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CHINA

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COL. CLABAUGH:

May I ask for a showing of hands as to how many of you have been in China? (A majority of the audience raised their hands.) I was afraid of that. I wish they had given me a country where none of you had been. Then I could talk freely. But I don't suppose there is such a place.

The specifications for this lecture were that it deal with China's economic potential for war as developed by the student committee last year. I called attention to the fact that that excellent report declared that the economic war potential of China was practically non-existent and that I was therefore being asked to talk about nothing. I was told it wouldn't be a new experience either for me or the class.

We have it on the authority of no less a person than Colonel Taylor that economic potential consists of four factors-- geography, population, natural resources, and industrial capacity. First, then, we will consider the geography of China. Let's have a look at the body. This map, which you have probably seen in several places, super-imposes an outline of China on a map of the United States. Its sole purpose is to give you an idea of the relative size. Any analogy between Texas and Yunnan is entirely coincidental. There was not room on here for the whole outline, but not much of China is left out, except the tip of Manchuria, that the Russians have now anyhow, and Outer Mongolia, which is independent. But all of China, including Tibet, is larger than the United States. China proper is about half the area of the United States.

In addition to the statistical troubles that I had in considering China's potential, it was my misfortune to get hold of a map with German lettering. But perhaps it will give you a better idea of the mountains and the plains than the other maps that were available.

China is divided by Cressy, in his "China's Geographic Foundations," into North, Central, and South China, and Manchuria or the Northeastern Provinces. The Chinese do not like the name "Manchuria." They prefer the term "Northeastern Provinces." In all China there are a dozen different races, some forty-four different languages, and hundreds of dialects. But they are pretty well homogenized at that, with China's well-known capacity for absorbing invaders and immigrants. She has every kind of climate, from tropical to subarctic. She has every kind of terrain, from the river beds and the plains to the loess highlands and the mountains.

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There are three main rivers in China. There is the Amur in the north, one of whose tributaries forms the border between Manchuria and Siberia. There is the Yellow River, "China's Sorrow," some 2,700 miles long and not navigable. Sometimes that river flows into the Yellow Sea to the South of Shantung Peninsula and sometimes into the Gulf of Chihli, to the north. The sluggish river is unable to carry its silt to the sea and has built up its bed until the river is higher than the land on either side. It occasionally overflows or breaks through the dikes or levees, and flood and famine follow.

In 1938, I believe it was, the Chinese blasted the dike near Kaifeng and flooded some 2,400,000 acres. One of the UNRRA projects, in fact their chief project, was the rebuilding of that dike, which they have just completed. Though it is supposed to be completed, the water is still coming through the dike. They hope to stop it by sand-bagging. That will restore some 2,400,000 acres of fertile land to productive use and return the river to its normal course.

Then there is the Yangtze, which comes to the sea at Shanghai. It is 3,200 miles long and is navigable to Hankow. Shanghai has been called the New York of China, and Hankow the Chicago, although the analogy is not too good.

Not more than one-fifth of the area of China is level, as you can see from this relief map. In the southwestern part, near the border between China and Burma and India, are the Himalayas, the "Hump," with which many of you are familiar. Then to the north is the largest and highest plateau on earth, Tibet, 12,000 feet high, with many peaks rising above that. Then farther to the north it goes down into tableland, with several desert areas. From this Mountain area in the West there is a gradual rugged descent to the coastal plains of China south of the Yangtze. There is another mountain range in Shansi and Jehol Provinces in northeast China, and extending along the Western border of Manchuria.

North China is divided into the North China plain, the mountains of Shantung, the loess highlands and the Northeastern provinces (Manchuria).

The North China plain extends from the eastern end of the Great Wall Southward to where it merges with the Yangtze plain. The Great Wall starts above Chinwantao and Peitaho on the coast, going irregularly all the way across China to the border of Sinkiang. Then there are the mountains of Shantung Province, with a corridor from Tsingtao to Tsinan, with an important railroad running through it.

To the North and West of the Yellow River plain, we have the loess highlands. The loess formation is wind-borne silt. Many of you have seen pictures of that. The roads are sunk thirty to fifty

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feet below the level of the land on either side, caused by the wind blowing away the dust raised by the carts. The loess formation has a peculiar characteristic of standing erect with vertical walls and makes possible the many caves which you find in that section.

South China is divided into the Central Mountain belt, the South Yangtze hills, the Southeastern coast, the Canton hinterland, and the Southwestern uplands in Yunnan and Kweichow. It is here that Kunming is located, which should arouse nostalgic memories for many of you.

As you know, Tibet is nominally under the Chinese suzerainty, but actually independent. Sinkiang Province is politically and nominally a part of China, but economically it is under Russian control. Manchuria we will talk about later.

You can see what an opportunity China has for a defense in depth, geographically. Another thing to know is that there are four thousand miles of coast line, with two ocean highways--one south by Singapore to Europe and the other East to the Americas! The border between China and Outer Mongolia and Siberia is the longest frontier in the world. So much for that.

I referred to Cressy a moment ago. He made an interesting tabulation of the contrasts between North and South China. The North has a limited, uncertain rainfall; the South an abundant rainfall. The North has disastrous floods and droughts. (The Yellow River is referred to as "China's Sorrow.") The South has canals and irrigation, with water always available. The North has a four to six months growing season, with one to two crops; the South nine to twelve months growing season, with two to three crops. The North has a semi-arid climate; the South has a subtropical climate. The North has a precarious agriculture; in the South crop failures are rare. The North has dry terraces; the South irrigated terraces. The North has frequent famines; the South has relative prosperity except for the overcrowded conditions. The North has wheat, the South has rice. The North is grassless and treeless; the South has bamboo and such abundant vegetation. In the North they use roads, two-wheeled carts, and draft animals; in the South flagstone trails, sedan chairs, and coolie carriers. In the North they use donkeys and mules, in the South water buffalo. The North has mud-walled houses with heated brick beds; the South has woven bamboo walls and thatch-roofed houses. The cities in the North have wide streets; those in the South are overcrowded, with narrow streets. The North has a smooth coast line, with very poor harbors; the South has an irregular coast line, with many good harbors. In the North the foreign

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intercourse is by land, in the South by sea. The North speaks one language throughout--the Mandarin dialect; the South has a great diversity of dialects. The North has as a rule classical and conservative scholars; the South has radical and restless ones, merchants and adventurers.

So much for Cressy. I might add that in the North they roll their "R's" and in the South they say "Ting hao, you all?"

Dr. Leighton Stuart, our ambassador to China and for many years president of Yenching University, who probably knows as much about China, as any man living, either Chinese or American, was quoted recently as saying that there was scarcely anything you could say about China that was not true as to some part of it, and nothing you could say about China that could not be denied as to some other part of it. So there is perfect documentation for anything I might say.

As has been said of many other lands, but is especially true of China, it is a land of contrasts and contradictions, other than the geographical contrasts we have just been considering. Maybe it's the Taoist concept of "THE WAY" and the Yin and Yang--the masculine and feminine, day and night, heat and cold, and many other qualities that go to make the harmonious interaction that is life according to the Taoist concept.

This may sound like a digression and in a way it is, but it has a bearing on the next factor of population and the facets of the Chinese character and gives an indication of their adaptability to industrialization and many other elements of the economic potential. Here are some of those contrasts and contradictions:

The Chinese are earth-bound and celestially minded. They are great pacifists, and yet are in constant armed conflict. They have the finest scholarship in the world and great illiteracy. They have a pride in their race, their history, and their culture, that at times amounts to arrogance; and yet a humility born of their philosophy and the wisdom of the ages. Perhaps that pride in their culture has delayed their industrialization, as we shall see later. They can show the greatest cruelty one to another, and yet the greatest tolerance and consideration. They are the original "share-the-work" boys. Some of the shops, as you know, have so many employees that there isn't room for the customers. A strike of the employees in our hotel in Shanghai was not for higher wages or shorter hours, but in protest against a reduction of the staff. You can't "break a man's rice bowl." They have a hospitality and a friendship unsurpassed anywhere, and yet an anti-foreignism that has manifested itself many times, notably in the Boxer Uprising and now in the anti-American demonstrations that are inspired largely by the Communists. That, too, has an implication as to why they have not adopted western industrialism and methods more generally.

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They have the most modern things and the most ancient--1947 sedans and rickshas Parker 51 pens and the ancient brush, hand looms and the most modern textile machinery, nylon hosiery and bound feet--not together of course the airplane and the water buffalo; frequently the blare of a loud speaker in Peking drowns out the ancient traditional calls of the street vendors; and amid all the odors that go to make the smell of Shanghai they can name a garden "The Garden of the Fragrance of Dew!"

I said that the committee found last year that the economic potential of China was practically nil. We have recently had at least two indices of economic war potential presented very effectively--that of Major Harlan and that of Mr. Masselman. I am indebted to the committee working on the economic potential for war of certain other countries for a preview of an index which they are constructing. I thought it would be of interest to apply these three indices to China.

Taking the U.S. as 100, one of these gives China a potential of .1%, another 3.7%, and the third 15.8%. This indicates that the potential lies somewhere between .1% and 15.8%. That sounds like a considerable range. The highest is 158 times the lowest. It is no reflection on any of these indices. It would be difficult to construct an index applicable to the great powers and typical smaller powers that would also be applicable to that great land mass and human mass that is China.

The variation above comes from the fact that one of the indices contained a factor for energy consumption, including both animate and inanimate energy. Anyone who has ever seen a gang of coolies at work knows that there is considerable human energy there. Sometimes as they carry their incredible loads with that rhythmic chant, they even sound like the hum of a great machine. Or if you have seen the flow of traffic through a Chinese street like a great turgid yellow river, the coolies with their heavy loads suspended from staves over the shoulder, bouncing under their weight with that quick trot, or struggling with loads on their backs or pulling weights on trucks or running with rickshas, you will realize that here is animate energy that is an economic factor. At any rate, it moved factories to the interior of China during the war, it helped build airfields, and it moved supplies to their armies. The very word "coolie" in Chinese means "bitter effort," and to foreigners everywhere it connotes the hard-working but bare-handed laborer. If you want statistics on this, here they are: in the U.S.A. only 2.4% of total energy consumption is from animate sources, while in China 78.8% of energy consumption is from animate sources. This is from the State Department's study of Energy Resources and International Relations to which reference will be made later.

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Another one of these three indices weights more heavily the factor of agriculture, which, of course, operates to increase the index for China. It is important to remember that each of these indices and the factors which compose them are indicators of the economic potential. They are not the economic potential. That is a composite of many factors, known and unknown.

There have been many definitions of war potential and economic war potential. One I like is the definition of a group of Brown University economists who defined war potential as "the capacity of any resource, geographical, human, capital, etc., to serve a war purpose." Certainly China has lots of geography and lots of humanity. And they defined economic war potential as "the capacity of a country to put its resources into those forms that will directly aid the prosecution of the war."

But I think we know what we mean by "economic potential for war." We mean economic potential for war; nothing more and nothing less. As Alice said "what is the use of words unless they mean what we intend that they should mean?"

Speaking of definitions and the precise use of words, you have probably heard the old story of the colonel whose wife caught him embracing another woman. She said, "I am suprised." He said, "My dear, when will I ever teach you the correct use of tactical terms? I am surprised. You are astonished."

We had another excellent presentation the other day of "The Changing Pattern of Economic Potential for War" by Dr. Hunter, who pointed out that economic factors must be seen constantly in relation to political and social conditions, as well as every aspect of the prevailing culture--religion, philosophy, attitudes, and customs--and that indices of industrial production or potential cannot be projected very far into the future.

Many of our studies have emphasized the changing pattern, and well they might. It is especially applicable to China. Changeless as is this ancient land in many ways, no area of this one troubled world is so subject to change at this moment--political, economic, geographic, military. Owen Lattimore said recently that in the next twenty-five years the greatest geographical area of change and the greatest population subject to change will be chind. It is in this light that I wish to discuss China, to consider some of the imponderables, the future potential, or, if you please, the potential potential.

Even if we were able to determine with reasonable accuracy the economic potential today, there is no guarantee that it would apply tomorrow. I think there is an analogy in insurance underwriting. A man may be in good health today and be run over by a Ford tomorrow; or a building may be classed as a good risk today and burn tonight. A nation may have a high potential today, but the changing pattern

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may carry it down in defeat tomorrow. Otherwise empires would never rise and fall. Carrying the analogy further, some day the historians and the actuaries may join forces and give us an "experience table of mortality" for nations and empires. I think we can refer that to Mr. Toynbee.

As to resources, only a portion of China's geological resources are known. Only one third of China has been geologically explored. But it is reasonable to assume that this vast area of over four million square miles will soon be made to yield its secrets. The airborne magnetometer, originally designed as a device for locating submarines, has been perfected and used successfully in experimental surveys over more than 40,000 square miles in the United States in a cooperative undertaking by the U. S. Geological Survey, Naval Petroleum Reserves, Naval Ordnance, Army and Navy Air Forces, Bell Laboratories, National Defense Research Council, and other agencies, public and private. It is stated officially that a wide variety of magnetic and geologic environments have been mapped, from the low magnetic gradients encountered in oil prospecting to the high gradients associated with magnetic iron ore deposits. The implications of this development on the changing pattern of economic potential of an unexplored area greater than the United States are tremendous.

We have discussed population, geography, and some of the attitudes of China. Let's have a look at the resources and production.

In any statistical approach to the resources of China we are frustrated first by the lack of dependable data. We don't even know the population of China. If we take the production and other data for 1937, to avoid some of the distortions of the war period, we find that sometimes Manchuria is included with China, sometimes with Japan, sometimes separately; Formosa sometimes separately, sometimes with Japan; and that the figures of the Chinese Handbook in some cases include only free China, and sometimes only the southwest provinces.

But this much we do know: China is rich in resources. She has enormous quantities of coal, with known reserves of 2,400,000,000 tons. Eighteen of the provinces have some coal. The 1937 production was approximately 30 million tons, half of which was from Manchuria. However, subsequent wartime production in Manchuria alone is said to have amounted to 27 million.

Iron ore production in Manchuria in 1937 was 1,300,000 metric tons, or 1.7 percent of the world total. In tungsten China's production was 11,000 metric tons, or 37.7 percent of the world total; antimony 15,000 tons, or 22.2 percent of the world total; and tin ore 11,3000 metric tons, or 7.2 percent of the world total. In addition there was some production of gold, silver, copper, lead, zinc, mercury, and managanese, but all in quantities less than one percent of the world total.

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In petroleum, the Oil & Gas Journal said in 1944 that the wells in the Kansu Field, 900 miles northwest of Chungking, were producing three thousand barrels per day, and added that China is one major country of the world which may become self-sufficient from an oil standpoint as a result of developments undertaken as a wartime measure. Oil seepages occur along a 2000-mile arc in western Sinkiang through Kansu into Shensi and Szechwan. We may soon hear of Chinese oil for the lamps of China.

The Japanese reported in Manchuria one of the largest and richest magnesium deposits in the world. The ore is said to contain 45 percent magnesium and constitutes a reserve of over 13.6 billion metric tons.

China had small but healthy and rapidly growing chemical, pharmaceutical, and biological industries before the war. There is a potential development of the chemical industry in the manufacture of basic chemicals, such as sulphuric acid, soda ash, caustic soda, chlorine, and ammonia, in which some progress has already been made.

You know some of China's principal agricultural products -- tea, silk, carpet wool, tung oil and tobacco. Agricultural products accounted for 75 percent of China's prewar exports. The tobacco product is larger than I realized. It rivals the U. S. The average production from 1935 to 1939, was 1.4 billion pounds for the U.S., and for China, 1.25 billion pounds.

Until the last part of the 19th century, China was the world's largest exporter of tea, with annual exports of 300 million pounds valued at \$100 million dollars. Since that time, her exports have steadily declined until they reached 76 million pounds and \$25 million. She was simply out-distanced by India, Ceylon and the Netherlands East Indies in methods of growing, processing and melting.

In silk, the estimated production for China in 1946 was 62,000 bales and for Japan, 130,000 bales. The silk industry is sick. The Japs destroyed half the mulberry trees and nylon destroyed 3/4 of the market. American weavers of fabric find they can produce 8 to 10 times the amount of fabric with a given number of employees, and recommend that the fabric be woven in China and exported to America to be dyed and finished here.

The five year average production of tung oil prior to 1938, was 264,000,000 pounds. The U.S. consumed in 1937, 120,000 million pounds. The annual consumption capacity of the U.S. is estimated at 300 to 400 million pounds if a supply were available in steady flow at prices slightly higher but comparable with other drying oils.

We hear a great deal about agrarian reform in China, and yet the monumental work by John Lossing Buck on "Land Utilization in China" showed that 54 percent of China's farmers own all their own land, that

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29 percent of them own some land and rent some land, and that 17 percent rent all their farmland. They have a smaller percentage of sharecroppers that we have in the United States. The recent report of the China-U.S. Agricultural Mission says that about 50 percent of the farmers own the land they operate, and that one-fourth own some of the land they operate and rent additional land. According to their report, about 30 percent of the land is rented. Undoubtedly there is a need for land reform in China but more important than land ownership are the problems of increased productivity, improved transportation, revision of the tax system, and better government administration.

As pointed out by the committee's report, China's great problem for the future, is transportation--water, rail, highway and air, in the order of their present importance, although air transport will play an increasingly important part in communications in China in the future.

China's oldest means of transportation and greatest carrier of freight is its waterways. Its coastal and inland shipping are as old as the history of China. Its limited number of steamships and its limitless junks and sampans are now supplemented by many American vessels that have been turned over to them. The docks at Shanghai, Tientsin and Canton are lined with vessels of all types and sizes, their old American names showing dimly beneath the newly painted Chinese characters.

In rail transportation, Manchuria has more mileage than all the rest of China combined. The Russians had built some of it in their desire to reach a year-round port. The Japanese doubled the mileage during their occupation and industrialization. In 1940, there were 7,380 miles of railroad in Manchuria alone, while in the rest of China, there were only 6,000 miles (in 1937). Much of this has been destroyed in the Japanese war and the civil war, and much that has been destroyed in the Japanese war and the civil war, and much that has not been destroyed is inoperative. The principal lines operating in China are between Peiping and Tientsin and Tangku and through the coal fields to Chirwantao, and from Shanghai to Nanking, and part of the Hankow-Canton line, and others intermittently and precariously.

I would like to comment on the way the railroads are being operated in spite of the destruction by the Communists and the difficulties with war damaged equipment. Gen. Rockey of the U.S. Marines, paid a great tribute to the railway administration for their achievement under difficulties. You could set your watch by the time of arrival and departure of the trains between Peiping and Tientsin, although the entire distance had to be under constant guard against Communist guerilla attack.

In highway construction, China was making substantial progress prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 1937. According to the China Handbook (1944), there were 40,000 kilometers of surfaced highways in

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1937, and several times that amount of unsurfaced roads. There was considerable road building in Free China during the war; notably the Burma and Ledo roads and other military roads. The use of surplus American road building equipment could facilitate highway construction now, but the lack of a stable government and inflated costs may postpone effective use of this machinery until it will have deteriorated to the point of being useless.

The building of airfields in China during the war, the training of pilots and technicians and the purchase of surplus equipment have contributed to the development of Chinese aviation. In the case of mail, important passenger traffic and light freight, air transport overcomes the difficulties of terrain which have handicapped rail and highway development. We may therefore, expect this form of transportation to make an increasing contribution to China's communication system.

In hydro-electric power as in so many other resources, China has a small development and a large potential. Present developed water power is largely in Manchuria and Formosa. The greatest potential is in the Yangtze River gorges between Ichang and Chungking where it is said 10,000,000 kw could be developed.

Present electric power installations in China, including Manchuria and Formosa, are capable of developing something over 2,000,000 kw. of this, Manchuria produces about 62 percent China proper, 27 percent and Formosa, 11 percent. Approximately 30 percent of the installations are hydro-electric and 70 percent thermal.

In total energy, consumption (animate and inanimate) for productive purposes in 1937, according to the State Department's study of "Energy Resources and International Relations," China used 72,975 million kwh electricity equivalent, as compared with 89,148 million for Japan, and 910,993 million for the U.S.A. In this, China ranked eighth among twenty-four countries, coming ahead of Canada, Italy, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Netherlands, Union of South Africa, Sweden, Spain, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Norway, Mexico, Netherlands' Indies and Rumania. But in per capita consumption, China ranks last with 164 kwh electricity equivalent as compared with 6,996 for the U.S.A. As pointed out earlier, 78.8 percent of China's total energy consumption is from animate sources, while in the U.S.A., only 2.4 percent comes from animate sources.

The hope of China lies in Manchuria-or it did until the Russian occupation. It is the key to China's industrialization.

With 40 million people, 90 percent of whom are Chinese, her industry and her agriculture, while directed by others, have been the product of Chinese sweat. It was the proving ground for the Japanese war machine. They did a good job there. In addition to doubling the railway mileage, many mines and factories were

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developed a "Fortune" correspondent reported: "The network of roads increased many times; freight volume went up 150 percent; iron-ore production hit around eight million metric tons, coal production 27 million. There appeared factories for cars and planes, new ports and new hydro-electric plants, and whole series of new mines that produced aluminous zinc, and magnesite ores in important quantities. Near the Manchuria-Korea border there sprang up big mines, factories, ports, and railroads that greatly increased the production of both countries. Manchuria became one of the biggest industrial areas in eastern Asia. But for the present tragic state of Manchuria I refer you to the March issue of the National Geographic, particularly as to the stripping of its factories by the Soviet troops.

Now, as to industrialization, whether you like it or not, I believe there is going to be a growing industrialization throughout the East and the so-called backward areas of the world. Personally I think we have nothing to fear from it. It will give us better markets. That has been the history of other areas that have become industrialized. We have been accustomed to thinking of China in terms of markets. We must also think of her in terms of production. You know about the four hundred million customers, and "oil for the lamps of China." Then there is the old saying that if you add an inch to the Chinese shirt-tail, you can take care of the cotton surplus of the South. But before you can add an inch to the Chinese shirt-tail, he must have the shirt-tail. Before he can have the shirt-tail, he must have the shirt. Before he can manufacture the shirt, there must be a greater measure of industrialization in China.

You have heard a good deal about the increasing importance of agriculture in industry. The Farm Chemurgic people talk of growing an automobile. All of that has a special significance for an agricultural nation like China.

They have the resources and the manpower. The manpower has the skills and the attitudes. They gave the world many inventions--paper, printing, porcelain, gun powder, the mariner's compass, and many other items. Their skill in native handicraft is notorious.

The war, that is, World War II and not their civil war, will hasten their industrialization. Many American ex-service men have taken jobs in Chinese business and industry. Many Chinese aviation cadets, pilots, and mechanics have been trained in this country. The program was 1,500 pilots, 900 crewmen, and 904 mechanics. An average of a thousand other students a year have been educated in this country for the past 25 years. The Textile World last year said one thousand Chinese textile engineers and students would visit textile plants in this country and England. There are 350 industrial trainees in this country now, and there is a constant turn-over.

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At least one Chinese corporation was formed during the war in this country wholly with Chinese capital. This was the Chinese Aircraft Corporation, which took a subcontract from Douglas.

All of these things give promise of an industrial China. I remind you of what I said a few minutes ago--that the magnetometer will make available materials for manufacture through aerial exploration in the rest of China.

Well, if this picture is confused, I can only say that so is China and so are the data on which this is based.

If I have seemed to try to sell you some Chinese blue sky or "Chinese Unlimited," I don't expect you to buy it. I wouldn't either,--not now. But we have a definite interest in China, definite commitments of long standing as to her territorial integrity and the open door, and recent commitments to restore Manchuria to China. We cannot write off our interest in China or wash our hands of it.

Dr. Latourette in his recent book on the development of China points out that China is peripheral to the British, that French influence has waned, Germany and Japan have been eliminated,; but the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. loom large on the horizon. China may be the ally or enemy of one of the other. Her contribution could be considerable. The issue may be the Open Door or the Iron Curtain. On the outcome depend considerations of global strategy and the welfare of half a billion people.

Finally, here is my "exclusive predication of things to come:" In the next fifty years, if man still inhabits this planet (which isn't guaranteed) China or the area that is now China will be a great industrialized region. On Easter Monday morning 1997, you remind me of that prediction. But things may move with tremendous acceleration in the next generation or two and it may come sooner than we think. Thank you!

Now, if there are any questions, remember, I am not an authority on China: I was there last year, but many of you have been there and so was Kilroy. Some of you were in western China during the the war. I was only in eastern and northern China. Others have been stationed in China in the past. As a fellow student, therefore, of this interesting problem I will try to answer any questions I can.

A STUDENT:

As one travels south through Europe in the western hemisphere, as one travels from Austria into Italy or from northern Spain to southeast Spain, one is struck by certain differences that are other than climatic, certain racial differences, racial characteristics, and differences in the general tempo of living and the culture. The same is true when traveling from the

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United States into Mexico or Cuba or the West Indies. I wonder if the same is true in China.

COL. CLABAUGH:

I think, as that long tabulation of Cressy's pointed out, it is even more true in China and in the East. The difference in the people physically is very marked. In North China there is a mixture of the Mongolian strain, which makes larger people and darker in color. In southern China, the Cantonese for instance are smaller.

A STUDENT:

So the color situation is reversed in China?

COL. CLABAUGH:

Yes.

A STUDENT:

Would you care to draw a brief parallel there between Japan's war potential, although it was a pygmy effort compared with ours, and the absence of any war potential in China?

COL. CLABAUGH:

First, as to the Chinese part of it, one of the factors usually cited in that comparison is the Chinese examination system. As you know, all public servants and officials in China, who by the way, occupy positions of greater relative importance than they do in the United States, are selected by competitive examination based largely on the classics. As someone has said, the educated don't use their hands and the laborers don't use their heads. The Chinese scholar has gone in for the classics and humanities rather than for science. That is one factor. Lack of capital is sometimes cited, but I don't think that is as much a factor as the examination system. Then another thing is that their pride, makes the Chinese sometimes slow to accept "foreign" ways. Most of the early wanderers and immigrants of China were inferior to the Chinese in culture. That gave the impression that they had a superior culture to all the world; that they were the Middle Kingdom, the center of the universe. Therefore they were not as quick to respond to western ideas and western industrialization as the Japanese.

On the Japanese side, you had a smaller geographical area and a more homogeneous people. As you know, the Japanese have a memosis - the capacity to imitate - to a remarkable degree, more so than the Chinese.

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They are a better disciplined people and, as I said, a more homogeneous people. Anyhow they built a relatively great war potential and China did not.

CCL. GALLACHER:

Will the restoration of these 2,400,000 acres of land materially improve the food situation in China? Will that be arable land or land that could be very fertile?

CCL. CLABAUGH:

Yes. It is very fertile land.

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