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491

DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS

7 January 1948

L48-64

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
SPEAKER--Colonel John L. Hornor, Faculty, The Industrial College of the Armed Forces .....	1
GENERAL DISCUSSION .....	13

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RESTRICTED

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432

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7 January 1948

COLONEL HORNOR: Captain Worthington, distinguished guests, gentlemen:

When I was in Europe I had no chaplain. You know that colored troops (of which I had my share) need religion. So, as commanding officer, I proceeded to be the preacher. My sermons were often written about 2:00 a.m. on Saturday night, while I waited on calls from Paris and other rear areas which could reach us only then. This particular Saturday night I was very tired; I knew what I wanted to use as a text so I did not bother to look it up. I gave it a chapter and a verse. The text was, "To thine own self be true and it must follow as the night the day thou can'st not then be false to any man." I preached I thought a very good sermon and had pronounced the benediction. As I was leaving my subsistence box pulpit, an enlisted man toward the center of the congregation rose up and asked me for the chapter and verse and said, "I knew Shakespeare was supposed to have stolen from everyone, but I did not know he had quoted the Bible verbatim."

This morning, gentlemen, I am quite sure of my text, though I feel that some of you may disagree with my interpretation of it. For that reason I shall leave ample time for questions. The text is, "The Distribution System for the Army and Air Forces under Unification."

Before we go further into the subject, I wish to emphasize that the most important factor in distribution is the placing of supplies in the hands of the fighting troops when and where they are needed. The soldier in the line, the man in the air, and the sailor on a fighting ship are the big first team. It is up to us to keep that team equipped in the most effective manner. An efficient distribution system is one which will deliver the supplies required by the field forces to them when and where they need them and will be so organized as to place the minimum drain on the resources of the Nation.

War is wasteful at best, and an efficient distribution system will play a very important part in reducing the unnecessary wastage. We saw during World War II many of the resources which we considered ample for fighting any war become most critical. We saw our manpower requirements expand until we were scraping the bottom of the barrel. No matter how efficient the distribution system is, there must be produced, in order to fill the pipe line, more of each item than is actually required by the forces in the field. When a nation has reached the maximum productive effort for which it is either equipped or has resources, it becomes

RESTRICTED

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necessary to eliminate some items desired by the field forces in order to produce a sufficient supply of those which are more essential to these forces. Thus it may be seen that supplies in dead storage whether in warehouses, docks, or even in the forward areas, and increased requirements due to duplication of reserves, poor handling, or poor stock control are not only a waste of the taxpayers' money but also a very definite hindrance to the war effort.

Right down through the ages we have seen each major war become more expensive and require greater tonnages of equipment. Not only are more people and more manufacturing facilities required to produce this equipment, but more people, more communications, and more transport of each type and variety are required to carry the tonnages produced. A comparison in Europe between the number of trucks used during World War I and World War II gives the astounding ratio of 1 to 58. A further long list of statistics could be cited to prove the foregoing subject; however, at this time I believe that any indication of such ratio between the late war and World War III illustrates the drain that will be imposed upon a national economy. By mentioning the drain on a nation's economy, I in no way mean to imply that such a drain should not be placed when necessary. But it is up to us to see that this drain is necessary and that our resources are conserved wherever possible, avoiding waste, duplication of effort, and, probably above all, time in producing the items required to support an operation.

An excellent example of the vast quantities required for the distribution pipe line during the late war may be cited with regard to 105 MM ammunition. There was a total of 85,300,000 rounds manufactured. Only 47,000,000 rounds arrived overseas, and 34,528,000 were fired. This picture I am sure could be drawn of other supplies as well, but these statistics were available, thus saving me further research.

You had for preparatory reading the lectures given last year by General Hall, Admiral Buck, and myself. These lectures should have given you a fair background with regard to the evolution of the distribution systems for the Army, Navy and Air Force from World War I days through to the systems which are presently in operation. Very little change has occurred in the outline of the system planned, with the exception that the Air Force has reduced its depots to six now located at Middletown, Pennsylvania; Warner Robbins, Georgia; Mobile, Alabama; San Antonio, Texas; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Ogden, Utah; and Sacramento, California; and the Army has reduced its planned general distribution depots to four from six, giving up the idea of establishing the depot at Granite City, Illinois, but having the Fifth Army area supplied from Columbus, Ohio, and Ogden, Utah, with the Sixth from Pacific Coast depots. The mechanics of operation, editing of requisitions, and other administrative details are still in the process of being smoothed out.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

423

During the past year, the unification of the Armed Forces has been accomplished by an Act of Congress. This legislation gave very sweeping powers to the Secretary of Defense whereby he may abolish unnecessary arms or services and create new ones where necessary. The Congress has allowed but two years for the accomplishment of unification inasmuch as a great deal of study and many recommendations had been made by the Army, Navy, and Air Force ever since the probability of a merger or of unification became evident.

Today I shall endeavor to outline to you what is hoped to be accomplished on the distribution side of the picture, depicting where possible the advantages that are to accrue and where in my opinion--let me stress "my personal opinion"--the systems as now envisioned appear to be weak or where I feel there is a possibility of strengthening or improving them. These differences, I emphasize, are personal and do not have the blessings or approval of any higher authority. They are placed before you for your critical analysis and evaluation.

Before plunging into the problem, I might give the basis for these personal views which I shall express. From my limited experience I have found that no organization is static. It must perforce be built around the personalities that are to form the teams. Therefore, an organization chart may be only theoretical. I might, in passing, remind you that this sentiment was previously expressed to you also by Dr. Vannevar Bush.

I do believe, however, that no matter what the organization is it must look to one boss: a board or committee may under pressure affect a **compromise** in a hurry which will meet the situation in a passable manner; but when the pressure is not there, the board or committee becomes a debating society, lacks cohesion, and positive direction. One man must make the decisions and must have authority to enforce his decisions.

I think that one of the best examples of a board's failure to accomplish its mission was that of the prewar Army and Navy Munitions Board. It had the authority to make policy but no authority to see that its policies were carried out. After World War II, an effort was made to stimulate the Board by giving it more prestige and placing it directly under the President. This was a help but not enough.

When my class at The Industrial College of the Armed Forces studied the various agencies of the War and Navy Departments, most of them were enthusiastic over the new situation of the Army and Navy Munitions Board. Two of us took exception to the report of the committee and submitted a minority report in which our first conclusion was: That a board without adequate directing power and administrative authority is incapable, due to its very composition, of enforcing the coordination of operations

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by organizations so long and so powerfully entrenched as the Navy bureaus and Army technical services.

On the day of presentation, members of the Army and Navy Munitions Board were present, and it was with trembling knees that I took the rostrum after the presentation of the committee report to make our minority effort. My heart sank when one member of the Board rose before I could have my say and asked to make a few remarks. He invited my attention to our first conclusion and stated that that conclusion was in the past and at that date the basis for the failure of the Army and Navy Munitions Board.

By unification of the Armed Forces it was envisioned that there would be one boss with full authority to make decisions and run the show. The law specifically gave the Secretary of Defense, it was felt, this authority. It further spelled out that he was to coordinate procurement and end duplication of effort and waste in that field. The continuation of procurement is storage and distribution. The Hall Board supplemented by other studies and agreements went into this phase as well, and there was published the booklet entitled, "Army-Air Force Agreements as to the Initial Implementation of The National Security Act of 1947." While these agreements were not the ultimate that was hoped for by those responsible for the report, they did feel that it was a step in the right direction and that problems could be solved as they were met during the period of implementation.

Let us look at these agreements with regard to distribution and see what was apparently intended, what difficulties could be encountered under the agreements, and finally see what the interpretation is and what significance it will have on distribution.

These agreements state:

"a. The distribution system now serving the Army and the Air Forces will remain in effect until modified by mutual agreement or by the Secretary of Defense, except that supplies and equipment now in the actual possession of the Army Air Forces will be released to Air Force control under the provisions of Public Law 253.

"b. Supplies and equipment procured by one department for the other will be earmarked for the using service and carried in stock as credits, subject to user demand. Through the Fiscal Year 1949, the Army will continue to provide the Air Force with supplies and equipment from existing stocks in accordance with current policies and practices except as modified by mutual agreement.

"c. Prior to the preparation of the Fiscal Year 1950 Budget, the Air Force and the Army will collaborate in the analysis of stock control

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

494

accounts, of stocks on hand or under procurement, including war reserve materiel, which were procured for or in support of the Army and/or Air Force, in order that such stocks can be equitably allocated to the Army and Air Force and taken into proper consideration in preparation of the budget. After appropriate allocation these stocks will be earmarked for the using service and carried in storage as credits to user demand."

As a result of these agreements the Army felt that it would be required to store and distribute those items common to both the Army and Air Force as they were presently doing. The Air Force, on the other hand, envisioned the bulk issue of these supplies by the Army to the Air Force, and they in turn would establish their own distribution system.

The first paragraph, which stated that "supplies and equipment now in actual possession of the Air Force will be released to Air Force control," has stirred up two interpretations. The Air Force felt that all property in use by them should become their property, while the Army argues that property on the account of the station property officer is still Army property and only that property actually issued to Air Force organizations with their own stock accounts should be released to Air Force control. The effects of these diverse interpretations go much further than may be seen on the surface, for they affect personnel, storage, stock control, and multitudinous other details.

So far-reaching was the effect that the Secretary of Defense has issued instructions that no transfers will be made for the time being except upon authority of his office. Also, he has stated that all parts of the agreements are subject to his specific approval, which approval he is withholding pending preparation of implementation instructions.

With regard to service troops, it has been decided that for the present the Chief of Engineers will furnish Engineer Aviation Battalions, the Quartermaster General will furnish laundry and bakery units, and so on down the line. One step now being taken in order to establish requirements and usage data is that all requisitions in the zone of the interior will separate Army and Air Force requisition needs and the issuing depots in the overseas theaters will keep that data for the Theater Commander.

Though, under the aforementioned agreements, the Air Force was to prepare its own budget in 1950, it is now fully realized that it will be impossible to accomplish this before the Fiscal Year of 1951 or 52. The system of allocation, coordination of stock control, maintenance of war reserve stocks, the percentage of allocation of stocks for foreign aid, as well as a host of other problems constantly present themselves for solution. Under a completely unified system it is felt that many of these problems would not exist at all and many others could be resolved in a minimum of time with very little effort and no loss of temper.

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You will note from my last year's lecture that I personally am an advocate of centralized control and coordination wherever it is possible. It is my unconfirmed, I repeat "unconfirmed", opinion that such is presently the view of the Office of the Director of Service, Supply, and Procurement. The placing into effect of the General Depot System for the Army was a very definite step in this direction, so far as the Army was concerned.

Feeling that further savings of personnel, warehouse space, and more efficient distribution for the Armed Forces as a whole could be rendered, General Lutes on 10 February issued a directive, the subject of which was "Joint Use of Government Owned and Leased Facilities by Army, Navy, and Air Forces." As a result of this conference the Navy tentatively agreed to establish naval sections in the Army general depots located in the Third, Fourth and Fifth Army areas and agreed to survey possibilities in the Sixth Army area and report later as to the feasibility of establishing a section in that general depot.

It is felt that this step was a very important move toward at least a coordinated supply system for the Armed Forces; however, for one reason or another the Army and Navy seem since that time to have drifted apart. A most glaring example is the present storage situation on the west coast at the Oakland Base where the Navy owns and operates partially used cold storage facilities, while the Army is forced to rent these facilities from civilian concerns. Though coordination does not appear as a necessity in peace, except from a budgetary point of view, certainly it is a necessity in war and any future war will place an even greater premium on coordination.

Though there were many glaring examples of waste, inefficiency, and hindrances to the war effort during World War II, I believe that a most excellent example of uncoordinated distribution occurred during the summer of 1942 at New Caledonia. To quote General Lutes: "A ship congestion occurred in New Caledonia of such serious proportions that my chief, General Somervell, dispatched me to the South Pacific by special plane to determine the trouble and straighten it out. I found 75 ships in the harbor with only 5 berths available for unloading. If not another ship arrived, it would take three months to unload the group riding at anchor. Ashore all forces were competing for space to store equipment. Piers were congested. The one small railway was overworked. Ships were being brought dockside to search for some high priority items needed by the Air or Ground Forces in combat, and if the item was found the ship was pushed back to its anchorage again."

With our forces requiring more supplies than it will be possible for our industry to produce, such a waste of these supplies in dead storage and the enormous reserves set up by each department will force

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

495

us in the next war into an integrated or common distribution system; and, as you all know only too well, it is far more difficult to make a change in organization and procedures under pressure of war with untrained help than it would be to establish and evolve a flexible but satisfactory system now.

Again referring to my last year's lecture, I mentioned an organization chart prepared by two radical members attending the interim course given by this College. That chart was not placed in the pamphlet but I have it here for your benefit.

Referring to Chart 1 being exhibited you have coordination through the Commander of Logistic Forces. Requirements are furnished by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are brought down. We have reallocated the various functions to what would correspond to the combined technical services and technical bureaus in a modified form.

You see here that the Service of Ordnance takes in all Ordnance, guns, and ammunition.

As you heard Colonel Johnson, from the Office of Defense Transportation, say, the Armed Services should certainly get together and have a unified transportation system. We have done that, recommending that the Transportation Service take care of its supply and all transport--land, sea, and air.

All the other services are similarly shown.


This organization, though probably not generally popular, I do feel places logistics in a position commensurate with its importance and seems to agree with the ideas expressed by General Nelson in his lecture on Organization and Admiral Hermann's lecture on Logistics and Requirements.

To show how quickly the importance of logistics may be forced into the background, there was a joint amphibious operation, Seminole, which was conducted between 1 July and 4 November, four months; and at the critique that was held after this maneuver the G-4 was not called on for any report or analysis of the supply problem of this operation. Certainly, a maneuver of this size and scope developed interesting and important problems which were probably even more realistic than the tactical problems encountered. Such failure by the Organization and Training Division of the War Department General Staff and Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, to take cognizance of these problems plainly indicates the interest which will be maintained in logistics as we roll into a period of peace with limited maneuvers caused by reduced budgets, unless those responsible are at a sufficiently high level to continually draw

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

42



RESTRICTED

47 24124

RESTRICTED

497

the attention of those in authority to the importance of logistic support of all operations.

If you recall, in our service schools prior to the war, we had one-half of Troop "A", 1st Cavalry Division, out on the right flank and one-half of Troop "A" on the other flank; no provisions were ever made to supply them. They were to live off the land. That is the place that logistics will soon occupy in the Army again if we are not careful.

This organization could accomplish the new procurement program which keeps procurement at the technical bureau and service level but prescribes a single service to accomplish the procurement of each item. Such an organization would require enabling legislation, which would undoubtedly take time. Such time as it would take, though, could be very well spent by the Armed Forces to get their individual houses in order.

Some work, I might say, is being done along this line. The Navy has obtained \$8,000,000 to set up a stock control system. There are now employed at Mechanicsville, Pennsylvania, 160 people working on the standardization of items with regard to nomenclature and cataloging. Their first task was to take those items which went into the hull of a ship. These items numbered 4,000,000. Upon first screening, the number was reduced to 560,000; and when passed through the final sieve, these items were reduced to 20,000.

By using the Navy here as an example, I do not mean that the Army is perfect or even approaching orderliness. We are far from it. In fact, the Air Force in this particular activity is far out in front of either the Army or the Navy.

There is in this field a joint committee of all three Departments hard at work. To date the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and the Medical Department of the Army have had the most successful results; however, there have been standardized by the joint committee some 1,500 items in electronics, and they are now working on paints, wire rope, and hardware. Indications are that little difficulty should obtain in cleaning and preserving materials, furniture and general office supplies; but in the field of forms, hand tools, and the like, each Department wants its own type adopted, and within the Army and the Navy each bureau or technical service is loath to give up its nomenclature, specification, or form.

When I discussed this matter with a member of the General Staff, he stated, and I quote: "This may be heresy to say, but until the Army and the Navy set up an outfit similar to the Air Forces Materiel Command, there is little hope that we shall be able to achieve much in the matter."

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of unification of logistics for the Armed Forces. The Army and the Navy are, first, organized along different lines and, second, they are not coordinated within themselves." It was not an Air Force officer who made that statement.


With these observations in mind, I should like at this time to submit to you an idea for coordination of the distribution systems of the Armed Services which may either serve as a compromise or which, if such an organization as shown on that chart is deemed feasible, could serve as an interim system until such time as legislation could be enacted and true unification of the Armed Forces distribution system could be affected.

Before going into this next proposed system, let me invite the attention of the Army and the Air Force to the fact that the Navy must be considered under two categories, (1) the Navy ashore and (2) the Navy afloat. The Navy ashore would fall within the scope of this system. The Navy afloat must be considered in the same light as a field army or a task force. Their supplies should be delivered to them in bulk; and their distribution from there on out would be at the discretion of the Admiral in Command, just as it is with the Field Army vested in the authority and responsibility of the Army Commander.

With this in mind, I now will proceed to break the principle which I stated at the outset of my lecture: that is, one boss and the weakness of boards or committees. However, a baby must crawl before it walks; and though we are happy to see it crawl, we look forward to its eventually walking and expect that to happen. A board or committee of the three Services might be the crawling stage. Now, before the baby can crawl, it must pull itself up. This pulling up process is in my opinion the coordination of the technical bureaus of the Navy and technical services of the Army by an organization similar to the Air Force Materiel Command, but modified to meet the common logistic needs of the three Departments. With this accomplished and with single service procurement agreed to by the three Departments, boards could be established for the present in the various distribution areas; and the post, camps, stations, or bases could have a designated depot, whether Army, Navy or Air Force, from which to draw their supplies. This will force the common items procured under the single service procurement agreement to be carried in bulk stock to the lowest possible echelon of supply.

(Referring to Chart 2 being exhibited.) Here we have the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Joint Logistics Assignment Board would be composed of these three Secretaries. Their job would be to allocate and determine the requirements as handed down by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assign procurement to the various technical services and bureaus, designate the storage and

RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

428

RESTRICTED

499

distribution responsibilities of each, and allocate to the various naval districts and army areas the amounts of supplies to be handled.

We come down here and have, for lack of better names, the Navy Materiel Command, the Army Materiel Command, and the Air Force Materiel Command. Their three commanders will form a board to allocate to the various depots the stocks which have been procured, and assign the posts, camps, and stations in those areas to draw from the various depots. They will also have such administrative duties as coordinating transportation, communications, construction, stock control, etc., within the area of their command.

As I said before, I do not like boards, but at least that type of organization would allow you to coordinate the distribution system without any enabling legislation.

To achieve an integrated supply system, I again emphasize, will take time. All three Departments must become less suspicious of one another or, should I put it in the positive sense, must develop more confidence in one another. Which brings to mind a story of two darkies.

It was back during the 1920's when the Eskimo pie (an ice cream bar covered with chocolate) was at the height of its popularity. Amos and Mandy passed a drug store where Amos suggested that they have an Eskimo pie. Mandy turned on him sharply and replied, "Look here nigger, it was all right when you said let's have a grass sandwich, but you ain't g'winter back me up against no snow bank."

The Armed Forces have had their grass sandwich in unification and single-service procurement. They are obviously not wanting to back up against a snow bank. An integrated distribution system is not a snow bank, but, in my opinion, that very good Eskimo pie.

Before summarizing my conclusions, I wish to state that Admiral Buck of the Navy, when outlining the Navy's distribution system next week will point out what he considers the disadvantages of too much coordination, will attempt to prove to you the practicability of keeping the present distribution systems, and will even expand and cite examples where single-service procurement has failed or is at least not as efficient as each Service running its own show. He has been furnished a copy of my lecture and should, therefore, be able to give you a most interesting rebuttal to it, which I feel will either have you thoroughly confused or able to impartially evaluate the two theories, arrive at sound conclusions, and make recommendation in your report which will be worthy of forwarding for consideration to those who must formulate the policies and establish procedures for the distribution system or systems of the Armed Forces.

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In conclusion, I should like to leave with you a few principles which you should consider when conceiving a plan for a distribution system.

1. Volunteer cooperation is fine but it seldom works as well as controlled coordination.

2. Atomic warfare will call for a dispersed yet completely contained distribution system.

3. The next war will tax our national resources more severely than any previous war.

4. An efficient distribution system will materially affect the production effort of our Nation by reducing dead stocks and wastage.

5. An efficient distribution system, by reducing requirements, will go a long way toward assuring the production of those items which are needed by the Armed Forces.

Finally the Distribution system or systems for the Armed Forces must be one which delivers the required supplies to the fighting forces in the quantities desired, when and where they are needed. Yet it must be one which operates efficiently with the minimum waste, dead stocks, loss, spoilage or destruction, and having accomplished the foregoing, places the least amount of drain upon our national resources and peacetime economy.

COLONEL HORNOR: I am now ready to be shot at.

QUESTION: My question concerns overseas operations. Would you have all of the activity in a theater under the control of the Theater Commander, following your "one boss" principle, or would you have in that theater one or more materiel commands to assist him? What would be your idea on that?

COLONEL HORNOR: Actually, that is beyond the scope of my lecture and also beyond the scope of the Industrial College. However, I suspected that a question of that nature would come up; and, feeling very strongly on the subject, I hastily drew up an organization chart.

(Exhibiting Chart 3--not included in appendix.) We already have in the overseas theaters unified command. So that principle is there. He is the boss, and he must be the boss. We have there the Army, Navy, and Air Force all getting their supplies sometimes coordinated, sometimes uncoordinated. I think--and we can do this in the overseas theaters without enabling legislation--that we can place the other chart I exhibited into effect.

# RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

500

You have an Army Commander, Navy Commander, and Air Force Commander. We can create a Logistics Commander, placing all supply personnel and supplies under the control of the Logistics Commander, who reports directly to the Theater Commander.

You have here your general ports of debarkation on the Far Shore under the control of the Logistics Commander, and all the supplies will come in there for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. It will be determined from there on out, from the depots there at the port, which are more or less sorting sheds, what will go to the base general depots for all three Departments, and from there will go the required supplies to the general depots which will serve the various base sections or naval districts in an overseas command.

Does that answer your question?

QUESTIONER: It does, except for one thing, which, perhaps, is clear from the chart; but I want to be sure that it is. That is the matter as to whether the Logistics Commander in a theater will owe his complete allegiance to the Theater Commander or to some logistics command back in the States.

COLONEL HORNOR: He will owe it to the Theater Commander. There can be only one boss anywhere. We saw during the late war, at least so far as the Army was concerned, that whenever anyone cut the channels getting back for supplies, it gummed up the works and it took longer to get them over than when he went through the Theater Commander in getting his supplies overseas. His allegiance is to the Theater Commander, and the Theater Commander will consolidate or will have the Logistics Commander consolidate the requisition needs of all three Services and get them back to the port of embarkation on this side, whether it be New York, Norfolk, New Orleans, or any of the rest of them.

Does that completely answer your question?

QUESTIONER: Yes, it does.

QUESTION: In respect to your remark that distribution in an overseas theater is beyond the scope of the school, it does not seem to me that you can divorce a distribution system for the Services, for the Army or the other services, just because it is overseas--some of it over there and some of it back here. It is all one system, isn't it?

COLONEL HORNOR: It is, and it must be. That is the reason that I came prepared to answer any questions that might come up on it. I do feel that we cannot, so far as distribution systems are concerned, cut off at the port of embarkation. It must go right on through until you

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deliver it to the Navy afloat or to the Field Army at the end of the communications zone.

QUESTION: It is a question of staffing these depots and of the general organization of these depots. In Chart 2 you have a Navy depot and an Army depot and an Air Force depot. Do you visualize the Services running their own depots or an integrated depot for all three?

COLONEL HORNOR: My firm belief, as you probably gathered from my last year's lecture, is that general depots should be used. Chart 2 was prepared for the present time to be used as an interim course. The Army and the Navy and the Air Force all have their depots today. Until they can be brought into a general depot scheme, why, we would continue to use their depots. They have agreed on many items for single-service procurement. For instance, the Army will buy most of the food for the Navy and will distribute it from an Army depot. The Navy will handle the Petroleum, and the Army will go to the Navy for their petroleum needs. In that way, the single-service-procured items are carried in bulk stocks down to the station, post, or base level. The farther up the line you have to break it down and issue it to the Services, the more personnel and handling will be required.

Chart 2 is purely an interim or a compromise affair. I believe in the general depot system and make it a general depot for the Armed Services rather than for just the Army, the Navy, or the Air Force.

QUESTION: What is being done to standardize stock numbers and nomenclature between the Services?

COLONEL HORNOR: There is a joint committee working on that for all of the three Departments; and, as I said, they have already done that so far as 1,500 items in electronics are concerned. They are now working on paint, wire rope, and hardware and have made fair progress on those items. There is probably not going to be too much trouble in getting items of that nature down with a common specification. But when we get to hand tools, as I stated before, the Ordnance Department is going to want a screw driver that is five inches, and the Quartermaster is going to want one that is five and a quarter inches; and there will be considerable fighting in getting them down to a common specification. But they are getting their cataloging together, and that will have to be done when single-service procurement is established.

QUESTION: Going further than that: for example, the Navy has instruments known as class 88. I suppose the Army has a class for instruments and probably the Air Force has a class. Will that be standardized?

# RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

501

COLONEL HORNOR: That will be standardized by this joint committee composed of representatives of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

ADMIRAL MORTON L. RING: I think the committee that the Colonel refers to is the Joint Catalog Agency of the Munitions Board. There are several joint groups and agencies working, but I think you must differentiate between the Catalog Agency of the Munitions Board, which is a single agency composed of representatives of the three Departments and directly under the Munitions Board, and the Standardization of Specifications group, which is a separate outfit from that dealing with cataloging.

In answer to the question just raised, I think you ought to give due credit to one of those things which you dislike so much--a board. The Joint Aeronautics Board, which, as between the Army Air Force and the Bureau of Aeronautics, has accomplished the most outstanding feat of two Services getting together and eliminating any conflict in programs, in nomenclature, in buying, or anything else between the Army Air Force and the Bureau of Aeronautics of the Navy. That is a board.

COLONEL HORNOR: Yes, sir. And the other board, sir, is the Board of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and the Army Medical Department, which, I believe, progressed to a great degree.

ADMIRAL RING: That is not so much a board as it is an agreement between the two Surgeons General to get together and establish in a Navy facility in New York an integrated effort--not a joint effort, but an integrated effort where a report is made to two men.

COLONEL HORNOR: Thank you.

COMMENT: One comment on the Oakland cold storage depot. The Navy ships all of the stores for the Army in the Marianas from the Oakland depot. So the Army does get a great deal of use out of that depot. Its material is shipped from the Navy depot in Navy bottoms and delivered to the Army in the Marianas.

COLONEL HORNOR: Thank you.

QUESTION: I wonder if you would differentiate between the Logistics Commander, as you have him on Chart 3, and the Communications Zone Commander as we had him in the late war.

COLONEL HORNOR: There is very little difference between the Logistics Commander and the Communications Zone Commander. I think there is considerable difference between this idea and what was known in the past as Army Service Forces, where the technical service staff

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was duplicated on the staff of the ASF. I think that was one of the reasons for so much friction between the technical services and the Army Service Forces--if I may criticize an organization that is out of existence now. But the technical services and bureaus, which would be combined, would definitely be part of the staff of the Logistics Commander; and he would not have other sections over his technical bureaus or services

QUESTION: Does this envision the use of the so-called Logistics Division?

COLONEL HORNOR: Yes. I think that that would be used in an overseas theater.

QUESTION: This may be beside the point. But since in the Navy the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts also runs the finances, as does the Finance Department in the Army, do you foresee any possible integration of the finance departments of the three Services?

COLONEL HORNOR: Under the original chart that I put out, I see no reason why not. I said it would take a reallocation of functions to put this into effect because there are no two technical services or technical bureaus which have exactly identical functions. The Bureau of Ordnance and the Ordnance Department and the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and the Medical Department are the two types of service that probably come the closest to having identical functions, but even in those there are differences.

DR. YOSHPE: In carrying out the current procurement functions, the three Services are organized on different patterns of organization, some following their procurement centrally, as in the case of the Air Force at Wright Field, and Navy in Washington to a large extent, whereas the Army has a conglomeration of different patterns, where some purchasing is done centrally on a commodity basis and some is done geographically, as in the case of the Ordnance Department. I wonder whether, in your proposal for an integrated supply system, you have given any thought to the organizational pattern for carrying out the procurement functions.

COLONEL HORNOR: I think that operations must be decentralized. It is more important today than ever before to decentralize operations. If you have them all in one place, they can be wiped out by enemy attack in any future war. The organization for procurement, I think, has to be split up along different lines according to industry. I don't believe that you can base a procurement program on geographical areas. That has been tried before. The Medical Department, for instance, at the outbreak of the war set up purchasing depots over the country. Then they found out there were practically only two locations where they could

# RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

502

procure their medical supplies. They finally centered their purchase of medicine and instruments either in New York or Philadelphia; I have forgotten which of those cities it was. They centered their purchase of hospital equipment in St. Louis. How you will set up your procuring organizations depends upon how industry is organized. As I say, I think it must be decentralized during any future war.

If there are no further questions, that will be all. Thank you.

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