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CHANGING PATTERN OF ECONOMIC POTENTIAL FOR WAR--POPULATION

20 March 1947

CONTENTS

| | <u>Page</u> |
|--|-------------|
| SPEAKER--Dr. Frank Lorimer, Professor of Population Studies in the Graduate School of American University | 1 |
| GENERAL DISCUSSION | 11 |

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GENERAL MCKINLEY: Gentlemen, this morning we have with us Dr. Frank Lorimer, a distinguished sociologist who has made studies of demographic problems for many years. He has been Professor of Population Studies in the Graduate School of American University since 1938.

Dr. Lorimer served in World War I with the American Expeditionary Force. In World War II he was connected with the Office of Strategic Services, the Foreign Economic Administration, and S.C.A.P. (Tokyo). He is a member of many learned societies and has acted as consultant to government agencies. He is the author of several books, the most recent of which deals with the population of the Soviet Union.

This morning Dr. Lorimer's subject is, "Changing Pattern of Economic Potential for War--Population." I take pleasure indeed in introducing to you Dr. Frank Lorimer.

DR. LORIMER: My record in the First World War might be made more specific by citing my rank, which was that of a private, first class.

At the start I would like to speak of two or three very broad, basic principles relating to the interpretation of population in relation to resources. I might state a few general ideas in one or two sentences each.

The distribution of the world's population today reflects, in large part, very long-time historic trends related to differences of geography. Two types of region that may provide important resources today were hostile to human habitation in earlier periods: First, the forest areas of the world which tended to have a sparse population of hunting peoples in prehistoric and early historic times; and second, the great plains (now the great cereal plains of the world) which remained relatively unoccupied, except by nomads, until the development of deep-plowing and technological agriculture.

In contrast to these regions there are the garden spots of the ancient world; the soft soils, the alluvial valleys, the mountains and coves. These are the areas that attracted pretechnical peoples and became the cradles of early civilization, which often extended out, through irrigation, into soft desert soils. These cradles of civilization fostered over many centuries the gradual accumulation of quite dense agrarian population.

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The pattern of the world distribution of population still reflects this contrast in the relation of different regions to the requirements of human subsistence with primitive techniques.

The two great nations which have been developed on areas that were previously sparsely occupied are, of course, the United States and the Soviet Union. The present area of the United States had only a small part of the indigenous Indian population, which was concentrated chiefly in the Caribbean region and in the Andes. The natural hostility of the North American forests and great plains to primitive settlement was here re-enforced by the ocean barriers to migration.

The area that is now the Soviet Union was deadlocked in the conflict between the forest peoples and the tribesmen of the desert. So the most fertile lands of Russia never came into use until a few hundred years ago when the dominance of the Slavs made possible their advance south into the hard soils of the prairie and steppe lands and east across northern Asia.

That means that the populations of the United States and the Soviet Union, although both have been growing very rapidly, still have a low ratio of population to physical resources; whereas, in extreme contrast, the populations of Asia, the Mediterranean world and the Caribbean have rather dense agrarian populations with relatively high ratios of population to economic resources. The future economic development of the latter group is thereby handicapped.

There is one other very general demographic pattern that merits emphasis. In general, up until very recently, there was maintained a sort of rough balance between death and birth. In normal periods there were generally somewhat more births than deaths, thus fostering slow growth. Epidemics and famines then repeatedly cut down the population. Graphically we can visualize the line of the birth rate as being generally a little above the line of the death rate--with the latter frequently rising in peaks far above the birth rate. Then some 300 years ago in Europe, with improved agriculture and trade the trend of the death rate begins to fall far below the birth rate. Then, starting in France near the beginning of the last century and some seventy years later in England and Western Europe, the birth rate began to drop with the impact of industrialization and urbanization. The gap between birth rate and death rate continued to widen in Europe and America for several decades after the birth rate had begun to decline. In other words, in the transition from the primitive balance of high fertility and high mortality to variations around an equilibrium of low mortality and low fertility, the rate of natural increase may continue to rise for some time after the birth rate has begun to decline. The peak in natural increase among European peoples as a whole was reached just before and just after the time of the First World War. The decline in fertility then became more

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rapid than the decline in mortality until we are now reaching the point for Western Europe where the two lines meet. In some countries the lines are crossing, with birth rates falling below death rates. On the other hand, in countries where fertility and mortality are both high, improvement in mortality can be effected without disturbing folk ways and the basic patterns of life; it, therefore, usually precedes the decline in fertility. The first stage in the transition to controlled reproduction is typically an era of rapid population growth.

One more glittering generality at the start. It is obvious that there is no one-to-one relation between population and the military power or economic power. The military mind, if I may be irreverent, has usually assumed some such relation. Even in China, I understand, Chiang Kai-shek is interested in increasing the nation's population. Actually, in many countries, an increase in population means a weakening of the military potential. In so far as Mussolini was successful in raising the birth rate in Italy--which was almost not at all--but in so far as he was successful he weakened the Italian military potential. Certainly he did from a short-range consideration, that is, as regards World War II, because all he did was provide a few more children to be fed. But even on a long-range basis, if a population is increasing more and if the increase in population tends to retard the rise in per capita productivity, it may actually retard the development of economic military power.

I once worked out a very rough index of the national income of various countries above minimum subsistence requirements, simply by taking the estimated income per capita in U. S. dollars for each country (using an available series of estimates which were about as exact as any that could be had) and subtracting \$60 from the values for each country as a minimum subsistence requirement, then multiplying the difference by the number of persons in the population. The product (population times the per capita income minus \$60 per capita) gives a rough index of the total economic power above a minimum subsistence. Nations that have an average per capita income below \$60 are here assumed to have no significant surplus economic power which they can invest either in war or in capital accumulation. The products thus obtained (in billions of dollars) for the different countries ran as follows: United States (about 1940), 70; the U.S.S.R., 28; the United Kingdom, 20; prewar Germany, 17; France, 9; Japan, 7; Canada, 5; Austria, 3; Australia, 3; Argentina, 3; Italy, 3. Then, in the two billion dollar class; the Netherlands, Belgium, Poland, Brazil. The figures for other countries were in the vicinity of one billion dollars, or less.

I mention these figures because it seems to me that, though very crude, they give a better picture of relative economic and military power than absolute population. The important point is that under some conditions increase in population may lower the figure for total national production minus minimum subsistence needs.

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Now I will speak about the situation in a few particular countries. In the United States as a whole--I hope my fellow-demographers will forgive me--I do not think you need to pay very much attention to population in considering the economic problems of the United States. On the whole the population patterns are more stable and the resultant problems less serious, probably, for the United States than for any other country in the entire world. It is true we are having a slowing down of our rapid population growth, but it will be some thirty years before we have a cessation of population growth; or at least it will be a rather long time.

We have already achieved a distribution of population in relation to our resources that is reasonably equitable. Less than 20 percent of our population is now supported by agriculture. Our population has become adapted to its industrial resources. There will be further changes in the distribution of overpopulation and changes in the composition of our population, with a gradually increasing proportion of older workers and aged persons but I do not see in the demographic picture of the United States any situations that are likely to create really serious problems of a disturbing economic order. This statement is subject to certain exceptions which must be discussed very briefly.

First, there is a school of economic thought which sees in the slowing down of the rate of population growth a serious threat to economic equilibrium and progress. This argument should not be dismissed lightly. It must be taken seriously. However, my own judgment is that the proponents have rather exaggerated their case. I will simply cite three references. The chief proponent of this thesis, that the slowing down of population growth involves the threat of economic stagnation, is Professor Alvin Hanson of Harvard. The most vigorous attack on the thesis is probably that which was developed by George Terborg, in a book called, "The Bogle of Economic Maturity." In my opinion the most carefully informed treatment of the subject is that by Professor Reddaway of England, called, "The Economics of Declining Population." The argument is a highly technical one, involving the relation of consumer expenditures, savings and capital investment. The analysis reveals some problems but they are not problems that cannot be met by institutional adjustments.

Then there is, of course, the matter of the changing age pattern. Again, this is inevitable. It is certain that we will have an increasing proportion of older workers and aged persons in our population and a decreasing proportion of children and youths--temporarily offset by the postwar baby boom. This has to be taken into account in certain types of economic planning, but there is nothing very alarming about this trend.

The effect of the declining birth rate has been somewhat offset in the past by the increasing base of potential parents. The absolute number of births has, of course, not declined as much as the birth rate has

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declined. In absolute numbers, after corrections for estimated incompleteness in registration, the births for the whole United States was, in the period from 1915 to 1925, about 2.8 million each year.

The youngsters becoming eighteen years of age in 1947, were born in 1929. That was a rather conspicuous year in American economics, as we all remember. In that year (1929) there were about two and a half million births. For several years thereafter there was a decline in the number of births each year, to about 2.3 million in 1933, and then a gradual rise. So that for ten years, from 1929 to 1939, the number of births was just the same, in absolute numbers, as it was in 1929, two and a half million. We are now (March 1947) just about at the crest of the increase in births stimulated by recovery from depression, full employment, and war. The Second World War has undoubtedly had a net effect of accelerating the growth of the population in the United States, the stimulus to marriages and births having more than offset the deficit of excess losses. Part of this increase is the return of a loan from the past, part is a borrowing from the future; but there will probably be some absolute net gain. The number of youths entering American industry is now at a relatively low level. After a few more years this number will begin to rise slowly, to a peak about 1965. Presumably thereafter, the stream of youngsters entering our labor force will begin to decline.

So much for the United States, very superficially—in this discussion, in which the shots are being scattered far and wide.

As the speaker mentioned in introducing me, I have been particularly interested in the population trends of the Soviet Union and in its economic background, so I will speak a little about that situation.

I mentioned earlier that the Soviet Union entered its historic period in a peculiarly favorable situation, in terms of ratio of population to resources for industrial development. The total population of the Soviet Union, in its prewar boundaries, was approximately that of North America. In total area it was about the same as North America. Obviously, the Soviet Union has very great natural resources.

The rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union is reflected in various statistics. Perhaps the simplest one is that of the proportion engaged in agriculture. You remember that at the present time in the United States less than 20 percent of our population is supported by agriculture. In the Soviet Union, in 1926, the time of their first census, the proportion dependent on agriculture was 76 percent. In a period of about twelve years, from late 1926 to early 1939 (the period between the two Soviet census reports), the proportion dependent on agriculture dropped from 76 percent to 55 percent. That is, of course, a very spectacular drop.

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Stated the other way around, it seems even more striking. In industry, mining, transport, distribution, education, etc., the proportion jumped in the twelve-year period, from 24 percent to about 45 percent. But, you see, in terms of what is happening (the transition from an agrarian economy to an industrial economy), the Soviet Union has only, as yet, progressed a relatively short distance. It has a very long way to go and may be expected to advance rapidly in the next few decades along this transition from an agrarian economy on a low technological level to a high-g geared industrial economy.

That is also reflected in the figures on the proportion of persons living in cities. The proportion of persons living in cities in the Soviet Union in 1926 was about the same as in the United States in 1860, on the eve of the Civil War. Twelve years later the proportion of persons living in cities was equal to that in the United States in 1890. The relative rise of urban population, which took some thirty years in the United States, took twelve years in the Soviet Union. But in 1939 the proportion of persons living in cities of the Soviet Union was the same as it was in this country fifty years ago.

They have, of course, during this initial period of industrial development established a certain framework of capital structure, such as the connections between metals and fuels--in the Urals-Kuznets-Karaganda triangle. They have also, of course, trained cadres of skilled workers and technicians.

I am going to speak more strictly now about the demographic aspects of the Soviet population. It is, of course, and will continue to be, an area of very rapid population increase, affected by great catastrophes involving population losses. Very terrific population losses occurred at the time of the First World War and in the disturbed period of civil wars and the famine in the years immediately after this war.

Then there was a period of serious population losses incident to the collectivization of the farm population. There was a rapid decline in births from the middle 1920's to the middle 1930's, with increasing resort to abortion clinics. But after taking this decline in births into account, it is evident that something of the order of five million persons died during the hard years of the First Five-Year Plan, who would not have died if there had been an orderly development of mortality trends from 1926 to 1939. This loss was a feature of the "forced industrial revolution" of the early 1930's. The effects were apparently most exaggerated in the Asiatic steppe region, among the Kuzaks.

Finally, there are the very great losses during World War II. Incidentally, I have never ventured to estimate losses in the Soviet Union during the Second World War. I do not know the magnitude of these

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losses. Furthermore, I think I am right in saying nobody else in this country knows. Of course, if I were in some research division which received an order to make such an estimate, I would produce a figure. (Laughter) But not being under such orders, I have not done so. However, I did take a hypothetical figure right out of the blue, just to show how war losses might affect future population growth. I took 20 million--as a hypothetical figure. (I emphasize this because I have been embarrassed by some reviewers who have referred to "the careful estimate of war losses by the author of this book.") My hypothetical figure had to be distributed, in order to work it into age groups, into hypothetical military losses, hypothetical deficit in births, and hypothetical losses to the civilian population.

The Soviets are apparently using at the present time, in dividing up the election districts, a total population figure which is about like my projected population figure, with hypothetical war losses plus the addition to the population added by annexation. So it is possible, just by chance, that this hypothetical figure is somewhere in the vicinity of the actual losses. If so, it would be a fortuitous coincidence. Moreover, it is quite possible that Soviet officials do not know how many people there are in the Soviet Union today. I do not see how they could know, and they were far wrong in estimates of the total population in the years immediately preceding the census of 1939. So, if Soviet officials could make a mistake of some ten million in their estimate at that time, they might not be exactly right today. Nobody knows either the war losses or the present population of the Soviet Union; but the population is probably somewhere in the vicinity of 190 million, plus or minus whatever figure you choose to use.

It is likely that the population added from the annexed areas is something in the order of the losses, due to the effect of the war, in the original population. It would be convenient if this were true because then we could use, subject to certain distortion that would not be too serious, the population projection for the original Soviet population within the old U.S.S.R. boundaries as giving you some indication of the population to be expected within its enlarged boundaries during the next two decades. The projected population without any adjustment for war losses, or changed boundaries, for 1945, was 189 million and for 1970, 250 million. These figures are not very significant, but they probably give as good an indication of expected actual population, after war losses and boundary changes, as is possible at the present time.

Colonel Taylor said that some of the members of the class have been a little bit mystified as to how such population projections are cooked up. Perhaps someone may want to ask about that during the question period. Later on I will be willing to discuss the procedures, if requested to do so. I will not take the time now.

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The births in the Soviet Union have been subject to more severe shifts than in almost any other country. Violent fluctuations are the characteristic of the Soviet demography as well as the Soviet economy. The course of life in the Soviet Union does not run smoothly and evenly-- at least it has not to date.

I think there was probably the most rapid drop in birth rate in the Soviet Union, from around 1925 to the early thirties (1935), that has ever taken place in any other country. I think it was a drop from somewhere around 45 to about 30 per thousand. In all of the cities and in some of the more advanced farming areas there was a very rapid response to the opportunity for abortion in this very difficult economic period. The birth rate was affected by the whole psychological climate of the revolution. Turkish women were tearing off their veils and stepping out on lecture platforms; it is not surprising that they began to regulate the number of births. There was a rapid shift from a peasant to an urban type of behavior in fertility as in other things. The relative frequency of abortion in Soviet cities at this time has no parallel elsewhere; the nearest approach was in the German cities in the early 1930's.

Due to the mortality losses and the decline in births, the Soviet population was suddenly ceasing to grow. But that was probably, in any case, only a temporary phenomena. In any event, economic conditions did somewhat stabilize after 1933 or 1934.

As everyone knows, the abortion clinics were closed by an edict in 1936, except in certain exceptional cases, such as diseased persons, or persons with hereditary defects, to whom the abortion clinics remained open. But even before the edict closing the abortion clinics, admission was limited. So that avenue of control of fertility was narrowed before it was finally closed.

Also the provisions for economic aids to children had been rapidly expanding, with more adequate provisions for the care of children, increased maternity allowances for women and other measures which tended to make childbearing more attractive and less repellent. So that there took place again a very sharp rise in the birth rate in a period of a few years, up to probably a peak in either 1937 or 1938. It might very well be that in the Soviet Union the birth rate decline in the future will not be so rapid as it had been in some of the Western European countries because many factors in the socialistic economy may lessen incentives to family limitations and make greater provision for child-care.

In addition, the Soviet Government has introduced the most drastic baby-boosting economic program that has ever been introduced by any nation; much more drastic and probably more effective than any measures

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yet introduced in France, Hitler Germany, or now being contemplated in England. Payment of a bonus for births in the U.S.S.R. begins with the third child and rises with each later birth—giving payments for each child at birth and during the first five years. The payment stops after five years, but before the five years are up the mother presumably has another child and is getting an enlarged payment for her children.

In any case, I think one can be pretty sure that the Soviet population will continue to grow quite rapidly, supported by a broad resource base and the rapid advance in technology which has only just begun. With the combination of a broad resource base and the rapid advance in technology, this growing population can probably be absorbed with a rising per capita production.

I have already mentioned irregularities in the number of births. The estimated number of births at the plateau around 1925, 1926 and 1927 was about 6.6 million births each year. The number dropped in the low period to which I referred (1933, 1934, 1935) to about five million births each year. It then rose again to about 6.5 million in 1937. The increasing parent-base made the number of births in 1937 about equal to what it was in 1925, although the birth rate never rose again to the former level. That is, in terms of rate, it starts at 45, goes down to 30, rises to 37 or 38 per thousand. In terms of numbers of births it starts at about a little more than 6.5 million, goes down to about five million, then rises to 6.5 million.

The number of children, in a year, that will enter the industrial age and military age shows a greater fluctuation than in the United States. Taking eighteen years as the time of entering this productive period and period of potential military power, there will be low increments during the next seven or eight years in the Soviet Union. In about 1955 the Soviet Union will then get back, for a period of some five years, to its normal large increment each year to its labor force.

Out of a thousand children born, the proportion of those surviving to eighteen in the Soviet Union is very much less than it is in the United States. But the number coming of age, the number reaching the age of sixteen, allowing for that greater mortality in 1955, when the Soviet Union gets back to receiving its normal increment of additions to the labor force, will perhaps be about four and a half million each year as compared with about 2.3 million in the United States.

One small point of some interest is that economic recovery in the Soviet Union, although one must expect it will be quite rapid, may be somewhat retarded by the absorption of the people in the annexed areas. It would seem that the areas annexed to the Soviet Union were annexed for strategic reasons, rather than for economic reasons. The populations added are mostly peasants in rather overpopulated areas, except in

RESTRICTED

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the Baltic States and East Prussia. The populations taken from Poland and Roumania were below the average levels, in terms of productivity in these agrarian countries. In the case of the sub-Carpathian district the contrast is even more striking. It should, however, be noted that agriculture in these annexed areas, though now at a low level of productivity, is less subject to periodic drought than in the Russian plain.

A larger, but perhaps even more problematic, issue is raised by the question as to whether or not, in view of climatic limitations on Soviet agriculture, a continued rapid increase of population will somewhat lower the general level of living that might otherwise be possible. I raise this question without attempting to answer it.

I have spent most of my time this morning on the United States and the Soviet Union. I will say only a sentence each on the two other great areas of the world, namely, Western Europe and the Asiatic-Eastern Mediterranean areas.

The countries of Western Europe are terribly population-conscious. They realize they are approaching a cessation of population growth and that recent trends would normally lead to a period of population decline. They are very much concerned about it and very much interested in developing national policies directed towards the family and population maintenance. The measures adopted or proposed along these lines are frequently larger in relative economic terms than our social-security system. They strongly reinforce other trends toward nationalistic economies.

England, you know, now has a parliamentary commission working on the development of a population policy to meet this situation. The advanced nations of Western Europe are all in the situation of being very worried about the cessation of population growth and the prospect of a population decrease. They are very much concerned about developing a change in their economic order that would tend to encourage and facilitate the moderately large families and the maintenance of population.

The vast populations of Monsoon Asia are in large part built on, and tied to, a rice economy. This creates a peculiar obstacle to the progressive transformation of their economies. And this region, as a whole, if a stable political order is established, is just on the threshold of a period of maximum population growth.

India and China, if these countries should stabilize their political and economic orders, could expect rapid improvement in mortality, followed by a much more gradual decline in fertility. Gradual increase in production would then be paralleled by an increase in the number of stomachs to be filled. The Malthusian problem here is real, and it is a very serious problem.

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The population problems of the Near East, North Africa and Southern Europe are less formidable. But the countries in this region have populations which are increasing quite rapidly, usually without an adequate resource base and handicapped by cultural factors that regard the development of technology. So that if we undertake the task of helping to promote the technological advance of these relatively overpopulated areas we will undertake what may be a very noble but is certainly a very difficult task. We must be prepared in advance for many disappointments.

Thank you.

GENERAL MCKINLEY: Gentlemen, are there any questions you would like to ask?

A STUDENT OFFICER: In the course of your discussion you mentioned the makeup of the war losses in Russia; for instance, taking your 20 million figure as a low. Now, not including the casualties but giving any kind of an estimate of the casualties, when you go back to the Russian surgeon general's estimate of about 70-some-odd percent of their wounded who eventually got back to duty, I presume that some 20 percent of them might be cripples or a drain on the balance of the population. Have you any estimate as to how many of those people are in Russia? Furthermore, out of these 20 million, how many of them were of the productive age for the labor force, looking for another ten years ahead?

DR. LORIMER: That is a very good question but I think you obviously know more about it than I do. (Laughter and applause) I was not trying to turn the laugh on you. I think you were sincerely seeking information but I think you have certain sources of information on this point that I do not have. I have not worked on Soviet material since the war. I have not used any of the information arising out of the war because I have been engaged on some other tasks. Your problem is a very real problem. I think you have indicated, very accurately something of its scope. I suppose it cannot be too exactly determined.

A STUDENT OFFICER: Could you give an opinion on the probable trend of the population of, say, Canada and Australia, which are comparatively thinly populated countries but which during the war have had a big increase in industry in the country? Could you give any idea as to the further trend of those two countries?

DR. LORIMER: Not very exactly. But, of course, in both of the countries the expectation is continued growth at a decelerating rate—not the expectation of an imminent cessation of population growth, as in Western Europe, and yet rather well advanced in the changes leading toward a cessation of population growth.

RESTRICTED

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Of course, Australia is very much interested in encouraging immigration further to aid the development of its area; but it is being very selective about the type of immigrants which it wishes to receive and incorporate into the Australian population.

GENERAL MCKINLEY: I wonder, is there any answer to the effect on the trend toward population growth, or decrease, through shortening the work hours? I ask that because at the time I was in Australia, they were trying to introduce the thirty-hour week.

DR. LORIMER: That is another question I cannot answer.

GENERAL MCKINLEY: I figure they had to do something; they were not going to work.

DR. LORIMER: I thought of that, too. (Laughter)

A STUDENT OFFICER: I would like to pursue a little further the comparison you are making between the United States and the U.S.S.R. You stated that in 1939, 55 percent of the population of Russia was on the farm. I wonder if you could possibly give me an estimate when 55 percent of the United States population was on the farm.

DR. LORIMER: No, I would not dare name it. I gave a comparison as to the proportion of the urban population living in cities. I think the proportion on the farms might have been a much better comparison. The period when 55 percent of the American population was dependent on agriculture was, I think, somewhere in the latter half of the Nineteenth Century.

A STUDENT OFFICER: You pointed out in the course of your discussion that in the urbanization and industrialization there was an increase in the birth rate, or an increase in the population and then there was a gradual falling off. Now then, if Russia is having a faster industrialization than we went through, is it logical to assume she will have a faster decrease in the birth rate than we went through? Therefore, to carry it out further, in 1970 she would not have the 250 million people that you projected. Is that true?

DR. LORIMER: These future projections were developed in the Princeton office, with which I collaborated. I estimated the vital statistics and they carried through the projection for the Soviet Union.

The projection regarding fertility was based on the assumption that the trend of fertility in the Soviet Union would follow the same course over the next thirty years as that previously observed in Europe beginning at a similar level. This is not a correct statement of the exact procedure, but it gives the basic principle.

RESTRICTED

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1564

The question is whether the decline in fertility in the Soviet Union from this point on may be more rapid or less rapid than it has been in the European countries. It is conceivable that because of the more rapid industrialization it might be more rapid. My own hunch would be that it will really be less rapid, due to other social conditions. Actually, one does not know.

There are two or three factors which may tend to make it less rapid. One is the fact that competitive incentives have tended to make a couple limit the number of children in order to achieve an advancement in the level of living for themselves and their children. Such incentives, though present in the Soviet Union, are probably not as pronounced, not as sharp, within the Soviet Union's economy and are cushioned somewhat by these larger provisions of care for children, maternity allowances and so forth.

Then, secondly, the fact that you have the totalitarian control it means the cultural attitudes are somewhat directed. It might be that although contraception is permissible, the supplies might be inadequate. And besides, the premiums which are being paid for babies may act as a very positive incentive because it gets to be pretty large for the larger families.

However, all of this is really anybody's speculation. The projection was on the hunch that there would be a decline somewhat following the pattern of the European decline. It could be argued it will be more rapid and it could be argued it will be less rapid.

GENERAL MCKINLEY: Any other questions? (No response) You seem to have satisfied them, Dr. Lorimer. Thank you very much indeed.

(10 June 1947--350)S.

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