

RESTRICTED

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ARMY PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAM

12 May 1947

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THE INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D. C.

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RESTRICTED

ARMY PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAM

12 May 1947

The purpose of this presentation is to show you the necessity for keeping the public properly informed on military matters; to show you how we go about getting our information to the public; and what we can and do accomplish through this effort.

The end of the war changed everyone's problems. During the war, the Army had all the money it needed and first call on the manpower of the country. Public information problems were mainly in the selection of what could and could not be divulged, and the provisions of facilities for newsmen covering the war. But we did learn that we must tell the public about the Army.

Our problem now, is to secure and keep public support and confidence for the peacetime military establishment.

We must make the public realize that the Army is one of the most important instruments of securing the peace.


Our responsibility is to create public understanding of our motives, and of our mission of providing for the national security.

Here in the War Department the best of plans and policies can be drawn, aimed at providing national security, but these plans alone will not constitute that national security. It takes public support -- money and manpower -- to translate plans into action.

This chart (See Chart 1) shows General Motor's basic plan of conducting its relations with the public. In our consideration of means to meet the peacetime requirements of informing the public, we were struck with the similarity between the problems of the War Department and those of a large corporation. The operations of the two are parallel. We both seek public support. Corporations with years of experience under the stress of keen competition -- know the importance of effective relations with the public. AT&T, for instance, devotes \$12,500,000 of its annual budget to this endeavor.

In the corporation, plans and policies are made at the management level. These plans are made in the light of probable public reaction. As these people evolve their plan, they are thinking in terms of public attitudes. Their plan is a product -- maybe it's a washing machine, a refrigerator, an airplane or an automobile -- it's all the same. If they can't make the public understand it needs this product, they are wasting their money and effort.

Having convinced itself of the good of its own product, management then sets out to convince its employees and all others connected with the



BASIC PLAN

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company -- branch offices, dealers and those who work for the dealers. One flow of information to the public is management to the company and allied personnel and on to the public.

Information flows back to the company from these sources thru the same channel.

At the same time management is taking its story direct to the public at large, through information and through advertising, and promotional campaigns. From the results of its direct campaigns, the company draws back information also.

The Army's problem is the same. We are concerned with creating and sustaining understanding and confidence -- in short, public support. Our informative effort seeks to build the Army's prestige. We want to show the Army as we know it -- a competent, forward-looking servant of the nation. Sound military plans and actions are a basic requirement. In the drafting of any War Department plan, public attitude must be considered. This specifically applies to such projects as UMT. Our basic mode of operation is essentially the same as that of the corporation. This basis is common to all good plans for dealing with the public.


With a project planned, the War Department must tell all the Army about it. Through troop information and education and public information liaison, we send the information to the Army in general. The I&E troop information program should make each soldier a public information agent. Each soldier has outlets to the public, most telling of which is his family. The Army is going to be right or wrong in the eyes of the family, depending on how Johnny tells it. Also, Johnny has friends and his family has friends.

We get back information from the field in the form of reactions and reports. At the same time, the War Department Public Information Division is engaged in explaining through its channel -- the intentions and actions of the War Department. Here we get information from analyses of public opinion trends as reflected in the press, radio, periodicals and polls. With this information properly evaluated, the Information Division can come up with a sound estimate -- able to say what the most probable public attitude will be to a given project. Now, the Army can't tailor its plans and actions to comply with the ideas of laymen. We must, therefore, tell them why War Department plans and policies are correct, and the Information Division must know what the public thinks in order to do this. We can, however, change some detail of a plan without disturbing the machinery, in the same way industry might change the color of a product.

Every man in the Army, for instance, is multiplied by at least three adults who are closely associated with him and who, in turn, branch out as "repeaters" to many million more people. (See Chart 2).

Plus

NATIONAL GUARD-ORGANIZED RESERVES-ROTC
CIVILIAN COMMITTEES



BUT NO CORPORATION HAS THIS

The army of 1,070,000 will have an average turnover of two or three hundred thousand annually, which swells the number of repeaters each year.

In addition, there are more than 8,000,000 veterans who are also multiplied many times over.

It is human nature that as years go on, these veterans swing from a highly critical attitude to a much more favorable remembrance of the Army and the Army's service.

They like to talk about it, and they must be kept advised as much as possible regarding Army policies and Army objectives. Add to these also the National Guard, CRC, ROTC and civilian committees.

It is a big job to present the Army's objectives to these millions of repeaters. But if their understanding and support can be won -- a large part of the public information job will be done.

The Information Division can actuate its basic information plan only through a positive, aggressive program. The end of the war brought an immediate flood of criticism of the Army. This was natural. Throughout history there has been a marked revulsion against war itself following each war. The Army being the visual instrument of war, became the object of this criticism. We in the Public Information Division recognized this situation for what it was and we set about to formulate a program to meet its requirements.

The Information Division's program falls into two phases. One, a continuing or long-range plan to get and sustain public understanding and good will for the Army; and two, programs designed to gain active support of specific War Department projects, for example, UMT, Research and Development, Recruiting, etc.

Within this program of positive action lie the component parts:
(See Chart 3).

1. Public Information Planning on General Staff Level.
2. Honest, Factual Interpretation.
3. Decentralization through Command Channels
4. Complete, Accurate Intelligence.

Let us consider these four component parts in detail.


Here is where consideration of the public information aspects of any War Department plan should start -- at the General Staff level -- not later when the plan has been completed. A paragraph covering public information aspects should be a part of the directive that launches any plan. (See Chart 4.)

A POSITIVE PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAM

1. PUBLIC INFORMATION PLANNING ON
GENERAL STAFF LEVEL
2. HONEST, FACTUAL INTERPRETATION
3. DECENTRALIZATION THROUGH COMMAND
CHANNELS
4. ACCURATE, COMPLETE INTELLIGENCE

1/30

PUBLIC INFORMATION PLANNING ON GENERAL STAFF LEVEL



A PARAGRAPH COVERING PUBLIC INFORMATION ASPECTS SHOULD BE A PART OF THE DIRECTIVE THAT LAUNCHES ANY PLAN

There are three reasons why the aspects of public information must be included in War Department policy planning. First -- to single out the public information features of a proposal at the beginning. Second, to permit the Information Division to proceed with its own staff study of the proposed project. By planning concurrently with the higher staff when the general plan is completed, we will have answered the question: What will be the probable public reaction to this policy and what are the bugs? And third; the Information Division can begin planning its own specific program which will be needed to present and interpret the proposed policy to the public.

(Under present procedure, we too seldom work this way).

The second part of our positive program is interpretation. (See Chart 5.)

Here on this chart is stated an essential truth in the development of public attitude toward the Army. "Public opinion of the Army is but the reflection of what it does."

Too many people in the Army have the idea that the Army can maintain good relations with the public by suppressing unsavory stories; by keeping them from being published and by taking countermeasures designed to offset bad publicity. It is not possible to suppress news successfully, be it good or bad, and it's poor policy to try. The result generally is a distorted story that shows the matter in perspective, out of all proportion to its actual importance. We must have complete frankness in our dealing with the public. A reputation for honesty is essential. The Information Division is not a propaganda machine. We cannot put a good face on an ugly fact, nor can we call back a bad story once it is in print. That's about as simple as putting a new bottom on a ship at sea. All we can do is show the Army as it is.


We cannot depend on good deeds alone to tell our story, however. We must tell it and tell it in the right way -- factually and promptly. We must draw on all of our initiative in doing this. We must get out the facts before distorted rumors or leaks are printed, else the facts are never printed. (See Chart 6).

Here is the crux of the whole question of public attitude toward the Army -- 140,000,000 people. In the final analysis these are the ones who will say what the Army is to be. These are the ones to whom we must interpret our plans, intentions and actions. These people must be made to understand the Army is theirs -- that it is they who need the Army.


There are 1872 daily papers with a total circulation of 50,000,000 copies. There are 10,000 weekly papers, 910 radio stations and 6400 periodicals serving the nation. Eighty million people a week go to 17,000 movies and see newsreels. These are available to tell the Army's story.


INTERPRETATION

PUBLIC OPINION OF THE ARMY
IS BUT THE REFLECTION OF WHAT IT DOES!



POLICIES





Can we depend on these facilities alone to tell our story as it should be told? The answer is no — for it must be told and retold in factual detail. This we do through decentralization — the third part of our positive program.

The Public Information Division accomplishes decentralization through its staff functions. (See Chart 7).

The staff functions are those of liaison with the War Department agencies, and of guiding and coordinating the Information program through the channels of decentralization — AGF, AAF, overseas commands — through Army commanders and through exempted stations. We work directly with Army commanders and furnish policy guidance and cooperation.

The reason we can't depend on the press and radio to tell our story in complete detail is because thru these we lose too much of the information the public must have in order to be informed. We lose this information because editors are interested primarily in news — news that will sell a five cent paper.

There is a definite distinction between news and information. News, generally speaking, is made up of the sensational, the unusual, and the exceptional. Also, news is a matter of personalities and localities. For instance, a murder here in Washington is front page. It may get a fair play in New York and it's news in Richmond. Generally, it wouldn't get in the Boston papers and, of course, Chicago and San Francisco don't care, unless the personalities involved came from there. But here in Washington we get all the details — the information, that is, along with the news.


The same principle applies to Army news. When the Information Division issues a release we put a news angle on it. The name of one of our top officials in the story will make news in Washington. The reason for this release is to disseminate information, and we put all the details in it. Well, the farther away from Washington this story gets, the fewer details it contains, because all along the line it is being edited according to what is news in each locality. So the information is lost.

Now if the Sixth Army takes this story and puts a local angle on it and uses the Commanding General's name, they can hang all the details of information on it and get good local coverage.

One thing about newspapers, they will print the same details two weeks later if there is another news angle on it, and they will do it more than once if there are subsequent good news angles. All the Information officers in the various echelons can use the same information with their own local angle tied in.

We must take advantage of this queer fact, for we must tell our story over and over. We must tell it to create public confidence in our plans and intentions. We must retell it to create understanding. We must keep on telling it to convince the public of the soundness of our

DECENTRALIZATION



plans; to make the public realize it must have these plans.

Community relations is another means of getting our information in factual detail to the public -- this is another phase of decentralization. (See Chart 8).

The community relations plan calls for the organization of Army advisory committees in each Army area, located on the basis of population and geography. The goal is 600 committees. These committees are made up of community leaders in every walk of life -- educators, churchmen, businessmen, veterans, editors, civic leaders, club women, labor leaders and farmers. The 600 committees will have a membership of 8000.

The Information Division disseminates War Department policy and viewpoint through the six Army commanders to the committees. We tell these committees what the WD's program is and why.

In addition to active support and advice in recruiting, venereal disease control, and UMT, members of these committees will be asked for reactions on various phases of the WD program. This entails study and thought on the part of the committeemen. Thus, they become educated and informed on military plans. Our experience, so far, is that these individuals indoctrinate themselves and become our spokesmen. We have been able to call upon them for samplings of public opinion in their communities. They have actually tapped the thinking of the populace in their areas.

Ben Franklin said in his autobiography that if you want to get active and continued assistance from a man the way to go about it is to get that man to do something for you -- in short become a member of the team. Being committed to your plan, your project becomes his project. He will have a personal interest in you. That's one thing the Army needs -- it needs the public to take a personal interest in it. We will do this through community relations and we will also get our story to the public in detailed accuracy.


The Second Army Area has been used as a guinea pig in this plan. There are now 161 committees in the Second Army. Organization is going forward in the other Army areas. We now have more than 300 committees comprised of over 4,000 members. These committees contact directly 43 per cent of the population. Applied to the country at large, this would mean more than fifty million people. (See Chart 9).

Here are the things we expect to accomplish through community relations:

1. A means of getting the Army story in factual detail to the public at large.
2. A means whereby the War Department will have access to reliable and wide public opinion on a specific matter.
3. A well-informed public, interested in national security matters.
4. Active advice and support by the leaders of principal communities throughout the land.


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COMMUNITY RELATIONS



2ND ARMY ADVISORY COMMITTEES

161 ADVISORY COMMITTEES - 3000 LEADERS OF OPINION



- 16 -

COMMITTEES REPRESENT 43% POPULATION OF ARMY AREA

Thus far in this discussion of the component parts of our program, it has been impossible to point to any one function and say THIS is intelligence -- the fourth part of our program. This is because there are numerous channels of intelligence which cut across operations. (See Chart 10).

On this chart are the means the Information Division has in its own shop by which it collects and evaluates intelligence as to the public attitude.

First is the Control Desk. We might call this the Information Division's front-line intelligence agency. It constantly surveys the news as it breaks -- looking for trouble points. It alerts the Division for action on immediate critical items. On the basis of these reports, we may find it necessary to go to Secretary Patterson or other War Department officials to clarify some piece of news. At other times we may need no help to take up some erroneous news report with the concerned writer or editor.

The morgue. -- This is newspaper parlance for a reference library. The morgue is the repository of information from which much of our intelligence is formed. It consists of a complete file of newspaper clippings pertinent to the Army, plus selected reference material. The demands made upon it range from the Secretary of War down to Haskins Information Service. On a recent typical day there were 36 calls for specific information. Six of these came from the Secretary of War's office. The Information Division, L&ED, Manhattan project and AAF library and National War College accounted for the others. We couldn't function very well without our morgue. We can depend on no other source than our own newspaper research in furnishing information or making estimates of the situation.

The liaison functions of the Information Division, from an intelligence standpoint, consist of disseminating information to various subordinate echelons on policy and technical public information matters. Thru this function we also arrange to conduct top-flight editors, publicists and reporters on tour of occupied areas and to installations in the United States. During 1946 we conducted four such European tours by editors and publishers. We've completed one tour to Europe and one to the Pacific already this year and plan to average six tours a year hereafter as long as the need exists. We have profited from these tours more than it may sometimes seem. This was evident when the so-called Meader Report to the Senate War Investigating Committee was made public. Editors and columnists stood up for us then, and our analyses of the news coverage of occupied areas now show that we are getting better than an even break. We feel that this improved occupation publicity is due to better understanding on the part of these editors.

One of the important intelligence functions of the Information Division is that of analysis. Through this function, we evaluate the impact on the public of our own publicity as a basis for corrective plan-

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INTELLIGENCE

**CONTROL
DESK**


ANALYSIS

MORGUE

**COMMUNITY
RELATIONS**

LIAISON

REVIEW



ning. Also, through this function we keep abreast of public opinion polls and are able to furnish estimates of the situation of public reception of important military matters.

The community relations program is a great potential for intelligence of public attitudes. It has already proved its worth in the reports of the Army Advisory Committees to the Second Army. This is an actual sounding board of public opinion.

The review function of the Information Division is a hangover from the war-time practice of reviewing for military security. All material submitted to us by civilian writers for review is now on a voluntary basis. There are about 400 submissions each month. It is a profitable arrangement for us because we get advance information of what these authors have in mind. Often we are able to correct false ideas and assumptions through this function. (All military personnel, Regular, Reserve or National Guard, if on active duty, must submit manuscripts dealing with military matters. It is discretionary with retired personnel).

In addition to the intelligence functions, the Information Division performs several operational functions in disseminating and interpreting War Department plans and actions on a national plane. The basic function is planning. Given a mission, Information Division planners utilize the intelligence at hand in making plans for the interpretation of a specific project to the public. The functional sections through which these plans are executed are those pertaining to Press, Radio, Pictures, Speeches, Periodicals and Women's Clubs. (See Chart 11).


Last year we distributed an average of 150 press releases a month. These go directly to the Wire Services and Washington correspondents. More than 4000 telephone queries come into the Division each month in connection with Press functions alone. Included in this operation is that of disseminating information to the Negro press.

Dissemination of information by radio and television is another Information Division function. Television has opened new possibilities for picturing the Army to the public. Television is in its infancy, but we are proud of the job we did with NBC adapting film for television use during Army Week. We are getting in on the ground floor and our television program will expand with the industry. Here also we prepare radio scripts and arrange for special events and other national network programs.

The Information Division also presents the Army's story graphically. It reviews, edits and furnishes both still and motion pictures to the news media. Over 5000 still pictures and more than 8000 feet of newsreel film were the monthly average released last year. We also edit, review and downgrade official film. More than 1,500,000 feet of official motion picture film alone were reviewed during the last calendar year.

The Information Division provides source material for speeches for

OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS



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Army speakers and for civilian speakers using Army themes. Provision is also made for dissemination of these to the press and radio. This same facility supplies military speakers at reputable functions on a nationwide basis. During the past year we provided 550 speakers for national or state-wide functions.

Magazine coverage of Army information is another concern of the Information Division. Articles are suggested to editors. Assistance is given in preparing these articles and aid is given Army writers in placing their material.

The Information Division prepares and distributes information to national women's groups over the country. This is another of our facilities for building good will and for explaining the Army's policies and intentions.

There is a WD Women's Advisory Council for this particular function, composed of the national presidents of 36 national women's organizations. We make direct contact with this advisory council through annual meetings here in the War Department as well as in the field. The Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, directors of staff sections and other key officials have addressed these gatherings.

The functions which I have been describing are discharged by 44 officers and 98 civilians. As a matter of interest, BPR in September 1941 had 52 officers and 203 civilians. Its peak was 141 officers and 311 civilians on V-J Day.


Here are some of the instruments the Information Division uses to fulfill its mission. Inside the red line are publications which go to inform the public. (See Chart 12).

There is a general press release. We issue about 1800 each year. This is one of the 5000 still pictures that go to the publicity media each month. Here is a radio script, typical of the many programs written by the Radio Section. It is one of the "This Day" series. The series is now being carried by over 250 stations. The annual return to the War Department in free time of this series alone is equivalent to a half million dollar advertising campaign if produced by a commercial sponsor.

This little piece of cardboard is a "mat". We furnish an average of 12,000 mats to newspapers and periodicals monthly. Into these mats or moulds, the printer can pour type metal and thus reproduce illustrations and stories without making cuts or setting type. Small town or country publications are delighted to have these, as they save money and time. We get a story printed without alteration.

This Women's Interests bulletin, containing military information of interest to women, is distributed monthly to 2,800 women prominent in club work. These 2,800 influence in turn about 20 million women.

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RED

These other publications outside the red line are to disseminate information within the military service.

For instance, the weekly digest of Civil Affairs in Occupied and Liberated Territory is an indexed collection of all newspaper and periodical stories relative to civil affairs. Four hundred and sixty copies are distributed here and the military government people overseas reproduce from the plates we send them by air 1,000 additional copies for their use.

The National Guard Digest is a monthly survey of news and opinion pertinent to National Guard. It is indexed according to states, a total of 800 copies being distributed to those state organizations.

The weekly Post-War Military Establishment is a survey of news and opinion on such subjects as national security, foreign policy, atomic energy, etc. The 1300 copies of this digest assist in keeping informed numerous military agencies such as the Armies, posts, camps and stations, ORG, PMS&T's, National Guard and others.

Included in these publications are the twice daily wire Service Bulletin, the daily Radio Digest and the daily digest of Press Opinion. These are designed to give key WD offices, fast up-to-the-minute news briefs of concern to the military. The wire service bulletin permits these key officials a quick view of the news before it is printed. The Radio Digest is prepared from broadcasts of interest to the War Department which we monitor in our Division. Three hundred copies are distributed.

The rest of these publications are information sheets, fact sheets and policy guides designed for the guidance of working people in the field.

Up to this point, our presentation has dealt with the necessity for maintaining close relations with the public and our program for accomplishing this objective.


Now I want to give you a brief situation report.

This chart (See Chart 13) reflects the general attitude of the press toward the Army during the eighteen-month period following the end of hostilities. The Information Division analyzed over 11,000 editorials during this period, a representative coverage of the nation's press. Of this number, 1700 were critical, an over-all percentage of 14.9. The red line represents the critical per cent.

From the critical peak of 37 per cent in September 1945 there has been a steady downturn except for a single flareup in March 1946. It was at this time that the Lichfield affair and its accompanying effect on occupation, caste and selective service gave us a bad time of it for a

PRESS OPINION

TOTAL EDITORIALS-11,525 NUMBER CRITICAL-1,727 CRITICAL PERCENT-14.9



while, the critical percentage rising to 28 per cent. Since that time the Army has fared very well. In fact, during the past eight months the critical percentage has been less than ten per cent except for a slight rise in August '46 when there was a little more than normal volume of criticism of war profits investigation, Military Justice and the conduct of troops in the occupied areas.

This is press opinion and not to be confused with public opinion. Press opinion is not public opinion, though they may coincide. The most accurate index to public opinion at present is the public opinion poll.

This chart (See Chart 14) shows a summary of a number of public opinion polls. They indicate that public attitude toward the Army is, today, more favorable than any peacetime period in our history.

For example, in September of '46, public opinion favored a Million Man Army. Eighty per cent of the people said they were willing to have their sons serve, if necessary, to maintain such an army.

In December of '46, 70 per cent of the people stated they would prefer maintaining the present Military Establishment to cutting taxes, if both could not be done. The Fortune poll of March 1947 shows 71 per cent prefer to maintain our armed forces at present strength. In the Far West it was 80 per cent. They still remember Pearl Harbor.

In January of '47, 53 per cent of all the people said that they would advise a son or brother between the ages of 18 and 20 to volunteer for the Army or Navy for at least one year, because they felt it of value both to the boys and to the country.

In February of '47, 72 per cent of the public favored UMT, which is a rise from the low of 63 per cent over eleven different public opinion polls on this subject.

I would not be brash enough to stand here and say that this situation is due to the Information Division's efforts alone. The unsettled condition of the world has made a substantial contribution. Also, there probably has never been a time when all echelons of the Army have been more keenly aware of the necessity for informing the public on Army objectives.


While appreciation within the Army of the necessity for properly dealing with the public is on the upturn, we still have never been able to utilize all of the many facilities within the Army in support of a specific project. The Information Division seeks to accomplish this completely coordinated effort.

Duty demands of all of us today the utmost effort in making the public understand. If the public lacks understanding -- and we know it does lack understanding -- it is up to us to stimulate that understanding. It is not something that the Information Division can do alone. It is a

1947

PUBLIC ATTITUDE IS TODAY MORE FAVORABLE THAN ANY PEACE-TIME PERIOD IN HISTORY

• IN SEPTEMBER 1946 . . .



80% SAID THEY WERE WILLING TO HAVE THEIR SONS SERVE, IF NECESSARY, TO MAKE UP AN ARMY OF 1,000,000 MEN

• IN DECEMBER 1946 . . .




70% SAID THEY WOULD PREFER MAINTAINING PRESENT MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT TO CUTTING TAXES

• IN JANUARY 1947 . . .



53% OF ALL PEOPLE SAID THEY WOULD ADVISE A SON OR BROTHER 18-20 TO VOLUNTEER FOR ARMY OR NAVY FOR ONE YEAR

• IN FEBRUARY 1947 . . .



72% FAVORED UMT - A RISE FROM THE LOW OF 63% (11 POLLS).

SOURCE: GEORGE GALLUP, DIRECTOR AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC OPINION

job for everyone in the War Department and everyone in the entire Army.

To do this, our future plans are:

(1) To continue along the present lines which we believe service tests have proven sound.

(2) To make more effective the decentralization of Public Information operations to Army Commanders since they are closer to local news media and the people than the War Department in Washington can ever be.

(3) To work closely with the troop I & E in program to the end that every military individual acts to cement good relations with the public.

(4) To increase mutual understanding of staff and public information problems between General and Special Staff officers and Information Division officers.

(25 April 1947--350)E