THE ROLE OF JCS IN THE GENERATION OF MATERIAL REQUIREMENTS

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GENERAL HOLMAN: Today we have the first lecture of the Requirements course. An understanding of the top-level organizations and their functions is of importance because from the plans of the top-level organizations stem the basic material requirements which are a guide to economic mobilization.

Our speaker for today is the Deputy Director for Joint Logistics, the Joint Staff. He has held, since the war, some very important assignments in the Office of the Under Secretary of War and in the Legislative and Liaison Group of the Office of the Chief of Staff.

During the war he was assigned to the Persian Gulf Command. Our speaker has a keen appreciation for the importance of logistic planning with respect to strategy and combined operations.

It is my pleasure to introduce to you today Brigadier General Donald P. Booth, who will speak to us on the subject of "The Role of JCS in the Generation of Material Requirements."

General Booth.

GENERAL BOOTH: General Holman and Gentlemen: Since this is the first of a series of lectures and seminars on the subject of "Requirements," our first consideration is the generation of requirements.

I have been asked to discuss the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their organizations, functions, and procedures insofar as they affect the generation of requirements.

I intend to cover the subject by outlining the influence of the National Security Council on strategic plans and by showing you in more detail how joint strategic plans are made and how they generate the requirements.

It would be well at the outset of my talk to clarify my use of the word "requirements" since the same word has two meanings, depending upon its use. When I use the word "requirements," I mean the demand for personnel or for end products from industry except when I refer to the "requirements" of a strategic plan. Strategic or war plans do not list end-item requirements. The strategic plan places "requirements" on the three Services by using as a unit of measure typical tactical forces and lists them at specified time intervals on and after D-day. For instance, a plan may show that at D-4 months, the Army is to have perhaps 29 divisions in place operational, the Navy 15 carrier task groups, and the Air Force 9 air groups. These "requirements" need further translation into the "requirements" as you and I understand them in most of today's discussion.

Chart No. 1 shows the NSC and JSC relationship to the President and other agencies for national security.

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THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The National Security Council is a new organization, created by the National Security Act of 1947. It is the first time in our history that we have had an agency responsible to integrate domestic, foreign, and military policies.

The role of the Council is to make policy recommendations to the President. It discusses and considers the very highest national policy matters. The part of the work of the Council that is of primary interest to us today is the responsibility of NSC to develop national objectives, but their work is far more extensive than recommending national objective to the President. The scope of the work that confronted the Council a year ago was almost unlimited. As would be expected, much of the year's work was taken up in establishing integrated U. S. policy as to our posit with respect to those foreign countries where the policy involves nationa security. The Council also has considered such things as preparedness, internal security, and import-export control.

As you look back over the past year and consider the unsettled critic world situation, you can realize that NSC has been confronted with proble not only of the greatest importance but of the highest urgency.

The Council consists of President Truman, Secretary Marshall, Secreta Forrestal, Royall, Sullivan, and Symington, and Mr. Arthur Hill (Chairmar of the National Security Resources Board). Mr. Sidney W. Souers is Execu Secretary.

The Council meets on the first and third Thursdays of each month and has had 23 meetings.

The President has attended and presided over five of these meetings. In his absence Secretary Marshall presides, or--if he is absent--Secretar Forrestal.

Besides the Council members the meetings are attended by only Mr. Sou and an assistant, Mr. Lay; Mr. Lovett, Under Secretary of State; General Gruenther, Director of the Joint Staff; and Mr. Blum, Office of the Secretary of Defense. The two latter accompany Mr. Forrestal.

You will be interested in the working organization of the NSC. Immediately below the Council level are the NSC consultants consisting of Mr. George Kennan, Director of the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department, Mr. Fahey of the NSRB, General Norstad, General Wedemeyer, and Admiral Struble. The consultants meet less frequently than the Council itself, but all studies are processed through them before being presented to the individual NSC members for final consideration.

CHART NO. 1


PRESIDENT OF THE U. S.
(COMMANDER IN CHIEF)
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WAR COUNCIL
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
MUNITIONS BOARD
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
UNIFIED FIELD COMMANDS

Below the consultant level is the NSC staff. This working staff consists of one representative each from the State Department, the NSRB, Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The Services are represented by an Army lieutenant colonel, a Navy captain, and an Air Force colonel. This staff meets as often as required--from three times a week to daily, depending on the load. Usually they work in their own agencies in the mornings and in NSC in the afternoons.

You may have noticed recently the statements made in the press that the Military dominate the NSC. Press arguments have been pro and con with the pros calling attention to and accenting the military experience of all Council members and the bulk of the consultants, while the cons point out that all but General Marshall have primary civilian backgrounds.

In this regard, the Hoover Commission which is studying reorganization of the Executive Departments now has a subcommittee under Mr. Eberstadt studying the National Security Organization. I don't know what recommendations the Eberstadt Committee will make in regard to either NSC or the JCS, but, regardless of what reorganization is advocated, it must be concluded that NSC is a very necessary agency in our Government. As time goes by, the value of NSC will become more obvious.

Except that NSC furnishes copies of their papers to the JCS, and they are furnished such JCS papers as are of interest to them, there is no direct relationship between the two organizations.

The national war objectives as approved by the President after being formulated in NSC have great over-all effect upon the generation of requirements since the all strategic war planning must be pointed toward accomplishing the war objectives. The "mission" of a war plan is to accomplish the national objectives. Individual objectives also may have considerable influence upon requirements. For instance, to go back to prewar days, a war objective such as one to implement a large scale denazification program with our military forces compared to an objective merely to destroy Nazi military power obviously increases the military requirements.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Our interest in the Joint Chiefs of Staff in today's discussion is in their responsibility to develop strategic plans.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff was established soon after Pearl Harbor to meet a war need to parallel the British Chiefs of Staff Committee and to provide U. S. membership for the Combined Chiefs. The JCS received statutory recognition in the National Security Act of 1947. The law modified the previous JCS organization by providing a director and a joint staff limited to 100 officers.

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The Joint Chiefs of Staff is more than a committee of the four chiefs. It is a complex organization which can make use of all the experience, skil and technical knowledge in all of the Services.

The JCS is a planning and advisory agency. It should be understood tha it functions at a policy-making level and is not an operating agency in th usually accepted sense. Whenever the JCS enter the field of operations, t designate one of the service chiefs to act as executive agent for them. E unified commander, for example, conducts his business with the Joint Chief of Staff through one of the service chiefs as executive agent for the JCS.

Chart No. 2 shows the JCS organization. The organization and procedur are little changed from the wartime organization and practices except for addition of the director and the Joint Staff.

The Director, Joint Staff, is the Executive of the JCS and is responsi to supervise and coordinate the work of the Joint Staff and the JCS commit On the chart you will note the division between the Joint Staff and the re mainder of the JCS organization is shown by heavy black lines outlining bo for the Joint Staff.

The Joint Staff is purely a planning staff. You will note that the Jo Staff is divided functionally into three groups. The three groups are the Staff of the Director. Each group is also the full-time working staff of of the three corresponding committees shown immediately above it on the ch

Members of the Joint Staff serve full time with the organization. In order to subordinate service interest and obtain an objective viewpoint, t Joint Staff Officers are responsible to the Director. Their efficiency re ports and fitness reports are signed by him. This is a contrast to the Br system where each service controls its own officers assigned to Joint Staf duty.

The committees, however, all have Service representation. Committee d is part-time duty with officers serving on JCS committees in addition to t regular duties in the Services. The theory behind having service represen tion on all committees is that the Joint Staff would otherwise soon become compartmented away from the service experience, interests, and capabilitie and their plans would reflect it.

Each of the various committees has the responsibility to recommend ac to the JCS on certain specified functions assigned to it by charter. The sum total of the duties and functions assigned to all the committees cove all of the responsibilities of the JCS.

The titles of the committees are shown on the chart and the titles ar descriptive of their functions. The three committees which work closely the Joint Staff are all organized alike with four committee members; one each service and one from the Joint Staff.

CHART NO. 2


NOTE: HEAVY BLACK LINES INDICATE JOINT STAFF ORGANIZATION
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ON MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE OF UNITED NATIONS
DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF
SECRETARY DEPUTY & SECRETARY AND SECRETARIAT
HISTORICAL AID SECTION
JOINT STRATEGIC PLANS COMMITTEE
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
JOINT LOGISTICS PLANS COMMITTEE
JOINT STRATEGIC PLANS GROUP
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
JOINT LOGISTICS PLANS GROUP
INTELLIGENCE SECTION
SECURITY CONTROL SECTION
PROJECT OFFICERS
JOINT WAR PLANS SECTION
POLICY AND OPERATIONS SECTION
TRAINING AND EDUCATION SECTION
AIRCRAFT SECTION
SUPPLY SECTION
TRANSPORTATION SECTION
CONSTRUCTION SECTION
UNIT PERS. SECTION
PETROLEUM SECTION
JOINT CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
JOINT METEOROLOGICAL COMMITTEE
JOINT COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS COMMITTEE
JOINT INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES COMMITTEE
JOINT MILITARY TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE
JOINT MUNITIONS ALLOCATIONS COMMITTEE

The Joint Strategic Plans Committee consists of General Schuyler, Army member; Admiral Boone, Navy member; General Ritchie, Air Force member; Admiral Glover, Joint Staff member.

The Joint Intelligence Committee consists of the three service directors of intelligence--General Chamberlin, Admiral Inglis, General Cabell, and General Todd, Deputy Director of Intelligence, Joint Staff.

The Joint Logistics Committee consists of the service chiefs of logistics planning, Colonel Denson, Army; Captain Todd, Navy; and General Whitten, Air Force--plus the Joint Staff member.

Strategic plans are initiated by direction of the Secretary of Defense, the Chiefs, the Director, Joint Staff, or under a program developed by the strategic planners. Let us look at the mechanics developing a plan on the Joint Staff and within the JCS organization. Assume for our purpose that it is desired to initiate planning for a war plan to be used for mobilization planning (including industrial mobilization planning).

This strategic plan will generate requirements and start a requirements cycle which flows through the three military Departments to the Munitions Board, then to the National Security Resources Board, and return to the Munitions Board; then, in case of shortages, back to the Military Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff thence back to the Munitions Board.

As it is the responsibility of the Strategic Plans Committee to develop and recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff strategic plans and strategic guidance, the problem is assigned to them.

This committee assigns the problem to its working staff, the Strategic Group, Joint Staff.

The War Plans Section of the Strategic Group is organized into a number of teams of three officers--one from each Service. The problem is given to one of these teams by written directive. Each of these teams has a fourth member, when required, an officer from the Logistics Group to work with them on plans and any other matters on which they need or desire logistic assistance. Concurrent strategic and logistic planning starts at this point. The logistics member uses the resources of the Logistics Group needed for the work of the team. The strategic team will call on the Logistics member for assistance in regard to such logistic matters as petroleum availability, or tankers, or airlift.

The directive which assigns the work to the team includes the statement of the national objectives and all the pertinent assumptions which the strategic planners desire to be used in the plan.

The team which is assigned the problem assembles the guidance given them, prepares such further assumptions as are necessary to initiate the work, and furnishes this material to the Intelligence Group with a request for an estimate of enemy capabilities for the period to be covered.

The Intelligence Group prepares the estimate of enemy capabilities requested by the strategic team, transmits it to them, and at the same time requests the Joint Intelligence Committee to approve it formally.

The team now having statements of the national objectives, strategic assumptions and the estimated enemy capabilities develops a concept of war calculated to fit the national war objectives and the enemy capabiliti and develops an outline war plan to fit this concept.

I have already mentioned concurrent planning on the Joint Staff and that the strategic team has a member of Logistics Group working with it. While the plan is being formulated by the team, concurrent planning with the Services is initiated informally by the team members frequently consulting officers in the Service planning staffs.

Upon completion, the team's written plan is submitted to the Assistant Directors of the Strategic Group and after being passed by them, it is sent to the Strategic Plans Committee and Logistics Group simultaneously.

The presentation of the written proposed plan to the members of the Strategic Committee for their consideration is the first instance of forma concurrent planning. Each Service member of JSPC releases the plan to his planning staff which reviews it in detail. Included in this review is collaboration between strategic and logistic planning staffs in each Serv

At the same time that the members of the strategic planners are considering the plan, it is given a limited feasibility test in the Logistic Group of the Joint Staff. A later lecture will give you detailed informa on our logistic feasibility tests, so I will not cover the subject at thi time except to caution you not to confuse it with the industrial feasibil test made by the Munitions Board.

The results of the logistics feasibility test are furnished the strategic planners and logistic planners. The Service members of the Logisti Committee initiate further analysis in their planning staff in the Servic after which plans are revised as necessary to eliminate unfeasible porti o At the time the final plan is submitted by the strategic planners to the chiefs for consideration, the Logistics Committee separately reports the logistic implications of the plan to them.

The strategic plan must be augmented by a joint mobilization plan or joint logistics plan in order that it may be completely useful for operational use or for computation of requirements. The joint mobilization

plan gives to the Services instructions as to the basis for service mobilization plans, and responsibilities for joint planning; it enumerates joint policies to be applied to mobilization planning in regard to logistic responsibilities such as induction of personnel, supply levels, and construction. A joint mobilization plan parallels the strategic plan which prescribes the basis for mobilization. Other strategic plans will each be paralleled with a joint logistics plan. The logistics plan also establishes common standards, factors, theater supply levels, which are essential to the Services in translating the employment of combat forces into requirements.

Those, in brief, are the mechanics of the work of the committees and the Joint Staff in developing a plan. The proposed plan receives careful and thorough consideration within the Services before it is approved by the chiefs.

There are two procedures used to obtain the JCS approval of a plan or study (or any paper). The completed work is always submitted to each chief. Each Service chief processes the paper in his service and when he approves, a designated officer telephones his approval to the Secretary, JCS. Admiral Leahy is notified when the three Service chiefs have approved, after which he gives his decision. Most JCS decisions are made in this manner. The cases which involve the most important strategic considerations plus those that are not readily approved by a "yes" over the telephone are placed on the agenda for the meeting of the chiefs.

The chiefs' meetings are regularly scheduled for Wednesday afternoons, but frequently they meet more often. During the two weeks preceding this, they met almost daily; and the weekend before last they were in continuous session all day Saturday until midnight and again Sunday evening until 10 o'clock.

The JCS meetings are attended by the chiefs themselves and one assistant to each Service chief and General Gruenther and the Secretary of the JCS. General Wedemeyer usually accompanies General Bradley; Admiral Radford or Admiral Struble accompanies Admiral Denfeld; and General Norstad accompanies General Vandenberg.

The chiefs occasionally will clear the room of all but the four of them and, of course, will call in other officers for consultation as desired. They have invited Mr. Forrestal to several of their meetings on matters of special interest to him.

The work load on the chiefs has increased tremendously this past year. In order to clear their agenda of all but the most important strategic matters, the operational deputies to the service chiefs, General Norstad, Admiral Struble, and General Wedemeyer meet weekly on Mondays. On many matters, they have been delegated the authority of their respective chiefs and they act finally for the three service chiefs. On other matters, they clarify the divergent views or issues so that the chiefs can make the decision in the shortest possible time.

Strategic plans as they are approved by the JCS are by no means complete operational plans nor are they intended to be. A strategic plan states the estimated enemy capabilities; it states national war objective it states assumptions under which it is conceived; and the concept under which our military forces will operate; and it outlines a number of milit tasks to be performed. Listed with these military tasks are the major ta cal units which are to perform them. A time-phased summation of the comb forces of each Service is usually included in tabs with the plan. As you can see, no end-item requirements are given in a form of easy reference for the Services or the Munitions Board.

The joint outline plan is adequate for the military services and unit commands to develop detailed plans. The tabulated forces given in the pl are indicative of the relative military effort that the plan represents, but even these force tabs are not complete. For instance the tab for Arr units will show the number of divisions on D-day, and D+1 month, and on to D+24 months; but the required corps troops, army troops, service suppo units, other logistic support, and elements in training are not indicated

Properly speaking, I should end my discussion of the generation of requirements right here at the time when approved strategic and logistic plans are furnished to the Services. But I want to bring out two points First, let me repeat that the requirements of a JCS plan are not in the form to be useful to the Munitions Board; secondly, the chiefs have a fu duty to review major material and personnel requirements of the Military Forces.

In regard to the first point, upon receipt of the joint strategic pla each of the three military Services must do the detailed planning. Each must develop for each military task set forth in the plan the complete listings of combatant forces, the service support units and logistic uni Service logistic plans must be made. The actual end-product requirement are developed from this detailed planning. The tanks, aircraft, guns, gasoline food, and ammunition all must be computed in detail by the th Services. It is the time-phased lists of these items from each Service that are needed by the Munitions Board.

With regard to the second point, the review of major material and pe sonnel requirements of the Military Forces by the JCS, there is yet no adopted procedure for this step in the requirements cycle. The exact pr cedures to be adopted are under study. I believe that the review of maj material and personnel requirements by the JCS will be a review of those major items which turn out to be critical items as a consequence of the review by the Munitions Board. I am also convinced that no matter what items or categories are reviewed, it will be necessary for the chiefs to review the planning factors and computation factors which the Services u in translating forces into requirements. The JCS review of the factors used for items in common use by two or more Services is already underway

In conclusion (see Chart No. 3) I would like to summarize by use of this chart to show the JCS participation in the requirements cycle.

The generation of requirements begins in the National Security Council with the statements of national objectives; it takes form in the JCS organization with the development of a joint strategic plan and a joint mobilization plan. The Services translate forces into end products and personnel and transmit these to the Munitions Board where they are assembled and reviewed for industrial feasibility. Both the JCS and Services review such requirements as may be necessary and after review, the JCS make the necessary adjustments by either modification of the strategic plan, establishing priorities, making allocations, or accepting the shortages.

COLONEL HICKEY: We are now open for questions. Now is your time to ask them.

QUESTION: In these plans is there normally any time schedule as to the results to be accomplished; in other words, when the end plan will be ready?

GENERAL BOOTH: Normally, no. The time element depends on so many things that you cannot set up a deadline date. However, there are exceptions to that; namely, when the chiefs themselves, or Mr. Forrestal, have set deadline dates for the JCS to get answers on plans back to them.

It is not normal to set a deadline.

QUESTION: General, shouldn't the NSRB be located below the Munitions Board? (Referring to Chart No. 1). Shouldn't that actually take place twice? The business of having requirements and allocation of resources may be changed by the action of the Joint Chiefs.

GENERAL BOOTH: It is perfectly possible that that may occur a number of times. For instance, if the Joint Chiefs object to an allocation of resources and it goes back to the Munitions Board, and they get their slice, and say it is too thin, there may be a big fight there. It may occur several times. I have that there as being indicative of the fact that it is their prime responsibility to allocate to the Military Establishment its slice of resources.

QUESTION: You did not mention the Research and Development Board. I wondered how that fitted into your scheme.

GENERAL BOOTH: I did not mention it because it does not fit into the subject of the generation of requirements at all.

QUESTIONER: I was thinking of research and development requirements.

GENERAL BOOTH: They would have requirements that they would place upon the Munitions Board or upon the three Services; but it would not co in any more than, say, the requirements of an army division. That would handled in the same category, as I understand it. The Services implement all of the requirements of the Research and Development Board, anyway. I is done through the three Services. The requirements would be lumped along with the requirements of the three Services and sent to the Munitic Board.

QUESTION: General, is there any direct connection between the Natio Security Council and the National Security Resources Board that would gi to the National Security Resources Board the national objectives at the time that they originate, prior to all the detailed work being done thro the NSC?

GENERAL BOOTH: Yes.

Mr. Arthur Hill is a member of the NSC. Mr. Fahey is on the consult level of NSC. One member of the NSRB staff is on the working staff that works in consultation with the working staff of NSC.

QUESTION: You mentioned the need for the chiefs to review personnel requirements as well as material. The Munitions Board, for example, doe particularly concern itself with personnel requirements, does it?

GENERAL BOOTH: Yes. One of the responsibilities of the Munitions Board is to handle the personnel requirements of the Armed Forces. One of the allocations of resources made to the Munitions Board by NSRB is an allocation of personnel; that slice of the national personnel capabil that goes to the Military.

QUESTION: At each level there seems to be a triumvirate. In tactic operations, does that cause much difficulty in getting things accomplish

GENERAL BOOTH: At times it may cause considerable difficulty becaus of differences of opinion. Those differences of opinion may stem right up to the top in each Service, in which case there are often prolonged arguments that have to be resolved at every level. At other times, ther is no difficulty in resolving those differences of opinion; there is a meeting of minds on most everything.

But, to answer your question specifically, frequently there are long drawn-out arguments in regard to certain important principles.

QUESTION: General, it is in my mind--I think I am correct--that the Secretary of the Research and Development Board told us here the other d that the Board had submitted to the Joint Chiefs a sort of over-all mast plan covering the general direction it was going. The plan was submitte for approval of strategic guidance.

CHART NO. 3

THE REQUIREMENTS CYCLE



Now you just stated, in answer to the question here, there was no connection. Can you clarify that?

GENERAL BOOTH: My only statement in that connection was that in the actual generation of requirements the Research and Development Board does not contribute. They do not actually put requirements in a strategic plan; nor do they add to it. They do put an additional requirement on each of the Services; that is, implementing research and development by requiring a greater amount of steel or a greater amount of some raw material or resource of the Nation. But I merely made the statement that they did not play a part in the generation of requirements at the National Security Council or the Joint Chiefs level.

QUESTIONER: Could I go one step further and ask what relationship they do have with the Research and Development Board.

GENERAL BOOTH: The relationship with the RDB and the Joint Chiefs is somewhat similar to that of the Joint Chiefs and the Munitions Board, being on the same level. They have no direct relationship. They have no direct participation.

However, through the Services and through the Secretary of Defense, there is that same relationship that you will have, for instance, on the RDB. You have an Army, Navy, and Air Force member sitting on that. You have an Army, Navy, and Air Force member sitting on the Joint Chiefs and on the Munitions Board and through the Services. Any formal strategic guidance that is needed by the Research and Development Board is obtained, by request, from the Joint Chiefs.

QUESTION: I have two questions: One of them is in connection with the National Security Council. I am a little curious as to the makeup of that Council, particularly in respect to Secretary Marshall. Is he on the committee because he is the Secretary of State or because he is General Marshall?

GENERAL BOOTH: He is on the committee because he is the Secretary of State.

QUESTIONER: The next question is along that same line: He is the No. 2 man for which of those two?

GENERAL BOOTH: The law states that in the absence of the President at meetings he will designate another member of the Council to preside. He has designated Secretary Marshall to preside in his absence.

However, with Secretary Marshall's duties being as they are, with his being away so frequently, there has to be a further designation, which has required Mr. Forrestal frequently to preside over the meetings. For that same reason (Secretary Marshall's absence) is the constant attendance of Under Secretary Lovett at the NSC meetings necessary. He attends whether General Marshall is there or not.

QUESTION: The other question I had refers to Chart No. 2. I notice the project officers. I was wondering if that is the complete list of project officers or whether that is simply supposed to indicate the gener type of project officer.

GENERAL BOOTH: In the logistics group?

QUESTIONER: Yes, sir.

GENERAL BOOTH: There are nine officers; three from each Service. They work on general matters, general logistics studies, and head-up thos studies for their group.

QUESTIONER: In other words, there are more sections than shown on that chart.

GENERAL BOOTH (to his Aide): Outline the section. You see, those s: technical sections work on specialties. There are technical experts who work under the project officer. The project officers carry items right across the whole board, whereas those particular sections handle just th matters.

QUESTIONER: I was wondering why it was limited to those six section I was wondering if that is a complete list; and if so, why?

GENERAL BOOTH: It is the complete list.

There are two determining things: On the Joint Staff, we are limite by law to one hundred officers. That is one of the considerations. Alo with that consideration is the fact that the job of getting the work out time is with the Strategic Plans Group. They have the blitzes on them m frequently, and get more punishment, than we do. We have thirty of the one hundred officers. They have a few more. So, we are limited in our bilities by being restricted in the number of people.

The second consideration is having to allocate to the technical sect that can do the most good on a quick feasibility test. We have found th those particular categories are the ones most valuable to us in analyzir a strategic plan.

QUESTION: General Booth, would you please describe the operation of this feasibility test from a logistic-plans point of view; the process they go through; how they work that up?

GENERAL BOOTH: Are you talking about one that is made by the Muniti Board?

QUESTIONER: Yes, sir.

GENERAL BOOTH: I believe that is going to be covered in a talk by someone from the Munitions Board.

COLONEL MICKELSEN: That is correct.

GENERAL BOOTH: I would rather not get into that field.

CAPTAIN ROWLEY: I don't believe you discussed the Joint Strategic Survey Committee very much. I am aware that at least the Navy member on that committee has been there for some time. Does that committee view possible plans from a longer range standpoint than the Joint Strategic Plans Committee? I have often wondered why the JSS Committee was not considered as a part of the Joint Staff since, I believe, it has been working on those duties exclusively for quite a while.

GENERAL BOOTH: You have several points there that are interesting. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee is the only full-time committee that the Joint Chiefs have. They do work continuously. However, they do not participate in the preparation of strategic plans. They do advise the chiefs on matters of long-range strategy and political-military matters. During the war, however, they did have some function in preparing long-range strategic plans, but they do not any more.

There is no field of logistics or strategy where they are not permitted to participate: The Joint Strategic Survey Committee can guide the chiefs on anything that they, themselves, elect.

CAPTAIN ROWLEY: Then could the JSS Committee members be construed to be sort of "elder statesmen," who have had for several years no other duties than that of serving the Joint Chiefs in various capacities?

GENERAL BOOTH: That is the concept behind having them; that is true. However, I take exception to your phrasing "for several years," because two of the members have been there less than a year. Only Admiral Davis has been there for a longer period of time.

COLONEL HICKEY (after calling for additional questions but receiving no response): That appears to be all.

GENERAL HOLMAN: To the members of the class, I am sure they will find, as their work on requirements develops, that this has been the key lecture, the keystone of the structure which will develop the subject. With General Booth's permission, we expect to have this lecture reproduced so that you can get more into the details of it very early in the course.

And to General Booth I say you have our sincere gratitude. We will remember this talk for a long time.

Thank you very much, sir.