

DISTRIBUTION AND STORAGE FOR THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE

7 January 1949

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COLONEL HORNER: General Holman, gentlemen: Whenever I talk before an audience of Army, Navy and Air Force personnel on the subject of unified logistics, it always reminds me of an incident that happened to a youngster in my command during the war. He arrived overseas a brand new second lieutenant barely 21, looking about 18. His brother lieutenants were all at least a few years older than he was, but he selected a girl friend who was, according to the official records, some 47 years of age. I must say she trimmed her sails, dressed and acted like a girl of 16 in spite of the wrinkles and middle-age spread. Needless to say, this youngster came in for considerable razzing by his associates. However, one night when he had been the butt of their jokes for two hours, he turned to them and said: "You know I like them over 40 because they don't yell; they don't tell; and my, are they grateful!"

From the standpoint of unified logistics, the three Services sometimes seem to me not to have reached the mature age of 40. In all three Services we have yelled about the necessity of continuing or establishing our own logistic support; we have swelled our organizations, or retained, at least, kingdoms if not empires, and many have "telled" privately and publicly how the Armed Forces would disintegrate and become inoperative should such an integrated system become a reality. So far, however, there have been very few in the Armed Services who are grateful for unification.

I am sure that the cause of resistance to a move toward unification has not been due to selfishness nor have the services really been contending for power and influence. They have been fighting for those principles and traditions which have been handed down in their services from generation to generation.

Whatever I say during the balance of this discussion is my own opinion and does not have the blessing of any higher authority. I merely present to you one side of a very highly controversial subject. Admiral Foster, Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, will later in the course present the other side of the argument. I see a number of friends here today who entertain views contrary to mine. I feel certain that before the question period is over, some of my arguments will have been brought most forcefully under a very bright light. I might add that my operational experience has been at a much lower level. My remarks concerning unification at higher levels are based on this low-level experience, supplemented by studies, conferences with and opinions of those with far more experience in the higher staff jobs than I have.

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During peacetime, logistical responsibilities are assigned within peacetime legislation and budget limitations. During the war, the shortage of trained officer personnel and the lack of adequate materiel became more important. However, in peace or war, men and material must be assigned in such a way that the combat efficiency of the Armed Forces as a whole is most effectively served. It should be our aim in peace to make them as near as practicable to what they will be in war. For successful future operations in peace or war, unnecessary duplication of effort or overlapping of distribution functions within the Armed Forces must at all times be prevented by the most efficient use of available personnel, facilities, and services of any or all of the Armed Forces.

During World War II, Army and Navy depots were set up at many adjacent points throughout the United States and abroad. Even if one disregarded the savings possible in actual buildings and space, an integrated establishment and operation would have done away with the construction of separate sets of access roads, railroad spurs, and utilities, amounting to approximately two million dollars per depot in the zone of the interior, besides saving thousands of tons of badly needed materials that could have been diverted to other uses in the war effort.

An example is that of refrigerated storage space which was especially at a premium in the tropics. One Service operated 5,885,936 square feet, and the other Service established and maintained independently 2,430,658 square feet. Under a unified storage system, this loss of thousands of tons of perishable supplies would have been prevented. In one instance, one-quarter of a million rations were lost on Guam alone because covered storage space was not available for use by one Service, while at the same time large tonnages of nonperishable supplies were being stored under cover by the other Service.

This situation did not exist only between the three Services. There was much antagonism to general depots within the Army and to implementing the postwar depot plan. In fact there are still opponents to the plan. In the First and Second Army Areas, Ordnance and Signal have been authorized to remain outside the General Distribution Depot System and to supply these two Army areas directly from Baltimore, Decatur, and Lexington in the case of the Signal Corps, and from Rossford and Letterkenny in the case of Ordnance.

We meet this opposition even in the theaters of operation where the stress of war was most realized. Though we had established General Depots in the European theater, in England, prior to our invasion of the continent, it was determined that the distribution system on the continent would be accomplished by the use of branch depots. This system performed its mission in the early days of the invasion while we were still on the beaches. However, with the break-through out of Normandy when supply lines lengthened, supplies became critical,

transportation overtaxed and ready to collapse, communications nil, and time itself the most important factor, it became necessary to integrate the various branch depots into a general depot if we were to succeed.

Early in September 1944, it was decided that all supplies for the Third Army would be centralized under one person, the Commanding Officer, of the 62nd QM Base Depot. The supply situation improved by this change and this one depot took over the supply not only of the Third Army but also of the Ninth Army, the Ninth Air Force and the Advanced Base Section. Trucks which had, until this time, proceeded from the beaches to the various branch depots with only a half load arrived with their full tonnage. The manpower required to operate the depot was decreased because of the ability of a centralized effort and authority to shift labor rapidly from the Medical Section to the Quartermaster Section, to the Ordnance Section, or any other section where it was most needed. By concentration of authority, more personnel were released to the most needed working level. Instead of eight people, each head of a separate depot being responsible for the distribution of supply to the Army in the field, one person was responsible for the whole task. Expenditures of labor, materials for utilities, packing and security were reduced. Transportation, labor, materials handling equipment, or supervisory personnel were constantly switched to the places where shortages existed. The communications improved and the effect was felt at once in all sections, thereby lifting morale and working efficiency.

In 1946, I cited this example from this rostrum and at that time recommended not only general depots for the Army, but, better still, the consolidation into Armed Forces General Depots all of the distribution depots of the three Services. This recommendation was not very well received by the Services at that time. In fact, it was so poorly received that a very important person within the Army saw fit to write the Commandant a letter taking exceptions to some of my statements and, particularly, my recommendations with regard to including the Navy within our distribution system. However, having had my ears nicely but firmly pinned back on this subject of integration, you can imagine my pleasure and gratification when last January I obtained a copy of Secretary Forrestal's memorandum of 19 January 1948 establishing a committee on facilities and services which directed--and I quote from that memorandum as follows:

"As a result of exchanges of correspondence between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, and later, between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Air Force, the three service departments have been collaborating for some months in studies which have had as their objective the achievement of economies and greater operational efficiency through the common use of certain facilities and services."

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My excitement and hope for a unified logistic organization were short-lived. On 16 April 1948, the Navy published its interpretation of this memorandum and, though probably most satisfactory to the various Technical Bureaus, it was a blow to integration, and again I quote:

"In this regard, it is clearly the intent of the Congress to provide, as an integral part of each Department, the service personnel (and the facilities) necessary to the fulfillment of the specialized operational requirements peculiar to each Department. No single over-all support agency would be an acceptable substitute from a military point of view, and it is clear that the Congress recognized this viewpoint in recognizing the necessity of certain duplications by insuring to each of the military Departments the existence of their individual requisite service components."

I believe that the reason for this failure to accomplish unification of distribution has been due in great part to a lack of understanding between the Services and a mutual distrust by commanders. These commanders feel that they will be unable to carry out their combat mission unless they have full control of their logistical support. We saw that feeling in the Army when the Ground Forces tried to gain control of the general depots.

It is my feeling that the Navy has been similarly frightened. So, before going further, I wish to make it clear that I feel that the Navy afloat must be regarded in the same light as the field army or task force. Their supplies should be delivered to them in bulk, and the distribution from there on out should be at the discretion of the admiral in command, just as it is vested in the commanding general of a field Army in the theater of operation.

During the course of this lecture, I shall try to cite some of the waste that has existed in the three separate service distribution systems and indicate a solution if unification were followed.

The necessity for unity of command during World War II was amply demonstrated and was accepted by all concerned. The publicity which was given to combat operations emphasized the necessity for teamwork between all combat elements of the Armed Forces. The achievement made under positive unity of command direction speaks for itself. The result of unified command in distribution can be equally as valuable and successful, and the necessity for unity is just as urgent.

War is wasteful at best, and an efficient distribution system could play a very important part in reducing the even necessary wastage. (We saw during World War II many of the resources become most critical, even though we had considered before the war those resources ample for the successful prosecution of any war.) We saw our manpower requirement

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expand until we were scraping the bottom of the barrel to fulfill our desperate need. No matter how efficient the distribution system is, there must be produced, in order to fill the pipe line, more of each item than is actually required by the forces in the field or in training. When a nation has reached the maximum productive effort for which it is either equipped or has resources, it becomes necessary to eliminate some items desired by the field forces in order to produce a sufficient supply of those which are more essential to these forces. Thus, it may be seen that supplies in dead storage, whether in warehouses, docks, or even in the forward areas, and increased requirements due to duplication of reserves, poor handling, or poor stock control are not only a waste of the taxpayers' money but also a very definite hindrance to the war effort.

Records of man's first use of weapons in combat have been lost in antiquity, but this initial step marks the birth of military supply and service because the most primitive weapons required repair and replacement. As primitive war evolved through the centuries and military organizations expanded in size, the importance of logistical considerations increased in similar proportion. Today, the relatively small armies of the past have given place to intricate combinations of men and machines. They feature mobility, firepower and destructive capabilities undreamed of a century ago, thereby creating tremendous demands for supplies and equipment which necessitate the maximum support of production sources on the home front.

Not only are more people and more manufacturing facilities required to produce this equipment, but more people, more communications, and more transport of each type and variety are required to carry the tonnages produced. A comparison in Europe between the number of trucks used during World War I and World War II gives the astounding ratio of 1 to 58. A further long list of statistics could be cited to prove the foregoing subject. However, at this time I believe that any indication of such ratio between the late war and World War III illustrates the drain that will be imposed upon our national economy. By mentioning the drain on a nation's economy, I in no way mean to imply that such a drain should not be placed on the Nation when necessary. But it is up to us in the Military Establishment to see that this drain is necessary and that our resources are conserved wherever possible, avoiding waste, duplication of effort, and probably, above all, time in producing the items required to support an operation.

In last year's lecture I gave an excellent example of the vast quantities required for the distribution pipe line during the late war with regard to 105-mm ammunition. I shall quote it again:

"There was a total of 85,300,000 rounds manufactured. Only 47 million rounds arrived overseas and 34,528,000 rounds were expended;

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I feel certain that you will all agree that not all that was expended was actually fired at the enemy. This picture, I am sure, could be drawn of other supplies as well."

From the foregoing statements, it may appear that I am more concerned with waste, the impact on our economy, expense or other factors which in time of war seem less significant than getting the supplies desired. Any interpretations by you of this nature are incorrect. The most important factor in distribution is the placing of supplies in the hands of the fighting troops when and where they are needed. The soldier in the line, the man in the air, and the sailor on the fighting ship form the big first team. It is up to us to keep that team equipped in the most efficient manner; thus the distribution system of the Armed Forces must be one which delivers the supplies required by these forces when and where they need them and in a usable condition.

I believe that we have started in the right direction toward reducing the drain on our economy by the accomplishments we have made in our procurement program. I believe also that if we will make the same advances in our distribution systems that we shall double our savings and will be more capable of furnishing the forces with the items which they require when they need them, rather than filling three separate pipe lines with additional reserves for each of the three Services.

If you have read my lectures of previous years, you will have noted that I am opposed to boards and feel that there is always a necessity in any organization to have one boss. It may be necessary during this interim period for us to rely on boards to accomplish our unification. However, I feel that they are expensive in talent, and, while we can afford the luxury of debate and delay in making a decision in time of peace, I feel that we cannot afford this in time of war. I further feel that very often the decisions arrived at by a board are a compromise and will not necessarily render the most efficient results. This feeling I know obtains on these various committees. They are all conscientious men and qualified officers. They have definite views on the subjects under investigation, and their departments generally have very strong policy views on the subject which each committee member feels he must carry out. While talking to one of these officers the other day, he told me that he felt certain there was not a committee member who wouldn't prefer an adverse decision to continuing the argument only to arrive at definite compromises that please no one and were almost certain to be difficult and delicate to implement.

As I have already stated, at the end of World War II, everyone had seen the advantages of unified command. There was a realization at that time of the necessity for unification; and though this feeling deteriorated rapidly with the Military Establishment with the advent of peace, Congress was still determined to accomplish unified Armed Forces.

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There were long and extensive hearings upon the subject before the new National Security Act was passed. This act provided for unification by cooperation rather than by direction. Perhaps it was the best law that could have been passed at the time. However, the definite coordination and integration hoped for has not been accomplished. I was talking to a member of a board working on procurement. He told me of the coordination that had been accomplished in some fields, but after some questioning by me, he admitted that, while they had accomplished much, they were far from true unification; just as they thought they had gotten single-service procurement ironed out in an item, something came up which reopened the case. He cited as an example the procurement of steam shovels. The Army was to buy steam shovels on tracks and the Navy was to buy them on wheels. No sooner had this assignment been made than a requirement came in for a steam shovel that had both tracks and wheels, thus causing a further case study before the procurement assignment could be made. Note that no one Service was to buy all the steam shovels.

Before becoming constructive, I should like to invite your attention to the apparent apprehension with which the public views our present organization and functioning. "Look" magazine on 28 September 1948 published an article on the present status of the Military Establishment which concluded as follows:

"A year's experience with an ineffective National Defense Act has pinpointed the weaknesses of the law:

"1. To control armed services budgets, the Office of the Secretary of Defense must have exclusive power to draft them and full authority over their presentation to Congress.

"2. To unify policies, the Secretary of Defense must have power to require agreement between the Services and order compliance.

"3. To stop the bickering and lobbying of the separate arms for Congressional favor, the Secretary of Defense must have power to require the Services to speak with a single voice and to summarily discipline those who speak out of turn.

"4. To exercise these real powers, the Office of the Secretary of Defense must have an adequate staff directly responsible to him.

"It is up to Congress to change the law in these respects. Otherwise, we can be sure that much of the \$15,000,000,000 we are spending to make us strong is being wasted."

So far I have probably seemed to paint a hopeless picture, making destructive criticism without indicating what could be done about it. From here on out I shall try to be more constructive at the risk of being provocative and accused of not being conservative.

These are my ideas, and again I stress, they do not have the blessing of any higher authority--which reminds me of an incident that happened to me several years ago.

My oldest youngster, then eight years old, had pestered me to show in the Devon Horse Show. He won that round and, much to my surprise, the day of the show won his first class. He had to go to the judge's stand to receive the cup. The presenter was a National Guard General of Cavalry who informed my youngster how much good it did him, an old cavalry man, to see the younger generation riding. To this my youngster replied--there were loud speakers so everyone could hear, including myself who was standing in the center of the ring--"Well, sir, we're in the Army, too, and my Pop said he never saw a cavalry man that could ride yet."

As I present these ideas, I can assure you that I recognize that there are many others who know far more than I do on the subject.

As you should have gathered by now, I am a believer in thorough integration, but before we can ever hope to achieve this integration, our three Services must obtain some similar structure with regard to organization. I was discussing this matter with a member of the General Staff of the Army who said, and I quote:

"This may be heresy to say, but until the Army and Navy set up an outfit similar to the Air Forces Materiel Command, there is little hope that we shall be able to achieve much in the matter of unification of logistics for the Armed Forces. The Army and the Navy are, first, organized along different lines, and, secondly, they are not coordinated within themselves."

With this in mind, I present to you the following compromise organization which could serve during the interim period, until we are able to obtain true integration. This organization is based upon the assumption that single-service procurement has been successfully assigned and implemented.

Chart 1, page 17.--Here we have the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Joint Logistics Assignment Board would be composed of these three Secretaries. Their job would be to allocate and determine the requirements as handed down by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assign procurement to the various technical services and bureaus, designate the storage and distribution responsibilities of each, and allocate to the various naval districts and army areas the amounts of supplies to be handled.

We come down here and have, for lack of better names, the Navy Materiel Command, the Army Materiel Command, and the Air Force Materiel

Command. Their three commanders will form a board to allocate to the various depots the stocks which have been procured, and assign the posts, camps, and stations in those areas to draw from the various depots. They will also have such administrative duties as coordinating transportation, communications, construction, stock control, etc., within the area of their command.

As I said before, I do not like boards, but at least that type of organization would allow the coordination of the distribution system without any enabling legislation.

That concludes the Horner solution for an interim organization and operation. I have drawn your attention to the interpretation of Mr. Forrestal's circular of 19 January and the obvious difficulties that this committee was sure to meet. On 29 July of last year, the Secretary of Defense was convinced that the directive must be implemented. He appointed General Mark Clark as his personal representative and directed that a pilot operation be put into effect in the western area which would produce a model to the rest of the areas for the most efficient use of facilities and services.

General Clark immediately set up a small headquarters, known as Armed Forces Headquarters for Unification of Facilities and Services, Western Area. He started operations, not from an over-all theoretical basis such as I have just given you, but from a purely operating standpoint, hoping undoubtedly that as results were accomplished, a pattern for eventual complete unification would develop.

Under command decisions, definite action replaced debate and in less than six weeks the following report of accomplished projects was personally made by General Clark to the Secretary of Defense:

1. Joint use of recruiting services and facilities in the western area.
2. Establishment of a Joint Public Relations Office in the San Francisco Bay area.
3. Movement of the San Francisco U. S. District Engineer Office to government-owned space.
4. Consolidation of ammunition activities at Benicia and Naval Ammunition Depot, Mare Island, California.

There are presently numerous other projects under way. However, before completion, these projects must now be reviewed and approved by the Munitions Board before presentation to Mr. Forrestal.

In other areas of the United States, subcommittees of the Munitions Board are carrying out similar investigations, and the results of these

investigations, with the recommendations of these field subcommittees, are reviewed and passed on by the Munitions Board before the implementing directives are issued by the Secretary of Defense. This method of accomplishing unified distribution is similar to the method being used to accomplish single-service procurement. Each commodity, function, service, or facility is selected and, based on the individual merits of the case, responsibility is assigned.

This may be the best method of approaching the problem. Certainly with strong efficient operators like General Clark in charge of the implementation, there should be a very definite change of scenery with regard to distribution in the western area prior to the time I reach this platform on this subject next year. I believe that we are making real progress. I believe that we are progressing slowly and should not be lulled into overconfidence because we are making progress; while accomplishment in the procurement field is most gratifying, the quoted statistics always show the percentage of items purchased under single-service procurement money-wise, which is, I must say, very impressive. However, if we looked at these same statistics item-wise, we should find a very small percentage figure.

The most satisfactory solution to unification of logistics in my opinion would be an organization as mentioned by two radical members of the interim course. It has been shown by me in other lectures, but I still believe in it except that I should replace the Joint Chiefs of Staff by a Chief of Staff Armed Forces, this being in line with my belief that there should be one boss and that boards too often are forced to a compromise decision. I might say that I am backed in this particular opinion by Mr. Eberstadt in a lecture before the National War College on 8 October 1946.

Chart 2, page 18.--You have coordination through the Commander of Logistic Forces. Requirements are furnished by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are brought down. We have reallocated the various functions to what would correspond to the combined technical services and technical bureaus in a modified form.

This chart shows that the Service of Ordnance takes in all ordnance, guns, and ammunition.

As you heard Colonel Johnson, from the Office of Defense Transportation, say, the Armed Services should certainly get together and have a unified transportation system. We have done that, recommending that the Transportation Service take care of its supply and all transport--land, sea, and air.

All the other services are similarly shown.

We have kept the remount in Service of Common Supplies. The Marines still have 40 horses and they must be cared for.

Before summing up my lecture this morning, I might tell a story to illustrate our condition in the Armed Forces today:

When our first staff went to England, there were only 20 of us. We knew no one. London had been bombed for a year and there were no children and practically no females in the city. After several months two of our members met an American girl and proceeded to have a date. It was so nice to have female company, particularly an American female, that our two officers failed to start for home until after the blackout, and in those early days of the war it was really black, for one could not even light or smoke a cigarette on the streets. After they had proceeded for some time, they wondered whether or not they were lost. Being God's greatest gift to the Army, neither would admit that he could be at a loss in any way. After much argument as to which way to go, a very nice-sounding voice said that if they would take this turning and that turning and keep straight on, they couldn't miss the Dorchester Hotel. They took the turnings and kept straight on, but finally thought they had missed their hotel. After some argument, again the nice-sounding voice informed them she was going to pass the Dorchester and would be glad to let them know when they arrived there. With that, each one informed her that it would be fine and if she would get them there, they would buy her a drink. With a portable battery radio they had going full blast, they arrived in the lighted lobby of the hotel finding on their arms one of the few females of her type in the British Isles.

My point is that unless we are careful we shall come out of the blackout with a distribution system handed to us by someone else, that is not to our liking, and certainly from the comments that we have all noted in the press, pressure will be brought to bear on Congress to take some action to bring about true unification of the Armed Forces.

Thank you.

QUESTION: You ended up your remarks with the phrase, "True unification." First, there are quite a number of hazy ideas of just what that phrase "true unification" is. My second point, which I wish to make in question form, is that I think we should be rather apprehensive of some of the broad claims that are made on reduction of waste, particularly in supply, distribution, and procurement by the bringing about of true unification. I would like to illustrate that with a very small example.

In 1943 the Air Force was a part of the Army. Obviously, we should then have been enjoying all the benefit of true unification. However, I wish to cite this particular incident. I was executive officer on a base. One day in the early part of 1943, the engineers descended upon us with a roll of plans under their arms. They laid them out and said,

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"Where do you want us to put the low temperature freezing unit?" We already had ice boxes, and so on, for our perishables. A low temperature freezing unit was a room that kept the temperature below, I think it was ten degrees Fahrenheit. We said we didn't need one. They said, "Everybody in the Sixth Service Command gets a low temperature freezing unit, so you will have to show us where you want it. If you don't show us, we will have to put it where we think it should go."

At that time there was a very grave shortage of refrigeration units all over the country and in the combat areas. We got that unit. We never used it. Later on, when I became A-4 of the Command, I found out a great many of the bases of our command didn't use the unit. Had the command had to justify a request for the unit and justify its necessity, I doubt that anybody would have asked for it.

COLONEL HORNOR: Right.

QUESTIONER: That is a point of danger that we can get into by this unified distribution in which somebody at the top says, "Everybody gets this dose of medicine whether he likes it or not."

COLONEL HORNOR: I think that is not unification, but automatic supply against supply by requisition. Those units should not have been put out on an automatic basis, but the post commander should have been required to request one if he so desired.

QUESTION: On your first chart you show three major commands. When you get over to the second chart, you break it down into ten. Aren't you going in the wrong direction?

COLONEL HORNOR: No, they are all unified. You have the technical services in the Army now.

QUESTIONER: I thought one of your propositions was to do away with the technical service idea.

COLONEL HORNOR: It was to combine them. You have to have those technical services and bureaus, but here; under this, you have them under the Joint Materiel Command; here are your technical services for the Army and technical bureaus for the Navy there. The setup is just as it is now.

QUESTION: I am just wondering if you in reality weren't trying to let the tail wag the dog, for two reasons: First, you are building an organization on a procurement basis. Procurement is an important function of the Armed Services, but it is only one. There are many others, and what is best for procurement might not be best for the others. Now, to get down specifically to the Department of the Army,

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the Army is organized on the basis of the technical services. That is a vertical type of organization. Each one is in effect a little empire of its own. Now you take the Army Materiel Command, aren't you in effect building a big empire on top of those already there, requiring more depots, more headquarters, and everything else, including a great many additional personnel? Wouldn't it be better to start at the beginning, before you have a joint organization, and reorganize the Services before you start your unification?

COLONEL HORNOR: That is right. It will require reorganization of the present organization and unification within the Services.

QUESTION: Who is going to determine fiscal and personnel coordination and everything else in any unification plan?

COLONEL HORNOR: Under your Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Staff determines that. After all, your requirements and the allotment of funds is a command decision. It is today and it always will be. The checking of vouchers and the work of figuring requirements are detailed down to the technical bureaus of the Navy and the technical services of the Army. That is the place where many people go wrong. They think the technical services and technical bureaus establish requirements. They do not. Requirements are determined by the command.

QUESTION: According to the chart, the Joint Logistics Assignment Board is taking over many of the functions of the Munitions Board.

COLONEL HORNOR: Yes, sir.

QUESTIONER: Is it contemplated that the Munitions Board would exist?

COLONEL HORNOR: If the Joint Logistics Assignment Board were established, there would not be the necessity for the Munitions Board. It would take over the functions of the Munitions Board.

QUESTION: Is it contemplated that the Joint Logistics Assignment Board, Chart 1, would actually determine requirements?

COLONEL HORNOR: That is the command line. They are the ones who decide what troops you will have, how much money should be asked from Congress, what policies will be followed, and to which Services your procurement and distribution will be allocated.

QUESTIONER: I am in the field using something, who is going to actually give me what I require, determine my requirements and give me instructions as to how I will store, issue, and take care of that material? That is what I am getting at.

COLONEL HORNOR: Under this integrated system, your technical responsibility will be in the technical service there, just as it is today. You have your two chains, the technical chain and the command chain.

QUESTION: You quoted some figures with reference to the 105-mm artillery ammunition. The total manufacture was 85 million rounds, consumption during the war was 34 million rounds, and you stated that of the 85 million rounds manufactured, 47 million were sent overseas. I am curious to know what those figures that you cited prove or disprove?

COLONEL HORNOR: It shows the amount taken to fill the pipe line. In filling the pipe line we manufactured 85 million rounds, which was more than enough for the use of the Services. As you say, we got only 47 million overseas, that is just over half of the amount manufactured, and about two-thirds were expended.

QUESTION: Now in your opinion, then, to be an effective operation, instead of having 38 million rounds left over, how many should we have had left over?

COLONEL HORNOR: I was not trying to prove anything there except to use that as an example of the tremendous amount you had to have for filling the pipe line.

QUESTIONER: I propose to take issue with your example as proof, which is a very poor one, for this reason: In November 1944, as you will recall, just a few months after the invasion of Normandy, we had just succeeded in getting our forces to Europe and getting them deployed against the Germans. Now our requirements as determined required a manufacturing capacity sufficient to supply the theater of operations with 40 rounds per Howitzer per day. Now our planners, the people allocating ammunition, were planning on that. The active Italian campaign had been supplied prior to that time with 40 rounds per gun per day. They had found that not sufficient for their purposes and had gotten approval of 55 rounds per Howitzer per day. On 17 November, a cablegram was received in the European Theater of Operation, sent by General Marshall, which said in effect, "The ZI cannot support your rates of expenditure. We have cleaned all reserves out of the United States. They are already committed to you. Beginning 1 January 1945, instead of 40 rounds per day, you can expect only 18." And we were well off in our 105 Howitzers as compared to 155 guns and 8-inch Howitzer

Now I have had these things thrown at me by everyone from the Chief of Ordnance on down.

Beginning at that time, General Burr and General Clay, who were then in the theater, made a special survey of the problem and after consulting

with Army commanders, they made a trip to the United States, two major generals, at General Eisenhower's personal direction. They managed to squeeze out of the ZI another five rounds which gave us about 23, or a little more. "It was too late," they said, "to do anything about increasing ammunition production. It takes 10 to 12 months to increase the facilities to provide more ammunition."

Then there was another factor involved. There were plans going on for the invasion of Japan which was set for, I believe, November 1945. Now the ammunition was required for use in that combat, and it would be a tough combat, judging by our experiences in Okinawa and other places and would require heavy scale artillery support. So I fail to see where these figures prove very much.

COLONEL HORNOR: The only thing that they were used to prove was the fact that they were required for filling the pipe line and to show the enormous quantities, over and above the actual expenditures, required for use in filling a pipe line,

QUESTION: In the early diagram there I noticed Army depots, Navy depots, Air Force depots; that doesn't appear to be consistent with the over-all concept in my mind.

COLONEL HORNOR: I said this is an interim plan, a compromise, that we would use until such a system as this would be put into effect, if it was.

QUESTION: You mentioned the unification, I think it was, although I may have the wrong word, of the Benicia and Mare Island Naval Ammunition depot.

COLONEL HORNOR: Yes.

QUESTION: Can you tell me how many miles of track they have torn up or did they actually add on some more people? Secondly, who was happy over the unification of Benicia?

COLONEL HORNOR: I don't believe anybody was very happy over the closing down of Benicia. That is a place, I believe, very similar to what we had in the Quartermaster Corps at Front Royal, Virginia. We finally lost Front Royal to the Department of Agriculture, and I certainly hated to see it go.

QUESTION: I have two questions: (1) Does your plan contemplate any change in the present responsibility vested in the Office of the Secretary, and if so, to what extent? (2) Do you not believe that in any such change as you contemplate here a natural prerequisite must be the complete overhauling of the fiscal accounting procedures?

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COLONEL HORNOR: Yes, very definitely. I think there are two things which, if you have control of them, you pretty well control everything else. If you control the funds and public relations, the people doing the talking, then, you pretty well hit everything. You can do what you want to do.

QUESTIONER: I am assuming control, but I mean talking the same language of fiscal accounting.

COLONEL HORNOR: There would have to be a complete overhauling of the responsibility for the obtaining of funds and allotting of funds to the three Services from the Secretary of Defense down through the three Secretaries, and the reorganization of those other offices to correspond with that.

QUESTION: Would you relieve the Secretaries of any of their own responsibilities now?

COLONEL HORNOR: Yes, some responsibilities and authority would be transferred to the Secretary of Defense.

That is all. Thank you very much.

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