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MANPOWER AND ATOMIC WARFARE

21 February 1947

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MANPOWER AND ATOMIC WARFARE

21 February 1947

A Blind Date With Destiny.

The subject of this informal talk which I am supposed to give you today is, what happens when girl meets boy for the first time, and she doesn't know too much about him, or it may be a blind date. At least it is intriguing. It is really very much like a blind date. Who knows what atomic warfare is going to be like? We have had enthusiastic descriptions of 1500-miles-per-hour aeroplanes with a range of 5000 miles coming across the Arctic circle, and in 24 hours attacking New York, Washington, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Southern California simultaneously. The war is over in a day unless a push-button in some central cave is pressed and the defending rockets directed at the enemy country are released, and the defending air fleets go into action. At any rate I have to leave that kind of speculation to the military strategists and tacticians. If we had to speculate on that, this lecture would end here.

Atomic War and Martial Law.

On this platform in this school last year, an imaginative army air colonel in characteristic fashion built up the story of what will happen in a future war: The President is scheduled to address the Congress in joint session at 11 o'clock. The details are given. The Representatives are in their places. The august Senate marches in. The cabinet members are taking their places, the Supreme Court files in. The President of the United States is announced. It is one minute before eleven--10:59. He is escorted to the rostrum. It is 11 o'clock. He is applauded generously. He begins "Mr. President and Mr. Speaker. As President of the United States, I declare...." It is 11:02. At that moment an atomic bomb in a blinding flash goes off over the Capitol. There is no government of the United States. The President, the members of the Congress, the members of the Supreme Court are dead! There is only one resource: martial law. Somewhere in the hierarchy of command, the Army takes over. That's a useful picture to keep in mind for it reveals, what Austria showed clearly, what Georgia showed, and what such destruction showed -- how very uncertain and insecure the inherent public power is. It reveals total war, involving all women and all children as well as all men. It reveals a new importance of martial law.

The Most Recent War Must Not be Fought Over in New Plans.

I suppose however the real significance of this topic is to correct a major difficulty of military planning; namely, the tendency

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to fight the most recent war over again, to memorialize permanently the great events which got the new planners -- if they really did something -- their distinguished Service Cross or medal or other decoration. Among planners you are likely to find the use for a phrase of Byron, "The bard is the hero of the story." The individual experiences of World War II are never likely to happen again. The purpose of the subject -- the kind of subject your Commandant likes, is to make you look forward, to anticipate problems, to use your imagination, even your fantasy and be bold enough to guess -- frankly guess. That I assume is our purpose today.

#### "Push-Button War" and Public Opinion.

So let us immediately come to some understanding as to one of the shibboleths which tends to stop analysis, imagination and detailed plans. It is the conception of push-button war. This is a bad phase for the public, because it oversimplifies the problem, miseducates the public, stands in the way of understanding such problems as universal training, civilian defense, the size and character of the army. The phrase should be taboo among the military services because of this misinformation of the public and the organization of a bad opinion, but more because as an admiral said when you push the button, it is not connected with anything, at least at present, and what it is connected with is the important thing.

#### Push-Button War and Manpower.

The idea placed in the public mind by such phrases as push-button war is a war of robots, a war of machines, and what has been our failure in the past will be ever more tragically true, the neglect or overshadowing of the manpower problems. As if a collection of push buttons was all you needed! There is omnipresent need of manpower in every stage of the future war:

1. The manpower, including womanpower, to make the machines
2. The manpower, including womanpower, to feed, clothe and house those who make the machines.
3. The manpower, including womanpower, to keep communities going in which factories are located and men and women work.
4. The manpower, including womanpower, to repair machines

Some of the problems that we call military that require manpower are:

1. The manpower to make the defense and war plans.
2. The military (manpower) to go out in ship, in plane, in submarine, and meet the enemy in numbers greater than we imagine
3. The ground forces to follow up in countries we attack
4. The ground forces to fight airborne troops when landed

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5. The manpower in civilian defense forces to meet destruction by fire, or chemical or bacterial warfare

6. The manpower to guide displaced persons from cities, particularly industrial centers, to organize havens and to run these havens or camps.

7. The manpower to operate the very much increased scope and application of martial law.

#### Manpower, Womanpower, Childpower.

When we think of the enormous and continental expanse of this country, the absence of barriers or first lines of defense, the frightful destructive power of war, these manpower problems cannot be left to improvisation, cannot be left to sham organizations that are only blue-print charts or organization. It is not push buttons that the American people need to be informed on, it is about manpower. I do not say military manpower, because there will be little distinction between military and civilian power. It will be about manpower, including manpower, womanpower, and even childpower. Total mobilization of manpower is clearly implied in whatever you can the next kind of war -- technological war, machine war, or atomic war.

#### I. LET US LOOK AT ATOMIC WARFARE

For the purpose of considering the problems of manpower in the atomic age, we must consider somewhat the character of atomic warfare even though there is not available to us now what the departments of national defense have already thought out in the way of a strategy of atomic war, and we would not of course ask for any details of the tactics of such war. At any rate there are certain things that are now public information that will serve our immediate purpose.

#### Some Characteristics of War in the Atomic Age.

In the atomic warfare we shall expect to find:

- (1) Weapons of extraordinary frightfulness
- (2) Weapons singly and in combination, capable of devastating destruction at a single blow;
- (3) Extraordinary mobility of manpower, weapons, and fire power, with jet propulsion planes, rockets, and aeroplanes of speeds now announced up to 800 miles an hour, and anticipating (or is it actual?) speeds of 1500 miles an hour and a range of 5000 miles.
- (4) A relatively small force is all that must get through to achieve frightful destruction of life and property of great range, panic, and social paralysis, this combined with kanikaze tactics, will complicate greatly the problems of defense
- (5) The extraordinary opportunities for the principle of surprise because of the destructive power, speed, and easy mobility of the new weapons

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- (6) The effective destruction, discord and chaos among the civilians, industrial effort and civic communities as a normal part of war

The Situation Invites Aggression.

There are two obvious observations that can be drawn from this description of atomic warfare that we need to point out. One is: The existence of such mobile destructive power is in itself an invitation to aggression, especially with the possibilities of success of such acts. New highwaymen like Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, on the highways of the world, are more likely to take such a gamble under the developing conditions of world peace. Blitzkrieg in World War II was obvious, slow in comparison and capable of being met. Here is a new warfare that strikes like lightning. One blinding flash and a rising cloud of "smoke" is the cerecloth of a community and its thousands of inhabitants!

World Government Now Not a Practical Solution.

The other is that there are very great, almost catalytic changes that need to be taken to prepare the world of 1947 for a world government equal to the responsibility for controlling nations and peoples to pursue the paths of peace. Without going into the details now I can state that there is need for a moral reconstruction of the individual and I mean the individual -- based on some more abiding conception than social expediency. Otherwise making available of our knowledge of "evil" to a world unprepared morally and socially will make this disturbed planet we live on look like Eden, compared to what will follow it. To use Tennyson's phrase, the world -- one world if you choose -- will have to be subdued by soft degrees to the useful and the good, or else! Time is of the essence.

II. THE PROBLEM OF FIFTH COLUMNS!

The Amazing Power of Organized Groups.

Warfare in an atomic world makes more imperative than ever that all nations, particularly the United States, take active measures now against all forms of infiltration by fronts, deceit by fifth columns and subversion by all forms and degrees of foreign agents. The problem is not one of ideology of honest difference of opinion about the best form of government, but it is one of elementary security. It is, strictly speaking, undeclared war, economic war, psychologic war, that we are even now facing. The existence in peacetime is tragic enough of such power as was wielded by the tugboat men in New York and the transport workers and the teamsters, or by the fonctionnaires of France in their demonstration of power in their one day strike this past week. The Bund and the Communists have demonstrated what a fertile soil a tolerant drifting America is.

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Such Power is Suicidal in Emergency.

If such power is tragic in peacetime, it is equivalent to national suicide under the conditions of war in an atomic age. Any attack, as is presumed will be made, will result in conditions in which all that has been learned in the strike technique, the techniques of deception, the fomenting of dissatisfaction, and all the subversive infiltration of fifth columns will permit the utmost in the way of chaos, disaster, and confusion.

Organized Means to Meet This Challenge to National Safety.

It is imperative therefore that the enemy within our gates shall be located and punished or deported now, without any witch-hunting, on the one hand, or protests of "virtue" under the protective coloration of alleged democracy, peace, or world unity, on the other. This will require a "force" of manpower, trained for continuing service now! In the present Government it would require expansion of that extraordinarily effective organization, the F.B.I. in cooperation with "intelligence" agencies in the armed forces and in police agencies of the states.

Undermining Activities Against Whole Nations.

It is greatly to be regretted that by virtue of the technological as well as the total character of modern war, the whole life of the nation and all the people are the objects of espionage, subversion and infiltration. But this is the fact. The counter measures needed ramify likewise into every aspect of our life and become dangers as the Gestapo and the OGPU and the NKVD reveal. The old care-free world is gone in the age of intrigue, espionage, infiltration, and world domination not by force but by subversion and intrigue. Manpower will be needed to man these political intelligence services as a safeguard for all the manpower and womanpower engaged in the defense of the nation.

Basic to All Preparation and Planning.

It is even conceivable that conquests of nations may be achieved by intrigue of fifth columns. The nation's power to resist may be completely undermined while all the external form of power seems to exist. If Germany had been only a little more patient, it might have demonstrated the complete effectiveness of the technique. Oriental cunning and Oriental patience are likely to be more effective through Communism if we continue to sleep. At any rate, having seen its power in fifth column activity, there is basic to all preparation and all planning the need to locate and destroy the enemy within our gates, without any effort at appeasement, nor any attention to diplomatic protests of nations that are full of deceit.

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III. THE NEW EMPHASIS ON PREPAREDNESS

The Need for Counter Offensive Measures at Very Beginning.

One of the military conclusions that may be drawn from the character of atomic warfare is that there is no place for a purely defensive nation or a mere defensive policy in the world as organized by men. Of course the habit of undeclared wars with or without rationalized explanations will be the order of the day. Any nation must not only be prepared for the aggression, it must be ready at the same moment to launch its counteroffensive in great force, mobility, according to well conceived plans, worked out in detail, and fully implemented according to the principles of military-economic balance.

Effect on Preparedness.

The kind of war conceived of as developing in the atomic age will leave no time for preparation. The defense for aggression must be in "being" at all times. No allies can hold the lines until we are ready, no oceans are barriers, nor anything else. Pearl Harbor, which is only the smallest miniature of what may be expected, must be remembered not only as a day in infamy, but as a lesson in the pathetic unpreparedness of a great nation that might easily have led to ignominy. In atomic war, time will be of the essence. There will be no time for improvisation, no time for planning, no time for training manpower, no time for setting the industrial machine, no time for stockpiling in the early impact of war. There will be little time for "rights" in an overwhelming immediate duty. This is a lesson that the people and the Congress need to realize right now, today in Washington. But that does not mean that what happened at the beginning of World War II should be tolerated: wasteful procedures, political jockeying, scattering of order utilization of military secrecy as a cloak for lack of planning or avoiding criticism, developing of "personal government" both in the armed forces and in the nation, the struggle for power between the armed forces and between the industrial and civilian power. The first lesson of atomic war is that complete preparedness at all times for any aggression, with no expectation of any period for getting ready or for catching our breath. The defense measures, assuming our "intelligence" is what it should be, but was not at the beginning of World War II, should be in being at the time of aggression; and with the first verification of aggression the counteroffensive measures should be launched.

I have summarized this point elsewhere l/ as follows.

"In view of these things -- the lightning character of modern war, international treachery, the subversive activities of "Fifth Columns", international cartels the devastating possibilities of initial blows and of continuing blitzkrieg, the destructive power of

l/ Fitzpatrick, Edward A., Col., AUS., Universal Military Training, Whittsley House, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., N.Y., p. 59.

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modern weapons, the futility of fixed fortifications or protections, whether Maginot lines, Siegfried lines, or oceans -- it is imperative that a citizen army be trained sufficiently in peacetime to prevent the "extemporizing" of armies and navies which we were compelled to do in the two World Wars."

#### IV. -- THE EFFECT ON UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING

##### Must Include Universal Military Training

If that is the effect on our preparedness policy, then it is obvious that universal military training must be included in our national policy and planning. To be ready on the day of aggression for the varieties of military-civilian duties that will be imperative will necessarily require training. The only sound argument for universal military training for America in the actual world situation is the military argument. Unless there is military necessity there is no valid argument for universal military training. Any educational, social, or health reasons are purely incidental and in the nature of by-products. There are more effective ways to achieve these educational, health, and social or disciplinary ways than military training.

##### Twofold Effect of Atomic Warfare on Universal Military Training.

The effects of atomic warfare on universal military training are twofold:

- (1) It makes more imperative the need for universal military training, and
- (2) It broadens its base and changes the character of the training to be given.

##### The Effect on the General Policy.

What has been said makes clear the more imperative need for training, universal in character for modern technological total war. With the new significance of civilian defense and martial law, and the rapidly fading line between military and civilian, the scope of military training for the emergency of war must be broadened.

##### The Effect in Character of Universal Training.

The problems of the character of the training, when it is to be given, to whom it is to be given, must be determined by the anticipated character of war. Obviously the military authorities are the men to make the proposals in the first place, and even in anticipation of the determining of the policy, to show the varieties of training needed in terms of the varieties of services required in the emergency of war. Some of the questions that must be answered are:

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1. What training shall be given for civilian defense? To whom? How long?
2. What training shall be given for industrial mobilization? To whom? How long?
3. What training shall be given for martial law? To whom? How long?
4. What training shall be given to conscientious objectors who will accept non-combatant service? How long?
5. What training shall be given to conscientious objectors who will accept only public service work under civilian direction? How long?
6. What training will be given to limited service men? How many classes of limited service men will there be?
7. What training will be given to each of the main divisions of the armed forces, and for any special services within the armed forces? How long?
8. What training shall be given in intelligence work for strictly military work? As counter espionage against saboteurs? Fifth columnists?
9. In what way is the universal military training program going to work in the scientific mobilization in peacetime and in wartime?
10. Should women be included in a universal training program? What training will be given and to whom?

The public information given out so far does not reveal any carefully thought-out plan, nor is what has been given convincing. The policy of universal military training may be lost and will in all human probability be lost, unless the armed forces reveals to the American people that they know what they are going to do, and how, when, and for whom. No information needed for the public would affect security.

#### V. EFFECT ON MILITARY MANPOWER

While it is not a part of our present duty to indicate the effect of atomic war on military manpower as such, particularly its utilization, I want to indicate some points which I have previously pointed out in my description of a U.S. manpower or personnel policy in my "Universal Military Training." All I want to do now is to include them in the picture without detailed description so they will not be overlooked in your discussion.

#### The Administrative Service of the War Department.

The first point relates to the utilization of personnel, on merely clerical and administrative functions. The major problem in the deferment of Federal government personnel was in the War and Navy Department. This was so because of the numbers involved and because of the practices.

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At least the two following suggestions and their corollaries should be put into effect now, besides the suggestions on limited service personnel.

An analysis of War and Navy Department functions and organizations shall be made so as to determine where male civilian personnel not fit for military service can be used. The spectacle of military and civilian personnel working side by side and doing identical jobs is not good for morale, nor is it in the interest of justice in time of war. (55) (U.M.T., p. 67)

In the civilian administration of the War and Navy Departments, priority shall be given to women over men, where the functions can be performed by women. (56) (U.M.T., p. 68)

The problem is complicated by the fact that the War and Navy Departments are not only over-all administrative departments, but operators of industrial plants, e.g., arsenals and shipyards. In future policies these functions should be sharply differentiated.

#### Change the Character of the Regular Army.

A word may also be said about the peacetime regular army. War is a much more serious business for the United States than it has ever been, and its conclusions are likely to be very much more decisive. At the heart of our defense and planning is the regular army and navy. The character of both is of supreme importance. It may, therefore, be well to consider this suggestion for the Army.

The Regular Army, with high professional esprit de corps with its key words, honor, duty, country, not rank, promotion, personal comfort, should be conceived as in continuous training, not as deteriorating on army posts. It should be constantly informed by competent research and intelligence and governmental reports from all over the world; constantly training in frequent realistic maneuvers of the most comprehensive nature with all units of organization; constantly studying its problems as professional men and reading regularly the professional literature of military science and military art. With such training and study, the Regular Army would, in fact, become an alerted defense force equal to any emergency. (53. U.M.T. p. 67)

#### A Question About the National Guard.

In this sketchy comment on the effects of atomic war on military personnel, it might be well to open up the very touchy, hot, and politically volatile subject of the National Guard. I think that unfortunately the center of gravity in the National Guard is in the

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Federal Government and not in the States by virtue of Federal aid and Federal recognition implemented by the dual oath. All I am going to do here is to make a suggestion. Might there not be a new orientation of the National Guard in terms of atomic wars. War is not likely to be pitched battles in the old sense. Attack is likely to be simultaneous in many parts of the continental limits of the United States. Airborne troops and fifth column activities will characterize or follow in the wake of the attack. Might there not be in this connection a vital function for the National Guard troops more in accord with the spirit and letter of the Constitution? Just a question.

Physical Classification for Armed Forces.

If the initial aggression and the counter-aggressive steps are indecisive, then the war struggle will be one and manpower will be in great demand. "Scraping the barrel" as it is called will come very much sooner than in World War II. National service will have taken the place of selective service, but the utilization of manpower becomes of supreme importance. No fully qualified men for military service should be assigned where limited service men or women can service. The physical qualifications for military service of the citizen army must be more flexible than in the past. The German Army has 7 physical classifications. The Japanese Army five classifications with three subdivisions in its second group. The British Army had 3 main divisions, with 3 subdivisions in the first group and 7 subdivisions in the second group. We must do something like that in spite of the report of the Special Committee appointed to investigate the problem in World War II. The House Military Affairs Committee in an Interim Report on this subject<sup>1/</sup> raised some questions. These are sufficient to open up the subject. They were:

1. Could all functions performed by members of the armed forces on the home front be analyzed to determine whether they can be performed by IV-F's?

2. Could an effective classification of inductees, of lower physical standards than at present acceptable, be made after induction into the armed forces, in terms of their physical capacities as well as their skills for the effective use of these capacities and skills, and then appropriate assignment to units be made?

3. Do any legislative limitations in size of the forces, or in kinds of services, lead to discouragement of the use of limited servicemen or IV-F's?

<sup>1/</sup> Under House Res. 30, Seventy-Eighth Congress, First Session, p.8.

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4. Are there any bars that need to be removed, that would encourage acceptance of IV-F's and avoid the legitimate effort to prevent burdens on post-war appropriations of the armed forces, for pensions, for hospitalization, for bonus, or that it will lead to war casualties that will burden present appropriations? (One understands, naturally, the desire to save all available hospital facilities for men who are war casualties.)

5. Is any program possible which would lead to the transfer of all capable men to combat service, and the replacing of these men with qualified IV-F's, or limited-service men or women?

6. Could a supplementary physical examination be instituted and directed toward a determination of specific duties for which persons not acceptable for general military service might be utilized? (If necessary, keep all these persons in the military service on an inactive status subject to assignment.)

#### VI. EFFECT ON INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION

With changed character of war both in mobility and in fire-power, and with the possibility of a decisive blow right at the beginning of a war by an act of aggression, the burden and responsibility on the industrial and agricultural economy is greater. It is certainly greater compared to a war of position, or of well known weapons, or a "military" war.

#### An Operating War Economy Meeting When Act of Aggression Occurs.

An industrial mobilization plan will not be enough. By stock-piling, by dispersion of industrial plants engaged in producing munitions, there must be an actually effective operating economy meeting the imperative needs of the armed forces at the beginning of the War.

#### How to Bridge the Gap from Peacetime to Wartime.

It is often said that you cannot create peacetime organizations that become wartime organizations upon the fact of war. There was much truth in that remark, for it was interpreted to mean a war organization to be maintained in peacetime. This was a difficult point to overcome in the peacetime thinking of what was essentially pacifist or at least pacific America. The realities of the world situation and the American position makes it necessary that our thinking be changed in order that this problem be met.

#### Utilizing the Normal Agencies in Emergency.

If I may use a rather homely illustration of fire drills in schools when I taught in New York City, we could empty a school of a

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couple of thousand children in a couple of minutes. The underlying principle in the fire drill was that the dismissals each day would be the pattern for the fire drills. The normal procedure became also the emergency procedure, and even in fire drills, obstructions were assumed in certain areas exactly as might develop in the emergency.

## The Application in Selective Service.

The principle has wider application, too. Take the Selective Service System. That was a fruitful field for the application of the principle making the Governor, notably in World War I, head of the system, using the electoral machinery for the registration, making the county court house or the city clerks office the location of the office of the local board office and using Federal buildings for the appeal boards was all part of the application of this principle.

## Some Applications of the Principle.

This is the principle that will convert American industry, the American governments, national, state, and local, and American industry to the imperative needs not merely for industrial mobilization planning but for industrial mobilization in being at the time of aggression. Let us start our thinking along these lines.

1. The nation will undoubtedly have to maintain its atomic bomb plants and continue the making of bombs as at present.
2. Industrial research in the technical laboratories will go on with government subsidy if necessary to improve all aspects of munition making, including weapons, vessels. Research will be cumulative and private industry will make currently available under proper security regulations what it learns. The nation will keep the industry informed under proper security measures what it learns in its own laboratories or in its tests.
3. University research on the pure science level as well as in the applied fields will be promoted, subsidized, where necessary, and be part of the plans.
4. A national scientific foundation financed by Congress will be the coordinating and stimulating agencies both for actual research and for scientific personnel.
5. Pilot plants must be in continuing operation under both civilian and under military control. Forms, patterns, specifications, efficient processes, best manufacturing conditions must be in "being" continuously. These must not only be productive enterprises but they must be training centers for personnel.

6. Persons not qualified for combatant military service or for front line service in the service forces, might be assigned to training under a universal military training program for services relating to their industrial (or agricultural) experience, their hobbies, or their choices -- or to the national needs. Consideration should be given in this connection to the Antioch plan -- and in any case the Cincinnati cooperative principle should be basic.

Industrial Mobilization Plan Should be Plan for Industrial Production.

All we are called upon to do today is to make suggestions. Industrial mobilization plans ought to be plans for actually getting munitions and industrial manpower. Charts of organization for super agencies ought not to be called industrial mobilization plans though they are an element in it. Of course they are important factors in the control of the American economy and were significant in the struggle whether the economy should be by the military or the civilian. They should be related solely to making the industrial economy meeting the national needs for victory -- and everything not related to and contributed to that paramount military necessity of the American people should be ruthlessly discarded or suppressed whether of the military, or labor, or industry, or the bureaucracy. If regimentation is what is necessary to win effective victory in the shortest time possible the American people will take it.

VII. SELECTIVE SERVICE OR NATIONAL SERVICE

The greatest immediate issue with reference to manpower in an atomic war is the question of selective service or national service. I shall here restate the case as I presented it last summer in a report in this College on "Manpower and the Economic Mobilization."

Planning and Preparation Must Be for Total War.

There is no alternative left to any nation in its planning but to prepare for total war. In total war there is practically no distinction between the civilian and the soldier, sailor, or marine. In total war, the nation is pitted against nation rather than only armies and navies against armies and navies. Total war makes necessary, therefore, a complete mobilization of all the resources of a nation, material and human. For the United States it includes all of the persons, men, women, and children who are 14 years of age or older, and even the potentiality of using those younger must not be overlooked, e.g., for chores on farms. For the United States it includes every physical thing and service; it includes munitions of war and their storage, transportation and distribution, the so-called civilian supplies and services to sustain the economy supporting the war's productivity and the war effort, and the slight remnant of civilian life, if there be any. The mobilization needed for total war is not merely an industrial, or even

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an economic mobilization, including the human resources. It is national mobilization of the total actual and of the potential resources of the nation for war. (p. 87)

Total mobilization for manpower must therefore be an integral part of the national mobilization of all the non-human resources of the nation, and every phase of industrial or national mobilization has its manpower requirements. (p. 88)

Total War Requires Every Phase of Manpower Be Studied.

In a total war where we are easily within target range of machines of great speed and of weapons using atomic fission, we cannot leave to "residues" the manning of the war production and the maintenance of the civil economy. More than ever the whole war economy needs to be planned including in each and every phase of it the manpower requirements. Recognizing that the terms military and civilian are more relative than ever and less distinguishable, the broad phases that must be considered are:

a. Military manpower; number, quality and physical standards.

b. Industrial manpower to produce direct military in

Raw Materials

Munitions

Ships

Airplanes

c. Industrial manpower to provide or produce

Trains, busses, ships for transportation

Wrapping, packaging

Warehousing

d. Agricultural manpower to provide (supplementary industrial power)

Foods and food processing

Clothing manufacturing

e. Civilian servicing manpower to maintain

Industrial manpower and agricultural manpower

f. Military-civilian manpower (including womanpower) for civil defense services for evacuation, for administration, for martial law in areas attacked by atom bombs.

g. Manpower to maintain the civil economy itself. (p. 92-93)

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Limitations of the Selective Service.

It is not important now to point out the tremendous popular success of Selective Service in both wars, but we must understand its limitations. The untried Selective Service System in World War I handled quite easily the task of raising by enlistment and induction 4 million persons for the armed forces out of a population of 103 million. In World War II where the problem was very much greater and the balancing of the military and industrial manpower needs became critical, there gradually came to the surface a number of problems which required additional administrative machinery such as the War Manpower Commission and the Economic Stabilization Board. Here was a very clear indication that the situation needed to develop more definite machinery for the control and direction of civilian manpower. Some refinements that had developed in World War I such as special calls to meet specific needs of the armed forces for workmen with particular skills such as machinists, carpenters or for highly trained people such as meteorologists, was not used in the second World War. A specific policy of "Work or fight" was not used as such in World War II, though approaches to the policy were used. Persons not physically qualified for military service in essential jobs were required to remain in their jobs even though under the normal rules of Selective Service they were theoretically free. However, it became necessary to provide special regulations for "job jumpers" who were able to be inducted after the Army reduced its physical standards for such persons. In World War II many certification plans for assisting local boards of which the most publicized was the West Coast Plan for the aircraft industry. While it was a function of the Selective Service System to maintain the military-industrial balance and to see that the withdrawing of the men needed for the military service disturbed as little as possible the war effort and the civilian economy as the increased pressures for men came from the armed forces, this balance had to be disturbed. The lack of policy on the part of the War Department and the lack of any adequate survey of the industrial skills of the country and the increased demand for war industrial manpower, made the job in any case very difficult; but the primary function of the Selective Service System was to secure men for the military service. The men who were to carry on the industrial production, agricultural production and in the civilian community were the men who were not physically qualified for military service or who were deferred as necessary by the Selective Service System on an individual basis, unless they were needed to fill a call. In the beginning the dependency deferments protected large numbers of essential workers as well as the American family. Later these dependency deferments were withdrawn, which greatly increased the number considered directly for industrial and agricultural deferment. There were 6,443 local boards that were making these decisions which were reviewed by about a thousand appeal boards. This kind of left-over manpower for the civilian effort would not be adequate in any major war and particularly in a war that required rather quickly the organization of our production machine, for

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the provision of essential munitions, equipment and services for the armed forces. The great weakness, therefore, of the Selective Service System was the lack of positive policy for industrial and civilian manpower. Though agencies were created to handle this problem positively, there was actual lack of coordination between these agencies and the Selective Service System. The creation by Executive Order successively of the Office of Economic Stabilization (6 October 1942) and of the Office of War Mobilization (May 1943) did not clarify or unify the manpower policies. An organization and administrative set-up is needed to integrate all these elements into a positive policy with the new elements which will be made necessary by atomic war. (pp. 94-97)

#### Economic Mobilization Plans and National Service.

Economic mobilization plans must anticipate the kind of emergencies that the nation is likely to face. If the war is a minor war or if we are to furnish our share of troops in any considerable number under the provision of the United Nations Charter, then the implementation may very well be carried out by means of the Selective Service System. If there is any anticipation in our war planning of a major war it will be necessary to have rather complete plans for national service. National service presents a greater problem of popular psychology than even the Selective Service System presented in 1917-18. It is dubious if the local board machinery which was at the heart of the Selective Service System could be used in a national service system though the registration machinery could be used. A great question that will have to be faced is whether trained individuals who understand industry or military requirements or civilian defense will not be necessary to make studies of questionnaires which might be secured in exactly the same way the Selective Service handled it by a registration and then by distribution of these questionnaires to the persons registered. It might be necessary to have appeal boards as England did -- to review the recommendations of these technically trained local manpower officers. This will require an entirely different kind of war planning and will require a new set of problems in public relations. At the lowest level we will have an administrative process rather than a quasi judicial process, and this will seriously affect the nature of the local problem even if local manpower boards will be available to hear appeals from the decisions of the local administrative officers. (pp. 97-98)

#### National Service in Relation to Total Mobilization.

The need in any future war is for some kind of an over-all control of manpower with adequate machinery to provide for its most effective use at all levels in all industries and in all the services needed in connection with war including services to the armed forces, to the civilian defense and to the industrial production organization and personnel and to the civil community. The over-all control and direction of manpower including womanpower, both on a national level and

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in the local areas is what is meant by national service. Because the life and death of the community, even of the civilization of which we are part, is at stake, human beings must for the sake of survival give Government during such national emergency this rather complete power over life and property. A total mobilization of our natural resources can be implemented most effectively only as there is a total mobilization of our manpower resources. Both must be related. In fact, the failures of our past effort to mobilize our natural resources without adding adequate plans for their most effective use by means of a mobilization of manpower. National service would seem to be practically a corollary of an economic mobilization that is necessary for a total war in an atomic age. (p. 97)

DISCUSSION

A STUDENT:

You have presented a rather grim and even a terrifying picture, yet I think you have remained within the bounds of realism. The thought has often been expressed, both here and in the other auditorium, that we must take the shock of the first attack. That brings up two questions to my mind: How are we going to get your story over to Congress and the American people? Is it necessary that we, even though we are a democracy, take the first attack?

DR. FITZPATRICK:

Well, to answer the second question first, if we wait until we take the attack, we will not have in being or potentially organized the way to meet the problem, so you might just as well capitulate now rather than wait.

With respect to whether Congress and the American people can be informed or not, I think the problem is that the War Department shifts its policy too often. First, it was one year for military training. Then, under the impact of Congress, they said six months training for discipline, and six months subsequent training. This is a very bad situation. What we need is for the Armed Forces, no matter what the pressure of public opinion, to stick by what their informed professionals really think, not what its politicians think, about what is needed for the Armed Forces.

I think there should be in the community itself enough people who are encouraged to think about these things. This number must be greatly increased. Except that I come here occasionally and except for the fact

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that I was in it and try to keep a little in touch with it, I have nothing to stimulate interest in military affairs. I do it on my own. I come here and am forced to think through the problems again. You don't have enough people in the laity of the United States thinking about your problems in terms of civilian life or ordinary life.

A STUDENT:

I would like to pursue that further and close with you. What are people like you, educators in your group, civilian leaders, and patriotic citizens, doing to try to preserve your way of life and your interests in this world? Traditionally the military in this country has been looked upon as the country cousin or country dog who comes to town. I would be interested in hearing your prognostication about what you are doing.

DR. FITZPATRICK:

I would like to suggest that the first thing we did, we declared that the military must be under the civilian. The second thing we did, we said, "You are a lot of professionals in the matter of war. It is up to you to devise for us civilians who are ignorant of your problems, who are not very much interested in them, how we can meet them." I should say your information to the public was not adequate.

A STUDENT:

My question hasn't been answered, doctor. What is being done by the civilian leaders who are interested in the preservation of this way of life in this country?

DR. FITZPATRICK:

The civilian isn't doing very much of anything because he doesn't sense the reality of the problem. The point that you have to bring home to him is that there is a problem and it is his problem rather than yours. You are our professionals and professionals have to be subjected to and meet the ignorance and the foolishness, and even the stupidity of the civilians who ask foolish questions. We don't quite believe you. You must increase our faith.

I noticed in Mrs. Marshall's book on General Marshall's life, she said, "Too often the idea is that we think the Army is made up of brass hats." "Of course," Mrs. Marshall said, "there are also a lot of brass heads among civilians." But the point is this: You are professionals; you are responsible at least for the basic information upon which public opinion must be based.

I will give you a very good illustration. Is there any interest in the states in National Guard legislation or appropriations? The National Guard Bureau here makes arrangements. They go up to the Governor. They hold National Guard hearings. I know in the State of Wisconsin there are very few civilians who ever attend those hearings, either to propose something or to be informed. There is no continuing interest in the problem.

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Personally, at least, I am a receptive potential. Normally, I don't come across the necessity for consideration of military problems in my life at any time in the year, except as General McKinley asks me to come down here or they send a question about which they would like to know what I think, and so forth. That is where the problem is.

A STUDENT:

How about including the problem in the educational program of the nation?

DR. FITZPATRICK:

I think one of the great problems is to include the whole study in the educational program, but you see you get accused immediately of teaching militarism. Fortunately institutes are being developed at the universities for example; Princeton and Yale, that will be one leavening influence. You know military history has been taboo. We had a pacifist era - and we still have the effects.

I remember I wrote a history of Wisconsin which contains a description of the World War I selective service system. There it is so that they would know in a general way its purposes and its functions and what that state did in World War I. You have to get people who can put the problem in a way that is interesting to civilian students.

I will give you a very good illustration. I went over to the Library of Congress the last time I was here to talk about the national defense expert to be selected by the Library of Congress to guide the Congress. I talked to the head of the Legislative Reference Service. I asked him what he was looking for, and to my utter amazement he said he was looking for a military strategist. There Congress is going to get tied up with the professional, technical subjects of military war which should be over in the War Department. What they need there is some person with sufficient vision who appreciates the military obligations of citizenship, the right of Congress to make public policy with reference to war, and who objectively could give to the Congress that kind of information. They don't need a military strategist at all. It would be a violation of the fundamental relation of the executive and legislative departments of government to have that kind of person in that job, if that is all he was.

A STUDENT:

Your discussion has raised another question. You stated that it is the military job to sell this idea to the public.

DR. FITZPATRICK:

Wait a minute. I don't think I said that. It is the military job to furnish the basic information that must be the basis for the selling.

A STUDENT:

I agree with you, but I think Admiral Nimitz, General Eisenhower, and all the high ranking officers in the Army and Navy have done their utmost to inform the public on what they think the situation is. It is very obvious what the Congress thinks of their ideas in view of the recent cut in the budget. What are you going to do about it?

DR. FITZPATRICK:

In Wisconsin we used to look for the best advertising medium we could find when we had a program idea to propose. I wrote a biography of the head of the reference library in Wisconsin which pointed out what he always did whenever he had anything to sell. He selected the best advertising medium in the United States. Whom do you think he chose? Theodore Roosevelt. The best selling medium is the President of the United States. He is the one as Commander in Chief and head of the Government who can do the best selling job.

It is my personal opinion, however, that he did a disservice to the program in the instruction he gave to the National Advisory Committee on universal training with the word "military" omitted. Within a few days the War Department came out in support of it. I suppose it had to. That was a disservice to the program of military training in the United States.

The thing I pointed out here is that any world government that is going to be an effective instrument in the control of the atomic bomb in the present status of individual and national development is in my judgment a chimera, and we have to take care of our own security.

A STUDENT:

Do you have any idea, psychologically or sociologically, of how we can change the peacetime word "warmonger" and the wartime word "patriotism" into the same word, so that in peacetime we are not warmongers and then we are wonderful patriots in wartime? How can we be patriots in peacetime?

DR. FITZPATRICK:

Maybe you could get a new Kipling to write a new Tommy Atkins. That would be one way to do it. The problem is to see what you have. To go back to Johnson's dictionary of the 18th century, you remember under patriotism, he has "Patriotism is the last refuge of scoundrels."

You see you have an immense tradition that you are trying to overcome. What you must devise is a new terminology. You have to do this job by substitution, by flank rather than by direct attack. That is the problem of psychology.

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The War Department just engaged Mr. Bernays of New York to sell universal military training to the country. The most effective educational instrument in this country today is advertising. They want to sell something, for example, a hair tonic. It is going! going!! gone!!!, so if you want it, this is the last day to get the new growth with "Herpicide". You see what we have done here? We have amazing techniques of getting before people by sheer repetition that are worth millions of dollars in sales. Take the little boy on the "Johnny" program. He has a certain voice. He gets a hundred thousand a year merely because he has that voice.

The problem we have to consider is the technique of mass communication which we are now doing in the schools and colleges. That will provide a technique. The greatest problem is whether we can do that in our educational system under the shibboleth to train leaders. As one of the educators who didn't get anywhere with his suggestion pointed out, we have to train a followership as well as a leadership. What you have here is a problem that goes to the very essence of the American way of life and the American concept of human nature. And the difficulty is there are too many "inhibitions" - personality conflict or personality deflation - in the prevailing opinion.

A STUDENT:

I would like to support your ideal plan of being constantly ready, but I would like to know your opinion as an economist as to how long and to what degree you feel the national economy could support such a plan as opposed to one of perhaps more relaxation of constant readiness in favor of better intelligence.

DR. FITZPATRICK:

Well, the great question before the American people in connection with atomic war while the world is in its present chaos and with the danger of uncertain attitudes by Russia, for example, or other nations, is this: "Are we worth saving?" What is at stake is the very existence of the nation. What are you going to do about it? If you ever could get the American people to believe that, you could get any money you want to preserve it. Until you convince them of that, you are not going to get very far. That is my theory of it. The point is to do it piecemeal or by partial measures or on specific issues. Isn't that the way to organize mass opinion. The fundamental issue is, "Is the American system, is the American nation (you and your family) worth saving?" And here is what war is going to be. It is a perfectly legitimate thing, without being accused of militarism, that the schools of the country should place the realities of the world situation before at least the high school level without any effort of warmongering, if you want to call it that, or anything else. It is perfectly possible within an objective presentation to do that.

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A STUDENT:

I have a comment, doctor. We have a tradition, a moral, legalistic tradition in approaching all our problems. That was evidenced in your speech when you advocated deportation of subversive elements instead of shooting.

DR. FITZPATRICK:

You heard the comment.

A STUDENT:

When you talked about your ideas of planning, you have pointed out the utmost or the worst that we could expect. Do you consider that we may be attacked by a country that has not the means of complete destruction? I would like to know whether or not you think it is worth while for us to make plans for a much lesser destruction than the one that you painted.

DR. FITZPATRICK:

I think any plan for the greater would necessarily include the lesser. The people responsible for plans have to plan not for the lesser but for the greater, particularly in the handling of manpower.

A STUDENT:

The question of handling manpower in this country is the question of amount. Whether the country will accept it, depends upon the amount of damage that is going to be done at that time. In one case if the danger is great, any national service plan would be accepted; if the danger is small, the selective service would be accepted.

DR. FITZPATRICK:

I suggested that if the United Nations merely called on the United States for its share of a force needed for a specific issue, the selective service would be adequate for that. If it were a case of a major war, national service must be the instrument.

A STUDENT:

It seems to me that you made an excellent point of the use of local and state governments in this whole problem. In any emergency that is a practical question since for one thing the trend in our country is toward a stronger and stronger national government, and by the same token a somewhat weaker local proposition. How in an emergency are you going to get the state and local governments into the chain of command, you might say, to carry on any effective mobilization program? If you are going to give the states and localities any leeway, you are not going to have very much uniformity, or if you have the thing completely uniform they won't help you.

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DR. FITZPATRICK:

In the first place, I am not one of those who is ordinarily for any complete centralization of power. I think the best system for the American Government is a strengthening of local and state governments. I think in the selective service system, for example, in this last war, we tended to emphasize too much a Federal idea rather than the fundamental principle, or the Anglo Saxon principle on which it was based, of local and state governments. I think in this war or in the question arising in the National Guard, the fundamental problem is to meet the diversity of attack that is likely to be possible by local instrumentalities rather than by over-all instrumentalities. I think when an emergency comes, then regimentation or national centralization may be necessary and is probably necessary in the chaos kind of psychology that atomic war creates.

CAPTAIN WORTHINGTON:

Thank you, Dr. Fitzpatrick for a most forward-looking talk.

(10 Mar. 1947 -- 350)E.

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