bomb if I go". What I am trying to say is that self preservation comes into this all the time; it gets to be an individualistic thing and the public only stands for a certain amount of it where one man has to go out and die so that another fellow can do something else.

We must protect these irreplaceable men, but we must also take steps to prevent many being irreplaceables. However, the problem here is not simple, but the responsibility is quite elemental. The case you cited happened in the Army. We cannot even blame that one on the Navy.

COLONEL BROWN:

Are there any questions from any of our visitors? (None)
Are there any questions from any member of our faculty?

MR. SWAREN:

I would like to ask a question. You talked about all these Ph.D.'s and M.A.'s and so on. I am just a plain farmer from Maryland, and I know, by golly, that three or four years from now we are going to suffer from the want of young engineers and young doctors and one thing or another. It is a pretty serious question as to how education should be continued during the war. I would like to have you comment on that if you would be kind enough.

GENERAL HERSHEY:

I certainly will. I would like to start on doctors first because it is a little more specific problem. We were short three thousand doctors in 1940 that we should have had. The three thousand doctors we did not have

would have been young doctors--young enough to walk. I mean walk, because we cannot take 60-year olds and put them in as battalion surgeons. We were short because, starting in 1932 and 1933, the medical colleges cut their allotments; they had about seven applicants for every place in the medical school during most of those years. One of the things Selective Service did in 1940 and 1941 was to tell the medical people that if they wanted deferments, they had to do two things: first, raise the enrollment to where it ought to be and, second, go on a speed-up program.

We will have more doctors in 1948, several thousand more than we would have if there had not been a war. We deferred medical students; we did not defer premedical students after the summer of 1943.

Last autumn twenty-six veterans applied for entrance into a well-known medical college, two were accepted. Eleven medical students with junior standing have been trying to find vacancies in medical colleges since the first of this year.

The thing that has worn me down has been the columnists who know all the stories about doctors. Now in science the situation is not so clear. I understand Russia has 450,000 people studying science. I would like to know how many planes they furnished us with what those 450,000 people did. Now I realize that the longer a war continues the more acute becomes the problem of training sufficient scientists. I have not believed that the ASTP or the VIZ programs were the answer to this problem. I do not object to the War or the Navy Department training scientists that they need, if they know what they are training them for; but to take people out of the Armed Forces and deliberately send them to colleges to pursue courses three or four years in length, against a possible need some time, and put them in places like Durham, New Hampshire, or Northfield, Vermont, at a time when fathers in their mid-thirties were being inducted will never be understood by the public. It will not be tolerated indefinitely. The congressional action of the autumn of 1943 came as a direct result of the educational policies of the War and Navy Departments.

Now, on the other side of the business, I have tried pretty hard to get somebody to say that we needed to pick five thousand, six thousand or ten thousand potential scientists every year out of the very best high school "kids" we had in mathematics or science. And I certainly believe that if they were selected and sent to college without the necessity of their fathers paying their expenses, it would be worthy of a trial. But I am fed up with the question of both scientists and doctors being interwoven with the desires of particular fathers to use this as a means of permitting their sons to go to college and force or hire some other father's son to do the necessary military duty. Deferment should not be reserved for those whose fathers can afford college for their sons.

I believe that we have said far too much about science, and I think the reason why we have is that the atom bomb came along and the scientists at once obviously emphasized the need for scientists; therefore they could say that anybody who wanted to be a scientist should be deferred. I do not want to get into the individual cases, but I can tell you some interesting stories about fellows who became scientists very quickly.

625

COLONEL BROWN:

The class has already paid you a higher compliment than I could express. We appreciate your coming here very much. I remember when you came here as a mere professor in 1939 and 1940 and we could keep you all day. Of course, you could talk then as well as you could talk now, backed up by a great deal of experience; but if we were to keep you as our tired, strained professor on manpower for the next 25 years, as I am sure we will, I think we shall excuse you for the remainder of the day.

(17 May 1946--200)S
