

PUBLIC INFORMATION BY THE GOVERNMENT

19 November 1948

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COLONEL BABCOCK: General Vanaman, members of the faculty, and student officers. The lecture this morning is another in the Public Opinion series. We felt that we should have a dissertation on the preparation of the public of the United States before any emergency to accept economic mobilization plans when they have to be put into effect.

Mr. Bernays has been called by "TIME" magazine "U.S. Publicist No. 1". Last year, at this College, he gave us a superior dissertation on many of the psychological aspects of public opinion. This year he is going to limit himself primarily to the preconditioning of the public.

It gives me great pleasure at this time to introduce Mr. Edward L. Bernays.

MR. BERNAYS: General Vanaman, General Holman, Colonel Babcock, members of the faculty, and members of the officer-student body: I feel almost like an old graduate, coming here again. The last time I was here, I gave a talk which I thought presented certain facts and a certain point of view. It was not until the afternoon seminar which followed my talk that I realized some of the things I had neglected to say. I shall try to profit by this experience and to predicate what I tell you today a little more on my experience last year. You see, I am trying to disarm you by telling you what I am going to tell you!

The question put to me by General Vanaman was this: How can we insure that, when and if a war emergency arises in the United States, the people will be as well prepared in morale as the Armed Forces are in manpower and material. This is a vital question. Public opinion, effectively mobilized, is our greatest natural resource in peace and in war. We know that when the people are well prepared in morale, manpower and materiel flow more easily. How, then, can we best prepare the public and keep it prepared for the strengthened military program necessary for our national security?

History is rich in precedents on how this has been done, but they are precedents we had better ignore. Subterfuge, lies, coercion, brute force, bribery, and appeals to barbarous emotions have been used by kings and dictators in order to mobilize public opinion. But these things are incompatible with the American way. We must proceed differently. America today is equipped with knowledge, skill, and experience which can be used effectively to build public understanding and voluntary public approval for essential measures; we can accomplish this without undermining our democratic structure.

In order to attain this goal, however, we must take into account a number of indispensable basic factors.

The first basic factor is this: In any basic plan for building the morale of the people, we must develop and maintain maximum security and maximum liberty for both the individual and the Nation. Civil rights and freedom for every citizen are fundamental to the America we are defending. Security and freedom must both be inherent parts of any public relations or informational program aimed at winning the approval of the public.

This is not the case in what Professor Harold Lasswell of Yale University has called the garrison police state. In such a state, the main consideration is security. The entire machinery of production, distribution, transportation and communications is subordinated to the needs of potential defense and offense. The public is forced to conform; civil rights are abrogated; rigid censorship is imposed.

Obviously, the methods of the garrison state run completely counter to the democratic principles on which our Government rests, as laid down by our Declaration of Independence, our Constitution, and our traditions. Military security in the United States can be achieved only with the approval of the people. From Shays' Rebellion to the fiasco of Prohibition, the American people have shown that they will not be coerced. With us, government must be with the consent of the governed.

In saying this, I am not simply projecting a personal viewpoint. It is something which is absolutely fundamental to America.

The second factor we must take into account is that government planning and action must be based on the assumption that the people and the Government are one. In the term government, I include the Armed Forces; they are part of the Executive Branch of our Government, as you will find by consulting "The Web of Government" by Professor Robert M. MacIver, head of the Sociology Department at Columbia University and one of the ablest thinkers on the subject.

Two centuries ago in France, Louis XIV said: "I am the State." Americans maintain that we, the people, are the state. This concept runs through every aspect of our existence, great and small. Our Constitution opens with the words: "We, the people of the United States." And when a radio program wanted to create identification between itself and its audience--and achieve a high Hooper rating--it called itself "We, the People.

Because Americans maintain that we, the people, are the state, no dictatorial, coercive or oppressive policies can in the long run succeed in our democracy. This key concept goes back to the very foundations of our republic. Thomas Jefferson stated it succinctly when he said:

"I know of no safer depository of the ultimate powers of society than that of the people themselves, and if we think them not onlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to confirm their discretion by education."

The third basic factor we have to consider in any plan for preparing the people of this country for an emergency is the necessity of common goals for the people and the Government.

Men live by their loyalties. In our society we have loyalty to one deity, not to a galaxy of gods. We have loyalty, in theory at least, to one wife and not to many. But we also have divided loyalties. This is notably true in regard to government. Civilian members of the Government are loyal to civilian branches of the Government; members of the Armed Forces are loyal to the Armed Forces, and usually to their own branch of the Armed Forces; and people in general are loyal to themselves and their own interests more than they are to the goals of government.

Yet it is a fact that government is not just trying to preserve itself; the Armed Forces are not merely trying to preserve the Military Establishment; and the people are not merely trying to preserve themselves. It is also a fact that every sound principle of self-preservation demands that each of us think and act in terms of common goals. The public must be made to understand that the basic common goal for all of us is the preservation of our democracy, and that this can be achieved through general support of a strengthened military establishment. This fundamental concept is essential for any public relations or informational plan designed to integrate the people and the Government in a national emergency.

As a member of the U.S. Committee on Public Information, I had the privilege of participating in President Woodrow Wilson's informational program during World War I. Wilson had a thorough grasp of the principle that unified loyalties are indispensable for success in war. He unified the people of America and the peoples of the Allied countries with a great concept. He made it clear that all of us wanted, as he put it, to "make the world safe for democracy." That slogan played a crucial role in focusing the multiple loyalties of the peoples on the common goal of the Allies.

This idea was projected in words and in deeds. It was the urgent need to achieve the common goal which led to the creation of a unified command; and, in turn, the unified command helped to bind the Allies even closer. Eventually, the common goal was implemented by the Fourteen Points, which, more than any single declaration, convinced the world that America and its Allies were animated by a common goal which had the total support of the governments, armies and peoples involved.

This over-all, basic preparation of the public cannot be achieved merely by handouts, slogans, mimeograph machines, or high-powered publicity or propaganda bureaus. Only a well-rounded program of integrated, enlightened democratic action by government and people working together can achieve it. Honest and helpful information, given to the public both in peace and in war, can aid in bringing about better and closer relationships between the Government and the people. And all along, the basic consideration must be not words, but deeds.

General Vanaman has asked me to say something about the obligations of our Government to the people, and the obligations of the people to the Government.

The obligations of our Government to the people are, I think, fairly clear. They are defined in our Constitution, in our Bill of Rights, in the vast body of our laws, in our underlying philosophy, and customs. The Bill of Rights, for example, forbids Congress from making any law abridging the freedom of speech, press, assembly, and religion; guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizure; asserts the rights of all citizens to a speedy trial by jury; prohibits slavery or involuntary servitude; forbids the state to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny anyone the equal protection of the laws.

While the Constitution thus defines the obligations of the Government to the people, it does not specifically define the obligations of the people to the Government. These are covered by various statutes, traditions, and customs. Every resident of the United States is obliged to obey the whole body of our laws, civil and criminal. Men between certain ages are obliged to serve in the Armed Forces when the law so requires. We assume financial support of the Government by paying taxes. It is our duty to vote. We are responsible for jury service. We are expected to participate in public affairs to the limit of our ability.

These mutual obligations are a background for the relationship between the Government and the people in peace and in war. It is part of the background of the three assumptions upon which we must base any program designed to prepare the people of the United States in morale when and if a national emergency arises.

The basic assumptions, you remember, are: It is necessary to develop and maintain maximum security with maximum liberty; the Government and people are one; the loyalties of all sections of the Government and the Nation must be focused on a common goal.

I emphasize them because they are what social scientists would call our frame of reference. If we are going to work out an informational program, it must of necessity be worked out with reference to the common goal. The Government, the Armed Forces and the people are one in serving the cause of preserving the whole, the democratic pattern, the American way, the society which is ours. It is on this foundation that we must proceed with recommendations for action and their implementation. That is why, in response to General Vanaman's request for recommendations, I did not relate the program I am about to suggest merely to what I thought the Armed Forces alone could or should do in regard to morale. It seemed to me rather that the problem of national survival ought to be visualized as the common goal of the Government, the people and the Armed Forces. With this constantly in mind, we may now proceed to consider the following seven-point program.

The first point in this program is to make full use of research as a basis of policy and practices of government in dealing with the public. I know, of course, that the concept of research is at the moment under a cloud because the polls were wrong in predicting the outcome of the Presidential election. This particular mistake, however, in no way militates against effective factfinding. Research is still valuable if it is used not as a master of policy, but as an instrument and guide. Modern research, especially in its more recent developments, can definitely indicate directions and guiding principles.

We know that during World War II, surveys of the general public and the personnel of the Armed Forces were used to great advantage. We know, too, that it was by the use of polling techniques that Stouffer found what demobilization plan at the end of the war would gain the widest acceptance by the Army and the public. Stouffer's plan was accepted and it gained overwhelming approval. Here was a striking example of the two-way process of democracy at work; it greatly improved the public relations of the Armed Forces.

The fact remains that surveys based on the best available techniques can indicate areas of agreement and disagreement in this or that group of the population; they can indicate apathy, distortion, ignorance, and misconception and other attitudes which must be understood by anyone charged with the responsibility of making policy. Knowledge of these factors will provide a background of facts. These data, properly interpreted, will indicate what should be the content and the emphasis of the informational program.

It will do more. Research and surveys of this kind will indicate what policies and practices which are not essential to military security, and which the public resents, should be discontinued. We know, for instance, from our experience in industry, that a strike often starts not because there is any basic maladjustment, but because there may not be enough

towels in the washroom. Resentment on this score may be distorted to a point where it leads to overt conflict. At the same time, surveys and research may uncover public resentment against practices which are essential. These must then be explained to the public convincingly.

We cannot afford to fall into the common error that polls, surveys, and research are now useless. Intelligently interpreted as a guide to potential changes in public attitude, and a basis for decisions and actions by leaders, polls can be effective tools. They should be used by government as one yardstick to guide its own attitudes and actions in peace and in war; and they should be used more extensively.

The second point in our program is to develop a well-organized peacetime public information bureau. This bureau should furnish the public with the kind of information which surveys of public attitudes have shown to be necessary in order to dissipate distortion and ignorance. Neither in time of peace nor war should this be a central propaganda bureau. It should not attempt thought control. The free competition of ideas is necessary to democratic functions and is basic to our tradition, our history, our laws, and our popular form of government.

In peacetime, censorship of information essential to the public is dangerous if the public is to have a sound basis for opinions on national security. When a war emergency arises, the activities of the public information bureau would need to be expanded and strengthened, and, obviously, censorship of military information vital to security would be necessary. This expanded bureau, in addition to its informational function, should maintain and build morale through deeds and words. Such a bureau must safeguard the Nation against excessive confidence and, what is equally dangerous, excessive apprehension.

The foundation of good morale is strong faith in America's goals, in the Armed Forces and in our Commander in Chief. It is the enchantment of this morale that must be the primary aim of government public relations in wartime, rather than the kind of thing I saw at an army camp at the beginning of World War II. There I found the PRO issuing information to the civilian public about the bushels of spinach the Army was using, the number of meals served per day in the various installations, and the amount of food the GI's ate.

This type of hit or miss public relations policy simply harnesses false presuppositions about the public to a mimeograph machine. It makes no attempt to meet the key requirements of any effective public relations campaign. Such a campaign cannot possibly be effective unless we first find out what the public does not know, what it wants to know, and in what areas it is the prey of ignorance, distortion, or misconception.

This is the indispensable beginning. Once this is done, we can proceed to carry out the aims of an informational program. These are to intensify existing favorable attitudes, to nullify negative points of view, and to convert those who misunderstand you to your own point of view. This can be effectively done by concentrating on the major aspects of morale.

I have just referred to the dangers of building morale by stimulating overconfidence in the public. The most striking illustration of this danger may be found in the Goebbels' diaries, and in Curt Riess' biography of the No. 1 Nazi propagandist. What they did in Germany under Hitler was to inflate the hopes of the people to fantastic heights. Nazi propaganda based these hopes on belief in a superman. That belief was inculcated so deeply that, when the debacle came, there was complete breakdown of belief. Disillusioned by the immense gap between the hopes inspired by official propaganda, and the grim reality of national disaster, the individual German ceased to believe even in himself. He was even incapable of realizing what had actually happened, so that the psychologists assure us that the Germans have no sense of guilt about the horrors committed in their name, and often with their enthusiastic participation. In this case, officially fostered overconfidence resulted not only in national but in spiritual collapse.

There is considerable discussion today as to whether our Government should have only an informational policy in wartime or whether this should be supplemented with a morale policy. Most of the experts believe that if we are to survive in an age of intensive psychological and ideological warfare, we must implement our informational offensive with a morale offensive.

In a recent study of propaganda in wartime, the organization of a public information bureau was divided into these sections: (1) budget and finance; (2) staff; (3) legal; (4) coordination; (5) information and morale in foreign countries; (6) troop entertainment; (7) film; (8) music; (9) theatre; (10) fine arts; (11) literature; (12) broadcasting; (13) domestic press; (14) foreign press; (15) tourist traffic; (16) entertainment of the wounded; (17) broadcasting concerts; (18) front newspapers; (19) front libraries; and (20) book collections.

This is a rough idea of the various fields of activity which an information and morale bureau might cover in wartime. In peacetime, however, the functions of a public information and morale bureau would not be so extensive.

The man who heads such a bureau should be a civilian, an expert in the arts of communication. He should function in cooperation with a committee of Cabinet officers. Authority should be vested in him in order to avoid errors which marked World Wars I and II--the errors of duplication and competition in policy, strategy, and method.

Only yesterday a man visited me in my office who had been a major in World War II. He spent most of his time discussing the internecine conflict on a certain European front between the OSS and the Army's Division of Information and Psychological Warfare. So, too, shortly after World War I, a brilliant Lieutenant of French Intelligence, Jean de Pierrefeu, wrote a book called "Plutarch Lied." Discussing the conflicts between Gallieni and Foch, and Foch and other generals, he said that the battle for immortality among the French generals was always a more dominant element in determining strategy than the need for France to win the war.

To avoid duplication and competition, the director of the public information and morale bureau will of necessity work in closest cooperation with the Armed Forces and civilian government agencies. Like a battle commander in the field, he must work without interference from above or below, subordinate only to our Commander in Chief. The director will, of course, be subject to the demands of the democratic processes. Engineering the consent of the public cannot be carried on by methods of arbitrary control or coercion. It will succeed only through information, persuasion, and suggestion.

The third point in our program is for the Government in peacetime, deliberately and overtly, to encourage free public discussion. There is a belief in some quarters that unpleasant truths hurt our cause. As a technician who has dealt with a lot of rumors in his life, I am convinced that unpleasant truth does most harm when it is suppressed. Suppression transforms concealed facts into distorted rumors; and since we are living in an age of acute economic, social and psychological insecurity, these rumors feed the fears of large sections of the public.

Those of you who have participated in any type of psychological warfare know that false and damaging rumors are much more difficult to handle than unpleasant truths. An unpleasant truth can be met directly because it is specific. But in the case of rumor you are dealing with an intangible factor which grows and changes its shape as it makes its way underground.

The common belief that government tries to shield itself from unpleasant situations by suppressing the truth must not be given sanction by government conduct in peace or war.

The fourth point in our program is that, in its whole public relations and informational policy, the Government should emphasize not words alone but deeds. After World War I it was said that words won the war but lost the peace. Persuasion and education by deeds are more effective than propaganda by words. And when actions of this kind are undertaken, they must represent the public interest.

Let me give you several examples of what I mean taken from World War I, when I worked with the Committee on Public Information.

We wanted the Italians to know that we approved their efforts to defend the Piave River. So we named a ship The Piave and sent it with materials to Italy. We arranged to have this ship launched under the sponsorship of a committee of distinguished men and women representing various sections of American society—management, the professions, education, and so on. At that time there was no radio, but we had photographs made of the launching. These were reproduced on postcards and dropped behind the Austrian lines to show them that America was supporting the Italians. They were also dropped and distributed among the Italian soldiers. Military Intelligence reported that these postcards have a very salutary effect on Allied morale. They showed we were actually coming to Europe's aid.

Again, to prove through action that the Poles, Czechs, and the United States were working closely together during World War I, we arranged a meeting of Paderewski and Masaryk at Carnegie Hall in New York City. Before this meeting, the peoples of Europe had believed that these two peoples, the Poles and the Czechs, were at loggerheads. But when Masaryk, representing the Czechs who were not yet a nation, shook hands with Paderewski, representing the Poles who were not yet a nation, a change took place. The dramatic public meeting of the two leaders destroyed the false notion of Czecho-Polish conflict, especially when pictures of the friendly handshake were dropped over the enemy lines and distributed among the Czechs and the Poles. This overt action was more effective in conditioning public attitudes than verbal assurances by Wilson, Paderewski, and Masaryk.

We had a similar example of the power of overt action in World War II, when President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill met on a battleship in midocean and worked out the Atlantic Charter with its Four Freedoms. The Charter is one of the great documents of history, but it was particularly potent in its immediate effect because it was released under dramatic circumstances.

When I was a boy, I was tremendously impressed by the fact that whenever President Theodore Roosevelt traveled by train, he shook the hand of the engineer for the newspaper cameras. In doing so, he dramatized for the people at large his own attitude toward labor in a way which words alone could never have done.

When I emphasize the importance of action in government information and morale building, I mean not only the kind of symbolic action I have just cited. We also need direct deeds. The process of mobilization, for example, is a direct deed which corresponds at once to the wishes of the people and the needs of the Armed Forces.

I have had occasion to talk with many veterans of both World Wars who, after being honorably discharged from the Armed Forces, were looking for jobs in civilian life. On these occasions, it struck me that there were vast areas where direct deeds would do much to give the ex-soldier a greater sense of being at one with his government, his country and the Armed Forces.

The most effective kind of public support is that gained through action which deserves public support. This action may be dramatic and may be publicized to the people in order to make its point. But it may also be quiet and have its greatest effect by making everyone of its beneficiaries a point of influence in his community. There is no more powerful type of persuasion and suggestion than having someone who has been in the Armed Forces return to his community so enthusiastic about his actual army experience that he becomes a voluntary persuader for the common goals of the Government and the people, creating among his friends and neighbors the desired "sphere of identification."

The fifth point in our program is to institute a continuing series of conferences and discussions between government and leaders of the important groups of our society. The term government, of course, includes the Armed Forces. A series of discussions might be set up between government and individuals representing the major voluntary organizations, representing the many groups of our society--farmers, labor, commerce, industry, and so on.

The United States is a vast country today, with 148 million inhabitants, 90 million adults, 23 million families. Most of these families belong to large voluntary groups which represent group interests. The farmer, for instance, belongs to one or more such groups; he belongs to the Grange or the Farm Bureau, or a cooperative, or all three. Suppose now that representatives of the Armed Forces met in conference with ten farm group leaders representing all the major farm groups. In discussing any given problem with these men, you would be, in effect, discussing it with the farm group members for whom they speak, that is, with most of America's farmers.

What I have in mind, of course, is a conference in which areas of agreement and disagreement are explored on a two-way basis. A discussion of this kind with, let us say, the presidents of the National Grange, the Farm Bureau, and the Farmers' Cooperative should be a normal part of our democratic process. Following this type of discussion, you would take the farmers' viewpoint back to the Armed Forces; and the leaders of the agricultural groups would take your viewpoint back to the farmers of this country via the farm journal, the newsletter and the farm organization; and this mutual give and take of ideas would naturally lead to greater mutual understanding, and greater community of interests in furthering the common national goal.

Again, suppose the Armed Forces launch a recruiting campaign in a farm state like Iowa. If the local army commander understands the importance of public relations, he will naturally take an interest in the Rotary Club, the Kiwanis Club, the Community Chest, and other groups which can help him in his campaign. But the campaign would be even more successful if the Armed Forces, before sending the commander out to Iowa, would

confer with farm group leaders in that state on a two-way basis. This effort at mutual information and understanding would thoroughly prepare the ground for the recruiting campaign. And what is true of Iowa farmers is equally true of all other groups of American society in all the states and territories of the Union.

Conferences of this kind are bound to strengthen the two-way relationship between government and the members of the many groups which make up our country. Two-way group discussion eliminates the bad results of trying to build support only by propagandizing one point of view. In group discussion, participants arrive at conclusions through the processes of give and take. Conferences between government and group leaders must inevitably bring government and people closer together.

At all such conferences, reasons for policies and information on the needs of government should be fully presented. Attitudes of all participating groups should be made clear. Out of this would evolve areas of agreement between group leaders and government. The leaders would report back to their constituent groups and ask for their support. A continuous reciprocal process would be set in motion between the Government and the voluntary groups representing the people, thus cementing their relationships.

The sixth point in our program is to add higher formal education to the training program of the Armed Forces in peacetime.

One of the finest things, from the standpoint of the American people, which came out of World War II was the GI Bill of Rights. In this country, getting a higher education is pretty much a matter of economic status. But for a long time, President Conant of Harvard University and other leading educators have pointed out that economic status has little to do with a man's IQ. What made the GI Bill of Rights so effective in winning the good will of the public is that it gives a man a higher education regardless of his economic status. Today, there are some 2.5 million students registered in our colleges and universities. Twelve percent of these are men who have served in the Armed Forces. This, it seems to me, is both a great tribute to American democracy and an excellent piece of public relations for the Armed Forces.

Surveys have shown that American adults at every level desire more education, and that education gives people greater economic opportunities. By satisfying this desire for more education, the Government (including the Armed Forces) can immediately bring about better relationships between itself and the people.

Furthermore, higher education for members of the Armed Forces would raise the social status of military service.

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In a society like ours, status values are among the most potent values, and they are not always determined by economic factors. A scrubwoman, for example, may earn more money than a schoolteacher, but a schoolteacher has a far higher status. In peacetime, the Army has not the status it ought to have in our democratic pattern; it has to compete with other values which are given higher status, such as business success. Education, on the other hand, is beginning to have a great deal of status. Nowadays when a millionaire comes to us for help in getting something he hasn't got, what do you think he wants? He wants an honorary degree at a university! This will give him a status value which money alone will not give him. Today almost everybody in America wants the status values which come from education.

It seems to me that higher education for members of the Armed Forces would help satisfy this desire and at the same time raise the status of the Armed Services. It would also improve morale and relieve the boredom which comes from not being engaged in the competitive struggle. Finally, it would increase the loyalty of ex-service men to the Government, since greater education is likely to increase a man's understanding of the country's need for the Armed Forces.

The seventh point in our program is the development of a more democratic Army, in order to give men and officers greater community of interest in working toward a common goal. Indeed, the Armed Forces can become guides and teachers of democracy.

The "New York Times" recently quoted General Bradley as saying that it is no longer enough to equip and train a man thoroughly; in order to make a man a good soldier in today's Army, he must be taught to comprehend the greatness of American democracy and the importance of his own role as part of his country's Armed Forces in preserving its liberties and institutions. "We must fulfill the human desire of these men for a sense of mission," General Bradley said, "we must give them confidence and satisfaction that come from knowing why they are needed."

Here, then, in rough outline, is the public relations or information and morale program I should like to suggest as a way of insuring that, when and if a war emergency arises in the United States, the people will be as well prepared in morale as the Armed Forces are in manpower and materiel.

I realize that this is not the conventional or easy way of answering General Vanaman's question. It is usually assumed, in considering public relations, that words alone can win a war. But experience has taught us better.

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The program I am suggesting is predicated on our history, on our experience as a nation, and on the science of human relations as developed by the various social sciences; and it preserves our fundamental principles of security and individual liberty. Besides, it is based on the military law that he fights best who most deeply believes in his faith. History has shown that armies built and supported by the faith of the people are the most effective.

That is why I have based this operational public relations program on the concept of the essential unity of government, army and people united in preserving our democracy.

Thank you.

QUESTION: Mr. Bernays, with regards to higher formal education for personnel of the Armed Services, let's assume that we can spend 500 million dollars for raising educational levels. Do you believe that that 500 million dollars could better be spent by sending discharged military personnel to college, or by raising the general level of lower education throughout the country, such as in the backwoods of Mississippi or Arkansas?

MR. BERNAYS: And I can name some other states. According to this year's statistics, the total annual income of the United States today is 200 billion dollars. So the spending of 500 million dollars becomes an expenditure of one-half of one percent. Now I have seen our national wealth down to 62 billions and less in the Depression. We see it up to 200 billion dollars today. To use a money-yardstick, especially as small a sum as 500 million dollars, when you are dealing with national survival and self-preservation, is to talk in the terms of a congressman.

My answer to you would be: First, I am all for improving the educational level of people in Arkansas and other states. Secondly, I don't see that this in any way militates against the suggestion I made, or that one action needs to be made dependent upon the other.

At one time I worked with George Washington Hill of the American Tobacco Company. I saw him spend \$100,000 a day to advertise Lucky Strikes. On the same day--and this was in the Depression--he would spend \$100,000 to advertise Bull Durham. I said to him once, "Mr. Hill, you are competing with yourself; you are taking away from one market to boost another." He said: "Look, Bernays, every brand of American Tobacco stands on its own bottom; I see no reason why one can't do both."

One more point: If you will read a book called "The Man in the Street," by Thomas A. Bailey, a brilliant thinker at the University of California, you will find there the story of the impact of public opinion on foreign affairs. Bailey shows that our foreign policy has been unrealistic because the average schooling of the American adult over twenty-one is 8.4 or 8.5 years. For a man who has gone to school for eight years, or 8.3 years,

to make the type of decisions that he has to make in the world today, is placing a tremendous strain not only upon him, but also upon those who lead him. I can think of nothing that will raise the level of America in terms of national and international policy as much as additional education.

It seems to me there is no question but that we should do both--raise the general level of education throughout the country and educate the personnel of the Armed Forces. It seems to me, further--and this has nothing to do with States rights--that, since we are going to rise or fall as a nation, it becomes the obligation of the National Government, in terms of its own defense, to insure that educational levels are raised.

QUESTION: Mr. Bernays, recently there was a poll taken on universal military training. If I am properly informed, that poll indicated that the majority of the American people participating in the poll favored it. The Department of the Army sent teams, if we might call them that, to each of the Army areas for the purpose of holding conferences and acquainting the people in those areas, representative organizations of those areas, with regard to the details and all aspects of the Universal Military Training Program.

Congress did not pass the act. Also, Congress called on certain members of the Armed Forces to testify as to why they were using public funds to force it through.

Would you care to give us your views on that?


MR. BERNAYS: I have a copy of the testimony. As a matter of fact, if any of you read the National Opinion Research Center Bulletins that come out every month--they come out of the University of Chicago--you will find that, ever since past the war, the approval of universal military training has moved up slowly. As I recall, it now is somewhere around 62 or 63 percent. It may be a little bit higher.

We can start with the assumption that the election results showed that the Eightieth Congress did not act in accord with the people's wishes. I think it is also safe to assume that Mr. Truman won, to a great extent, because he attacked that Congress. So it would seem that in this particular case--you had a situation in which Congress did not speak up for the people.

Now if you say, "Why didn't it?" I can give you numbers of what seem to me logical reasons. If you will look at your statistics, you will find that the potential number of voters in the last election was almost 90 million. But on Election Day, you actually had only 48 million voting; there were large numbers of people who did not vote.

You also had the poll tax. There was also the fact that certain groups of the population which are very numerous don't vote as much as others. All this shows that a Congress need not necessarily speak for the majority of the people. The fact that the Eightieth Congress did not was shown by the reversals which took place--the swing from a strong Republican to a strong democratic majority.

But let me give you the second reason, as I see it. When you deal with any public problem, you find that the curve worked out by the Italian sociologist, Pareto, holds true. This curve is one you might show this way (indicating). There are a number of people who are very articulate in favor of something. There is a median line that goes from being favorable all the way to another little area in here (indicating) that is very much against. Now this line in here (indicating) goes all the way from being strongly against to strongly for, with apathy between. Yes



Now unless you can take any issue where you are dealing with the people and make it a real overt issue, you are very apt, even in congressional hearings--we have been in contact with many situations of this kind--to get this group here (indicating) and this group here (indicating) to become so articulate that a Congressman or an average bystander is very likely to get a distorted viewpoint of the situation.

If you take the question of universal military training, I believe the American people are for it. If, however, the individual gets a picture of it from congressional hearings, what does he do? He gets those groups that are very vociferously against it and someone else gets those that are vociferously for it to distort the picture of reality to a point where the Congressmen themselves may not be hearing the true mandate of the people.

Now if I were for universal military training--I am not a military expert, and I don't make up my mind apriori--but if I were a military expert and felt that this was the soundest policy, I would utilize the type of method that we have discussed; I have a document, I think, of the hearings before the House in which Mrs. Woods, and other women who went out to women's groups, gave their points of view. I would not resort to that type of one-sided propogandizing because, obviously, any one-sided propogandizing becomes subject to suspicion by the side that doesn't believe it. We found out that propoganda on a subject which has two sides will usually intensify both sides.

So that your problem is not to carry on propoganda. It is not to shout, "Hurray for universal military training," says Mrs. X, or Mrs. Y, who is actually on the pay roll of the Army. It is a problem of sitting down

right here at the table with these five people who represent 20 million voters and saying, "Look! Here are the reasons why we think universal military training is important; now what do you think? Why don't you think this way? What can I give you of fact or authority?" If you will do that, the public will not feel that covertly somebody is trying to put something over on them.

QUESTION: In connection with this matter of higher education in the Military Service, I am curious whether you had in mind education while a man is in the Army, regardless of whether he is a Regular Army man, a draftee, or one brought in under UMT, if it comes; whether you are thinking of an extension of the GI Bill of Rights to provide that education be given after a man gets out of the Army. If the former, did you have in mind that it be given to the men while they are in the Army, in private civilian institutions, or the idea that the Armed Services will run a series of educational institutions themselves?

MR. BERNAYS: I think that yours is a very splendid question. Frankly, I had not gone into those elements. My recommendation had been prompted by the following realities and the following assumptions:

First, I know that today, with peacetime attitudes what they are, most of the men who are going into the Army feel that it is a deprivation and not an addition to their life. In the age group we are concerned with deprivation represents an educational deprivation which, in a civilization like ours, becomes an economic deprivation. If you have looked at any of the figures that have been worked out by the University of Cincinnati, you know there is a definite coefficient of earning power based on education

In discussing the situation with a number of social psychologists, in order to find a pattern that might be called an overnight change of attitude we were looking for something that would be what William James called the "moral equivalent of war." One equivalent was physical exercise which, James said, everybody ought to take for a year--as the Greeks did.

What I favor is status for the man who goes into the Army. Then he won't enter military life with a feeling of ambivalence, hating it on the one hand and recognizing its necessity on the other; but will enter it knowing that he is getting the one thing he wants if he has money at his age level, and the one thing he wants if he doesn't have money.

You brought up the point: Should it be done in the Army, should it be done at regular educational institutions, or should it be done after the men get out of the Army? It seems to me the whole effectiveness of this educational program--granting it can be done relative to the time factor--lies in carrying it out while the soldier is still in the Army. Maybe if it is done, the men might even be happy to stay in the Army longer than the fifteen months or whatever period of time it is now.

Second, if you look at the gap between our collegiate-university body and the Armed Forces in terms of research, money support, campuses, and so on, it seems to me that it is already so great that we are talking to some extent of mere nomenclature. It seems to me that where they have universities at the particular center, something could be worked out; where there aren't, the university for its own sake could develop the extension-type of activity that I know, from my own university (Cornell), was developed up there at the time when people were in the Army.

I am, indeed, grateful to you for your question. It will enable me to make some further investigations as to methodology. The idea you bring up might work out in any one of a number of different patterns.

But I have no doubt, thinking now as a technician in persuasion and suggestion and in what we call "the engineering of consent," that the one thing, overnight, which would make people like the Army would be for the young men who went into it not to feel, "I'm losing a year!" but rather that they are gaining a year.

We know very little about human beings. We do know, however, they have certain drives. We know that they have drives for power. We know they have drives for status. Every psychological study reveals that status is a great deal.

If we start with the assumption that in our society status is one of the few things we know about regarding the human personality, then if you want to give the Army status values in the eyes of people who aren't in the Army, the thing to do is to take part of the status from somewhere else and give it to the Army. Officers already have status because society gives them a status. But the man who is a soldier, an enlisted man or a draftee, hasn't any status.

We happen to be working at present on the problem of recruiting nurses for the Armed Forces. The basic premise is this: Here is a little girl from some little town somewhere. She has gone through nursing school. She is going to start in having a pretty tough time. The first four or five years of her professional life are gone. But when she gets into the Armed Forces, she immediately acquires status; she becomes an officer. That status value will help determine the kind of husband she will get. It is going to affect the home she is going to run. It is going to affect her place in society. More than that, it is going to affect her whole personality structure and her sense of security. The one thing we are suffering from in America is insecurity of status. Insecurity of status is related to minority groups. Insecurity of status is related to a decline in our economic security.

A man named Lloyd Warner recently made a series of studies for Yale. He called this "Yankee City." In these studies, he takes the little town of Newburyport and analyzes it the way Robert Lynd did Middletown. He finds out that in most of American society there are six groups: upper-upper, lower-upper, upper-middle, lower-middle, upper-lower, lower-lower.

Now what does he show? He shows that in the society of Newburyport there was mobility, up to about 100 years ago, when people could move from the lower-lower to the upper-upper in whatever way they could--by skill in handicrafts or business or what not. The "American dream"--represented by a Mackey, who founded Anaconda, or a Hill who built a railroad empire--was to start in at lower-lower and end up at upper-upper.

With the rise of mass production and technological improvements; with the whole change in the social control of our manufacturing instrumentality by the big organizations located in New York or Chicago; with the rise of Labor's power, and, let us say, its stratification by its central trade union--we have today a lack of social mobility. That is the whole basis of the contemporary American pattern.

In America today, the one thing that is still left in the way of social mobility is education. The run-of-the-mill fellow may never have heard of Warner or the studies which the Institute of Human Relations at Yale worked out; but the fact remains that education is now the equivalent of the social mobility he is seeking.

If you then take, aside from these purely statistical, human and status-value elements, this basis of "the American dream," together with this 500 million dollar educational package, and hand it to him, you have immediately created an entirely new impetus, which you have already seen in the GI Bill of Rights. I would say, from watching those people, that the new impetus is going to develop a lot more social mobility in the next twenty years than was possible at the time I was graduated from school, unless I was lucky enough to strike oil in Oklahoma.

GENERAL HOLMAN: Mr. Bernays, you have certainly given us a great deal to think about. We feel most fortunate that you have been able to give up your time to appear here to speak to us. For the faculty, the student body, and our guests I would like to say we are very deeply appreciative.

MR. BERNAYS: Thank you.

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