

RESTRICTED

SHIPBUILDING

10 March 1948

L48-107

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10 March 1948

COLONEL CRANE: Gentlemen, we started out our study of shipbuilding by hearing from Admiral Mills from the Navy point of view. This morning we are going to hear a discussion of the shipbuilding problems from the point of view of industry. Our speaker this morning has a wide background of experience in shipbuilding, first as an officer in the Navy, in the Bureau of Construction and Repair, secondly, as an active operator of shipyards, and lastly as president of the industrial association of the shipbuilders, the shipbuilders Council of America, By virtue of his experience and background he has acted as spokesman for the shipbuilding industry in the studies recently conducted before the President's committee on that subject. It is a great honor and privilege to present to you this morning the president of the Shipbuilders Council of America, Mr. H. Gerrish Smith. Mr. Smith.

MR. SMITH: Colonel Crane and gentlemen: Within the past three years, there have been made two important appraisals of the relationship of the shipbuilding and shipping industries to the national welfare. The first was a report prepared jointly for the United States Navy Department and the United States Maritime Commission by the Graduate School of Business Administration of Harvard University and submitted in June of 1945. The second was a report of an Advisory Committee on the Merchant Marine appointed by the President of the United States in March of 1947. This Committee's report was made in November of 1947.

The Harvard study established the following fundamental principles as unavoidable conclusions:

1. "That the contributions of ships and shipyards to security and prosperity are not equal."
2. "That the nature of the shipping and shipbuilding industries and the reason for their existence in the United States has not generally been correctly appraised."
3. "That the requirements of national security are so much greater than the requirements of national prosperity that economic forces alone will not produce either the kind or the amount of shipping and shipbuilding which the country needs for its national welfare."

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Merchant ships engage in both domestic and foreign trade. The volume of shipping and types of ships needed for the domestic trade alone always have been totally inadequate for national security in a time of emergency. To help supply this inadequacy, the Merchant Marine must participate substantially in the carriage of commodities in our export and import trade with foreign nations. The extent of this participation by our Merchant Marine in international trade has presented tantalizing problems for the past hundred years. Many reasons have been ascribed, but the principal one is that American ships, since the use of iron and steel in shipbuilding, cost much more to build and much more to operate than the ships of any other maritime nation engaged in international trade. As a result, it is evident that some assistance must be given by the Government to encourage American private operators in foreign trade so that they can run ships on an equal basis in competition with the shipping of other maritime nations.

Government shipping aid, for many years, has been termed a "subsidy." Parity payments are granted only to permit an American operator of a subsidized line to buy American-built ships at the foreign price and to operate the ships on a basis of equal cost with his foreign competitor. The word "subsidy" is an unfortunate word, as payments made by the Government are for the primary purpose of equalizing the cost of building and operating to the American operator as compared with his foreign competitor, so that ships may be readily available for national security.

In addition to constituting a vital factor in national security, shipping, shipbuilding and ship repairing are, of themselves, important industries that are entitled to consideration entirely aside from the national security aspect.

Shipbuilding and ship repairing give employment to American labor directly or indirectly in practically all industrial communities in the United States. The shipyard itself does not absorb more than half of the labor cost. The remainder goes out to the industries throughout the entire country engaged in the manufacture of the material, equipment, and machinery used in the building of a ship.

Ship operation likewise gives employment to American labor and consumes in its operation a multiplicity of products of American industry.

A chart attached hereto, Exhibit B, exemplifies the broad distribution to American industry of the equipment and materials involved in a moderate building program of various types of ships.

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If the shipbuilding industry is to be preserved, the preservation of its design staffs is vital. Designers must be constantly engaged in work on new construction, in order to keep abreast of the most advanced developments here and abroad.

The preservation of a nucleus of shipbuilders, covering the specialized and skilled craftsmen and supervisors, is equally important, as most of shipyard work is of a type not found in other industries.

In the automobile industry, it is a fact that more automobiles of one type have been produced in one day in one of our large automobile plants than all the seagoing ships of 1,000 gross tons and over produced in all the shipyards of the United States in a peacetime period of 20 years. As a result of the mass demand, large initial expenditures for special machinery and tooling needed in the production of duplicate parts in the automobile industry are justified, whereas such expenditures for machinery for the production of a few similar parts that might go in to one or two ships would be wholly out of the question.

When just two or three ships of the same design are to be built, the cost of the second or third ship is substantially less than the first, because the design plans for the first ship will be applicable to the second and third. The same is true of the work in the mold loft and the patterns that follow.

During World War II, the shipbuilding industry, for the first time in history had an opportunity to demonstrate the advantages of multiple production for as many as 300 ships of one design were built in the same yard. The record shows that after some 60 of these ships were built the man-hours required to complete a ship were nearly cut in two. Even this was not mass production as understood in the other industries previously referred to. Multiple production, however, does not occur in peacetime.

The shipbuilding industry has only two principal sources of demand for ships:

1. The United States Government.
2. Commercial shipping interests.

Private shipyards build for the Navy, the Maritime Commission, the Coast Guard, the Lighthouse Service, the War Department, and the other departments of the Government.

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as essential wartime facilities, the following have been retained for possible emergency use in the future.

Retained by the Maritime Commission

1. North Carolina Shipbuilding Co., Wilmington, North Carolina
2. Kaiser Co., Inc. (Richmond Shipyard No. 3), Richmond, California
3. Bethlehem Alameda Shipyard Co., Alameda, California
4. Kaiser Co., Inc. (Vancouver Yard), Vancouver, Washington

Retained by the Navy

1. Bethlehem-Hingham Co., Hingham, Massachusetts
2. Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. (Port Newark yard) Newark, N.J.
3. Cramp Shipbuilding Co., Philadelphia, Pa.
4. Brown Shipbuilding Co., Houston, Texas
5. Todd Pacific Shipyards, Tacoma, Washington
6. Pacific Car and Foundry Co. (formerly Everett Pacific Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co.,) Everett, Washington
7. American Bridge Co., Ambridge, Pa.

In wartime, all coastal areas as well as the Great Lakes and Great Rivers have contributed to the building of both commercial and naval vessels. In peacetime, the major part of shipbuilding for ocean service is on the east coast. The Great Lakes and the Great Rivers, in peacetime, build commercial ships for their own use. Ship repairing yards exist at all times in all important maritime ports.

There is much detailed ground that might be covered in any characterization of the shipbuilding and ship repairing industry, but I believe that what I have stated is sufficient to give you a reasonably adequate conception of it. At this point, I shall review, first, the status of our merchant shipbuilding, and then of our naval shipbuilding for the past 34 years, to show some of the shortcomings during that era and the present unsatisfactory condition of the industry. This review covers shipbuilding of merchant vessels and of government vessels separately.

MERCHANT SHIP CONSTRUCTION

Due to the failure of the Nation to recognize the need for an American-owned and operated Merchant Marine, the Industry, at the outbreak of World War I in 1914, was not prepared to undertake a

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Act of 1920. This Act set up the machinery for inauguration of merchant shipping services with war-built ships through an operating subsidy; a revolving construction loan fund, and tax exemption on any profits applied to the building of new tonnage. Some incentive was offered for the building of new ships, and a few ships were built. The incentive, however, was not sufficient to promote the replacement by private capital of existing ships with new modern ships to compete with those that were being built continually after the war by other maritime nations.

Then followed the Merchant Marine Act of 1928 in an attempt to remedy some of the defects in the Act of 1920, to stimulate shipbuilding; through mail contracts, the revolving construction fund, and loans at low rates of interest. It resulted in the building of 31 combination passenger and cargo ships, 9 oil tankers, and two freighters. This Act, however, offered little or no incentive for the building of cargo ships.

The third of these acts was the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. This act provided for setting up the Maritime Commission to deal with merchant shipping problems. It provided for a construction differential to make it financially possible for operators designated services to buy ships at the foreign cost, provided that profits in excess of a stipulated percentage were set aside to be applied ultimately to new construction. It directed consideration of a long-range building program. Such a program was actually inaugurated by the Commission in 1938.

Reviewing the interim between World Wars I and II, the Shipbuilding Industry was reasonably active in the completion of World War I program until 1922. There was very little new construction from that date until the building prompted by the Merchant Marine Act of 1928 began. The highgrade combination passenger and cargo ships built under the provisions of that Act provided a healthy impetus to the shipbuilding industry over a period of about four years.

Table 24 and Chart 1(A) establish conclusively the very spotty building over the sixteen-year period from 1922 to 1937, inclusive. The total production of seagoing merchant ships in the United States during this sixteen-year period was less than 1,500,000 gross tons, the yearly average being less than 11 ships, totaling 93,475 gross tons. There were two consecutive years in which only two merchant ships were delivered in each year, and the aggregate tonnage delivered in 1934 was 9,554 gross tons. The production of cargo ships during this sixteen-year period averaged only 3.3 ships a year, and there were six years in which no cargo ships at all were delivered. Construction of oil tankers averaged 3.5 ships a year for the sixteen-year period. There were four years in which no oil tankers at all were delivered.

All of the above contracts were awarded prior to the United States entry into the war in 1941.

The great and continually increasing volume of ship production during the war years was made possible by the multiple production in individual shipyards of hundreds of vessels of the same type, such as those of the Liberty class and those of the Victory class. An opportunity was thus provided to demonstrate the inevitable reduction in cost that results from the use of repetitive processes in multiple production.

NAVAL SHIPBUILDING

At the outbreak of the European war in 1914, the volume of Naval construction in private shipyards was small. The total displacement tonnage of combatant vessels delivered in 1915 was insignificant. However, with the German fleet bottled up by the British, and existing heavy combatant vessels of the British Navy in existence, it was felt that if this country should become involved in the war, United States Naval vessels of smaller types would be more important than the larger types of combatant vessels. Numerous contracts were placed, therefore, for destroyers and submarines in 1915 and 1916, and for a large number of submarine chasers and other small craft.

For some time after the war there was shipbuilding activity in the completion of the prewar program of the larger units of naval vessels, work on which had been suspended at the outbreak of the war. Tables 25, 25-1, 25-2, show naval vessels under construction from 1914 to 1947, inclusive. There was some naval construction during the entire period between the two wars, but it was extremely limited in the sixteen-year period from 1922 to 1937, inclusive, so that, at the beginning of 1933, there were only 38,000 displacement tons of naval vessels under construction in private shipyards.

There was a distinct revival of naval shipbuilding starting in 1934. In this year, Congress established the composition of the Navy at treaty limits, and authorized construction of vessels to reach those limits and to provide for replacements. An Act in 1938 substantially increased the authorized tonnage of combatant vessels, and authorized construction of a number of auxiliaries. In January 1940, an 11 percent expansion of the Navy was authorized by Congress, followed shortly thereafter by a 70 percent increase to provide for what was popularly known as the "Two-Ocean Navy Program." It was in this year, 1940, therefore, that the very large naval program started. This program, together with that for merchant shipbuilding, placed the shipbuilding industry at the outbreak of the war in December 1941, in a position to expand rapidly and carry out the tremendous war program. The tonnage of ships--naval vessels and merchant ships--built in these war years is shown on Tables 24 and 25.

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| <u>Quarter Ending</u> | <u>New Construction</u> | <u>Repair Work</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------|--------------|
| 31 Mar. 1945 | 644,656 | 103,525 | 741,181 |
| 30 June 1945 | 488,792 | 101,919 | 590,711 |
| 30 Sep. 1945 | 291,137 | 84,930 | 376,067 |
| 31 Dec. 1945 | 171,713 | 47,167 | 218,880 |
| 31 Mar. 1946 | 133,728 | 44,848 | 178,576 |
| 30 June 1946 | 90,601 | 52,866 | 143,467 |
| 30 Sep. 1946 | 63,312 | 45,955 | 109,267 |
| 31 Dec. 1946 | 45,801 | 49,226 | 95,027 |
| 31 Mar. 1947 | 34,656 | 80,226 | 114,882 |
| 30 June 1947 | 31,931 | 86,499 | 118,430 |
| 30 Sep. 1947 | 22,005 | 58,736 | 80,741 |
| 31 Dec. 1947 | 28,932 | 74,513 | 103,445 |

Labor rates increased greatly during the war. Average hourly earnings in the shipbuilding and ship repairing industry as of December 1933 and yearly thereafter are as follows:

| | | | |
|---------------|--------|------------------------|---------|
| December 1933 | \$.651 | December 1941 | \$1.060 |
| 1934 | .756 | 1942 | 1.220 |
| 1935 | .774 | 1943 | 1.321 |
| 1936 | .793 | 1944 | 1.385 |
| 1937 | .850 | 1945 | 1.306 |
| 1938 | .847 | 1946 | 1.423 |
| 1939 | .858 | November 1947 | 1.530 |
| 1940 | .897 | (Last month available) | |

During World War II, the industry benefited from the experiences gained in World War I. When demands were increased and expansion was found to be necessary, it was first accomplished, wherever practicable, by extending the facilities of existing organizations or by utilizing the personnel of existing organizations in helping to develop plants in new localities. The best possible use was made of existing staffs to expand the industry in every conceivable way. This applied both in the building yards and in the repairing yards.

Because of the large war production of ships in the United States, there was a marked shift in the relative status of World tonnage at the end of the war as compared with that at the beginning of the war. The table below shows the number of vessels and gross tonnage of several of the important maritime nations in September 1939, as compared with 30 June 1947.

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But the outlook for the industry in the few years ahead is still far from encouraging.

The industry has been sustained since the war largely on re-conversion work on merchant ships from wartime to peacetime requirements. This work is still fairly active but will be largely completed within the next few months. The industry desperately needs additional work, particularly of high-class ships for the Merchant Marine and combatant vessels for the Navy, but the appropriations recommended in the budget report for this year offer little encouragement.

Of particular interest is the Report of the President's Advisory Committee on the Merchant Marine, referred to in the opening paragraphs of this statement. If the recommendations of this report are implemented, they will go far toward preserving the industry in that state of activity essential to meet the Nation's need in the event of another emergency.

Gentlemen, I thank you very much for your very kind attention.

COLONEL CRANE: I would like to start off the questions by asking you this: With reference to these shipyards which are held in reserve by the Maritime Commission and the Navy, they, of course, just represent the physical facilities. There is no organization of personnel in connection with those. Is there any plan for tying that up to the existing shipbuilding organization to sort of sponsor the necessary technical staff of personnel required to operate those plants?

MR. SMITH: No. Not at the present time. Those plants simply exist as dead plants, with caretakers. What the services undoubtedly have in mind, both the Maritime Commission and the Navy, is that if there is any kind of work that those yards can do, they will keep them going. But beyond that, so far as I know, there is no definite organization set up to put them in operation.

QUESTION: With regard to your statement that America needs to build additional high-class passenger ships, how do you reconcile that with the average American feeling that, because of union troubles, they would rather travel on foreign ships? Doesn't that indicate the need for some foreign ships in our trade?

MR. SMITH: I think the need for building those ships is emphasized, first, from the security standpoint; and, secondly, from the fact that ships of that type, together with naval vessels, are about the only types of ships that maintain the high technical skill in the

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
MR. SMITH: It works out to such a small figure, when you get it down in black and white and see what it means, that it is not anywhere near so serious a problem as one would be led to believe. In connection with the Marshall Plan and the carriage of the goods, turning over our own ships, the Federation of Ship Operators has submitted statements which look as though there is a saving of only about one and a half percent, that might be equivalent to what would be considered as our exports in their ships. Take Norway and Sweden and work it out as to exactly what part that represents of their total exports and it is a very small figure. It makes a good argument, and consequently it has been argued to the limit; but the actual benefit accruing to a country from the export standpoint is so small that if they would just invite a few more people to come over and travel around their country and spend money over there, it would more than make up, several times make up, for what they would lose if we were to continue to carry in our own ships what they would like to carry in theirs.

The figures are worth studying. There has been a great deal said and written by the Shipbuilders Federation on that subject. The figures are worth studying because they bring this subject into the light as it has never been brought out before. There has been an important statement made on this subject by Mr. Patchen of the Grace Line. They have exploded the theory to a considerable degree, that we are seriously cutting into the exports from other countries by not letting them carry our products in their ships.

COLONEL CRANE: On behalf of the Commandant I want to thank you for a very interesting and instructive and helpful talk. Thank you very much.

(2 April 1948--450)S.

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GROSS TONS OF STEEL SELF-PROPELLED MERCHANT SHIPS DELIVERED EACH YEAR BY PRIVATE SHIPYARDS BY TYPES 1914-1947

CHART (A)




TABLE 24

TABLE SHOWING GROSS TONNAGE AND NUMBER OF STEEL SELF PROPELLED MERCHANT VESSELS
 - BY TYPES OF SHIPS -
 BUILT IN THE PRIVATE SHIPYARDS OF THE UNITED STATES
 AND DELIVERED IN THE YEARS INDICATED BELOW
 (Includes only vessels of 2,000 gross tons and over)

| Year | CARGO | | TANKER | | PASSENGER AND CARGO | | TOTAL | | |
|------|------------------|------------|-----------------|------------|---------------------|------------|------------------|------------|-------|
| | No. | Gross Tons | No. | Gross Tons | No. | Gross Tons | No. | Gross Tons | |
| 1914 | 16 | 85,542 | 8 | 44,917 | | | 24 | 130,459 | PRE |
| 1915 | 19 | 92,675 | 2 | 11,709 | 2 | 16,510 | 23 | 120,894 | WORLD |
| 1916 | 43 | 187,529 | 23 | 155,896 | 1 | 6,063 | 67 | 349,488 | WARI |
| 1917 | 81 | 382,292 | 39 | 247,003 | | | 120 | 629,295 | WORLD |
| 1918 | 355 | 1,465,520 | 27 | 182,852 | 4 | 23,590 | 386 | 1,671,962 | WARI |
| 1919 | 634 | 2,894,641 | 43 | 279,098 | 3 | 16,549 | 680 | 3,190,288 | POST |
| 1920 | 382 | 1,829,782 | 57 | 390,960 | 11 | 91,916 | 450 | 2,312,658 | WORLD |
| 1921 | 49 | 269,030 | 70 | 554,595 | 19 | 214,072 | 138 | 1,037,697 | WARI |
| 1922 | 10 | 78,442 | 5 | 44,073 | 3 | 41,293 | 18 | 163,808 | |
| 1923 | 10 | 75,524 | 2 | 15,513 | 7 | 33,947 | 19 | 124,984 | |
| 1924 | 5 | 41,232 | 1 | 6,546 | 6 | 35,824 | 12 | 83,602 | |
| 1925 | 8 | 62,162 | | | 3 | 18,850 | 11 | 81,012 | |
| 1926 | 2 | 16,302 | 1 | 8,952 | 5 | 28,789 | 8 | 54,043 | |
| 1927 | 9 | 73,179 | 3 | 30,470 | 7 | 51,294 | 19 | 154,943 | |
| 1928 | | | 2 | 20,630 | 3 | 44,190 | 5 | 64,820 | |
| 1929 | 4 | 24,685 | 1 | 9,096 | 2 | 23,614 | 7 | 57,395 | |
| 1930 | 1 | 7,964 | 10 | 92,933 | 5 | 50,311 | 16 | 151,208 | |
| 1931 | | | 5 | 41,981 | 9 | 108,968 | 14 | 150,949 | |
| 1932 | 2 | 16,122 | | | 13 | 129,348 | 15 | 145,470 | |
| 1933 | | | | | 4 | 49,527 | 4 | 49,527 | |
| 1934 | 2 | 9,544 | | | | | 2 | 9,544 | |
| 1935 | | | 2 | 19,022 | | | 2 | 19,022 | |
| 1936 | | | 8 | 63,428 | | | 8 | 63,428 | |
| 1937 | | | 15 | 121,852 | | | 15 | 121,852 | |
| 1938 | 8 | 43,476 | 16 | 137,930 | 2 | 4,252 | 26 | 185,658 | PRE |
| 1939 | 14 | 91,560 | 11 | 119,429 | 3 | 30,063 | 28 | 241,052 | WORLD |
| 1940 | 31 | 227,275 | 16 | 148,509 | 6 | 68,943 | 53 | 444,727 | WARI |
| 1941 | 61 | 423,019 | 28 | 267,979 | 6 | 58,107 | 95 | 749,105 | |
| 1942 | 652 | 4,678,988 | 61 | 612,121 | 11 | 101,844 | 724 | 5,392,953 | |
| 1943 | 1,410 | 10,116,973 | 231 | 2,163,147 | 20 | 219,753 | 1,661 | 12,499,873 | WORLD |
| 1944 | 1,175 | 8,457,190 | 240 | 2,485,923 | 48 | 461,291 | 1,463 | 11,404,404 | WARI |
| 1945 | 833 | 5,384,610 | 188 | 1,769,583 | 46 | 509,169 | 1,067 | 7,663,362 | |
| 1946 | 78 ^{1/} | 580,749 | 8 | 80,055 | 22 ^{2/} | 11,750 | 88 ^{3/} | 672,554 | POST |
| 1947 | 37 ^{4/} | 190,056 | 5 ^{5/} | 22,662 | 8 | 73,755 | 50 ^{6/} | 286,473 | WORLD |
| 34 | | | | | | | | | |
| Yrs. | 5,931 | 37,806,063 | 1,128 | 10,148,864 | 259 | 2,523,582 | 7,318 | 50,478,509 | |

1/ Includes 1 carfloat, 2 suction dredges and 1 cargo vessel totalling 5610 gr. tons

2/ Includes 1 passenger vessel of 1750 gross tons

3/ Includes totals of footnotes 1/ and 2/

4/ Includes 2 dredges 2600 gr. tons, 4 Seagoing Hopper Dredges 24,000 displ. tons
 2 dredges 7612 gr. tons, 1 cargo vessel 1440 gr. tons

5/ Includes 2 Tankers 3401 gr. tons

6/ Includes totals of footnotes 4/ and 5/

Shipbuilders Council of America,
 21 West Street, New York 6, N. Y.

TABLE 25-1
TABLE SHOWING THE NUMBER AND DISPLACEMENT TONNAGE OF STEEL COMBATANT NAVAL VESSELS BUILT
IN THE SHIPYARDS OF THE UNITED STATES AND DELIVERED IN THE YEARS INDICATED BELOW BY GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS

| Year Delivered | Built in Private Shipyards | | | | | | | | Built in Navy Yards | | | | | | Combined Total | |
|----------------|----------------------------|-----------|------------|---------|---------------|---------|-------|-----------|---------------------|-----------|------------|---------|-------|-----------|----------------|-----------|
| | East Coast | | West Coast | | Gulf & Inland | | Total | | East Coast | | West Coast | | Total | | | |
| | No. | Tons | No. | Tons | No. | Tons | No. | Tons | No. | Tons | No. | Tons | No. | Tons | No. | Tons |
| 1914 | 12 | 35,695 | 3 | 1,176 | | | 15 | 36,871 | 1 | 27,000 | 2 | 408 | 3 | 27,408 | 18 | 64,279 |
| 1915 | | | | | | | | | 7 | 8,135 | | | 7 | 8,135 | 7 | 8,135 |
| 1916 | 19 | 100,405 | | | | | 19 | 100,405 | 1 | 31,400 | | | 1 | 31,400 | 20 | 131,805 |
| 1917 | 4 | 35,610 | 4 | 1,494 | | | 8 | 37,104 | 1 | 676 | 2 | 2,411 | 3 | 3,087 | 11 | 40,191 |
| 1918 | 55 | 55,723 | 19 | 15,950 | | | 74 | 71,673 | 3 | 33,797 | 12 | 8,902 | 15 | 42,699 | 89 | 114,282 |
| 1919 | 110 | 156,603 | 18 | 22,509 | | | 128 | 179,112 | 5 | 5,493 | | | 5 | 5,493 | 133 | 184,605 |
| 1920 | 55 | 69,823 | 26 | 32,796 | | | 81 | 102,619 | 9 | 41,488 | | | 9 | 41,488 | 90 | 144,107 |
| 1921 | 12 | 45,216 | 17 | 22,236 | | | 29 | 67,452 | 4 | 35,731 | 2 | 2,616 | 6 | 38,347 | 35 | 105,799 |
| 1922 | 6 | 5,826 | 1 | 854 | | | 7 | 6,680 | 1 | 876 | 3 | 3,924 | 4 | 4,800 | 11 | 11,480 |
| 1923 | 14 | 111,400 | 9 | 7,200 | | | 23 | 118,600 | 4 | 3,640 | | | 4 | 3,640 | 27 | 122,240 |
| 1924 | 9 | 25,950 | 1 | 800 | | | 10 | 26,750 | 1 | 2,000 | | | 1 | 2,000 | 11 | 28,750 |
| 1925 | 5 | 10,250 | | | | | 5 | 10,250 | 1 | 2,000 | | | 1 | 2,000 | 6 | 12,250 |
| 1926 | | | | | | | | | 1 | 2,000 | | | 1 | 2,000 | 1 | 2,000 |
| 1927 | 2 | 66,000 | | | | | 2 | 66,000 | | | | | | | 2 | 66,000 |
| 1928 | | | | | | | | | 1 | 2,710 | | | 1 | 2,710 | 1 | 2,710 |
| 1929 | 1 | 10,000 | | | | | 1 | 10,000 | | | | | | | 1 | 10,000 |
| 1930 | 3 | 30,000 | | | | | 3 | 30,000 | 2 | 12,730 | 1 | 2,730 | 3 | 15,460 | 6 | 45,460 |
| 1931 | 1 | 10,000 | | | | | 1 | 10,000 | | | 2 | 20,000 | 2 | 20,000 | 3 | 30,000 |
| 1932 | 1 | 10,000 | | | | | 1 | 10,000 | 1 | 1,540 | | | 1 | 1,540 | 2 | 11,540 |
| 1933 | 1 | 10,000 | | | | | 1 | 10,000 | 1 | 1,110 | | | 1 | 1,110 | 2 | 11,110 |
| 1934 | 5 | 27,900 | | | | | 5 | 27,900 | 2 | 20,000 | 2 | 20,000 | 4 | 40,000 | 9 | 67,900 |
| 1935 | | | | | | | | | 7 | 9,950 | 1 | 1,410 | 8 | 11,360 | 8 | 11,360 |
| 1936 | 17 | 35,920 | | | | | 17 | 35,920 | 2 | 4,000 | 3 | 4,430 | 5 | 8,430 | 22 | 44,350 |
| 1937 | 10 | 42,360 | | | | | 10 | 42,360 | 12 | 26,610 | 5 | 7,330 | 17 | 33,940 | 27 | 76,300 |
| 1938 | 11 | 69,900 | 2 | 3,000 | | | 13 | 72,900 | 6 | 25,800 | 1 | 1,450 | 7 | 27,250 | 20 | 100,150 |
| 1939 | 16 | 32,600 | | | | | 16 | 32,600 | 9 | 30,060 | 2 | 2,950 | 11 | 33,010 | 27 | 65,610 |
| 1940 | 12 | 31,705 | | | | | 12 | 31,705 | 14 | 21,060 | 1 | 1,630 | 15 | 22,690 | 27 | 54,395 |
| 1941 | 15 | 45,915 | | | | | 15 | 45,915 | 13 | 87,360 | 3 | 4,555 | 16 | 91,915 | 31 | 137,830 |
| 1942 | 75 | 310,015 | 14 | 22,820 | 5 | 9,925 | 94 | 342,760 | 29 | 80,685 | 6 | 9,150 | 35 | 89,835 | 129 | 432,595 |
| 1943 | 206 | 622,425 | 60 | 112,095 | 121 | 148,950 | 387 | 883,470 | 119 | 253,790 | 39 | 48,050 | 158 | 301,840 | 545 | 1,185,310 |
| 1944 | 175 | 527,050 | 65 | 106,645 | 147 | 175,610 | 387 | 809,305 | 66 | 258,750 | 16 | 25,805 | 82 | 284,555 | 469 | 1,093,860 |
| 1945 | 87 | 345,835 | 17 | 41,200 | 40 | 69,580 | 144 | 456,615 | 31 | 189,105 | 3 | 5,725 | 34 | 194,830 | 178 | 651,445 |
| 1946 | 47 | 239,500 | 4 | 8,800 | 9 | 19,800 | 60 | 268,100 | 6 | 60,480 | | | 6 | 60,480 | 66 | 328,580 |
| 1947 | 2 | 59,500 | 3 | 6,600 | | | 5 | 66,100 | | | | | | | 5 | 66,100 |
| TOTALS | 988 | 3,179,126 | 263 | 406,175 | 322 | 423,865 | 1,573 | 4,009,166 | 360 | 1,279,886 | 106 | 173,476 | 466 | 1,453,362 | 2,039 | 5,462,528 |

Included in the above are the following categories:

Battleships
Aircraft Carriers
Cruisers
Destroyers
Destroyer Escorts
Frigates
High Speed Transports
(Destroyer Escort Type)
Minelayers
(Destroyer Type)
Gunboats
Submarines

Shipbuilders Council of America
21 West Street, New York 6, N.Y.

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