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ORGANIZATION FOR CIVILIAN REQUIREMENTS

14 May 1948

L48-143

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
INTRODUCTION--Colonel John F. Stamm.....	1
SPEAKER--Dr. William Y. Elliott, Professor, Department of Govern- ment, Harvard University.....	1
GENERAL DISCUSSION.....	17

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THE INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

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COLONEL STAMM: We have with us this afternoon an old friend of the Industrial College, Dr. William Y. Elliott, a member of the staff of the School of Government of Harvard University. He has participated actively in both an advisory and administrative capacity in government here in Washington. The subject of his lecture this afternoon will be "Organization for Civilian Requirements."

During the last war, Dr. Elliott was closely associated with civilian requirements, as Vice-Chairman of the War Production Board in the last year of the war. Because of that, he is able to speak to you not only from the theoretical point of view but also from the point of view of someone who has actively participated in civilian requirements in a wartime period. Inasmuch as we consider that an economic mobilization plan cannot be complete without making adequate provisions for civilian requirements, we feel that it is particularly timely that you receive a lecture of this kind right now. For that reason, I take great pleasure in presenting to the College, Dr. William Y. Elliott.

DR. ELLIOTT: Colonel Stamm and members of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces: I like to be thought of as a friend of the College. I hope that will continue. I have usually spoken my mind pretty frankly here, and I have always enjoyed the discussions that have resulted from the talks as much as anything in which I have taken part.

The Industrial College obviously is going to have a tremendously difficult task not only in actual operations but in staff work in the course of any future war, a prospect which all of us are looking at today with eyes more open than ever before. If you will take the trouble to look over the remarks that I have made here over the past few years, you will see that the situation with which we are confronted is no surprise so far as I am concerned. When I was Vice-Chairman for Civilian Requirements, I very nearly was fired out of the War Production Board for trying to attack conditions to Lend-Lease to Russia in the last stages of the war; and I certainly wanted to stop the priorities on their reconversion program, which rated, with military triple A priorities, ahead of everything except the Manhattan Project. We continued delivering these reconversion Lend-Lease supplies for Russia--until the last three or four months--tools, turbines, generators, and many of the things that are the most critical needs of Russia for her war potential. Since transferring my activities after VJ-day up to the "Hill," where I have been in one capacity or another and am now staff director for a couple of congressional committees, it has been my hope that we could stop that business sooner than we have. It has been an incredible spectacle, which history will write down as our folly--I hope not adding the postscript, "Whom the gods wish to destroy, they first make mad."

RESTRICTED

cut down the operation of the civilian economy more successfully than in any other way. The simple device which was used was to say to the branch chiefs in the War Production Board and the division directors, "Unless you control your material with an L and an M order and limit it to its essential uses, you will not get it imported." That was very persuasive. Leon Henderson, as head of the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply, was extremely useful during those days. To his credit be it said that he was prepared to take strenuous measures with the civilian economy. He was often far more rigorous than the industry divisions of the Office of Production Management or later the War Production Management were themselves. But his persuasions, which were public and in the nature of berating, were not always so effective as the simple device of saying, "You don't get the imported materials unless you control them."

It is very useful to have one simple power that will enable you to say "No," and it is essential in the organization of the civilian economy that that power be conferred at the earliest stages and used sensibly with due clearance, with complete staff work to gear it into the military effort, and at the same time with a full realization of the essential elements of the civilian economy which are indirect war components and which maintain its efficiency as a productive system.

Now, it is in regard to civilian requirements that I want to address my remarks to you today--first, in terms of the organization which the title suggests; secondly, in terms of some of the operating problems that will be, in my judgment, very different in any future war that we might fight from what they were in World War II; and thirdly, in the light of those two foregoing problems, in terms of looking at the setup that we ought to be contemplating at this time in relation to the National Security Resources Board and the National Security Council in adequately treating this problem of the civilian economy before it is too late. Without several well-studied alternative plans we have to improvize and do many unplanned and unwise things as a result.

Let me start off by saying that in a general way the problem of the organization of the civilian economy in wartime has preoccupied the British, of necessity, since the creation of the Committee of Imperial Defense, which was one of Balfour's most far-sighted steps in 1904. The humiliation of the Boer War and the sudden rise in the tempo of the danger signals in Europe, with the threat of Germany to the British at about that period, resulted, of course, in their taking the situation in hand and in the creation of this Committee of Imperial Defense, on which, to some extent, our own machinery has been modeled--not slavishly or consciously in all instances, however. Addressing itself to the same problems, our National Security Council has necessarily begun to set up the same kind of committees and subcommittees and so on.

RESTRICTED

Then, too, the scientific brains of any country are much better used as scientific brains today than they are when put somewhere on a kitchen-police detail or in some other form of "military" activity. A man who today is really in the forefront of nuclear physics, for instance, I suppose there is no argument, is not a fellow you would want to have even in a very important military command; and as a youngster, he is not likely to be available for such. There are dozens of other fellows, perhaps hundreds and thousands, who are as good or better than he is in that way.

So the exemptions, the classifications, and the kinds of reserve occupations that have to be worked out to protect the basic elements of a war-supporting civilian economy, assuming we all agree on an all-out war effort, are very important military factors. Two large-scale wars close together, the change in the governing classes and the tempo in England, the disappearance of cheap coal, its economic position generally, and fifth-generation capitalism (or ca-PIT-a-lism, as they pronounce it) have all had their effect on the passing of the British Empire. But a very important cause for its decline could be written down as being the fact that a generation of leaders in England was killed off as volunteers in the first months, in many instances, of the first war, often even before they had an opportunity to become the officers whom they logically should have been. A very wasteful use of manpower and serious in its consequence! If you read the honor rolls of the dead in Oxford or Cambridge or any other college in England, the names of that lost generation--and it is more than a generation--are a terrible commentary on the gap between the generation of Lloyd George and Baldwin and so on and the young leaders who should have been taking over. A young man like Eden, who was not really a notable fellow at my time in Oxford, is able to go up to the top because the competition is not very keen. That is the result, to some degree, of this slaughter of talent that I am talking about. I think you have to consider--and I am urging it on you because military men are so apt not to consider that as part of their military problem--that the proper use and safeguarding of the irreplaceable part of manpower, your top national brains, is a very critical part of the war effort. Any war that we fight in the future is not going to be one in which there are just front lines, that is, so far as the distribution of risk is concerned. It is more likely to be more evened up than anything we have seen in the past, so far as this country is concerned and so far as I can see. The manpower problem is one that any kind of an organization of a war economy has to consider, and enough manpower has to be left for essential civilian economy.

The Production Committee in the Committee of Imperial Defense was a third one. Largely speaking, the Ministry of Production in England came out of that. Our War Production Board fulfilled the combined functions of the Ministry of Supply and the Ministry of Production in England. I think ours is a better arrangement. I do not see any

RESTRICTED

One of the committees that the Committee of Imperial Defense set up in addition to Intelligence was Enemy Alien and Subversive Activities Control so that they could light on enemy agents pronto and keep on top of them. One of the problems that we have in our system is a certain amount of jealousy between the intelligence agencies of our Government. The problem of centralizing their functions and proper clearing is greatly important but not properly recognized. Good intelligence would have saved us from some of the most ghastly mistakes of this war, including paying a price to Russia to come into it in the Far East when we ought to have threatened her to keep out of it. That was a failure of intelligence, a complete misunderstanding of the Japanese position in Manchuria, as Donovan and others have admitted, and for reasons that one need not go into.

Control of subversive activities becomes a very important part of this picture, particularly as in a country like ours today sabotage and fifth-column activities may readily change the whole industrial potential of the country in a very limited time. If you recall, the ore from Mesabi Range, on which the steel production in this country depends to an appalling degree (at least 80 or 90 percent), passes through the Soo Locks, of which modernizing and extension was being done by a former Chief of Engineers--I forget his name--during the war. I got in on that when the Escanaba by-pass problem was dumped in my lap. "Without being paid two or three billion dollars," he said, "if I were a Nazi agent, I could put a few drums of high explosive in the stream, with rudders, fins, and motors on them, and stop this war pretty quickly, so far as this country is concerned." That may have been an exaggeration, but knock out the Soo Locks and you would do something pretty drastic. It would take a long time to put some of them back if they were knocked out properly. And those things are known objectives.

The Russians were known to have their eyes on them during the recent war. They picked them out as something to be thinking about--not the Nazis, the Russians. We are beginning to get stories and confirmations of things of that sort. They are not idiots about these things. Bottlenecks in our transportation system and port facilities could be brought about without dreaming up the effects of atomic weapons on cities. You don't have to have them to do a job. Bacteriological and other types of warfare are things not to be bandied about in discussions by laymen. However, atomic weapons do have their importance; they are bound to play a role against us, too, in any war that begins in or lasts into the 1950's. Whatever methods are used, fifth-column and subversive activities can cut down the productive capacity of a country simply appallingly, so that our whole effort might be entirely different in character. We might have to carry on, on a limping basis rather than a full-production basis unless we have properly taken those things into account. The whole civilian economy could be crippled so that little would be left except for the war uses needed for survival.

RESTRICTED

durable goods, such as refrigerators and washing machines-- if the repair parts and servicing are kept going. Things like washing machines and laundry services help maintain the efficiency of the American home and allow women to go to work in a factory because they don't have to spend all their time working at home. In the long run you in the military effort are the gainer; you have a labor supply instead of having the women washing clothes in the old way. There must be repair parts and servicing. There must be a tremendous backlog of things that will keep the economy going at its basic minimum levels in a high production economy like ours. Our efficiency depends on electric motors and gadgets to save human labor for more productive uses.

As to rationing, there must be enough in the rationing inventory to make the ration good, or you will just get into a horrible mess. It is better not to ration sometimes and let the distribution go completely to pot, with all the inflationary and bad effects that that represents, than to ration something in a way that is completely inequitable and not based on adequate pipe lines and inventories. But in general these things that have to be rationed--we looked at a few of them during this war, gasoline, fuels, and I think in any future war we would come to it with clothing of an essential character pretty quickly-- should be rationed as early as possible.

The same thing applies to price fixing. The economy must be controlled and this should be done quickly, not the way the OPA did it during the late war. The "general max" thing that they plumed themselves on so much was an invitation to upgrading and line-shifting. If you remember, the "general maximum" regulation permitted a person to make a percentage of profit at the level at which he had been previously doing business. It did not deny him the right to shift from one type of production to another. What did he do? He immediately shifted up the line to the luxury article, where he made maybe fifteen percent by a higher price; and he did not go on making low-cost underwear or something of that kind, the things that the ordinary man has to have.

In WPB we handled leather very differently from textiles during the war. To me it was an object lesson. I would recommend it as an immediate step to be taken in respect to anything. We just froze every type of production that a manufacturer was engaged in, except for his war contracts. He went on making the same line of shoes with what was left of his civilian production. He couldn't upgrade them. We took that right out of the OPA's hands; and there was no problem about shoes at any time during the war that couldn't be licked, though we did have some difficulty with baby shoes (white) and a few items of that sort at one time or another. We got shoes at reasonable prices and we let them make a reasonable profit. We didn't try to squeeze all the profit out of them, as some of the mistaken "all-out" boys did in OPA. We did hold them down to a line that did not permit upgrading and upgrading and

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

War Production Board proper running another part of it, all arguing with one another and having to go up to Vinson every few weeks or months to straighten out the quarrel--and we often didn't get it straightened out then! That didn't make any sense. It is easier for the OPA fellow to resist pressure under that system. He will say, "I have nothing to do with production. Go over and talk to the branch chief in WPB." The branch chief, too, passes the buck. "Elliott, in the Office of Civilian Requirements--he's the guy that writes those orders. Go over and see him about them. He's trying to do this, that, and the other, and so on." That's nice as a way of "passing the buck," but it is not very sensible if you are trying to accomplish a result and get something done.

I recommend highly the Canadian alternative (and the British controller system was the same sort of thing) as a different kind of proposition. That would apply, in my judgment, at least to the service industries which my shop ran. We didn't have power over price controls in those, but we should have had. We should have had the whole problem. If there were going to be ceilings on hotels, we ought to have done it. We were running the hotel problem, the movies, laundries and everything else of that order. Certainly the service industries ought to be a primary part of the civilian side of war controls, and they all ought to be in one pot. Then getting a general price policy could be a staff job of the top single war agency.

The same reasoning ought to apply to textiles, in my judgment, across the board, as it did in Canada. With us the textiles were not part of the OCR. You can argue that a great part of a war is fought with textiles. Certainly, it is. In that line they were controlled by a WPB industry division. But they did not fail to produce textiles in Canada for the Army there because they had them under civilian control, rather than under Howe's Munitions control. On the contrary, I think the Canadians did an extremely good job. They did a balanced job and they prevented disproportionate luxury production and things of that sort, which were really the gross scandal of our whole operation.

Leather is the same story.

Consumer durable goods you can argue about, but I would put them in the same category. These are the nuclear products in the civilian economy.

You can argue about transportation being a separate setup. It affects the war so drastically that I think it must have a separate setup. But I think there ought to be a much clearer line of authority leading down from one central war agency than there was in the recent war, for integrating the entire picture. We had, to the degree Donelson didn't give it up at one stage or another, the priority power to integrate that kind of thing. We never made it stick except on import

RESTRICTED

a complete series of alternative studies, with a reserve corps of people to draw from who would fit into slots in just the same way that your military reserves would, with training, every year, of two or three weeks for some of them, two months for others, with a period for getting the whole staff together down here so that they can look at the state of affairs at one time. The statistical controls should be set up and ready to go, with basic information kept as complete and up to date as possible.

I have just finished the Herter report for the Select Committee on Foreign Aid. It will be out Monday. It is not quite so large as a telephone directory. I think it is a useful document. Nothing was more shocking to me in doing that report than to see the state of the statistics in our system of government, since the war. I spent six of the most painful months of my life trying to iron out the shipping statistics in 1942 and get them set up properly. We had them under control after a big fight. We didn't do it completely, but we made them make some sense. We worked out a system under the M-63 order and reporting forms that give you a setup that you could really check on through the Customs, not by adding a lot of new machinery, but by making the Customs workers do some things that are useful instead of what they were doing, or aren't. You can do many things of that sort. The statistical controls and the knowledge of where you are in an economy are absolutely essential to staff work. I am going to conclude my remarks on this part of it by just suggesting that this peacetime staff work-- and that is what it has to be; it is not an operating proposition-- must be undertaken to get the strategic-material problem under proper control.

As to stockpiling, I believe we wrote into this act (Economic Cooperation Administration) every provision for stockpiling that I could think of with the full backing and under the instructions of my committee. Nothing was more impressive than the consensus in Congress on getting paid back some part of our large outlay through these "deficiency materials." These provisions in several sections, but, particularly in 115 f of Title I, got through everybody, including Senator Vandenberg, who had been briefed against them by the State Department. He was very sensible and level headed, a fine fellow. When he heard the arguments, he understood them; and in the late night conference we had, he seemed to me very just in his appraisals. There it is in the bill and nobody has any excuse as an administrator of the ECA or as a negotiator, including Averell Harriman, for not protecting our interests and getting some strategic materials. That bill is well-written on that part, (the ECA) I will say that; and if you fellows in the Army and the Navy don't get your Munitions Board, the boys over in Hill's shop, and the rest of them to do a job on that, I'll haunt you. /Laughter/ I don't ever again want to go through a period such as I spent in 1940 and 1941

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

furnished a magnificent leadership. This resolution that he put through the other day is the complete answer to "reform" so far as I am concerned. It takes the thing by stages and by steps and in the right way.

Now looking at the world in those terms, we see that civilian requirements must be something entirely different from an easing into a war on a two-year basis. Those L and M orders ought to be there now, ready to go into effect tomorrow or any day at need. The conversion orders ought to be there now. The limits on profit, the setting up of every kind of fiscal control, the tax policy, the budgetary setup--all this the Committee of Imperial Defense tried rather painfully and somewhat inadequately to do in England.

I tried to get Mr. Roosevelt to set up such a war plan in 1936 when we were working on the Committee on Administrative Management. I had the confidential portion of that report on the White House Executive Office and Staff to do for him. He said "No. No War Planning Committee. Baruch would run away with it!" Those were his words. "I won't touch it." Baruch ran away with it anyhow, maybe. But the point was that the President of the United States at that time chose to let go the whole organizational problem of this area, which certainly had some importance, for reasons that to him may have been perfectly adequate, even though they appeared to center in his fear of one man, I never quite understood the importance of that decision. But I suppose a man who viewed it politically and who understood Baruch better than I did might have found that an adequate reason. To me he seems to have served his country well--I believe History may say more wisely than did F.D.R.

This time we cannot afford to let anything deter us from that kind of a step. The setup that is being created around the Defense Council (The National Security Council) and the Resources Board is, in my judgment, as important as anything we are doing, although it is getting far less attention than many other things. I don't know what the Council is doing. I hope it is doing something and not doing what Burke said had been done in England at the end of the eighteenth century or thereabouts: "We have three Secretaries of State," he said, "and we have just created a fourth to see why the others are doing nothing." /Laughter/ I trust that will not be its fate.

In the area of civilian requirements, the point I am trying to make is that this is not going to be a nice, leisurely proposition of persuading and selling a lot of people to the effect that sacrifices are going to be demanded, that they must not advertise special sales--that is what I spent a lot of time doing during the war--and that it would be well if they had a voluntary form of rationing. This one is going to be something that we will have to jump on quickly; we will

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

have to mean business, carry it through, be wise enough not to arouse popular resentment, get the leadership that can do it, suppress sabotage and subversion, which you know are going to be more powerful this time than at any previous time, and carry on as a "united nation" in a world in which we hope to have and maintain our allies, giving them the leadership and moral tone that the world requires and such as free men have a right to demand.

I think we have that leadership in many parts, in spite of our political difficulties and upheavals; and it is on both sides of the fence. But we must make it stick. And you in the Industrial College must study it in a way that military men have never had to rack their brains before in this country. The job that you have before you is not a very easy one, but I hope you will be up to it. You have my blessing, for whatever it is worth, as an ex-civilian requirements fellow who does not want to do it again.

QUESTION: Sir, it would seem that our need for proper statistics would apply in peacetime as well as wartime.

DR. ELLIOTT: Yes, sir.

QUESTIONER: Would it be feasible to have a centralized governmental statistical agency?

DR. ELLIOTT: There is supposed to be such a thing in the Bureau of the Budget, but for budgetary reasons it doesn't have many to work for it. I do not want to be harsh about this, but there are enough statisticians running around to do the job if anybody ever put them together. We really have a terrible problem of that sort, and there is a lack of a setup like the War Production Board, the Requirements Committee, the Combined Board, and the General Staff. I think one of the big military functions of your outfit here is to try to see if you cannot put some pressure, at cabinet levels and elsewhere, on that problem.

QUESTION: There has been considerable discussion about getting the business of running the country during wartime into the hands of civilians. It resulted in the National Defense Act which we now have. My question is: Can we, through the sort of system which the National Defense Act sets up, get the necessary push to have a complete system for running the country under the kind of an emergency that you visualize unless the Armed Forces take a greater lead in it?

DR. ELLIOTT: I hope you do. Otherwise I would be in a bad way in answering that question. Of course, you could have raised an even more fundamental question, couldn't you? Couldn't you have raised the question whether a democratic form of government with checks and balances,

RESTRICTED

not to worry about them, then I won't put so much emphasis on quinine, rubber, tin, and so on." I couldn't get anybody to open his mouth or put anything on paper or even say "shut up." So I drew my own map of what I thought we could count on and hold, and what I thought we couldn't. I happened to be pretty nearly correct, but anyhow we went ahead on that basis. We had no other.

The point is we could not get close to any kind of strategic information in the War Production Board, and yet we were having to make decisions every day where such information was needed. Let us have all the necessary elements geared in together in one agency in peacetime. That ought to be civilian in its control and inspiration because that is the nature of our government. You cannot just put a uniform on somebody and say he's the boy to do it.

The Chiefs of Staff have never had any trouble getting themselves taken seriously by anybody except Harry Hopkins, so far as I know, and only the Russians or the British could get Harry to take them seriously. In other words, they had their weight in wartime and they always do. But one of the pathetic things about this is that we starve the Army and kick it around in peacetime, but in wartime we say, "Miracle men, tell us how to be saved."

QUESTIONER: That is what has me worried. We don't set up the organization to perform like miracle men and then we are called upon to do it.

DR. ELLIOTT: That's right. However, there were a few miracles of leadership performed during the late war in the ranks of generals and admirals. People who had never operated with a division suddenly bloomed into the greatest generals and admirals that we and perhaps the world have ever produced in the way of handling armies and great naval combinations. But I don't know what we could have other than the device that I have suggested to you we should have in peacetime, with a trained regular reserve of people who are on call at all times as the skeleton of this force. But I am talking to the wrong people. I think you pretty well go along with that.

DR. YOSHPE: Dr. Elliott, you made a strong plea for an integrated war organization in which price control, rationing, production and manpower controls would be set up in one place for more effective war administration.

DR. ELLIOTT: At least under a line of command that ultimately came back to a single head.

DR. YOSHPE: Yes. I wondered whether in the light of that, you might comment on the current thinking in the NSRB. We do have a knowledge

RESTRICTED

positions and that sort of thing in a comparatively short time. We have nobody with long-time experience to hold the thing together. Well, there are a few of them, such as Kennan and Chip Bohlen, Peurifoy, Ravendahl and some Foreign Service Officers. But we don't have enough of permanent civil service or permanent government employment and we don't pay anybody enough to make it worth his while.

QUESTION: Doctor, would you mind discussing the problem of the determination of minimum civilian requirements?

DR. ELLIOTT: I did last year and it is all in the book. That is the reason I didn't talk about it this year. But you are a new lot. I have fifteen minutes. I will give you five minutes on it, if that suits you.

There isn't any way to determine minimum essential civilian requirements that is anything more than arbitrary guess work because we can't be sure of (a) the immediate part of our economy that won't be destroyed or damaged very soon in the next war; and (b) what our "allies," so-called, can do to help us, or what we shall have to do to help them. Alternative war plans should exist for several different answers to these problems, and a different level of civilian economy would have to be planned for each. The best thing that I can say about it from my own experience is that an economy limps along on a basis that will carry an expanded wartime activity on a level that is substantially at the average prewar level in the essential items. You can't cut shoe requirements below those, subtracting the Army and so on, without trouble. You can cut out, if you are strong minded enough, all kinds of luxury productions except women's beauty aids. Nobody in his right mind will cut that one. Not even Stalin succeeded in doing that, and Hitler and Mussolini failed miserably. I think we had better leave that one alone, that is, cosmetics and so on.

Determining what are the essential things in a civilian economy depends on how desperately you are fighting for your life. It is all relative to that. You could run for a year to two years without anybody having any new clothes in this country, because even the babies who are newly born would find somebody else's diapers if they had to. Other people have done it longer than that, but it wouldn't be wise to do it. The cutting off of employment in all these types of production suddenly, with no shift immediately possible to war industries would be extremely unwise. It would be very unsettling to just clamp down an order and say, "No more of this, that, or the other is to be made" all at a bang, without any plans for what you are going to do with the people to push them into other occupations, without consideration, for instance, of the net effect.

RESTRICTED

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whoever is to succeed Mr. Hill, to work out if they meant to do it. I hope that you will not run into the usual jealousies that do occur in that sort of thing, as to who does what and who is top dog and so on. But I am afraid that is likely to persist for some time. The new agency should have real and unified powers to get strategic materials, to plan and implement necessary war facilities, with its own budget, or directive authority on other funds.

QUESTION: Doctor, would you mind going back to this question of personnel? You speak of setting up this reserve corps in peacetime with which to staff the agencies in wartime. It has been my impression, which was definitely confirmed during our recent field trip, that the kind of men we want for that out in industry now are not willing to spend the time to come in here to Washington for the sort of orientation of which you speak.

DR. ELLIOTT: That's right--as things now stand. At least too few of them are, for any real length of time.

QUESTIONER: How can we go about persuading them? It seems to me that is the crux of the whole problem.

DR. ELLIOTT: I tried to suggest that in answering a previous question. Large enough salaries and allowances is a part of it. A draft law in peacetime that can't be shrugged off is another part.

QUESTIONER: I understood that was on a permanent basis.

DR. ELLIOTT: The same thing applies. Any National Service Act that we pass ought to contain provisions for establishing and maintaining a reserve, civilian and military, as a part of the ordinary operations of our manpower problem for war. It ought to require the protection of the jobs of the people concerned. It ought to impose a duty of spending a certain amount of time, at the option of the Government, with appropriate safeguards in pay. It ought to have a provision for drafting people in peacetime. If you can take my boy and anybody else's boy and put them in uniform and let them get shot at in Korea or somewhere else, I don't see why anybody who is working for General Electric or Harvard University or anybody else should not be under the same kind of proposition. Of course, it is a little hard to pick on certain fellows. But, after all, you ought to be establishing a reserve all the way across the board. And this manpower setup that I am talking about means the legal power to enforce a universal draft for which some part of the service would be performed during an appropriate time. Ordinarily a fellow can manage two weeks or a month any year, from his business. The service ought to be passed around among business, too. He could take more time if it were properly done, but he must be covered in the same way that the Selective Service Act covered the people under that.

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