

~~RESTRICTED~~

2 3 2

AN APPRAISAL OF THE LOGISTIC LESSONS OF WORLD II

31 October 1947

14-17

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
SPEAKER--Lieut. General LeRoy Lutes, Director, Service, Supply, and Procurement Division, Department of the Army.....	1
GENERAL DISCUSSION.....	12

PUBLICATION NUMBER L48-33

THE INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~RESTRICTED~~

REGISTERED

AN APPRAISAL OF THE LOGISTIC LESSONS OF WORLD WAR II

31 October 1947

GENERAL MCKINLEY: Gentlemen, this afternoon we are very fortunate in having with us Lieutenant General LeRoy Lutes. He comes to us as a old friend, having been on this platform many times. I cannot begin to imagine how valuable all his experience during the late unpleasantness has been in preparing him for what he is going to talk about today. His subject is "An Appraisal of the Logistic Lessons of World War II." As you know, he is Director of Service, Supply, and Procurement Division in the Department of the Army. I take great pleasure indeed in welcoming back General Lutes.

GENERAL LUTES: General McKinley, members of the faculty and gentlemen: My talk today will be very general. I am only going to point up a few general lessons from the war. It will not be so specific or detailed as last year.

The instruction given at the Industrial College is of great interest to the Service, Supply, and Procurement Division of the Army General Staff. For this reason it is always a pleasure for me to meet the members of the Industrial College faculty and student body and to learn about the work that is being done here.

General McKinley has stated that it would be useful for me to discuss the principal logistic lessons of the recent war and to indicate some of the fields that require careful study if we are to be successful in the event of an armed conflict in the future.

On 2 September 1945 in Tokyo Bay, the United States and its Allies concluded the greatest war in history. World War II was the most important armed conflict in which the United States ever engaged, whether measured by the size of the forces employed, the vast dispersal of the battlefields, or its tremendous impact upon national life. Between 1942 and 1945 we maintained the largest and the best equipped and supplied Army in our history. This logistic undertaking made transcendent demands upon the resources, energies, and ingenuity of our Nation.

The word "logistics" has been given many different shades of meaning. A common definition is: "That branch of military art which embraces the details of the transport, quartering, and supply of troops in military operations." In this discussion, I shall use the word in the broad sense that embraces all military activities not included in the terms "strategy" and "tactics." In this sense, logistics includes the procurement, storage and distribution of equipment and supplies; the transport of troops and

ପ୍ରକାଶକ

cargo by land, sea, and air; the construction and maintenance of facilities; communication by wire, radio, and the mails; the care of the sick and wounded, and the induction, classification, assignment, welfare, and separation of personnel. That is a large order.

World War II was a logistician's war. Its outstanding characteristics were the totality with which manpower and resources were mobilized and the vigor with which belligerents attempted to destroy each other's material resources for war. Fabrication and assembly plants, refineries, laboratories, rail and highway networks, ports and canals, oil fields, and power-generating installations were primary objects of offensive action, because of their logistic importance. Developments in mechanized, aerial, and amphibious warfare made the logistic support of armed forces vastly more complicated and extensive.

The full logistic implications of World War II must await a complete assaying of our experience. The chief lessons, however, are already apparent. Logistic limitations in many cases dictated our strategy, as well as the type of campaign to be fought and the timing of its initiation. The emphasis that I am placing upon logistics is not intended to detract from the importance of strategy and tactics, the gallantry and courage of the combat forces, nor the imagination and professional skill of combat commanders. Don't misunderstand me on that. The combat forces won the war by providing the guts, manpower, and skills with which our superior weight in materiel was applied in destroying the enemy. Our cause, however, would have been lost without the magnificent logistic support of our entire Nation. Logistics provided the tools with which our air, ground, and sea forces fashioned victory.

United States strategy, in general, was to hold the enemy at bay, while gathering strength for offensive action. Because we were unable, either from the standpoint of human or material logistics, to attack both at once, priority was then given to the destruction of the most formidable--Germany. The holding phase of our strategy included the provision of all possible material assistance to our Allies, the securing of lines of communications, and a preliminary offensive against the enemy's logistic potential by bombing his industrial plant, disrupting his lines of communications, and depriving him of raw materials. The second phase of our strategy was implemented only when our men were trained and we were able to bring preponderant weight in material to bear. We then launched the all-out assault and offensive, first in Africa and Europe, and later in the Pacific.

Ultimate victory in each theater was assured when the quantity and quality of our weapons and equipment surpassed those of the enemy. If any indisputable logistic lesson can be drawn from World War II, it is

RESTRICTED

that in any major war involving industrial powers, no nation can hereafter emerge victorious without substantial and sustained superiority over its enemy in the quality and quantity of its weapons and supporting equipment.

World War II compelled the United States to utilize its resources, labor, industry, agriculture, transport, science, and military on a greater scale than ever before. All civilian activities were affected by, and most of them in varying degrees contributed to, the war effort.

Before World War II, it had been customary to consider the potential resources of the United States as practically unlimited and sufficient for any war in which this country might become involved. The demands of World War II in some respects reached the limits of our resources. There were at all times practical limitations of one kind or another upon the production of essential items of munitions. It is generally true that the Armed Forces were adequately supplied, but it is also true that rapidly shifting requirements, shortages of raw materials and production facilities and other factors at one time or another caused critical shortages of important items, such as aerial bombs, heavy artillery ammunition, heavy trucks, automobile tires, radio tubes, and cotton duck and webbing. I recall all of these were short at one time or another during the war. Indeed, they were critical.

The controls imposed for the purpose of directing the resources of the Nation into war channels were neither as complete nor as severe as those of our Allies or the enemy. You remember the extent to which they went in those controls. Conservation measures and many restrictions on materials and facilities for nonessential production were voluntary or only partially effective. Except by a few indirect and rather ineffective devices, we had no means of controlling industrial and agricultural manpower. Production for civilian use continued at a considerably higher level than that of either the enemy or our Allies. Controls are distasteful to a democracy and their use is only advisable in time of emergency. We must admit, however, that we could have increased the production of munitions by means of more stringent government controls.

Any future major war, regardless of the weapons and tactics employed, will be even more "total" than World War II. Great quantities of old, as well as new and more intricate types of, munitions and faster and faster means for transporting military forces over great distances will be required. Measures for the protection of the United States itself against guided missiles, radioactivity, and chemical and bacteriological warfare will require huge additional expenditures of manpower and materials. Our logistic potential will be taxed to the utmost. Only the fullest utilization of our resources will assure us the best possible chance for victory. Please remember that--the fullest economic utilization of our resources.

RECORDED

Perhaps the most significant lesson of World War II is that the military potential of a nation is directly proportional to the nation's logistic potential. The first hard fact to be faced in applying that lesson is that our resources are limited. The next is that the slightest delay or inefficiency in harnessing our logistic resources may cost us victory.

America's contribution to victory in World War II was decisive because its raw materials were relatively abundant; its basic industry was larger and more productive than the enemy's; its productive plant was beyond enemy striking power; there was time in which to produce munitions, to train our military forces, to organize our Government and economy for war. In both World Wars, we had advance warning and a period of protection by our Allies in which to mobilize our strength. No enemy will make the same mistake a third time. Our military forces, Government, and national economy must be carefully and skilfully prepared for instant, complete mobilization in defense of the Nation.

Time is the most precious element in logistic preparations for security. Measures must be prepared in advance for the all-out, logistic mobilization that must be completed between the time when danger threatens and the time that war actually strikes. Our intelligence must give as adequate forewarning. That is very vital. Reserves of supplies and equipment, of machine tools, of munitions plants, of strategic materials, and of trained manpower must be maintained to bridge the gap between penultimate operations at the time of the warning of danger and full conversion to meet aggression. Mobilization must be rapid, efficient, and automatic so that fully trained and equipped forces, supported by the full-blast production of munitions, will be available the moment the United States is attacked. The alternative would be to create and maintain a large, active military establishment with its vast stores of munitions, and constantly to supplement older weapons and equipment in quantity with the latest types. This would be contrary to our national tradition and the cost prohibitive. We all know that we cannot hope to get appropriations for such an organization from Congress.

It is, therefore, imperative that advance plans provide for more effective organization encompassing the civilian war agencies. We can't have the supplies we need unless we make plans for cutting down the lead time. Most serious duplications, wasteful action, and complex procedures existed during World War II, when the organization of these agencies was largely improvised. I am speaking now of civilian agencies. Their very multiplicity impeded the accomplishment of essential activities. The charters of certain agencies, such as the War Production Board and the War Shipping Administration, were drawn in such general terms that it was necessary to provide special supplementary agreements defining their responsibilities and relationships to the military agencies. The War and Navy Departments found it necessary to maintain large staffs merely for conducting business with the maze of Washington agencies, and too much

REFUGEE

241

time and energy were uselessly expended. Although it is not the business of the Military Establishment to control or interfere with the civilian agencies necessary for the conduct of war, the Armed Forces have a most vital interest in their efficiency. The organization of the Executive Branch of the Government for war must be examined, and careful plans developed, in order that the benefits of all possible improvements, simplifications, and economies in directing and controlling the Nation's effort in the event of another emergency may be derived. The National Security Act of 1947 establishes agencies charged with advising the President concerning the wartime unification of Federal agencies and departments engaged in civilian and industrial mobilization. This is a step in the right direction. Only the prompt and vigorous fulfillment of the charters given the new agencies will meet the Nation's need and make clear what further preparations must be undertaken. In other words, war is only beginning.

World War II disclosed other important lessons. Earlier wars were confined to a few well-defined combat areas. We didn't have such large armies. Our combat areas were few and definite. The divisions of responsibility and spheres of action between our land and sea forces were clear-cut. World War II marked a radical change in the manner of waging war. World War II covered the globe; weapons became more numerous, interchangeable, and varied; airpower developed into a major offensive force; armed forces grew larger and infinitely more complex; joint operations were the rule. Future security demands that we anticipate a global war, in which all combat elements engaged, in every Theater, are under a single command controlling all forces--land, sea, and air. We must be able to employ all three major arms in appropriate balance and force the instant war strikes. Only the most complete coordination of the entire logistic mechanism will assure our ability to concentrate the full logistic strength of the Nation, where it is needed, regardless of the fighting force served. Please remember that one. It is only by a complete coordination of the entire logistic mechanism that all elements of the fighting forces can be served in any locality. Coordination of operational and logistic planning, particularly, must be accomplished in peacetime--it is too late to attempt it in war.

Logistic organization and procedures within and between the military forces were far from perfect during the recent war. Too much of our success was accompanied by inefficient practices. Too much was accomplished only by placing terrific strain upon the energies of our logistic leadership. Not enough can be attributed to sound organization and efficient procedures. The committee system of the Joint Chiefs of Staff handles logistic matters in a cumbersome and time consuming manner. The Army self-contained procurement and supply agencies, eight in the War Department and eight in the Navy Department, had an adverse effect upon both industrial mobilization and the supply of combat forces. Duplicating supply lines and different standards of service among the Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces complicated and slowed logistic operations. Within the War

DESTROYED

Department itself two logistic organizations developed, one for supporting the Army Ground Forces and another for the Army Air Forces. We hope that the new National Defense Organization will develop more integrated logistic and operational planning among the elements of the National Defense Establishment.

The importance of proper logistic organization and functions in Theaters of Operation was not understood within the Army. The subject has received too little attention in peacetime. Lack of doctrine governing logistic activities complicated relationships between theaters and the supporting supply agencies. It was War Department policy to give a full measure of autonomy to theater commanders in organizational matters. Recommendations of the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, for streamlining and standardizing oversea logistic organizations and methods in order to facilitate supply and improve administration were rejected for this reason. In other words, it was felt in the War Department that every theater commander should have full autonomy to organize his logistic setup as he saw fit. Therefore we had different setups all over the world.

Efforts of theater commanders to coordinate Army, Navy, Marine, and Air logistics were difficult and left much to be desired, because of inherent differences in the basic organization and systems employed by the three services. Single operational command over land, sea, and air forces could not fully unify logistic operations, because logistic support was drawn from separate and independent organizations.

A fully satisfactory organization within tactical units of the Army for performing logistic functions in the field was not developed during the war. The number of types of service units, over 150 at the end of the war, is one indication of the confusion in this field. In addition, special units or units with special equipment were continuously created. There was an unnecessary overspecialization in types of service troops, thereby making it difficult to secure maximum flexibility in the utilization of service personnel. There was some experimentation with combined service units, but this type of organization, which had much to recommend it, was not pushed vigorously nor fully exploited.

At the beginning of the war, the War Department had been ill-prepared for handling large-scale logistic activities. For example, there was no adequate system for calculating supply requirements on a large scale. We had a little army, a corporal's guard of 150,000, before the war. When this army expanded into the millions an adequate system for computing requirements on a huge scale had to be developed. No adequate methods existed for calculating supply requirements, balancing them against resources, or for controlling procurement. Peacetime stock accounting procedures, primarily designed to determine and charge losses, impeded rather than facilitated supply operations. The establishment of the Army Service Forces early in the war placed a great many of the logistic functions performed in the Zone of the Interior under a single command that

RECORDED

devoted much of its energy to the improvement and simplification of supply, administrative, service, and procurement systems and procedures. Concurrently with similar efforts by the Navy and the Air Forces, the new command brought to bear the most advanced managerial experience in industry and Government, and made tremendous progress in developing uniform, efficient procedures. There is still much to be desired in that field. For example, we need badly a uniform cost accounting system throughout all three of the Forces--the Army, Navy, and Air Forces. That is one example. I could give you a large number. Many savings could be made by uniform documentation. The Army Supply Program, the Supply Control System, the War Department Shipping Document, the Controlled Materials Plan, and the system for domestic and overseas requisitions are examples of the logistic techniques developed. Standard, simple techniques for systematic [redacted] recurring operations were also created. During the war the Army Service Forces sought the best key personnel, proper organization, and a framework of practical, well-understood procedures. These are practices that have been neglected by the Armed Forces as a whole. When compared with private enterprise, our Armed Forces have been backward, except under the impulsion of war, in utilizing modern managerial methods. The gains of the war must not be lost. Managerial improvements must be continuously and vigorously sought and applied. Don't get the idea from me that I am saying that I think everything was badly handled. On the contrary, we won the greatest war in history. Our logistics were successful. I am merely trying to indicate certain lessons of the war. That is the object of this talk. I am not saying that management during the war was not effective. But there are a few broad lessons that should be learned, with, of course, the object of trying to correct those deficiencies before another national emergency comes.

Throughout the war, troop bases authorizing the numbers and types of troops to be activated, trained, and employed were unsatisfactory for logistic purposes. In 1943 as many as 12 different War Department Troop Bases governed logistic planning and action. Even at the end of the war there were three separate troop bases in which we had to try to supply the Army. In addition to those, there were what were called troop lists, for troops within the continental limits of the United States. In other words, we tried to buy on one broad troop basis and focus on other special troop bases or deployment, which was not sound logistics. The Army Service Forces was compelled to anticipate the plans and decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the War Department General Staff in order to have sufficient lead time to implement them. That is a fact. I am not pulling any punches in that statement. I have talked about this latter to the representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the present operational side of the Army General Staff. It is something that must be corrected. There is one lesson that every one of you should carry with you as a missionary, that is, that logistical and strategical planning must be concurrent. We cannot get a strategic line

RESTRICTED

tonight and produce the equipment to support the plan tomorrow. War is unpredictable and does not lend itself readily to precise long-range planning; however, a better system must be developed for estimating troop requirements and anticipating the deployment of units--one that will provide the logistician time and a firm basis for producing munitions and equipping the forces needed to implement strategic and operational plans.

Throughout the war insufficient numbers of service troops were provided in the War Department Troop Bases, which governed the number of service personnel trained and units activated. The needs of the theater commanders were never completely filled; nor was the quality of service units as high as desired, because sufficient time was seldom provided for their training, and the need for the assignment of able individuals to service activities was not fully recognized. Now each of you can become a missionary or that also. You will find in your contacts with the operational staffs that some of the picture service troops as units of truck drivers and stevedores. The fact that we must have skilled radio men, skilled ordnance maintenance men, and skilled signal men, for example, sometimes does not percolate. It is clear that in the future service troops will be increasingly vital to operations, that they must be carefully trained, and that they must be provided in adequate numbers both in the Zone of the Interior and in the theaters of operations.

Faulty military personnel administration was the source of a great many problems encountered in logistic operations, and the training of military personnel is less efficient, in general, than other activities. Personnel policies and procedures governing the flow of individuals through induction, processing, training, assignment, and shipment overseas were complex and wasteful. Failure of inductions to meet military quotas in 30 out of 44 months of the war, delays resulting in 15,000 ton maritime assignment in 1943, misassignment of three and one-half percent of our personnel, and the failure to determine future requirements for specialized personnel are examples of a few of the difficulties encountered. Although the Army Service Forces made substantial progress in controlling and utilizing its own personnel, progress was not satisfactory throughout the War Department or in the oversea commands. No accurate statistics exist, but it is safe to say that the time lost because of unnecessary processing and delays in assignment was enormous. Methods of estimating personnel requirements in specific categories and of controlling assignments to such categories left much to be desired. Personnel is the heart of any enterprise. Certainly it is basic to warfare. We were scraping the bottom of the barrel before World War II ended. Inefficiency in the utilization of the nation's manpower will be unsafe in a future war.

RESTRICTED

Training in logistic planning and operations before the war had been seriously neglected by the educational system of the Armed Forces. The Army War College and the Army Industrial College give some attention to certain phases of these subjects, but the overwhelming emphasis in officer training was upon tactics. The curricula of the Service Schools and the Command and General Staff School seldom included the handling of units larger than division or corps. Nowhere in an officer's training was there a comprehensive treatment of the logistic problems of the War Department or of theaters of operations. Extensive knowledge of purchasing, production, distribution, storage, transportation, construction, communications, hospitalization, and finance was possessed by very few persons within the Armed Services. No captain of industry or commerce, regardless of his ability, was qualified to deal with the large and complex problems of the theaters of operations, of the Technical Services, or of the War Department. This was also true of some of the officers who were made responsible for large and important enterprises. Few had training or experience in the management of large enterprises or the broader aspects of logistics. Granting the fundamental importance of logistics in modern war, it follows that military leaders must have a thorough appreciation and knowledge of the subject as a prerequisite to top command.

World War II demonstrated the importance of scientific research in a spectacular manner. Never in the history of warfare were there more rapid and far-reaching scientific and technological developments in weapons. This was achieved through the unprecedented teamwork of science, industry and the military. A most important logistic lesson is that our safety depends upon the continuation of this close collaboration in the development of new instruments of war. Scientific research is never static, nor is the secrecy surrounding weapons and production processes ever permanent. Our present superiority cannot be retained without a comprehensive, long-range research and development program designed to assure full scientific, industrial, and military participation. Such a program will be costly, but we dare not let penny-pinching or neglect endanger our security.

The exact nature of any future war cannot be foreseen. That it will be different from World War II is a certainty. Technological advances already have made obsolete many of the weapons and tactics of the late war. Solid-propelled and guided missiles may eventually replace artillery and aircraft as major weapons. It is uncertain whether or not new applications of atomic energy will render battleships and carriers ineffective and reduce the role of infantry and armored divisions to that of security and occupational duty. No one knows what offensive or defensive weapons electronics may provide. If new developments prove to be as revolutionary as it appears they may, it is entirely possible that contemporary concepts of naval, air, and ground warfare will be discarded. It is already clear that different strategy, different tactics, and different methods of organizing the combat elements will be employed in a

RESTRICTED

future war. Warfare will become more mobile, more mechanical, more destructive, more dependent upon science and technology. War will tend to involve more and more of the world's population and to spread to every corner of the globe.

No matter what methods of warfare are developed, it is inevitable that logistics will play a predominant role in any future conflict. Provision will still have to be made for the maintenance and supply of the combat forces, regardless of their mission, and regardless of how they are organized and deployed. The rapid movement of troops and equipment to threatened points throughout the world will be of the utmost importance. A difficult logistical problem—the rapid mass production of new and improved weapons and all types of military equipment will be imperative. The destruction of logistic potentials will be the primary objective of warfare, the defeat of combat forces in the field becoming a secondary consideration. Of that I am sure.

The security of the United States presents a serious and complex problem in logistic preparedness. How should we plan, and how can we organize for national security? What should be the place of logistics in the organization? What should be the relationship of logistic functions to the combat areas and to other government agencies? What is the best internal organization for accomplishing logistic functions? How shall we provide for the continuous research and development of new weapons; for adequate quantities of equipment and sufficient numbers of trained forces to meet sudden attack; for rapid, ample, industrial, and governmental mobilization?

These are questions for which we must find satisfactory answers. They must be approached objectively, intelligently, and with courage. It is inevitable that the human tendencies to revert to old habits of thought and action, to protect-sectarian interest, to protect the established order, to resist change, to be swayed by sentiment will exert powerful influences. These tendencies have no place in our efforts to insure our Nation's security. It is demanded that every one of us rise above lesser motivations and loyalties and work always for the highest good of the Nation.

Our future security depends upon the application of the logistic lessons of World War II. If the United States should again be threatened at a time when we are logistically unprepared, the result will be disaster.

In summarizing some of these lessons, I might say that wars cannot be won without logistic superiority. The major logistic axiom of any war is: "Get there first with the most." Our inability to support the

RESTRICTED

24+

Philippines lost them. Skill and courage are not enough. They must be solidly supported by weapons, equipment, and supplies, and in time.

The outcome of the next war may very well be decided by what we have at the moment war strikes. The United States will be the first target next time, and we cannot count on allies powerful enough to rescue us, once overcome. Our every effort now must be bent toward the maximum preparedness and military efficiency with the resources allotted to us.

The logistic organization with which we will fight must be in being and capable of immediate expansion. Our 1941-1942 logistic organization had to be radically changed and a logistic command created. There will be no time for reorganization of war strikes again. Based upon the soundest possible estimate of the nature of future warfare, we must seek and find the most effective logistic organization, and we must put it into operation.

Military effectiveness must govern, but logistic supportability is the first prerequisite. Our resources are limited. The utmost economy within the framework of military effectiveness is imperative. Whether or not we use our resources efficiently is apt to mean the difference between victory and defeat. Every means of increasing our military efficiency, every means of extending the life and effectiveness of the materiel at our disposal must be found and used.

We must be able to strike with full force and to maintain that force until victory is won. The Germans unquestionably had logistic superiority at the start of the war. They lost the war because they were unable to maintain that superiority. We must make sure all our planning is completely realistic and that full provision is made for sustaining the logistic effort.

Industrial and governmental mobilization planning must be complete, precise, and capable of instant execution. We shall not have time, by trial and error, to improvise war economies in the future. Nor can we expect to survive duplication or inefficiency. The National Security Act of 1947 provides a framework within which it should be possible to make the preparations in time of peace upon which our very lives may depend.

Our research and development must secure and maintain, and our intelligence must confirm, unquestionable superiority in weapons and military equipment. But superiority in quality is not enough. The best possible balance between superiority in quality and superiority in quantity is imperative, and we must see that that balance is maintained all the time.

REF ID: A2020

Since we are aware of our logistic deficiencies and the lessons of World War II, the Armed Forces can do a number of things that will increase the effective employment of our human and material resources in a future emergency. In closing, I should like to suggest a few subjects worthy of thorough study. They are:

1. The improvement of our Industrial Mobilization Plans by carefully correlating them with strategy; maintaining closer relations with industry; by developing and improving sound systems of allocations for materials and facilities, and by intelligently using priorities in both the allocation of raw materials and of end items. I cannot emphasize too much the use of priorities. The proper use of priorities in the allocation of facilities and raw materials as well as end items depends on the strategic planning—what will be need first and where will we need it?

2. The conservation of materiel by standardizing specifications and procurement procedures, by standardizing and improving the operating efficiency of requisitioning and distribution systems; by maintaining balanced stocks; and by improving supply control. Without supply control we cannot tell where we stand. We should improve and simplify our supply control system. We should eliminate nonessential items. During the war we supplied over 375,000 different items to the troops. I am not sure that we needed that many.

3. We should develop a nuclear peacetime logistic organization which is susceptible of instant wartime expansion. In other words, we should have in peacetime a logistic organization that we think is the best and one that we can immediately rely on for expansion in war. We should develop the most efficient theater logistic organizations, that is, we should have a standard organization for all communications zones which supply the theaters of operations overseas.

4. The refinement of plans for the broadest feasible production base, for insuring production continuity, for the most effective use of educational centers, and for utilizing the productive capacity of neutral countries. We know we are now short of certain critical items. We know that certain neutral countries have these items. We should develop that.

5. The supporting and extending of the joint participation of science, industry, and the military in research and development activities.

This is only a partial and imperfect list of studies that should be made in order to apply the logistic lessons of World War II. They are subjects that can be studied profitably by the faculty and students of this school, and we look to you to do it.

Thank you.

RESTRICTED

27

GENERAL McKINLEY: I would like to make a little observation here. The other day I was talking to some British friends of mine that I had served with in Italy. They were over here on the Ruhr Coal Conference. They gave me an idea that I had never thought of. I asked, "How are you getting along over in Berlin? How are you getting along with the restoration of the country?" They said, "We are still suffering from overwinning the war."

The implication there, of course, is that we over-destroyed things in Germany that that country needs to keep it off our necks now. To me that was a new idea. I don't know how new it is to other people. But in line with what you said about the closeness with which strategy and logistics must be coordinated all the way along, it seems to me that if war is to be total and as destructive as we expect it to be, we must look into the future and not make our defeat of the enemy so thorough as to make the care of their country a burden to us when the war is over. I think our strategic plans must contemplate that the destruction which we produce is all for a military purpose and not just as thorough as we can make it.

GENERAL LUTES: I think that is a very good point. It is no for the representatives of the State Department. Do you have any students here from the State Department?

GENERAL McKINLEY: No, sir. There are some in the War College.

GENERAL LUTES: You might coordinate with them on that. This college could be working on it too.

QUESTION: In regard to a logistics organization for the Armed Forces, can you tell the class whether the possibility of organizing a logistics division or logistics corps has been pursued by the other organizations?

GENERAL LUTES: It has been pursued in the planning. There has been no opportunity to really give it a test. There are differences of opinion on it. I would like to see it definitely tested if we had the troops and the money to do it.

The only criticism that I have heard raised against a logistics division is that it would not always be sufficiently flexible to fit into any type of theater of operation and therefore might be wasteful of manpower. In other words, if in your logistics division you needed only fifty percent of the skills in a particular combat area and the other fifty percent is not needed, you would be wasting some of your manpower. On the other hand, there would be many places and times where a properly balanced logistics division, or logistics unit with properly

RESTRICTED

balanced services in it, would be very useful. I would like to see it given a good test.

QUESTION: How much authority do you think the logistic organization should have in the determination of designs of operational equipment? Naturally the operational people want to have the best equipment possible, but it is not always possible to develop and produce a good design in time to be of use.

GENERAL LUTES: That is correct. It depends considerably upon the broad-mindedness of the people involved. We have to fix a time schedule that industry can meet. In other words, if time permits, the customer should get what he wants. If time does not permit, we must modify the specifications so that industry can produce the item in time to be used in combat. Boiled down, that is what it amounts to. We must go along with industry where it says it cannot make an item strictly according to the specifications of the combat forces and get it out on time.

QUESTION: General Lutes, we are all thoroughly aware of the fact that the maintenance of a healthy economy in this country is one of the first prerequisites to being prepared for industrial mobilization or economic mobilization. With that as a background, do you think there is any chance of the military having any more of a voice in the day-to-day economic life of this country than it has had heretofore? I refer to such things as the feasibility of building or the location of transcontinental highways, the carrying of first-class mail by airplanes in order to maintain a healthy air-line industry, and matters like the adequacy of the rolling stock of railroads and the abandonment of nonprofitable rail lines, and things of that kind. They are matters which we military people have not heretofore thought of. But in the light of the possibility that we may have some defensive fighting to do the next time and that strategy has an apparent concern in some of these instances, is there a chance that through such things as the Resources Board the military may have more of a voice than it has had heretofore?

GENERAL LUTES: I think so. Personally, I believe that we will have more and more of a voice. I think the national defense requirements will through this new organization under the National Security Act of 1947 be brought before the public and before the Executive Department of the Nation more than ever before. We have the channels to do it. We have the organization to do it.

I don't know how far our recommendations will go. Nobody can guess that. In a democracy it is bound to be give and take. We will not want it any other way. In other words, the military should not and never will be able to dictate how highways will be built or how private enterprise will point up its efforts, with ut government subsidies.

~~RESTRICTED~~

24.

But I do believe that never before in the history of the United States has private enterprise been more willing to cooperate with the national defense than today. You will find that the leaders of industry are, and for the last twenty years in fact have been, very cooperative with the Government in attempting to do everything possible within the limits of their funds and their abilities to assist the Government in national defense matters. So I believe that we are about on the threshold of a closer relationship between industry and the Government than ever before. I think the recommendations of the Services to the Resources Board will carry considerably more weight.

As a matter of fact, I might tell you that recommendations are already being made by the Army, Navy, and Air Force in matters of that kind. We have just in the last few days recommended that the Secretary of Defense support in every way he possibly can the procurement of more railroad rolling stock. That is a matter of very high priority. We will need it badly in any emergency. Of course, industry needs it now also.

The shortage of cars is due to the shortage of steel. Right now there is a serious question concerning the allocation of steel in the civilian economy, whether oil pipe lines or railroad cars, etc., should get higher priority. But the military is aware of these problems and will make recommendations if practicable.

GENERAL MCKINLEY: General Lutes, you have been very generous with your time. We certainly do appreciate your coming down here again and again. Thank you very much.

(10 November 1947--450)S/mwg