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IMPORTANCE OF PRODUCTION TO THE ARMY AIR FORCES

29 January 1947

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CAPTAIN WORTHINGTON:

Gentlemen, General Eaker, Deputy Commander, Army Air Forces, is too well known to this audience to need any introduction. I want to welcome him to The Industrial College of the Armed Forces. General Eaker.

GENERAL EAKER:

I just told General McKinley that I thought the instructors who were here last year should not be compelled to listen to my discourse, because it will have some similarity to what I said then. I have sat sufficiently frequently in the audience as a student myself so that I will take as little of your time and bore you as little as possible, consistent with the mission which has been assigned to me.

I liked particularly the introduction of the Deputy Commandant, because I told him last year I am a little sensitive about introductions since an experience I had when I was coming home from Italy. I went to tell the WAC's, who had served with me so long and so well, "Good bye." They did a tremendous job in the war, as all of you know. I said to them, "In the skill and for which you are specially trained I would exchange any two soldiers for one WAC." At that moment I was rudely apprized of the fact that the audience was not exclusively feminine, as I had supposed it was, when I heard from the band down at the foot of the platform, one G.I. lean over to another and say, "I would exchange any two generals I saw in the war for one WAC, too, wouldn't you, Joe?"

I have broken down my proposed remarks this morning into a series of subjects. The first one I call "The results and aftermath of demobilization."

We had nearly two and a half million airmen in the war. Near the close of the war we had reached what we considered acceptable standards of efficiency. They were doing a remarkable job in tearing the industrial heart out of the enemy. But as a result of demobilization we came down in about a year from the two and a half million to five hundred thousand; but the character of the demobilization was such that we did not have left a single group of acceptable combat efficiency anywhere. We did not have a single squadron that we would have been satisfied to put into combat.

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Now, I want to assure you that I am not being critical of our system of demobilization. I think the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of the two departments of the Armed Forces did the only thing they could do. In other words, they reacted to the will of the American people. The many thousand letters that we received in the year after the demobilization convinced me completely that they were doing it the only way they could do it and be completely fair to the individuals. As is often the case, there was a conflict between the interest of the Government, the interest of the Armed Services and the interest of the individual. But following that system in complete fairness to the individual wrecked the Air Force. Of course, our plight was not peculiar as the other Services were in a similar state, I have no doubt.

The past year has been one of rebuilding with us. I think you may be interested in a brief outline of the organization which we set up to do the rebuilding. There may be some changes in the postwar organization that is being set up at the moment. I am not certain what that organization will be. There are many factors, such as the proposed unification of the Services, which may affect that. But I am going to tell you about the organization that we thought best in order to accomplish the rebuilding.

We divided the Air Forces into eight major commands. First, there are the combat commands. They consist of the Strategic Air Command, which organizes and trains the long-range striking force. There is the Tactical Air Command, which was designed to work with the Ground Forces; and the Air Defense Command, which was designed as an area command, the only one that we had which was geographical in character. Its six Air Forces are coterminous with the six army areas. They will handle the civil components--the Air Reserve, the National Guard, the ROTC and also all combat civilian elements.

Then we have the supporting commands. The principal one of them, of course, is the Air Materiel Command, which handles the procurement of all equipment and supplies peculiar to the Army Air Forces; the Air Transport Command, which handles our communications and weather services and strategic air transport; and the Training Command, which provides the necessary schools both for pilots and other personnel and technicians. They have a tremendous job to do because 80 percent of Air Forces personnel are recently recruited. In recent months we have been getting more war-trained people; but in the early stages we found that about 80 percent of our people had not had previous service. That has placed a tremendous load on the schools.

Another major command is the Air University, which occupies a very prominent and high place in our rebuilding scheme because when we look about among the reasons for any success we had in the war, we think the service schools must be given a great share for training the

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leaders who had to bear the whole load of the war. We want to give great emphasis to the Air University--a collection of schools which will prepare the leaders for the Air Forces of the future.

We also have the Air Proving Ground as a major command. There has been some question about that but our experience is that the maker of the munition should not test its tactical suitability, but that he should always have a proprietary interest in it. He should always think that this is a thing he has built; that it is his business. We have had the experience, and I am sure you have had it in the Army and the Navy, of not being satisfied always to use technically what is supplied by the technical services. For that reason we want the testing of our new weapons to be done by the men who must use them in battle.

That has worked out very well. We took the most skilled combat people that we had and put them in our Proving Ground. They take the planes which the technical services propose to give the operational units and test them for every combat task.

It was determined by the War Department and approved by the President that the interim strength of the Air Forces would be 400,000. With that number we could man about 4,600 combat-type airplanes. They would have as supporting elements about 225,000 civilians. The whole force would maintain a reserve of about 32,000 war-built airplanes as a war reserve of wartime built planes left over when the war ended.

We have not been able to reach that figure. In fact, we have released a lot of people that wanted to stay with us, particularly for the transition. Our budget setup that was sponsored by the President calls for 1.13 billion dollars in direct appropriations. If authorized by Congress, that will enable us to maintain about 350,000 military and about 125,000 civilians. For that reason we will be cut from the 70 groups which we had planned as an interim figure to about 55 groups, manned, and about 15 groups at skeleton strength.

The reason we think it is wise to maintain certain other groups, skeletonized as against doing away with them entirely is this: A skeleton group would have a nucleus of trained personnel. It would have a commander, an adjutant, engineer officer, communications officer and a small nucleus of combat personnel. You could then by calling reserves to active duty build that unit up quickly and within three months have it where it would perhaps be ready for initial action.

When you do not have a unit skeletonized, it will not have its trucks, it will not have its planes, it will not have any of its equipment. In other words, it will take a year to eighteen months before you can have that unit ready for combat. So we believe very strongly

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that, since we have this great war potential of manpower and materiel, when we are forced by current budget cuts to reduce the group figure from 70, we should always skeletonize the reduced groups.

The budget cuts always pinch more in peacetime. Whenever I think of the budget I am reminded of the elephant story. One of our veterans read a want ad which went like this: "Wanted, a conscientious, alert young man to go to Africa, capture 42 elephants and bring them home alive." This veteran thought that capturing elephants would be fun, though he did not have any experience. Anyway, he went down to see the man who had put in the ad and he told the man that he had not had any experience in catching elephants.

The fellow said, "That is all right. You do not have to have any experience. Here on the table is all the equipment you need."

The boy looked on the table. There were a case of Scotch whiskey, a pair of Navy binoculars, a cigar humidor and a pair of eyebrow tweezers. He could not understand how he was going to capture elephants with this equipment. The man said, "Oh, that is easy. This is the way you do it: You take a boat for Cape Town, get off the boat, and go up into the interior. You take this long pair of binoculars and locate a herd of elephants. When you have located them, you drink the case of Scotch whiskey, turn the binoculars around, the elephants will then be about the size of mice; take the tweezers and pick the elephants up and drop them in the humidor. But do not bring back any Pink ones."

I am very certain sometimes that we really looked on defense that way in the twenty-five years between World Wars I and III, in supplying our Armed Forces. The appropriations were based on that method of going out and capturing elephants. I am not certain but that we may be confronted with that situation in the future. I think it behooves all the people in every branch of the Service to do what they can to educate the American public to make certain that our budget is in accord with the task we visualize we will have to do.

We must have those three things, the organization, the personnel, and the budget. Each of us should make very certain that we form a very energetic one-man team to talk to and educate the American public and explain these facts. If we had done that in the past, I think we would have fared better than we did.

I want to outline for you the concepts we have had in mind in drawing up our plan for the interim Air Force. The first of these is the concept of the Arctic frontier. Here is what we mean: We know from history that wars have tended to travel on parallels of latitude. In other words, wars in the past have tended to move across the earth

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parallel to the equator. We think now that in the future wars will be more likely to travel on lines of longitude. This is the way we arrived at that conclusion:

We figure that in any war in the future which may affect us adversely there must be compounded two prime elements. In the first place, there must be large populations which might become warlike. In the second place, there must be a vast industrial capacity to produce tremendous quantities of weapons.

Take a globe and look at the southern hemisphere. You can dismiss the whole southern hemisphere. There are no areas in the southern hemisphere where those two conditions now exist or where they are likely to exist in the near, foreseeable future.

Then where are the most likely places in the northern hemisphere from which wars can come? There are three such places. One is Western Europe, from whence so many wars have sprung; another is Eastern Asia and the adjoining islands, from which the Japanese jumped off the last time; and the third is the central land mass of Asia. Those are the only three places from which wars of a magnitude to affect our security could come.

So we draw great circle courses from those three possible launching sites of future wars, from the centers of those areas, to the industrial targets of the United States. We note that those paths all pass over or near the Arctic area. So we say that any defense strategy must take into consideration that concept of the Arctic frontier.

Another consideration is that the sooner we locate the enemy's industrial capacity and the quicker we destroy it, the sooner we will terminate the struggle and also the fewer of his weapons we will have to absorb inside our own territory. That being the case, we say that it is primary that we must maintain long-range striking force.

At the moment that consists of a long-range bomber force and of mobile, air borne ground forces. In the future it might be guided missiles. But whatever that weapon is, it will probably travel on great circle routes, and it will be aimed directly at the industrial heart of this country.

We say that the one lesson which any dictator of the future must have gained from the last war is this: "You cannot win unless you destroy the industrial capacity of the United States and unless you reduce their manpower potential. You are bound to lose if you allow the United States two years in which to get ready to wage all-out war." That being the case, it seems to us a reasonable conclusion that any aggressor who goes on the rampage in the future will select as his first target the industrial capacity and the manpower of the

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United States. So we feel that every possible enemy we can have must be analyzed very carefully to determine where his war-making production is and that our plans be aimed at its early destruction.

A third factor which we have been thinking about in connection with the industrial capacity of the United States being the first target is this: We must get our industrial capacity as widely dispersed as we can. We might possibly induce industrialists to work in close cooperation with the Army and Navy and Air and to put as much of their establishments underground as feasible and to put their nerve centers as far away from these big targets as possible. I think the best thing we can do for these industrialists is to make them realize that the next war will be ushered in by a rain of bombs or guided missiles on our industrial centers.

We also think we must make certain that we have the best weapons. We think the second-best weapons in the next war will be as useless as the second-best poker hand. We are certain that we are not going to have the best weapons the next time unless we devote a great deal of our resources and energy to experimentation and research. So we hope our leaders will always show a willingness to absorb a cut somewhere else as against experimentation and research.

The 1948 budget as proposed to Congress has about 120 million dollars of direct appropriations for experimental air development; one hundred million for development of conventional planes and equipment and 20 million for long-range missiles' development.

We also think that this country has very badly overlooked the importance of the civil components, the National Guard, the Reserves, and the ROTC. When we went into World War II we had 1,800 officers and 18,000 enlisted men. The other Services were somewhat comparable, that is, very low. We expanded rapidly and built up to 2.5 million men and 470,000 flying personnel. So the 1,800 as compared with 470,000 and the 18,000 compared with 2.5 million show that the airmen from civil life played a leading role in our victory. That is why we give great emphasis to the so-called civil components—the Reserves, the National Guard and the ROTC.

I thought I would outline for you the status of the civil components air-wise. I think it is an alarming picture. The War Department is now asking for 150 million dollars for reserve training. Of that approximately 56 million was allocated to Air. Under the present budget before the Congress for 1948, we will get about 33 million dollars for Air Reserve training.

Now, we had planned to train about 47,000 officer personnel during the year as reserve crewmen and about 120,000 enlisted men as

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technicians. Under our reduced figure we will be allowed to train about 10,000 flyers, of whom about 4,500 will be pilots, and about 5,000 enlisted men. So, when we came out of the war with 470,000 trained airmen in all categories and we are allowed to train only about 10,000 flyers and only about half as many technicians, you can see what is going to happen to that vast war-trained manpower. Within a very few years it will disappear as a war potential.

On the National Guard side we had planned for 514 units, which would include 84 combat squadrons. All the other units were supporting services, such as Air Service maintenance personnel, signal squadrons, etc.—the supporting services that we need for 84 combat squadrons. Under the budget allocation that we will have now we will be able to provide in 1948 about 170 units. That will probably cut down our combat squadrons to something like 48, with the other 122 diverted to supporting elements.

I would like to leave with you a realization of the value of the civil components. For the next ten years I would say that the greatest resource that this country will have in the way of manpower will be the eleven million men that were trained in the war. After a few years the war-trained reserve will rapidly go down. It will go down as age overtakes them. After that it will be very important to have some system that will enable the military to train reserves. Obviously, as our present war-trained reserves disappear, we will have to build up new reserves in the intervening years to take their places. After the war-trained reserve of manpower is gone, we will have to depend on peacetime trained civil components for a large part of our security.

Lastly, we think the outstanding lesson of this war is the need for industrial capacity, for a healthy aircraft industry. We have a board, The Air Coordinating Committee, composed of very capable individuals from the Army, the Navy, and Air, that determines how many planes the aircraft industry should build in peacetime years in order to maintain its health, its capacity for expansion. They decided that this industry must build in time of peace some 3,000 aircraft annually if they are to retain the engineers and trained technicians and have the capacity for expansion in an emergency.

Under the present authorization I think that we would only be able to buy about 1,500 of those in the military services. It has been estimated by this same group that the civil industry can consume only about 300 planes per year. Of course, some of those will be trainers and small, single-engine planes that have little value in war and no value in keeping the industry healthy for building war planes. There is grave danger, therefore, that the aircraft industry will in the years to come not be in a position to expand to meet an emergency. That is a very grave concern of ours and should be of the American public.

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Also there is another 15 million dollars that was allocated to industrial planning in 1947. Despite the fact that seven months of the fiscal year have gone by, we have spent only a small part of that 15 million dollars. I have looked into that. I wondered why with only 15 million we had not spent it on this much-needed task.

I found that it is very largely due to the state of the industry. They tell us they are not going to be able to undertake much in this way without help from the military to show them what is wanted. They have to be given our plans and requirements for the future. They are having to let many of their best people go, as we are. This failure to do industrial planning is very serious.

It is evident to me at the moment that the shortage of funds is not on this question our primary concern. We must get the industry working with us. The demobilization seems to have completely wrecked them, even more than it has us. They simply are not at the moment able to make proper plans for expansion to meet any future war.

Some concepts which govern our planning--we have asked ourselves these simple questions: "Why was it we were successful in the last two world wars? Why did the other side lose?" We have decided it was, first, because we had more and better manpower, and second, because we had more industrial capacity to produce more and better weapons of war. The third and fourth reasons were what military men call the logistic factors--time and space. We had two years during which the enemy was held by our gallant allies in which to gear our industrial manpower and resources to an all-out war. In both wars we had allies who provided us vital time.

Let us consider whether those conditions will enable us to win the next time. Will we continue to produce more and better manpower? The answer to that, it seems to me, is this: We shall have more and better manpower next time if we maintain the institutions, the homes, the schools, the churches--the institutions which produced manpower for us last time. It is very encouraging to note that our men who fought the Second World War were better than those who fought the First. They were more serious, they were better educated, they were healthier, they were even bigger, by the actual records one inch taller than their fathers. So we did more of a job with the youngsters in the twenty-five years between the wars. We must, of course, continue to do that if we are going to be successful in any future struggle.

As to industrial capacity, there again we must think of the future. Since the war closed we have had many strikes which have been crippling to industry in this country. Every patriotic American should make it high priority to see that we work out legal, just provisions to settle these difficulties between management and labor.

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Will these time and space factors favor us the next time? We have figured it out this way: The Germans did, as you know, early in 1944, produce a rocket which could travel a distance of 280 miles at 700 miles per hour 70,000 feet above the earth and deliver a ton of explosives with considerable accuracy on British targets. Now, since that is true, and since the scientists who accomplished that are still alive, it seems to us that, starting from there, it is reasonable to believe that in five or ten years any of the leading industrial nations in the world might well come up with a super rocket or long-range guided missile that will have a range of five to seven thousand miles, which will travel from one to two thousand miles per hour, sufficiently high above the earth to avoid its curvature and deliver ten to twenty-five tons of explosives or an atomic warhead with exact accuracy. I think you will agree with me that when that time comes, the time and space factors will have gone from warfare. Our enemy will for the first time have a weapon with which from his homeland he can reach our industrial capacity. That being so, the industrial centers of the United States will no doubt be the first targets in the next war.

Under conditions like that we have worked out what we call a four-point program which will provide national security. Our primary reason for it is that we believe when we have determined what a good program of national security is, we should be very careful to see that the people of the United States are properly informed of it. If they are properly informed, they will make the right decision. It is our job to get them properly informed. Here is our program:

First, we should have professional diplomats. We believe the people of this country must show as much interest in international negotiations and in maintaining a proper State Department as they show in maintaining our Army and Navy. We are not critical of the State Department. We do not know what the requirements of the State Department are. The military is our business. But we know this: when international negotiations break down, when diplomacy fails, the soldier must take up the burden. So we are very hopeful that diplomacy will not fail in the future.

The way to do that is to take the best brains in the country at an early age and train them for international diplomacy. We must have the best international negotiators in the world in the future.

The second thing that we should have is a central intelligence agency to make certain that we have the funds and the resources and the personnel to know what is going on in every section of the world. For if there is any great section of the world where we do not know what is going on, it may well be that its people are building a war chest of frightful weapons to be hurled our way. We must know where these things are being made, in order to destroy them before they are launched. So an active intelligence agency is one of the prime requisites to the maintenance of security.

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The third thing we must do is to maintain strong armed forces until the United Nations Organization has demonstrated its power to keep world peace. A month or so ago in a large western college where I had been asked to speak on the subject: "A Brief Look at Two Wars, the Last One and the Next One." At that point a heckler said, "You military men keep talking about war. That is what causes war." I said, "It did not occur to me that when a minister talks about sin, he is encouraging sin. It did not occur to me that when a doctor talks about disease he is promoting disease. But this I can tell all of you: that there is no man who hates war as much as the man who has to fight it."

I feel that we must sell that thought to the American people, because they always ought to be informed about the situation. There are people who are always accusing the military of wanting to build up a great empire in order to get more rank, or promotion. We must make it clear that of all people we hate war most and that we hope with the greatest fervor that there will never be another war.

I think in preparing this security force we should certainly keep in mind a number of conditions. We must have forward looking leadership and a sound plan. You will recall that the military man has always been accused by the public and by the legislators and by a number of interested elements of being ultra-conservative. Perhaps we are. I have often told people who made that charge: "One reason why we are so conservative is because we are charged by you with protecting the country. In other words, when we gamble we may lose the country, so we must be pretty conservative."

A member of the Budget Bureau told me the other day, when I was discussing the appropriations: "We feel we will not have another war for five to ten years. The country has to pay a great debt left from the last war. We think we had better save on armaments the next few years and build up as the time approaches." I said, "If you are right, you will save several billion dollars. If you are wrong, you will lose the country." That is what you are gambling with.

The fourth thing that we urge is that we teach a brand of patriotism which will cause the people to put national interest above selfish, petty, personal interests. I think during this war everybody with very few minor exceptions supported the war effort, and that was a great reason for our success. But we have been seeing many evidences in the years since the war that the individual now puts his own selfish interest first. Some organizations, too, put their selfish interest above that of the public or of the whole Nation. If that thing continues, we will certainly be in a dangerous situation.

There are a few things that I think we should remember as we carry out this defense scheme. I think military men must take the

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lead in the education of the people. I think in the past we have had a tendency to isolate ourselves too much. We have not mixed in the civil life of the community. We have not told about this job of ours and tried to enlist support for it. We have isolated ourselves too much. We must not make that mistake in the future, it seems to me.

Our leadership must be made up of young, able, progressive, forward-looking officers. We believe that young men should get to the top when they show outstanding ability.

I think we should streamline, economize and cut overhead. We are for a simple organization. I feel that in the past our organization has been too cumbersome, too complicated, not sufficiently flexible. I believe all of us in the military service should do whatever we can to cut overhead. I think we could cut out 50 percent of our overhead and perhaps be the better for it.

But I will tell you this: The cut must start at the top. I told one of our seniors the other day: "If you will cut out eleven letter writers, we can cut out eleven letter answerers." I think you could get along with 50 percent of the present organization, but the cut must start at the top. Wherever it starts, that had better happen, because if we start all these economy squeezes from the bottom, from the fighting men, instead of from the top, the country is not going to have what it takes for national security.

Another factor is that we must enlist the interest of industry in peacetime for the requirements of war. I think if we outline the needs to them properly we shall find that they will cooperate.

A very important consideration is that we prepare the people for the impact of a future struggle. Years ago, when a war was going on, the average man on the farm knew very little about the war. In this war there were certain areas, like England, where they were on the frontier and the war reached into the lives of the citizens. There the first rude shock was pretty destructive and reached into the heart of the nation. The English were very courageous people and were willing to stand up under the burden of war. But at the start there was considerable consternation and confusion.

In a future war the initial stroke may come right at the civilian in his home, at his industry, his work and at his recreation. I feel that if he is not organized and trained to meet that first rude shock in the future struggle, it may be disastrous to the result. As we all know, it is a cardinal principle that the two best ways to win a war are, one, to remove the enemy's means of waging war, and the other is to break his will, break his spirit. If we allow that to happen, if we allow the enemy to break the spirit of our defensive people in the

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early days of the conflict, we will never get the weapons built or the essential establishments built up to win the war.

Of course, we should all do everything possible and reasonable to avoid a future struggle. Nobody wants war; but the thing that brought about the Second World War, in my opinion, primarily was that the peace-loving, democratic peoples of the world reduced their armaments and their means of defending themselves to such a low state that it invited the aggressor. We must certainly not make that mistake again.

We won both the First and Second World Wars after the end of four years of effort. Next time, if we are sufficiently careless and supine to allow ourselves to get into a third world war, we may not have the will and the means to win. The greater pace of the next war, the greater power of the weapons, the greater range of weapons, will make it most difficult. For this reason every military man must make it clear to every citizen, and every citizen must realize, that our primary concern must be to prevent a future struggle.

Gentlemen; I appreciate very much the time and attention you have given my remarks. If you have any questions to ask, I shall be happy to try to answer them.

A STUDENT:

I was very much surprised to hear your statement about having a fifteen million dollar authorization for planning, which you could not spend.

GENERAL EAKER:

I did not quite put it that way. I said we had gone through seven months of the fiscal year and had allocated only a small portion of the amount available. I inquired why that was. I found that we had a number of people in our Materiel Command spending their full time going to different factories and different leaders of the aeronautical industry on the planning end, and we have been unable to get them to accept contracts to do the work we wanted them to do. The reason which was given to me was that they had had to let their people go; they had had to cut down, and had to let their planning people go, so they did not have the skilled people who could have done that work. They did not know how many people they would have next month. They were loath to sign a contract for a particular task, like industrial plans.

A STUDENT:

Would you outline the types of contracts you asked them to take?

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GENERAL EAKER:

It would be much better for you to get a representative of the Materiel Command to tell you that. I would guess such as that has already been presented to you in the course of your program. But in general they were, for example, No. 1, How long would it take you to change over from the manufacture of washing machines to the manufacture of machine guns? No. 2, What would be your cost figures on a pilot line of tools? In other words, how long would it take you to build a set of jigs, dies and fixtures and to install them and have full production going as against hand production of war munitions?

They were offered certain pilot types and asked to study them and see if they could change over from producing their regular product, say ice boxes to the war machines.

I mentioned that because to me it is very alarming that with only fifteen million dollars to spend for industrial planning we have not spent most of it in the first seven months of the fiscal year.

A STUDENT:

General Eaker, I gathered from General Devers' speech day before yesterday that he would like to have a considerable part of the Air Forces under the Ground Forces. I would like to know your reaction to that.

GENERAL EAKER:

I do not know that you have made your question clear to me. But I know General Devers very well and have had many conversations with him. He was my commander both in England and in Italy; he is one of the ablest commanders I saw anywhere. I have the highest regard for him.

We have talked a lot about whether the Ground Forces should have their air element, as the Navy has its air element. Incidentally, I want to tell you a little story in that connection before I answer your question.

A very able division commander was complaining that he was not getting the air support that he needed; so I went up to the front to see him. We talked it over. I found out what he wanted, and we put our resources in there and did the job. But in the course of the conversation he said to me, "I think every division should have its own air." I told him I thought it would be better to keep all the air under one management. He was not convinced, but I gave him what air he wanted for his current task.

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A little later he was made corps commander. I went to see him again. In working out the air plan with him he said, "Eaker, I was wrong when I said the division should have its own air. The division should not have an air force but the corps should have its own air." We disagreed again, each stated his reasons, and I departed. I gave him the air support that he asked for this time.

A little later he was made army commander. He then said he had changed his mind and now felt the army commander should control the air.

We feel General Eisenhower was wise indeed when he once said: "When I go into battle I do not want a part of the Air Forces, I want it all, and I want it under the most experienced air commander."

You will recall that in the early days of the Tunisian campaign the Germans had some 600 combat aircraft, the French had about 200, and the British had about 400. We had about 800. That made about 1400 total for our side. But the surprising thing was that the Germans had air superiority. In other words, the German high command decided where they would put all 600 aircraft. In that way the Germans threw all their air against our piecemealed air and got superiority.

When General Eisenhower put General Spaatz in command, General Spaatz joined all our air. From that day forward the Germans did not have air superiority. Never again did they get air superiority, and I think any historian of the future will agree for a number of reasons that the campaign pushed on progressively and successfully from that point. In other words, the air must be kept all in one command, so all of it can be used at any time.

CAPTAIN WORTHINGTON:

Thank you, General Eaker, for a very remarkable talk.

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