

PLANT SECURITY -- CIVILIAN DEFENSE

20 December 1946

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COLONEL GALLAGHER:

Gentlemen, this morning's discussion will concern itself with two closely related but separate and distinct problems, namely the problem of plant security and the problem of civilian defense. In treating of these subjects, I will attempt to discuss the problem of plant security first. This discussion will include an explanation of what plant security is and a description of how it operated during World War II, together with an evaluation of its results. I will then attempt to treat of the problem of civilian defense, including its historical background, the purposes underlying the formation of O.C.D. and its history during the war. The final phase of the lecture will consist of a proposal for the organization, operation, control and management of both plant protection and civilian defense in a future emergency. Briefly summed up, the lecture should give you the following information concerning plant security and civilian defense:

1. What they are.
2. What was done in World War II.
3. What should be done in a future emergency.

Let us consider first the problem of internal security, commonly referred to as plant protection. This problem had no historical background at the time of the outbreak of the World War II emergency and so all planning and operations had to start, in effect, without precedent. Internal security in its broadest sense denotes the protection of the premises, utilities, materials, resources and production of the continental United States against all hazards, not requiring organized military offensive to combat.

The mission of the internal security program fell, in general, into four main categories:

- a. The safeguarding of military information.
- b. The investigation of alien acts of sabotage and subversive activities.
- c. The protection of essential production and delivery of material required by the Armed Services against physical threats and hazards as well as against the efforts of disloyal and subversive individuals.

- d. The passive protection of the continental United States against enemy attack by land, sea or air.

Any consideration of the mission of internal security at once indicates the depth, breath and scope of the problem. Its enormity dwarfs the imagination.

To accomplish the mission of internal security, there were many important programs instituted and implemented during World War II. From the wide number and variety of programs instituted and implemented, I have selected 10 which I think are worthy of special attention. These programs were:

1. Fire Protection and Prevention.
2. Alien Employment.
3. Visitor Control and Identification.
4. Master Inspection Responsibility List.
5. Removal and Suspension of Subversives.
6. Fingerprinting.
7. Key Personnel.
8. Loyalty Investigations.
9. Auxiliary Military Police.
10. Safety.

Let us now examine each of these programs with relative brevity. The fire protection and prevention program included all steps needed to protect facilities engaged in the production of war materials against interruptions of operations due to fire. In the early days of the war, the common opinion was that if it didn't burn it did not need protection, and as a result of this attitude, this phase of the problem received, if anything, too much emphasis. I do not intend to convey the meaning that fire protection is unimportant, but in the early stages of the war the great emphasis layed upon it resulted in too little attention being paid to other programs. The fire protection program was carefully planned and intelligently executed and while there were some ever present difficulties such as the constant squabble over fire protection systems, the program was a reasonably successful one.

The next important program was the alien employment program. The mission of this program was a dual one. The first aim was to preclude danger to or destruction of vital facilities or materiel against espionage activities by aliens. The second motive was to make available to the war effort the wealth of labor and technical skills of our loyal alien population. The early general policies adopted resulted in the virtual exclusion of aliens from employment. These early policies insisted upon the establishment of citizenship and strangely enough a great many good loyal Americans were unable to establish their citizenship. This was particularly true in the South, where records of birth were not available. As the war program developed, many of the restrictions against the employment of aliens were removed and loyalty to the United Nations

was the predominately determining factor. The alien employment program was one of tremendous scope. In all, over 200,000 investigations were made. Strangely enough and I merely state the situation I do not try to explain it, most of our difficulties during the war did not come from the sources that we had expected to produce them. They came not from the citizens of enemy nations and other unfriendly groups, but from old line American families. Believe it or not, in one case the individual concerned traced his ancestry back to the Mayflower. On the whole, the program was a very successful one. The principal difficulties experienced in the program were:

- a. Discrimination against certain groups of aliens.
- b. Too great a work load for available manpower to handle.

The next program we need touch upon is the visitor control and identification program. The purposes of this program were first the safeguarding of classified information; second, internal security; and third, the reduction of visits to insure continuity of production. The visitor control program ran into difficulties because it was difficult to determine what constituted a visitor. An International Business Machines Expert might come into a plant to repair or inspect equipment. Inasmuch as he was not an employee of the plant it had to be determined whether he was a visitor. Visiting dignitaries from foreign nations called at plants quite often. In many cases their visits had the blessings of their government as well as our own. It was, however, difficult to determine whether they should be classified as visitors or what classification to place upon them. Nevertheless, the visitor program was relatively successful. It failed, however, to materially reduce the number of official junkets that had such a retarding influence upon production.

The Master Inspection Responsibility List was one of the most important and at the same time most successful programs of internal security. The MIRL was a currently maintained periodically published list of all privately owned and operated facilities vital to the prosecution of the war. The facilities were assigned to War and Navy Department agencies for security inspection service and a procurement agency was designated in each instance to be responsible for effectuating the recommendations of the inspection agency. The MIRL attempted, after a fashion, to determine the importance of plants in the war effort. The list rose fairly steadily and on May 31, 1943, it reached the peak of 16,007 facilities. This number declined to 13,887 by 30 September 1943. By November 1, 1943, the number had decreased to 4,649 facilities; by 31 October 1944, to 1,231 and 30 June 1945 to 992. The MIRL was an excellent basis upon which to plan plant protection activities but until the later days of the war, it is highly probable that too many plants were included and that the very number of plants included materially raised the value of the list. After all, it is highly improbable that over 16,000 plants existed whose continued operations were vital to the continued operation of the war. The evaluation of importance was always a difficult problem,

a difficulty which was increased by the secrecy with which certain services surrounded specific facilities.

The next program was that concerning itself with the removal and suspension of subversives. Its fundamental purpose was self-apparent, namely to identify and exclude persons, suspected of or susceptible to subversive activities, from privately operated facilities or vital portions thereof, of importance to the national defense or to the war effort, in order to attain three objectives:

- a. Preclude damage or destruction by such individuals to war production, premises, installations, material, and utilities.
- b. Preclude delay in delivery of war material while in transit by action of such individuals.
- c. Prevent espionage and transmission of valuable information by such individuals to the enemies of the United States.

This program was beset by many difficulties but was successful. Some of these difficulties were experienced because of complaints of labor. In the early days of the program those responsible for the carrying out of the program failed to differentiate between normal labor activities and subversive activities. Still other difficulties concerned themselves with the complaints of the suspended subversives themselves. The program had to be carried on in such a way that certain injustices resulted. Some of the injustices were inefficient administrative machinery to provide for re-employment; second, the failure to specify charges against suspended subversives, and third, the fact that the removal of a suspected subversive generally resulted in his discharge. Most of these difficulties were later overcome. In the course of the program, approximately 2600 subversives were removed or suspended, approximately 325 of these removals or suspensions were reversed. One of the interesting ones that was reversed was the suspension and removal of an FBI undercover agent who was doing his work so well that he was picked up, suspended and removed.

The next program that we need discuss is the fingerprinting program. Its purpose was the identification of criminals. As a program it was a failure. It was finally used to weed out persons who had been convicted of arson, malicious destruction of property and persons who had been committed to insane asylums. Although the program was a failure in that it did not find a subversive individual and that it reacted against the interests of many individuals, it was successful in that it weeded out the worst types of criminals, and more particularly because it broke down the prevalent feeling of distaste for being fingerprinted. When the program was originally begun, those responsible for it had little conception of its ultimate results. It was found in certain industries, notably the hard rock mining industries, that you could have one of two things:

- a. Fingerprints.
- b. Manpower.

You couldn't have both. If you wanted the print, you lost your labor. We needed the hard rock mining industries' products much more than we needed the fingerprints, and so the fingerprint program died of its own weight.

The next program was the key personnel program. This was essentially an investigative program covering employees in private industries. Its objective was the collection of information to prevent the employment of suspected subversive individuals on important war work and to identify any who might have already been employed. The aims of the key personnel program were essentially accomplished by other programs and the objection to the program, most of which emanated from the important officials who were, of course, subject to investigation, soon brought about a falling off in the intensity with which it was pursued.

Let us now for a moment consider the loyalty investigation program. It followed quite naturally the key personnel program and the fingerprinting program and preceded necessarily any action under the alien program or the removal or suspension of subversive program. The loyalty investigation program was the largest single internal security program undertaken. It required more individuals to implement the program and more individuals were affected by it than by any other program. In all, approximately 3,500,000 individuals investigations were made during the war. Many difficulties were encountered. The large case load, inexperienced men and administrative difficulties made the operation of the program most difficult. Despite these difficulties, the program was remarkably successful. The men in charge of it accomplished their tasks with success and with efficiency. It must be borne in mind that the personnel engaged in this program were fact finding personnel only. They developed facts concerning the individuals, others took action when necessary.

The next program that merits consideration is the auxiliary military police program. Basically, this program was the organization of guard forces at all War Department plants, posts and stations controlled or operated by the Supply Services or by the Army Air Forces and at all important war plants, as civilian auxiliaries to the military police. Drilled and instructed as military units, subject to the Articles of War as civilians serving with the Army in the field, their mission was to provide internal and external protection to the plant against sabotage, espionage and natural hazards. At the peak of the program 200,000 men were AMPs. The program was highly successful in every one of its objectives. The men were more efficient, carried more authority and were more effective in control of their fellow employees than would otherwise have been the case. The AMP organization was popular with the men and with the plant managements, and throughout the period of hostilities no guard force of AMPs failed to provide, for any reason, the protection for which they were hired.

Let us now look at the safety program. This program was aimed at the

prevention of accidents and was an important factor in maintaining production schedules. Before the program was instituted on 31 August 1942, it had been felt that fire, espionage and sabotage were the important hazards and that most plants were receiving sufficient accident safety inspection from their own insurance carriers. First efforts of the program were directed towards war production plants for the reason that production of war material was the most important single factor in the war effort at that time. Later, the program was extended gradually to the civilian employees at War Department installations and to military personnel. Despite the fact that the program was an unusual one, its success was outstanding. By December of 1943, a 30% reduction in accidents had been accomplished. This represented a savings in lost time equivalent to 8,000 workers. Among civilian employees of the War Department, one million of them, the accident rate dropped from 13.9 in January 1943 to 6.0 in June 1945.

We have thus far attempted to introduce you to the important phases of the program of internal security pursued during World War II. It is now incumbent upon us to see who carried out these programs. Gentlemen, I will not bore you with a long recitation of the number of agencies involved in the carrying out of this program. The FBI, The Provost Marshal General's Office, the Army and Navy and the Office of Civilian Defense, and the War Production Board all had certain responsibilities. In addition to these units, which exercised the major controls, separate programs were carried on by a wide variety of agencies, in all numbering close to 100. Despite the number of agencies involved, a reasonable degree of integration was achieved. Too many agencies however resulted in much duplication of effort. A considerable part of the resentment of industry to internal security operations stems from this duplication of effort.

Let us at this point leave the problem of internal security to return to it a little later in the discussion. Let us now turn to the problem of civilian defense. Civilian Defense is somewhat different than internal security for it has some historical background.

At the close of World War II, it had reached a state where long range flights by heavy laden planes were common place. Scientific progress, if I may use the word progress in this connection, has developed missiles and other weapons of fearsome and awesome power.

The concept of attack against civilians is not a new one. What is now is the present form of attack by aerial bombardment, and the newness of this form arises only from the magnitude of the attack which has become possible through the use of the airplane. In the first World War, aerial bombardment was experimented with and found effective. London was bombed, Paris was bombed. Both cities experienced the first elements of the problem we are considering today.

Immediately after World War II, an Italian military strategist, Giulio Douhet, worked up a study of the experience that had been gained and as a

result of his study proposed a new strategy of war in a volume entitled, "The Command of the Air." This new strategy embraced a theory of attacking civilian communities for the purpose of enforcing the demand that their government sue for peace. This theory was predicated on the assumption that war could be made so terrible not only for the military men but for the civilians that they would much prefer to live under a foreign nation than to exist under the kind of attack that would prevail. Douhet's book attracted considerable attention. The war planning departments of some of the great nations of the world proceeded to develop plans both for offense, to wage such a war and defense, to protect their civilian population against such attacks.

Italy, being one of the first totalitarian nations, was one of the first to develop civilian protection. Italy began her studies of the problem in the early 1920's. Japan was practicing it in 1927. Germany began civilian defense as early as 1932. As early as that date Germany was educating its populace to put out incendiary bombs, to protect itself against gas, and had instituted many research projects on the techniques of civilian defense. It is well to note that this was being done not by Hitler but by the German military administration, who recognized the possibility of an aerial bombardment.

The country whose civilian defense problem is of greatest importance to us is Britain. Great Britain, as a whole, with the conservative government was unwilling to recognize the possibility of military attack on the civilian population, but there was one man in the Air Force by the name of Hodsell whose arguments were strongly opposed when he demanded that the country make preparation for defending its cities against attack in the war he knew was coming as the Nazi government grew powerful and as preparations were being made for an air attack. Hodsell came to be recognized and finally a civilian defense act was passed in 1937. That act provided for payment of grants in aid to local governments which would make preparation for civilian defense. As you can see at that time the central government recognized that something more than argument was required, and in Great Britain as in every other nation of the world money talks. Furthermore, because the government was able to exercise that kind of control civilian protection got off in some ways there to a better start than it did here. In order to receive money grants in aid, the various counties and communities in any given area in Great Britain, had to join together in what were known as a "scheme making authority". In order to obtain such money 242 "scheme making authorities" were established usually composed of a few cities and a county or two. These "scheme making authorities" were legal entities which were entitled to receive money from the government, when they completed preparation. Some people in England regarded civilian defense as a joke even at that time, nevertheless the work went on. The local authorities were unwilling, many of them, to give up any of their power in a joint effort among surrounding communities to prepare for defense but nevertheless the idea grew.

The war in Spain brought the first great attack upon an undefended city, Barcelona. The attack on Barcelona succeeded in a diabolical way. It proved that to some extent bombing an undefended city could be successful for the defenders of Barcelona were forced to retreat and ultimately to surrender. When the bombing of Barcelona came along, the military began to take more serious interest and then the fateful 1 September 1939 arrived. The German Army began to march. The British government declared war. By October 6 Poland had been defeated. A very large part of the attack on Poland consisted of heavy bombardment of cities for the purpose of discouraging the civilian population, destroying communications, breaking up transportation and cutting off one part of the Polish Army from the other.

By that time the world began to realize the seriousness of the attacks upon civilians of a nation. In the United States the War Department began to take a more serious interest in the problem presented by these attacks.

This period, however, was followed by the so-called phony war which lasted until 10 May 1940. On that date, you will remember, the German Army began marching through the low countries and in another historical short campaign conquered three nations. In the course of these brief campaigns the Germans used their techniques of bombardment of civilian communities with even greater intensity than before.

Now there could be no mistake as to what form the war would take. Accordingly, a civilian defense section was established in the War Department in G-3.

In August of 1940, the historical battle of Britain began. This battle consisted entirely of aerial bombardment. For many weeks, British cities were subjected to heavy bombardment and we in the United States waited breathlessly to see what the outcome would be. Great Britain held out. The civilian defense organization established in 1937 worked. Civilian defense enabled Great Britain to survive and at the same time gave us a chance to prepare.

In January of 1941, a joint mission composed of civilian and War Department representatives was sent to England to study the problem of civilian protection and the British solutions. On their return this commission submitted a series of reports. We are not concerned with the details of these reports here except for the fact that they recommended the establishment of a civilian agency in the United States charged with responsibility for developing plans for the protection of American cities against aerial bombardment. Out of that recommendation came the executive order for the establishment of the Office of Civilian Defense.

So much for the historical background of civilian defense. I have spent this time in order that you may realize that the problem is not new and so that you may better understand some of the statements that will shortly be made.

Let us now see how Civilian Defense was organized in the United States. The United States had looked with increasing admiration at the courageous defense the people of Britain were making. We had observed the steadily growing organizations of citizens of all ages and occupations banding together in protecting their lives, their homes, and their businesses. As the war spread in area and increased in fury, it became obvious to many foresighted people that this country might be involved. It was equally plain to these people that unless we followed Great Britain's example in organizing the civilian population we would be exposed to similar greater loss and damage.

Many communities anticipating possible air attacks embarked upon their own civilian defense programs. Volunteers were recruited, organized, and trained. These efforts were praise worthy but they lacked one important virtue; there was no coordination and relatively little cooperation between the programs and policies of adjacent states and communities. Each community was a law unto itself; each planned its own program provided its own training facilities, and adopted its own procedures.

On 20 May 1941, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 8757 creating the Office of Civilian Defense within the Office for Emergency Management within the Executive Office of the President. The duties of the Office of Civilian Defense as stated in the executive order were as follows:

1. To assure effective coordination of federal relations with state and local governments engaged in defense activities.
2. To provide for necessary cooperation with state and local governments in respect to measures for adequate protection of the civilian population in emergency periods.
3. To facilitate constructive civilian participation in the defense program and to sustain national morale.

The order creating OCD prescribed that it be headed by a director appointed by the President who would be assisted in determining policies and programs by two groups.

The first of these groups was called the Board for Civilian Protection and was composed of the director and representatives of the War, Navy, and Justice Departments and the Federal Security Agency designated by the heads of these departments. It also includes representatives of the council of State Departments, the American Municipal Association, and the United States Conference of Mayors. On July 16, 1941 by Executive Order 8322, a representative of the American Red Cross was added.

The duties assigned to the Board were to advise and assist in the formation of Civilian Defense programs and measures appropriate to the

varying needs of each part of the nation. These programs and measures were to be designed to afford adequate protection of life and property in the event of an emergency.

The second group, the Volunteer Participation Committee was composed of the director and not more than 20 members representative of various regions and interests of the nation. The members of the committee were to be appointed by the President and on June 20, 1941, by Executive Order No. 8799 the number was increased from 20 to not more than 45.

The committee was directed to serve as an advisory and planning body in considering proposals and developing programs designated to sustain national morale and to provide for constructive civilian participation in the defense efforts.

It should be noted here that in outlining the duties of these two groups the words used in the order are advise, assist, advisory planning, provide opportunities and so on. No where in the entire order was either of the groups or the director given any authority. We had what we experienced so often during the war; the problem of responsibility without authority.

Fiorella H. LaGuardia, then mayor of the nation's largest city was appointed director. Numerous other appointments were made including the appointment of Mrs. Anna Eleanor Roosevelt as assistant director in charge of the participation. During the first few months of the Office of Civilian Defense operations under the leadership of the Little Flower and World Traveler, there was produced a great deal of thunder but very little rain. Almost all of the activities concerned themselves with the volunteer participation group and consisted of activities which some of us later referred to as the "do gooder deeds". Nothing was accomplished toward protecting the people or preparing to protect the people and little was done to institute a sound protective program.

During this period we had some excellent programs of dancing; the roof of the DuPong Circle Apartments was utilized for entertainment; numerous other projects of similar nature were started but little was done to protect the country against bombing attacks. As a result of many of these activities OCD got what is commonly known as a bad press. In fact, I think that throughout the war it had the poorest press of any government activity.

I think all of you remember the Mayris Cheney fan dancing stories as well as some of the others. I don't elaborate upon them here except to mention one story in the press which did the OCD no good and which illustrates some of the early difficulties the organization experienced.

The first of these stories concerned itself with stirrup pumps. Perhaps you will remember that little device. It was a modified bicycle

pump which people were expected to place in a pail of water and use to pump the water on a fire. It was one of the favorite devices of Little Big Hat and had been used in England with some success. After careful consideration by experts in OCD, it was decided that the device was impractical and unnecessary for use in the United States and decision was taken not to make them. Unfortunately certain commitments had been made by government officials and agencies and as a result of these commitments hundreds of thousands of these stirrup pumps were made with their sale or generous production expense guaranteed by the government. When the device proved unnecessary and unsatisfactory and when people realized the amount of labor, materials and money that were being spent upon them, the storm broke in all the papers. Despite the fact the OCD had fought their production every inch of the way and despite the fact that OCD never made one, the newspapers ignored these facts and OCD had to take the rap for someone else's mistake, and how it took it.

Perhaps the conditions that prevailed in OCD in the early days were due to the conditions in the country at the time. The public wanted no part of war. Apathy was the ruling feeling, particularly in the interior states where the people flatly refused to realize that in air miles many important cities and industrial installations were nearer to enemy bases than were some on the coast line. Even in the states and cities bordering on the Atlantic Ocean many people were either unable or unwilling to recognize the fact that 3,000 miles of water were no longer a natural defense.

With the attack on Pearl Harbor all of this was changed and volunteers for civilian defense swarmed to state and local councils to such an extent that by 31 January 1942, less than two months after the outbreak of war, nearly 8,500 local communities had enrolled more than 5 million people in civilian defense activities.

Slightly after the entry of this country into the war, primarily in an effort to dissipate the bad name that OCD had acquired and partly because of the suddenly increased work load placed upon the organization, the War Department assigned more officers to duty in the OCD, bringing the total number to about 75. One of the first of these assignments was that noble soldier Lorenzo D. Gasser. Fortunately, General Gasser was placed in charge of the Protective Property Program. On February 10, 1942, James M. Landis, former head of the Securities Exchange Commission and Dean of the Harvard Law School, was named Director. Landis immediately started to reorganize the agency, eliminating many unnecessary departments, streamlining others and in general endeavoring to simplify operations. Fortunately his reorganizing operations kept him very busy and as a result the protective property program under General Gasser suffered little interference.

In February of 1942 OCD really started to function on a nationwide scale. As has already been pointed out, one of the major handicaps under which the OCD labored was its lack of true authority. Its

only powers over state and local councils were tact and persuasion, and the first of these was not always used. The national office and the 9 regional offices that had been set up could advise, recommend, suggest, wheedle, and cajole, but they could not say must.

It is important that we realize that up until this time OCD had no funds with which to carry out any program it might devise. Its operations were carried on through the Office of Emergency Management and any funds used by it obtained from that source. This situation was corrected by the provision of an act of Congress approved 27 January 1942, but unfortunately not signed until 6 March 1942. Under the provision of this law 100 million dollars was appropriated for the civilian defense protective property program. These funds were allocated as follows; 3 million dollars administrative expense; 55 million dollars, fire defense equipment; 29 million dollars, gas masks; 8 million dollars, protective clothing; 5 million dollars, medical supplies.

While the provision of these funds made it possible for OCD to function with some degree of satisfactory results, the provisions under which they were made available were most regrettable. So resentful was Congress at this time towards the OCD that the use of the funds was severely restricted. Planning and procurement was to be accomplished by the OCD, but the actual manufacture and letting of contracts was done by War Department procuring services. I respectfully submit that in determining the method that these funds should be used Congress found the hard way. Despite the difficulties involved the Protective Property Program began to function, contracts were let, and production commenced.

Few people realize the situation that prevailed with regard to such things as fire fighting equipment in the country. The average age of fire equipment in the country at that time was about 16 years. Gentlemen, let me repeat that statement, the average age of fire engines in the country in 1942 was about 16 years. That means that the fire departments in the country, as a whole, were fighting fires with 1926 model automobiles. The fire fighting equipment was woefully inadequate in the event of an emergency. The situation was complicated by the fact that a number and variety of hydrant sizes and threads existed. New York City, Philadelphia, Washington, Detroit, all centers of national importance, have fire fighting equipment differing from each other. It is important for us to realize that if we have a blitz in Washington, Philadelphia fire fighting equipment won't help. If Philadelphia is blitzed, New York equipment will be valueless. Of course, adapters can be simply made, but I submit that with the bombs bursting and the shells falling, volunteer firemen are going to have their hands full without worrying about the use of adapters.

Getting back to the OCD Protective Property Program, we have found General Gasser in charge and in the first half of 1942 the program really began to progress. General Gasser surrounded himself with able, competent

officers and despite the lack of authority much progress was made. General Gasser was assigned to other duties at the end of June in 1942, and that gracious gentleman, Major General Ulysses S. Grant, took over as Chief of the Protective Property Program. During the next year the progress initiated under General Gasser was continued, but by the middle of 1943 the tide of battle had turned, and while the possibility of enemy attack still existed, the probability grew less each day. With the middle of 1943 the progress of OGD had slowed up, and I often think that from that time on, that splendid and able soldier, General Grant, was fighting the third battle of Manassas with approximately the same results to the Federal forces as were achieved in the first two battles. Despite the vicissitudes suffered in this battle just referred to, the accomplishments of the program were exemplary.

Few people realize the extent of the accomplishments of this program. Eighteen thousand fire pumps were built and delivered with all fire fighting accessories. These pumps were built in a matter of months. They were not the elaborate red painted brass fire engines we see in the modern municipality. They were, however, capable of throwing 500 gallons of water a minute upon a fire, and after all you put out fires with water, not the red paint and brass in the fire engines. Hundreds of miles of emergency fire hose was made and delivered, gas masks production facilities were created capable of manufacturing 2 1/2 million gas masks per month. Millions of gas masks were made and delivered. Sufficient medical equipment was obtained to equip 11,440 mobile medical field teams. In addition to this mobile team equipment 5,720 complete casualty stations were set up and equipped.

Despite the unfavorable comments that were so often made, the results achieved by the equipment program were outstanding, but the accomplishments of the equipment program were but one phase of the accomplishments of OGD. I think perhaps the greatest accomplishment that may be attributed to it is the complete unification of the people that was brought about by its program. Never before in history had such a mass mobilization and training program been accomplished so promptly and so well involving millions and millions of people whose contact with the war in many cases was limited to their civilian defense operations.

Insofar as operations are concerned, the program that was designed and executed in World War II embodies many favorable characteristics. Although names of the operating divisions were changed repeatedly in World War II the general pattern of operations remained the same. These operations fell into five categories.

The first of these was the training operations. The training programs were well conceived and fully executed. Too much was written and much of that abstruse and verbose but basically the training manuals and the training programs were sound. In any future consideration the training materials and methods used should receive careful study.

The second operation of OCD concerned itself with protection of the people. This was probably the soundest of OCD programs. It embraced among other things:

- Blackouts.
- Defense against air raids.
- Camouflage.
- Protective construction.
- Defense against bombs.
- Defense against gases.
- Defense against fire.
- Decontamination.
- Rescue.
- Evacuation.
- Medical protection.

It included certain planning with regard to the nature of the protection to be furnished and extensive planning, procurement and delivery of the equipment to be furnished to afford the desired protection. As I have indicated its operations were successful to a marked degree particularly at the time when protection was of greatest importance.

The next group of operating activities carried on in World War II were those dealing with the medical aspects of the problem of civilian defense. The medical operations dealt primarily with planning for:

- a. Emergency medical aid.
- b. Gas protection.
- c. Sanitary engineering.
- d. Rescue first aid.

Many aspects of the medical program were sound. It suffered, however, from a tendency to plan and undertake unnecessary, relatively unimportant programs. Although in World War II the medical division worked closely with the protection branch, it would seem wise in any future emergency to include the operations of the medical division with those dealing with protection.

The next phase of operations in World War II were those that dealt with facility security. This phase of the operations of CCD was established 19 May 1942 by Executive Order 9165. The program of the facility Security branch supplemented the protective programs of the Navy, the Army, and the Federal Power Commission and correlated the anti-sabotage activities of other government agencies. While the facility security program was a good one, it is questionable as to whether it belongs in the realm of civilian defense. It would seem to me that its operations could better be carried on by the military, particularly the office of the Provost Marshal General.

The final operation of CCD that must be discussed was that very broad activity called Civilian War Services. These operations were those carried on under various names and disguises by the volunteer participation group. The projects embraced the conquest of local problems and included among others:

- a. Child care.
- b. Housing needs.
- c. Overburdened transit facilities.
- d. Salvage.
- e. War bond sales.
- f. Racial relations.
- g. Many others.

Whether the programs carried on by the civilian war services group were worth while they are now of academic interest only. Certainly they brought little credit and much criticism to CCD. They were generally mismanaged, the motives and purposes of many were subject to question, and few of them had any connection with civilian defense.

Any future organization must studiously avoid being diverted into unrelated projects such as those in Civilian War Services, worthy though they may be. Social welfare, uplift, and do good activities are problems for others, not problems of civilian defense. Accordingly, future programs should embrace protective activities and protective activities only. These activities should include:

- a. Training.
- b. Defense against air raids.
- c. Protective construction.

- d. Defense against bombs.
- e. Defense against gas.
- f. Defense against fire.
- g. Rescue.
- h. Evacuation.
- i. Medical protection.

Medical protection should include medical protection not only from the aspect of surgical treatment of casualties but from the aspect of mobilization of the medical profession against the potentiality of bacteriological warfare and the dangers incident to the utilization of atomic weapons.

Having thus seen the programs that appear to be essential to civilian defense let us revert for a moment to the programs of internal security in the hope that we can name what programs should be implemented to accomplish plant protection. A careful analysis indicates that the ten programs discussed earlier in the lecture are the desirable and essential ones. We will remember that they were:

- 1. Fire Protection and Prevention
- 2. Alien Employment
- 3. Visitor Control and Identification
- 4. Master Inspection Responsibility List
- 5. Removal and Suspension of Subversives
- 6. Fingerprinting.
- 7. Key Personnel
- 8. Loyalty Investigations
- 9. Auxiliary Military Police
- 10. Safety

We have now considered in some detail the problems of internal security and civilian defense. It is my carefully considered opinion that passive defense, that is defense against any enemy except that requiring the utilization of the armed forces to combat it, should be considered as one basic problem. To me, the problem of internal security and the

problems of civilian defense are not two problems as was the situation in World War II, but are basically one problem and should be considered as such. Let us now see what may be done to solve the problem.

It is proposed that there be created within the military establishment a permanent civil defense agency. This agency should consist of military and civilian specialists in the field of internal security, civil defense, military and civil law, municipal governments, intelligence, scientific developments, industry and utilities, health and welfare and such other related fields as may be required.

The agency should operate directly under the War Department General Staff with the executive authority to coordinate and direct matters of internal security and all other elements of civil defense with the Navy, Coast Guard, other federal agencies, state governments and any other agencies as may be necessary. It is suggested that the civil defense agency operate in 3 phases as follows:

PHASE I - Organization Administration and Planning.

(1) Initially take the following actions:

- (a) Formulate specific and comprehensive plans for civil defense and internal security.
- (b) Draft essential legislation for authorization and appropriation of funds, and such other legislation as may be necessary to insure full cooperation between Federal and State Governments, and between the several states, in all matters of civil defense and internal security.
- (c) Collect and evaluate all information that might affect problems of internal security and civil defense.
- (d) Develop by research and practice specific techniques, equipment and material.
- (e) Develop, in cooperation with the War Department Bureau of Public Relations, a program designed to convince the citizens of the country of the wisdom of including internal security and civil defense in War Department planning, and keep the public informed of pertinent current and future plans in order to promote confidence and to encourage cooperation and participation.
- (f) Organize a course at some established school, preferably a service school to train selected personnel, both military and civilian, in civil defense staff organization, functions, and procedure.

PHASE II - Training and Equipping.

- (1) Establish regional offices under the headquarters of each Army Area in accordance with existing military areas.
- (2) Establish cordial liaison with State and municipal governments, Federal agencies, industries and utilities within the regional areas.
- (3) Develop plans for progressive and total mobilization in connection with civil defense.
- (4) Initiate and supervise to extent possible training in civil defense and its techniques in all Army units and military training facilities within the area.

PHASE III - Operation

- (1) Upon the declaration of a limited national emergency:
 - (a) Direct and supervise, through the State governments, the mobilization of the existing civil defense organizations within the civilian population.
 - (b) Direct and supervise the procurement, by the states, of additional personnel required to bring the skeleton structure organized in Phase II up to full strength, and then insure adequate training and equipment for this additional personnel.
 - (c) Mobilize, equip, and train civil defense battalions as provided above.
 - (d) Put into effect such precautionary evacuation measures as are necessary.
 - (e) Expedite the construction of shelters, dispersion of industry, and other passive defense measures planned in Phase II.
 - (f) Accomplish the total enrollment of all civilians in some phase of the civil defense organization.
- (2) Upon the declaration of full national emergency:
 - (a) Direct and supervise the total mobilization and operation of civil defense activities and implement all necessary plans.

In this morning's talk, I have tried to give you some idea of the problems of Internal Security and civilian defense. I have told you of their historical background; I have told you how they were formed, what their purposes were, how they operated in the early days of World War II and later, and what should be done in a future emergency and who should do it. I only hope that you men will realize the importance of this

problem and devote your attention to it.

World War II experiences of three large nations, Great Britain, Germany, and Japan, have been carefully analyzed by a large carefully selected group of specialists. The civilian populations of all three of these nations were subjected to terrific pounding from the air and from various other weapons of modern warfare. All three received saturation raids; One was invaded, one was subjected to the nerve-racking terror and damage of a prolonged attack by buzz bombs and enormous aimed missiles that approached silently, because they were faster than sound, and one nation received two gigantic blows from the most effective and fantastic weapon of all time, the atomic bomb. One of these nations was victorious, two were defeated, thus the studies conducted revealed a cross section of experience that ranged from single small bomb incidents through holocausts such as the Harburg fire to the terrific havoc of unleashed atomic energy. Significantly, the post mortem opinions of civil defense experts and laymen throughout the world war were generally unanimous. They were as one in their declarations that so long as Armies are maintained and war remained even a remote possibility, civil defense must be recognized as a primary component of overall defense and must be removed from its former inferior and haphazard role. Leaders in both defeated nations in retrospect deplore procrastination in national leadership in and the lack of military appreciation of civil defense matters.

Speaker after speaker has stood on the platform and told you that the next war will be an all out war. Each has repeated that if we ever have another war it is probable that this nation will be struck first. Let me reiterate that statement, in the event we have another war it will be an all out war. This nation will in all probability be attacked first and the attack will come without warning. It is inconceivable to me that any future enemy will repeat the mistakes of World War I and World War II. The greatest of all of these mistakes made by the enemy was in permitting the United States, the self-appointed arsenal of democracy, time to get into production, to arm and to fight. It is highly probable that if the enemy had attacked us first in World War I or World War II we would now be a vanquished nation. By the grace of God we were not first attacked, and today we are a victorious rather than a vanquished nation. I think it goes without saying that the brunt of an enemy attack for at least the first year of the next war will be borne by the civilian population; the ability of the people to withstand that attack will determine the outcome of the war and the future existence of the nation. The ability to withstand that attack will depend upon the thoroughness and the efficacy of plans prepared by the national government for their organization to resist and survive such an attack. We here are studying organization and administration; we are studying production; we are studying manpower, foreign resources and purchase policies. Every one of these studies is predicated upon the assumption that civilians will be actively engaged in defense efforts in the event of a future emergency. Gentlemen, that postulate is wrong. Unless adequate civilian defense measures are set up to protect the civilians so that production, organization and administration will be possible,

if we fail now to properly plan for Internal Security and civilian defense, production, the conduct of a war will be impossible.

Gentlemen, in conclusion I would like to read to you an extract from an article that appeared in the Stars and Stripes in December 1944. Remember, gentlemen, that was the time of the battle of the Bulge. I quote "For the love of God let us remember the dead, let us learn from the living, let us unite against the foe".

I repeat, gentlemen, the problems of civil defense and plant protection are vital, to the protection of this nation. If you do not at once begin to study and evaluate these problems, if you do not learn all you can about them and plan accordingly, then, gentlemen you will have failed to learn from the living. And if a future emergency finds this country unprepared and unprotected, if no comprehensive implemented, operative plans for civilian defense and plant protection exist, then truly it may be said you and you and you, each and every one of you, will have forgotten the dead.

If there are any questions, I will be glad to answer them.

A STUDENT:

I am afraid this is not a question, but I think I must express my opinion that I am quite unable to share all of your views that the problem of organizing your civil defense is a military one. I don't think it was done that way in England. I agree with you that the military must be ready to take the first brunt, but I believe that it is not a military responsibility to organize the civil defense of the country. It was not done by the military in England. It was entirely a civil business, and I think in general the civil defense organization in England was fairly successful.

I do feel that if you put on your War Department the responsibility in peacetime of planning for the civil defense, you may suffer as I think you suffered in your industrial mobilization program in this country, in that it was planned by the military but not accepted by the civilians, if the civilians have got to do the job in the long run. I feel rather strongly about it. I am sorry that I have to disagree.

COLONEL GALLACHER:

I am interested in your reaction, Captain. I think perhaps our difficulty arises from a misunderstanding as between you and me. I did not intend for a minute to indicate or try to indicate that the military was going to run the entire show.

I feel that at this time there should be instituted within the military because, frankly, I believe it is the only place we have to effectively institute such an organization, a group made up of some military, but

to a much greater extent of civilians, who are qualified to make the original plans.

What I am getting at, Captain, is the prevention of a situation again where they take a man in, put a uniform on him, and say, despite his qualifications "You will now start building fire engines."

Now, at the time of the emergency, insofar as the actual operations of civilian defense are concerned, I heartily agree with you. At the local level, at the state level, it is a civilian activity purely and simply. My only reason for including the military is to provide the necessary impetus to bring about the organization.

I am glad to be able to tell you that within the last three weeks the War Department has appointed what appears to be a very able and very competent board to study this whole problem. Up until then little had been done since the last war, with the exception of a few studies including a very able study made in the Provost Marshal's office. I might add that the three-phase operation I described, planning training and operation are essentially the recommendations of the Provost Marshal's Office.

So I agree with you that the operations have to be essentially but not entirely civilian operations. The planning, because I believe we have no other place, has to be done under the sponsorship and guidance of the military.

A STUDENT:

It is a civilian responsibility. It is not a military job. The military job is going to be outside the country. At the beginning of the war, because it is the only existing and running organization, it will have to hold the fort for the first moment until your civilian organization, which is being planned by civilians in peace, gets going.

COLONEL GALLAGHER:

I must disagree with you, sir, that in the next war we are certain to be fighting somewhere else. I hope that is so. But, unless some very sound thinkers are not on the right track, the presumption is that we will be attacked first; that it will be a sneak attack, and, that we can expect it to be directed at our productive centers. And if you think in America that with the exception of a very small group of civilians you are going to get any sound, careful planning for civilian defense without the military impetus, I think you are wrong. I am sorry to have to disagree with you.

MR. PIERCE:

Just in order to clarify the situation, I agree with the Captain very strongly in this. Your statement that the planning must be done with the General Staff --

COLONEL GALLAGHER:

That is not exactly what I said. I said that the permanent civil defense agency should be set up within the military establishment and operate directly under the general staff.

MR. PIERCE:

-- I don't agree with that. Can't it be done by a group in the General Staff including civilians?

COLONEL GALLAGHER:

I had hoped that I emphasized the fact that the group be made up of both military and civilians.

MR. PIERCE:

And moved outside immediately on the outbreak of hostilities to a civilian agency.

COLONEL GALLAGHER:

On the outbreak of an emergency. As soon as an emergency has been declared.

MR. PIERCE:

Moved outside the War Department.

COLONEL GALLAGHER:

That is correct.

MR. PIERCE:

Into a civilian agency.

COLONEL GALLAGHER:

That is correct. But I believe that the Staff on many of the echelons must include a cadre of the military because of the authority they have.

MR. PIERCE:

I completely disagree with that suggestion. I think that inside the War Department there should be, of course, some home liaison people between the Army and the civilians throughout the country, provided that at the outbreak of hostilities it will be entirely under civilian control with the military out of it.

COLONEL GALLAGHER:

You are entitled to disagree and I respect your opinion but because of my wide experience in the field of civilian defense in a period when the problem was most acute I think an all civilian organization is unwise in America.

A STUDENT:

I think in speaking of liaison with civilians your last statement was erroneous, at least, as far as my idea of their mission is concerned. My idea of their mission was that never did our strategic planners see anything farther than a few sporadic raids with airplanes, and that the Office of Civilian Defense was primarily a morale builder, a morale protector of our workers, to keep them on the job.

COLONEL GALLAGHER:

I doubt that. By the end of 1943 your statement may be true. I think by that time the War Department had come to the conclusion that sporadic raids at calculated risks were all we needed to fear. But I do believe, in fact I know, that in the early days of the war the strategic planners were seriously concerned over the possibility of attack.

A STUDENT:

From where?

COLONEL GALLAGHER:

From within a border of one hundred, two hundred, and three hundred miles of the coast line, with the intensity diminishing as we got inland. The Army, I respectfully submit, does not waste the talents of Maj. General Lorenzo D. Gasser on an organization which they deem is unimportant.

A STUDENT:

Do you mean, attacks from the Pacific?

COLONEL GALLAGHER:

From the Atlantic primarily.

A STUDENT:

There was never actually any carrier-borne raid.

COLONEL GALLAGHER:

That is right. There was never any. But perhaps there might have been. We didn't know what was going to happen. We had certain very vulnerable spots, many of them along our coast line and elsewhere where an attack, even though a small one, might have had disastrous consequences.

A STUDENT:

Carrier raids on the country could only be sporadic raids on industries in the country. Any carrier raids even by the enormous carrier fleet of your own country would only be sporadic raids on the industries in this country. You couldn't put an intensive raid from all the carrier-borne aircraft you had in the country on this country.

COLONEL GALLAGHER:

Such as Pearl Harbor?

No other questions? Thank you for your attention.

(14 Jan. 1947--350) L.