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PUBLIC INFORMATION--A DUTY OF THE ARMED FORCES

14 May 1947

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PUBLIC INFORMATION--A DUTY OF THE ARMED FORCES

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GENERAL MCKINLEY: Gentlemen, this morning we have with us General Joseph Lawton Collins. General Collins is a graduate of West Point, the Command and General Staff School, the Army Industrial College, and the Army War College. Also, I might add, he was one of my instructors when I attended the Army War College.

During the war General Collins achieved recognition as a dynamic leader and master of tactics. He distinguished himself particularly for his exploits as commander of the 25th Infantry Division on Guadalcanal and the Solomon Islands, and as commander of the Seventh Corps which captured Cherbourg.

In recognition of his combat leadership, he was made Chief of Staff of the Army Ground Forces. More recently he has been serving as Chief of Public Information, coordinating public relations, information, education and legislative matters affecting the Army. This morning his subject is "Public Information--a Duty of the Armed Forces."

I take extreme pleasure in welcoming back General Collins.

GENERAL COLLINS: It does seem familiar to get back to the Industrial College again, although the surroundings, I can assure you, are very much different from what they were when I was a student, when we were sitting down on the ground floor of the old Munitions Building, tucked back behind the book racks and the other dusty things that had been left behind from the last war over there. I congratulate you on your new surroundings.

I am delighted to see that the Industrial College has seen fit to include in its course a series of lectures on the subject of public information. I think it is a vital subject for any branch of the Armed Forces today. I would like to go back and give you, as an introduction to my discussion, an incident that occurred in my first relationship, with this business of public relations.

Some years ago, I was the G-2 and G-3 of the Philippine Division at Fort William McKinley. Since our post was located some 10 or 15 miles outside of Manila, there was no particular reason for having a public relations officer, so I doubled in brass on that score.

One evening about ten or ten-thirty I had a call from the editor of the Manila Bulletin. He said he had just received a letter from some civilians downtown, complaining that there was an infantile

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paralysis epidemic out at Fort William McKinley and the Army was doing nothing about it. In fact, we were sending our school children in to Manila by bus each morning, thereby endangering the lives of the children in Manila. He said, "How about it?"

I assured him that we did not have any real epidemic. We had some cases of infantile out there all right, but so had they in Manila. I said, "I will check up on it and call you back in a few moments."

After hanging up the receiver, I called the Chief of Staff on the phone to check with him. Now, this officer was a very fine gentleman. He was a soldier of the old school, however. His reply to me was very immediate. He said "Joe, don't tell them anything. It's none of their damn business." I said, "Well, colonel, I think we would be making an awful mistake if we don't give this information." "No. Don't tell them anything. We know what we are doing. That is our business." I said, "Do you mind if I call the General?" He said, "No, I don't mind."

Fortunately, our Division Commander was a very able and very broad-minded man. His answer at once, of course, was "Sure, give them the information. Get hold of the medico and give it to them at once." I got hold of our surgeon, and found out the number of cases that we had in the preceding six months, which was not large. I telephoned this to the editor. He thanked me and, of course, he did not publish the letter. You can just imagine what would have happened had I told him it was none of his damn business. Not only would the letter have been published, but we would have been raked backward, forward and sideways--rightly so.

That made a terrific impression on me. I have thought about it many times. Thank Goodness, that policy of "the public be damned" is no longer the policy of the War Department. The Navy Department, I think, has always been wiser than we. I do not think they ever followed such a policy.

Our policy today is about this: We must give to the public all of the information about their Army. This is the Army of a democracy. It belongs to the people. It comes from the people, and they are entitled to know everything about their army--as a matter of fact, about their Armed Services. You will never, in this country, get full support for any program unless you do let the people know what the program is and everything about it. So that, basically, is the fundamental precept under which we operate today.

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Also we think that you are never going to have good public relations by simply putting on a high pressure campaign to "sell" the Army or Navy or Air Forces to the public. In my judgment, we will get good public relations if we have a sound military program, ably administered with common sense, and not otherwise. If the program that we are trying to follow has flaws in it--if it is not sound--if we don't administer it well--with judgment and with restraint, and with some consideration for the public--then we will have bad public relations no matter what the public relations officer does about it. That is the other main point which we follow in establishing our general policy for the conduct of our public relations.

There is a third major point that we have to bear in mind. After the last war, we in the Army all settled back into our shells. We went back to the little 2x4 posts scattered around the countryside. We paid no attention to the public. We did not join anything with the public. The public gradually lost track of us. They felt that the war was over. They felt that the business of winning wars was a job for the Army and Navy, and there were not going to be any more wars anyway. So they settled back very comfortably and said, "Thank God, that is over with. Now we will let the Army and Navy, these people that we pay to consider such matters as national security, worry about this from now on. We are not interested."

So far as the army was concerned, we were guilty in saying, "All right, if you are not interested, we are not interested." So we sat back more or less complacently and let the thing ride. We cannot do that any longer, gentlemen. The problems of national security are much broader, much more profound than they ever were before, and it is not our responsibility alone. That is the main point. Even, if we had the capacity to solve all these problems, the public ought not to let us do it in my judgment. They are always suspect of military men. Then, if they are suspect, the only way we can get them on our side is to place some of the responsibility on them. In other words, let them know that we cannot solve these problems alone. The national security is their responsibility just as much as it is our responsibility. Therefore, in our general dealing with the public we are endeavoring to do just that--make common cause with them in attempting to solve our national security problem.

I have talked all over the United States to this end and our army commanders are doing the same thing. One of the basic points we are making is the one that I have just made: that there is a mutual responsibility of the public and the Armed Forces for national security. If there is anything that gives any nation in the world pause today so far as starting another war or seeking world domination is concerned, it is not just our military capacity or our naval capacity, it is our tremendous industrial

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capacity; our ability to produce foodstuffs, not only for ourselves but for our allies; and then, finally, the conviction that our people will fight if they are forced to do so in defense of the things in which we believe.

So, we must share this responsibility with the public at large. We have to make them accept their share of that responsibility. Those are the three major points on which we are trying to key our whole public information program.

Now, General Parks has told you already in a lecture something of the mechanisms that are employed in the organization of public relations which is now called the Public Information Division of the War Department. There are one or two additional points, however, which I have talked with him about and which I would like to stress.

First of all, that we no longer are holding tight rein on our public relations program right here in Washington. We are endeavoring to decentralize to the army commanders and air force commanders so far as possible. We pass information out to them on all major matters as rapidly as they develop here in Washington. In order to do that the Public Information Division must know early in the game what is being planned by the War Department. General Parks has outlined to you the measures he is using in trying to keep himself and his division so informed.

I also have a job to do on that. One of the reasons a senior officer was selected for the coordinating job was to insure that he could sit in with the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, and other senior directors in the War Department General Staff at the time decisions are being made, so that he can raise the public relations question with respect to any particular policy that is under debate. He can say, "Well, have you considered this aspect of it from a public relations standpoint? What will be the reaction of the public to this thing?" In some instances we may possibly have to change our policy or at least weigh it very carefully in that light.

Or if we must do something, even though we know, ahead of time, that we are going to get relatively adverse public reaction then we can say, "Give us a little time on this and perhaps we can condition the public as to what this is all about. Give us time to work out a public relations program to go with this policy in order that we can inform the public as to the reasons behind the action that the War Department is taking." I think that is a great step forward.

Now, not only must we do that here in the War Department, but we are endeavoring to emphasize to our commanders in the field that they must do the same sort of thing. That involves taking the public relations officer into the confidence of the commander. Too often in

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the past the public relations man has been a second lieutenant or some other officer that does that in addition to fifteen other duties, and he hears about something after the house has caught on fire. Then they call for the fire department to put it out after the conflagration is well under way. Our object is to try to prevent the fire from breaking out. So, we are saying to our commanders, "If you don't have a good public relations man, get one." They might yell back to us for help in selecting one. They say, "We have no trained public relations officer." I will tell you in a moment what we are trying to do about training them at Carlisle.

As an actual fact we found that we already had in the Army some officers who were top public relations people in the civilian world. That does not mean that you must have trained newspaper reporters to be your public relations officer. In many instances it is better to pick an older officer of the Army, Navy, or Air Forces, a man who knows his service, with judgment and a little plain, common-sense. He can learn the job of public relations even easier than a cub reporter can learn the Army, Navy, or Air Forces. I think that is definitely the case.

The tone of the public relations business, particularly out in the field, is going to be set by the commanders themselves and not by a public relations officer. Public relations officers are merely implements; they are the tools; they are the staff officers. The commander is going to set the tone of his general relations with the public.

Let me illustrate that by a story that actually occurred down in Florida during the war days. There was an air field down in Florida that was a development of the war. A great many civilians were employed there from the nearby town which was some distance from the air field.

In order to reach it, we had to drive across a series of winding bayous, these little, low, flat streams, all of which were crossed by a succession of bridges that had to be raised in order to let river traffic go by.

They began to have trouble down at this post with the civilian employees quitting. They would not stay on the job. Nobody could find out what was wrong with them until the War Department sent a personnel man down to investigate. He inquired in town before he went out to the post what it was all about.

It developed that the post commander was sending into this town a small boat to pick up the mail and also to pick up supplies of one kind or another to take out to this post. The boat came into town just as the civilian employees were leaving town to go out to the post, and as they came along, this boat would raise a bridge,

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holding up traffic for five minutes. Then at the next turn in the bayou, they had to raise another bridge. Those things involved a delay on the part of people getting out there of something like 20 minutes or a half hour. Then, to make things perfect, the boat came back in the afternoon just as the people were coming back from work, and the same procedure was followed all over again.

Naturally, these people had kicked to the commander, and he did not do anything about it. He just passed it off. "Well, it was necessary," and just let it go at that.

So, when a personnel man came down, he learned about the boat trips and talked to the fellow about them; he finally convinced him it was poor public relations to do anything like that. The boat schedule was changed and trouble with the civilian personnel evaporated.

The point about this situation is that it does not take a newspaper man to discover anything like that. That is plain, ordinary, horse sense. That is all we have to use as the basic thing in handling our public relations program, particularly with the people out in the field.

We have been blessed in the Army with two magnificent Chiefs of Staff who know something about public relations--who know more about public relations than any cub newspaper man. They are General Marshall and General Eisenhower. They set the tone here in Washington.

It is equally important that the commander in the field set a similar tone in his relations with the public. If we will do that, our process of decentralization will work--if the people in the field will simply use a little common sense and judgment in their relations with the public.

Now, the other thing that I said we were trying to do was to get out of our shells and mix in with the communities in which we live. One of the basic difficulties with all public relations in this country is the fact that our people instinctively have a distaste for things military. They have a suspicion about the motives of our military leaders no matter who they are. We are constantly seeing that. In the papers day after day--some columnist raises the point, "We have a military man as Secretary of State; we have a military man as ambassador to Moscow; we have a naval officer as ambassador to Belgium; we have a military man heading the Veterans' Administration. The military are about to take over the country."

Well, that basic thing really runs through a substantially large part of the attitude of the public thought concerning the Army and the Navy. How can we break it down? How can we convince the people that we have no ulterior motives in these jobs? I think one of the best ways we can do it is to let them see us. They do not suspect

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General Marshall or Ike Eisenhower, but they do suspect the rest of us. The only way we can break down that attitude of suspicion is for all of us to get out and get to know the people in the communities in which we reside and take an active part in the community life; to assist in the community chest drives; to assist in the organization of boys clubs. That is a marvelous thing. We are attempting to do that right here in Washington. You should participate in the Rotary Club and other civilian organizations in the town wherever you are.

I frequently have people tell me after I have been out talking somewhere, "General, you are different from the rest of the people in the Army." I say, "Not in the slightest. You just don't know them." The answer is, "Get to know them; give them a chance to know you." I am confident if we will do that we will break down this suspicion of the military man, his motives, and his ideals.

I would like to touch for a moment upon the proposition of training our people in the public relations field. We have had introduced at almost all of our Service Schools in the course at the Military Academy, at Leavenworth, and here at the National War College, at least, a brief course on this over-all subject of public information and public relations. I think that will be a great step forward in informing our youngsters about some of these principals. You fellows--you are almost too old to be talked to. What we must do is to get young fellows who are going to be commanders of the future and bring them up. We are endeavoring to do that at Carlisle Barracks. We have an Army Information school where we train public relations officers and information and education officers.

I was up before the House Appropriations Committee the other day. They questioned me about the money that we are spending for this sort of thing. The question came up about the school there and what were we doing training 100 to 200 public relations officers every four months? What in the world were we going to do with them?

I said, "If I were king and I had the money to do it, I would send every officer in the Army to our college, not with any view of making him a public relations officer, but to bring home to him some of the problems of running the Army of a democracy--because that is basically what they are studying up there. They are studying the matter of close relations with the public, and how the public reacts, and what we ought to do. That is a matter of training them for the high command. I can think of nothing more valuable than to do just that." So that is what we are endeavoring to do. What we have to do is to get our young officers trained to the point of view that the public does have an interest in what we are doing; they do have a vital part in our responsibility.

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I want to turn to the information and education side of this matter. Before I do, however, I do want to touch upon some of the other aspects of the public relations business. I have been talking about external public relations so far. The next major point I want to touch upon is something about our internal public relations. General Lanham briefly touched on it in his talk on information and education. I want to elaborate a little bit on what he said and touch some other aspects of it.

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First of all the question of relations between officers within the Army itself. All of you gentlemen know that prior to World War II we had frequently very strong differences of opinion and relationships, we will say, between the Artillery and the Infantry. We were branch conscious to an inordinate extent. The Field Artillery thought they could win the war by themselves. The Infantry were convinced they could not, that everything in the Army had to revolve around the Infantry.

During the war that gradually disappeared in the idea of team work--that the Infantry could not possibly win the war. It took most intimate relations with the Field Artillery and with the Air Forces, to say nothing of the Services that have to back up the fighting Infantry. In the Army we broke down to a tremendous extent that severe, inordinate branch consciousness. I think that is a great step forward in the business of public relations, strange as it may seem.

I would like to continue that idea a little bit as between the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. I have had many civilians come to me and say, "I was at a cocktail party yesterday with some Air Forces officers"--or you might say Navy officers or Army officers--"who were talking about who won the war." You always get this business that the Air Forces won the war, or the Army won the war, or the Navy won the war. The civilian always says, "Why in the world can't you people get to working together in some form of team work." It is bad public relations. Every time it happens it weakens our position with the public at large, because they say, "You people are still looking at things from a selfish angle. You are looking at it from the Army or Air Forces angle instead of looking at it from the broad national security standpoint."

If we can raise a new crop of generals and admirals in the Air Forces, in the Army, and in the Navy to break that down, I think we will have taken a marvelous step forward in our over-all public relations. In other words, you have an internal public relations business there that is of vital concern to the security of this country, and particularly in respect to the support which we will

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get from the public in the way of appropriations, which is vital after all. This sort of class that we have here in the Industrial College, the War College, and the staff colleges now, I think, is a marvelous step toward a sound relationship between the Services.

There is one other aspect of internal public relations that I want to mention to you and that is the business of loyalty to commanders up and down the scale. I still think that loyalty is perhaps the cardinal military virtue, and yet we still have instances--certainly in the Army; I cannot talk for any other service--where, when an order is received from the next higher headquarters, the staff and sometimes the commander says, "What in the world are they thinking about anyhow up there? My God, haven't they got any sense at all?"

And so they criticize the order that comes in from the next higher echelon, and they issue their perfect order. It gets down to the next echelon and they say, "My God, what in the world are they thinking about? Don't they know . . ." so and so and so and so. If they could all run the whole show it would be swell.

That creeps into the public relations business definitely--again through the cocktail route as a rule--and I can assure you, gentlemen, it is bad public relations and it is bad Army, it is bad discipline.

Everyone of us should remember that the fellow up above us has a broader view of that than we do. I do not need to argue that. We cannot all know what the exact relationship is. We must have this business of loyalty to commanders up and down the line, and the feeling of confidence that must exist if you are going to have an integrated team up and down the line, just as everywhere we have to break down this excessive branch consciousness without breaking down the traditional pride of organization and pride of service, which, of course, we must maintain.

Finally, the third point of internal public relations: I want to emphasize this business of the relationship with the men, which is a vital matter. Through the Selective Service System we passed about 11 million men through the Army, during the war. If we all had done our job up to the hilt, we might be able to sell the Army to the bulk of them. If we had been able to do it, today we would have 11 million advocates out in civil life. Think of the value that would have been to us!

I know as well as you do the difficulties involved in trying to convert 11 million independent Americans into lovers of anything military. In fact, I am always amused by these criticisms that we get on the universal military training program when the civilian

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seems to think if you take these boys out and give them six months of military training they will all become militarists. We tried to sell the Army to the GI for five years and we did a poor job of it. If we cannot even sell the Army to youngsters in five years, we certainly do not have much chance of making militarists out of them--if we should ever seek to do that--in a period of six months.

On the serious side, we have failed for one reason or another to sell the Armed Services as a whole to the 11 million people that came through the Services during the war. We tried to do it in the Army--at any rate one of our services was an information and education program. Now, unfortunately, it got off to a bad start. I do not want to seem critical of the people that initiated it, but it was true that because commanders were rather skeptical about this new idea, by default they let it get into the hands of out-and-out "Commies" in some instances, and certainly into the hands of extreme left-wingers and into the hands of impractical men who could see this rainbow up here but could not see the rough going that was underneath the rainbow. So they based the program well over the heads of average men and got it into the hands of those who did not know practical soldiering. The commanders did not do anything about it as a general proposition and thereby failed to put over the program.

To me, the essence of this information and education program for our men is in the business of morale and discipline. It is something in which the commander himself must take an interest.

I have told many times a story of von Steuben, the old Heinie that came over to this country during the revolutionary war to put a little discipline into the Continental forces. We have thought of him as a rigid militarist, a martinet of the worst order, a man who had no milk of human kindness in him at all.

As a matter of fact, that was not the case. Some years ago General Thomas dug up a letter that von Steuben wrote to Germany after he had been in this country a year or two, working with our Continental forces. It was quite a remarkable letter. It ran something like this--von Steuben (writing to an old friend of his in the German Army) said: "The genius"--that is the character of the American people--"The genius of these people is different from ours. You tell a man to do something and he does it. I must first explain the reason why, and then it is done."

I say that old Heinie writing back in 1778 or 1779 had put his finger on the essence of American discipline and American leadership. You simply have to explain to our men what you are driving at, and if you will do it about everything you are trying to do, it has been my experience they will meet you more than half way every single time.

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Unfortunately, instead of the commanders themselves putting some effort behind explaining to the men why they had to give up some of the rights in the Army when they came in, why they had to have people sitting around in ports of embarkation and debarkation, they did little or nothing about it. Consequently, we lost a great deal in our effort to orient our men and get them on our side.

Just to show you the importance of this program, I want to read you a press dispatch that came from Nanking not very long ago, having to do with the civil war out in China. This dispatch said, "The Chinese Government's greatest military problem is not in supplying its army with guns and ammunition, but in developing the Army's fighting spirit," competent government observers declare. Having for the last year watched strife between the government party and the communists, they say the government lacks a workable system of explaining to the common soldier what his interest is in fighting the communists. In contrast, the communist soldiers have developed a program of intensive indoctrination which aims to make every little soldier from general to rear rank private familiar with the civil war and his part in it. The result has been the creation of an aggressive spirit among the communist soldiers that has been a factor many times in overcoming better equipped but poorer informed government troops, so that government's whole system of national defense discloses an almost complete lack of anything approaching the American Army's war-time section of information and education." That came from a hard-boiled newspaper reporter out in Nanking.

I say that until our commanders will take this thing to heart, our information and education program is going to lag. It is something in which we all have to take a tremendous amount of interest, I am confident it will pay dividends.

General Lannan and I have tried to put this program into effect in our office. We have cleaned the commies out and we have come down from the clouds to a practical basis. We have established a sound basis of handling newspaper presentations, placing those under military control instead of turning them loose to say anything they desire. I am confident we are on the right track now. I believe it can be made a very vital part of our program.

Now, the final point I would like to discuss with you is our relationships with the Congress, because it also forms a part of our over-all public relations, and it is the third responsibility that I have in the War Department. Here again I think that part of our difficulty stems from an attitude, which many of our American people share, and that is a sort of standoffish attitude with reference to politicians--as we frequently call them--or politicians. We say, "This fellow is just a politician. How can Congress decide these matters for us? It is just a bunch of politicians."

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If you believe in democracy, then you have to believe in politicians. We cannot run a democracy without politicians. It has been tried. We have seen people in our Government who did not have the political sense utterly fail, even though they were good administrators outside. As long as we have our form of government—and God knows I do not want to live under any other form of government—we are going to have politicians. We are going to have a wide range of men deciding these matters for us in the Congress. Therefore, we must recognize the fact that these men are far more than merely politicians.

I have had fairly close relationship with the Congress for the last year and a half. The more I see of its members, the more I realize the tremendous job they have to do. Those who take their jobs seriously—and most of them do—work much harder than we do. They have a terrific schedule to follow. They are under terrific pressure from constituents, from us, and other agencies in civil life. Therefore, when we go before them, instead of taking a stand-offish attitude—which actually has been tried in the past—always unsuccessfully, of course—we have to go before them and lay before them the important part of our story and be prepared to sit down and discuss it with them, not with any idea that they do not know what they are talking about.

They know far more than one has a right to expect. Any of you that go before any of these committees, sit down in a chair by yourself with a ring of them around you, will soon learn that these men have extremely sharp minds and they are going to dig right down to the fundamentals of your program. If you do not know what you are talking about, you will be on the griddle, sure enough.

Therefore, in the preparation of our legislation, it behooves us to analyze the thing from top to toe and be prepared to meet possible objections that will be raised on the Hill. We have endeavored during the past year, in the preparation of this sort of legislation for Congress, to have the General Staff go over our whole program to see the relationship between the various bits of our legislation. We have endeavored, after having that broad program formulated, to correlate with that our public relations program. We have endeavored to present a defense of that legislation on the Hill that was correlated, that would have a definite relationship within each part, and I hope it is going to produce good results.

We have tried to make clear to the members of our committees on the Hill that we are sharing this responsibility, not only with them, but with the public itself, and, therefore, in doing that also I think we have gotten better support than we otherwise would have had. We are still a long ways from getting all of our legislation through. Nevertheless, I think we are on the right track, and I am confident that the basic policy covering it is sound.

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What we are trying to do, gentlemen, in the War Department today, is to put our external public relations program on a sound footing of mutual confidence between the public and ourselves. We are endeavoring within the Army itself to break down these old jealousies and differences and build up a sense of teamwork and mutual loyalty; then, finally, with Congress itself, trying to present to them a well-rounded program that is correlated and well-based fundamentally on the concept that the responsibility is not just ours, but of Congress and the public at large.

Thank you.

GENERAL McKINLEY: I want to open the question period by asking one myself. It relates to the relationship between your legislative function and the Budget Office of the War Department, because in the old days both functions were in a single office; also that was true down where I was, in a Technical Service. As the activity grew because of the war, these functions were separated and put under different heads. At the level where I was working that caused some confusion. I wondered what the relationships are now and what your comments would be on that?

GENERAL COLLINS: That is a very good question. There was some thought given to placing the Budget Office under my direction. That was not done. The Budget Office still operates directly under the Deputy Chief of Staff. I operate under the Deputy Chief of Staff also. The Budget Office is independent of our Legislative and Liaison Division, and at times there is some divergence there, some crossing of wires. It is not serious, but occasionally it does develop. I have not given too much thought as to whether it would improve the situation if it were, say, placed under me. I have plenty to do as it is right now myself, and I would not want to go out and try to claim it. Organizationally, it probably is not sound. From a strictly organizational standpoint, it probably should be under my direction in conjunction with the Legislative and Liaison Division, but the War Department has not seen fit to put it that way.

We have a very close relationship, however, with the Budget Officer, and we do work in very close coordination with him. The main point really would be whether or not the Budget Officer ought to be under the head of the Legislative and Liaison Division.

GENERAL McKINLEY: I will explain a little the way my thinking has gone. We get appropriations for the implementation of a program. You are responsible for selling the program. In so many cases where there is new legislation in process which must get into the appropriation bill, you have to go to the Military Affairs Committee to activate it through authorization legislation. That is under your jurisdiction, but the money must be secured in an appropriation bill by the Budget Office, and they may get mixed up. I am thinking about the relations with Congress.

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GENERAL COLLINS: Yes, from a practical standpoint. It is not often such occurs, but the money is the thing that counts is certainly true. Too often, I am afraid, in the War Department, studies are made, or new proposals are made, and sometimes get approved without any analysis of what the cost is going to be. We are taking steps right now in the War Department to see that any new study that proposes anything has to have, as an integral part, an analysis of the cost. From now on, anybody who wants to start something new has to say that it is going to cost so many million dollars. Sometimes that will kill it right there.

A STUDENT: General Collins, I wonder if you would analyze the comment I heard on the radio this morning on the "World News Round-up." This celebrated news commentator came on and described the disheartened, disillusioned American soldiers, because the educational programs which had been promised them by recruiting officers—they could complete their education, and so forth—had been suspended; that applications for schooling would no longer be taken; that the number of teachers had been reduced from 280 some odd to 75 because of the cuts in the budget. The Army was crestfallen about the whole matter but it was beyond their control. It was due to appropriation difficulties, starting in Congress.

GENERAL COLLINS: I do not know what the source of that was. Part of it is true. We had to begin to curtail educational opportunities offered almost a year ago. The funds for this purpose are so limited that we had to scale them down materially. It is equally true that the recruiting service—and perhaps our Information Service—failed to emphasize that to recruits soon enough. Undoubtedly some men in the Army enlisted on the basis that they would be able to get additional education, specific tutoring from teachers while they were being trained. We told the recruiting people months ago, when this thing first came up, that they would have to state factually what the educational facilities are that we could offer men today. We still do offer them relatively excellent educational opportunities, but not on the scale that we did during the war, and particularly during the months immediately following the conclusion of the war.

We do still run correspondence courses. That is a joint thing with the Navy. I cannot give you exact figures from memory. We have an astounding number of youngsters getting high school diplomas through correspondence schools. They are being accredited for college. Arrangements have been made with some of the top-notch institutions of this country to accept those credits for college entrance. The results are far better than the International Correspondence course, for example. You know most people start the International Correspondence course and drop it after about a month or two. Our percentage of completions is higher than they have ever had in ICS.

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I think this man was undoubtedly talking with some youngster who had not been given something that he had been promised. He had been promised something that we had not been able to fulfill. To that extent, I think it is just criticism. We have tried to explain up on the Hill that we do not have the facilities that we used to have. We have not succeeded in getting additional funds. But it was inevitable that there should be certain cutbacks in those funds.

A STUDENT: General Collins, has there been a study made of the types of organizations in each community that a fellow should join, their cost, and just about what salary a fellow would have to have in order to sell himself?

GENERAL COLLINS: We have not made a study, naturally, on that, but it is true that it is going to cost some money, but not very much as a matter of fact. Actually, most of these organizations are interested in having speakers come down, and usually they will pay for your plate--that day at any rate. Neither the War Department nor the Navy Department can possibly give you money for that purpose, but as a matter of fact, I think that is part of your pay. That is part of your job from my point of view. We are paid a certain amount of money to do our job. In my opinion the business of participating in the community's activities is part of our job. This is part of the America for which we should be able to spend four or five dollars a month. You are not going to get it from any other source.

It is true, so far as senior officers are concerned, they are hit far more than junior officers. Their funds are just indescribably low. For example, the whole Army Ground Forces all over the world gets \$8,000 a year for entertainment purposes.

We had a man in one day from one of these veterans' organizations. He was sitting with me, telling how terrible we were and we ought to do this, that and the other thing. I said, "Who is going to pay the bill for this thing? General Devers and General Spaatz had \$8,000 a year for entertainment purposes for the whole air forces and for the whole Army." He said, "My God, we spend \$60,000 right here in Washington." I said, "You do?" He said, "Yes, \$60,000." I said, "We spend \$8,000 for the whole Army in the Ground Forces."

So the senior commanders have either to pay for a certain amount of this entertainment out of their own pockets or through the assistance of leading citizens in their community, and they frequently get parties thrown for them.

Incidentally, the Navy does that right along, far more skillfully than we do. I wish we could take some leaves from their book.

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A STUDENT: General Collins, what sort of organization do you think the superagency, super-secretary should have in kind of goods to handle public relations?

GENERAL COLLINS. That is one of these matters that takes some talking between services. There are two ways in which it could be done from a strictly theoretical standpoint. In my judgment there should be right under the Secretary a unified public relations (I&E) division. The Navy does not have an I&E program, but it is very much interested in it. Admiral Johnson, who is a good friend of mine, has talked with me a great deal about it.

The Marine Corps has adopted our practice. It uses our same pamphlets. I believe the Navy is beginning to do it to a certain extent. But I personally think there should be a central organization there under the top Secretary to establish the policy of the Government on the whole business, Army, Navy, Air Forces, alike. I think there would still have to be a working agency within each of the subdepartments, but I think there should be a small policy group on the top level to set up what procedures on the broad policy were going to be, and see that there is not any undue clashing between various services, seeking support from the public as was done during the war on some of our procurement programs.

That is, as I say, a theoretical solution. It is what I believe would be the best solution. Whether or not it will evolve that way, I do not know.

A STUDENT: Have you ever considered the events leading up to the retirement of General Charles Hagood in about 1937? Have you reached any conclusions of the lessons we could learn from that?

GENERAL COLLINS: I do not know enough about those incidents leading up to General Hagood's retirement to pass judgment on them. I knew the old gentlemen slightly, but I was engaged in something else at that stage of the game, by far more interesting--I would not say more important. I am not familiar with the circumstances of General Hagood's retirement. I am not trying to dodge the question; I just do not know enough about it to make comment.

A STUDENT: Does the fact that the National Committee appointed by the President on Universal Military Training dropped the words "military training"--I presume at the President's request--indicate that the philosophy of this is that the Nation should carry its share, that the Armed Forces is not willing to support it, or that the Nation is not ready to adopt it?

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GENERAL COLLINS: Well, the imputation of your question is probably correct, that the Nation is not fully prepared to accept full responsibility for this yet. Let me state what the War Department's view is in reference to this matter.

In our appearances before that commission and in our special utterances on the question, we have stressed the point that in our shop the universal military program would be decided on its military merits. It ought to be adopted or turned down on the basis of whether or not it is necessary from a military point of view.

Now, we say that is not in conflict with anything the President has said. We are sticking to our knitting, which is the business of whether it is necessary from a military point of view. Now, any other aspect of the matter is the responsibility of somebody else. We are saying that we pass on this program because we feel it is necessary from the military point of view. I have said to my civilian audiences that it ought to be decided on that basis. On that issue I still feel that that is correct.

We will also get many beneficial byproducts from the universal military training program, in my judgment. Our Demonstration Unit at Knox is making it perfectly evident, that it is necessary in order to support civilian components of the Army and the Army Air Forces. I do not know about the Navy. But it is vitally important to get the necessary number of men into the National Guard and into the organized Reserves to replace a pool of trained manpower which we are losing now at the rate of a million and a half a year, and finally to give the Guard a chance to become an effective M-day force.

I say we are asking too much of our National Guard to expect it to raise competent divisions with one night's drilling a week and two weeks' summer training. It just cannot be done. With six months' training we could at least give those youngsters \$1,000 worth of training in comparison with the \$50 that they get normally in the National Guard. If the National Guard could get all its recruits from the UMT, then the Guard could pick them up from there, and with one or two nights a week of training plus the summer training, they would be infinitely better qualified than our Guard has ever been in the past. Those three reasons are the real reasons for universal military training in my judgment. We have been stressing that in our program.

A STUDENT: General Collins, you have recommended that the Army officers, the Navy officers, and the Air Forces officers go out and mix with the public in the way of public speakers in Rotary Clubs, Kiwanis Clubs, etc. I personally think it is a very fine idea. I do not think there is any more sorry spectacle in the world than a human being that gets up and can't speak. Most human

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things fall in that category--present speaker excepted. We can go to the Pentagon and take French lessons, Spanish lessons, and Portuguese lessons. Are you giving the Army a chance to take public speaking lessons so they can respond when called on to carry the message of the Army to the public?

GENERAL COLLINS: Well, within the Army schools we are attempting to do that. Down at the Infantry School, I well remember the first lecture that we had there. I had been instructor at West Point. When I went to take a course at the Infantry School, I first of all heard a talk about public speaking. I was utterly amazed. It was marvelous. It was a seminar. It was so far above anything we had at West Point, there was just no comparison. The course in public speaking and methods of instruction at the Infantry School are superb in my opinion. It has permeated through a large part of the line of the Army. I have not seen it in recent years, but I am confident it is still a good course.

At Leavenworth, they had a brief course also in public speaking, fortunately starting with the toughest form of speaking. The first thing you were called on to do was to make a two-minute speech. Well, it is far easier to talk for 20 minutes than it is to talk for two minutes, far easier to make a longer talk. You have to be pretty good to talk for two minutes and say something that means something.

So the answer is, we are endeavoring to do it through our school system. We are starting at West Point now.

COLONEL CLABAUGH: I was thinking particularly of something I heard yesterday in one of the committee rooms, discussing some of the people now going to Georgetown. Naval officers were told, "You are able now to go over to Georgetown, or the YMCA, or some place in Washington, and take public speaking courses for \$29.50 and the Navy will pay for it."

GENERAL COLLINS: Once again, the Navy is ahead of us. I will look into that.

COLONEL NEIS: Sir, could you explain any significance in the change of name from "Public Relations" to "Public Information" just at a time when it would seem that the War Department has come to the broader and truer concept of public relations based on public opinion and public information, or information and education relations as applied to Congress and the public? It would seem that "public relations" is a broad term.

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GENERAL COLLINS: That is a very interesting question, and it is illustrative of the things you are up against in running the Army of a democracy. It is a question of names, purely and simply. Now, there is a fine line of demarcation between information and propaganda. You cannot draw it. It is not any straight line at all, but there is a fine line there.

Now the term "propaganda" has come to have an obnoxious connotation in the minds of most people. Similarly, the over-all business of public relations has gradually been given the same connotation. Many industrial firms are now hiring public relations people to handle their relations with labor, and labor accuses them of all sorts of things. Legislative people call them lobbyists, which in many cases they are. So the terms "public relations" and "public relations consultant", or "public relations counsel" have gradually come to have a bad connotation up on the Hill.

It was suggested at one of our hearings by somebody up on the Hill that we get away from the term "public relations." We have said, "We are not propagandists." We say that honestly. As I said in the early part of my talk, our job is to furnish information about the Army. If I had to define propaganda, I would say the difference between true information and propaganda is that normally propaganda at least connotes the idea that we are trying to put something over that factually is not correct, that we are trying to sell something in the guise of something else. That is my concept of the difference between propaganda and true information. We say we stick to information, good and bad alike, and we do. So it was suggested that we get away from the term "public relations" because Congressmen were getting complaints from their constituents about the public relations angle of things--you know some of them want to do away with all public relations divisions in the departments of government. One man particularly wants to do that. My answer to him on that one was, "If you fear the Army, fear this business of the Army getting control of things, certainly you don't want to force us under cover."

In other words, we believe we have a responsibility to the public to inform them of their Army, and we want to do that right above board, out in the open. That is information. If we have to come to the point where by devious means we have to do that, we will get into the field of propaganda and into this field of the bad aspects of public relations.

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So the whole thing came down to exactly that. In order to get away from criticism--at the suggestion of some friends of ours--we changed the name from "Public Relations" to "Public Information." Our procedures are exactly the same. That is for your information.

GENERAL MCKINLEY: General Collins, we certainly thank you very much indeed for this most stimulating talk. Thank you very much.

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