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DEFENSE THROUGH DISPERSAL

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26 January 1949

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COMMANDER JENSEN: One of the recognized means of mitigating the effect of enemy-inflicted damage on civilian industry and population is that of dispersion--dispersion of facilities and personnel. Yet there are many difficult problems connected with dispersion the like of which we as a nation have not experienced. Our speaker this afternoon is well qualified to talk to us about these problems. Dr. William F. Ogburn is a sociologist of recognized standing, who is interested in the sociological aspects of civil defense. He has spent some time in research in this subject. I am sure that as a result of what he tells us this afternoon we will have a greater appreciation for the manifold and complex problems associated with dispersion and a greater appreciation for the needs of continuing our planning if we are to have an organization for civil defense in being and ready for war when it comes.

Gentlemen, Dr. Ogburn.

DR. OGBURN: In the introduction to my subject I would like to comment on one or two points with which you are no doubt familiar but which I think need emphasizing.

There has been a revolution in modern warfare, nothing less. I think of it as the bringing of the destruction of war to the civilian population. I doubt if we have had anything like it since the attacks of the Indians on the frontier towns or since the ravages of the Vikings along the western coast of Europe. This bringing of war to the civilian population--and that includes women and children--is the effect of one invention and that is the airplane. The airplane carries bombs and its capacity for destruction will be increased greatly by the atomic bomb.

An observation often made in the history of warfare, whether it is true or not, is that we fight the succeeding wars in terms of the past wars. We now have an expression in common use, called "the Maginot mind," derived from the attempt to see World War II, when it came; not in terms of mobile units and mechanized guns, but in terms of the old trench warfare. So the French built a trench de luxe, and they named it after the engineer Maginot. Whereas World War II was a war of logistics. Whether or not there will prove to be such a lack of appreciation of new techniques in connection with another world war, if we have one, I do think that this concept of bringing the destruction of war to the civilian population ought to be recognized and planned for. I am going to raise the question before I close as to whether the organization of our Military Forces at present is set up to encompass

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and deal with this problem. My thesis is that it is not, although that is not my major concern here this afternoon. But that is one of the reasons why probably we will be slow in recognizing this revolution and preparing to meet it.

Beginning with the topic, then, of the defense of the civilian population, I note for purpose of my presentation here that there are two kinds of defense. One kind has to do rather largely with strict military defenses and might be thought of as defense in terms of anti-aircraft guns, radar, and fighter planes, and also in terms of the care of the civilian population which might be undertaken through military units such as hospitals or doctors. This kind of defense would also encompass devices to prevent panic, and studies of the operations of units like the Red Cross. It would, of course, also include the activities, which were undertaken in World War II by the Office of Civilian Defense, that had to do with blackouts and devices of that kind. It is not my object this afternoon to discuss this type of defense at all. I judge that you have already studied that and you may be quite aware of the problem; much more so than I.

The second type of defense is dispersal. The bringing of war to the civilian population is the bringing of war to aggregations of civilians. These aggregations of civilians are in cities. Hence the defense of the civilian population from explosives is pretty much the problem of the defense of cities. I am not sure what the problem would be if we had waves of atomic dust sweeping over the land. I am not sure that this statement about cities being the core of the problem would be true if we had bombs or other methods of distributing hormones or chemicals to kill the plant life of the country. I do not know very much about bacteriological warfare and the killing of crops, so I would not be competent to speak of them. But I do think that perhaps the one type of defense which I know most about is the defense of cities. I think that one way of defending cities is to deconcentrate them. My remarks, therefore, in general will be concerned with the dispersal of urban populations.

Let us break down, as our next step in the analysis, this concept of dispersal. I will break it down into two classes, three ways.

The first way is to note that there are two types of dispersal. The conception of one of these types is very widely used. It is the dispersing of industries and populations from one region to another, such as the location of industries in the interior of the United States or in the southern part, as was achieved during the last war. This is a sort of doregionalization of industry. The recent move of the United Aircraft plant from Bridgeport to the neighborhood of Dallas is an illustration. The movement spearheaded by Roger Babson to place industries in a block of states around Arkansas is another attempt to carry out some doregionalization of industries.

The problem of deregionalization of industries I shall not talk very much about either. I would say that in the main it is a rather difficult problem if you think of deregionalizing plants which have to make a profit during peacetime. The location of industry is an economic matter and many economic factors relate to it, not the least important of which is the market.

I recently attended a regional conference in the State of Washington. One of the complaints out there is that there are not enough industries in that great region of power along the Columbia River. One reason why there are not more industries is that they are far removed from large markets. There are other problems, as of power and of labor, that confront an industry that would move from one region to another.

The other type of dispersal is the deconcentration of cities. It is deurbanizing rather than deregionalizing. It has to do with the loosening up of cities, with introducing space among the urban and industrial units of a metropolitan area. I address most of my remarks this afternoon to this type of deconcentration. You can see at once that many of the practical problems of an economic sort in peacetime which confront those who would deregionalize do not confront those who would merely deconcentrate. If you move an industry from within a large city to 75 miles outside, you are not taking it very far from the markets, particularly if it be a large industry, and you are not necessarily getting it very far from a labor supply. Very likely the power sources are as available to an industry 75 miles out from a city as they are to an industry within a city.

Then I note two methods by which this dispersal may be accomplished. One of these methods is a very rapid one and the other is a very slow one. When I speak of rapid deconcentration, I think of it in terms of perhaps three, four, five, or six years--less than a decade. When I speak of a slow deconcentration I think in terms of some sort of period from possibly 25 to 100 or 150 years. Many at first never thought of there being two methods of dispersal. The imminence of the atomic bomb produced a feeling of urgency, and most persons thought of a rapid or immediate deconcentration.

The difficulty with an immediate deconcentration is the tremendous cost and the tremendous resistances which would have to be overcome. We did a little figuring at the university and we think that the mechanics of rapid deconcentration of a fairly complete sort might run in terms of something like 500 billion dollars. But the monetary cost would be the least part of it. There would be so much uprooting, so to speak, of our civilization, because it is an urban civilization, that a rapid deconcentration would certainly be difficult to achieve.

You can see at once that a slower tempo would be more practical. Industries have a certain rate of obsolescence. When their plant does

become obsolete, in 20 or 30 years or some such period, it will be possible then to build new plants somewhere else with less cost than it would be to uproot a new plant and move it. The estimated cost of moving the United Aircraft plant from Bridgeport to Dallas was, I believe, about six million dollars; and it will take about a year's time to move that one plant.

I will have other things to say about this slower method; but I will go on to mention a third dichotomy; namely, that there are two degrees of dispersal. The first degree that I mention is a rather complete dispersal and the second one is a somewhat partial dispersal. We spoke for a time of taking a city like Chicago and breaking it up into 50 or 100 smaller places. That would be a complete dispersal. You would uproot it and reassemble it into a given number of smaller places. This is the sort of dispersal which architectural planners often speak about. You would have as a result of this, if it were done completely in the United States, no large cities at all. You would have, let us say, a very large number of smaller places of 50,000, more or less. So it would mean a rather complete change of our urban distribution.

The partial dispersal is to be thought of rather as a dispersal in which one would take out of the city a certain number of military objectives. We would, of course, have to define the military objectives; but we could begin with the large industries that would be producing war materials. It might be that in some cities certain types of offices, particularly government offices, might be military objectives; and also certain types of landing fields would be considered military objectives. We haven't time to go into what is a military objective. But if we thought of military objectives as rather limited in number, it might be possible to move those out. In that case you would have, let us say, a city consisting of a good many offices and marketing centers, a good deal of merchandizing--stores and amusement and educational places. One could think of a city as also including a great many smaller manufacturing units each employing a handful of workers and manufacturing a very limited amount of products. This rough sketch, then, thinks of partial deconcentration as leaving probably rather large cities with most of the military objectives, or many of them, removed some distance out.

It might be argued that this is not protecting the civilian population. I admit that it would not protect the civilian population as much as if we had a complete deconcentration of the big cities. But one should think in realistic terms, of degrees of protection, it seems to me, rather than in terms of absolute protection.

Having delineated these different models or conceptions of deconcentration, I would like next to focus our attention on what I call the slow and partial type of deconcentration rather than the other types.

In approaching this subject I note as a matter of history that urban civilization is around only 100 or 125 years old, and that cities are a product of the industrial revolution and came as a result of the railroads. When the railroads came, where railway lines were linked with the boats of harbors or rivers, or where rail lines crossed, cities grew up. England and the eastern United States today have a highly urbanized civilization. But with the coming of the automobile, the bus line, and also the commuter train, the cities became a little less packed together. At least, they covered more area. I would like to record some facts that I have gathered to indicate this.

At one time a city had a political boundary around its economic activities. If you think of a city as being two things--one, a political city, where they vote and have a mayor and council; the other, the economic city, where they trade and produce--then you will recall that the economic city and the political city were the same in early times. But in recent times the economic city has spread far out beyond the boundaries of the political city. Nowadays we call the economic city a metropolitan area. In the economic sense, it is just the same as the city. It happens to have a different tax rate and a different mayor, but economically it is the same. We sometimes refer to the economic city as a city plus the fringe around it, or sometimes we call it the city and the suburbs.

I have learned that most of our large cities from about 1910 to about 1940 grew in general at some such rate as one-sixth or one-tenth as fast as the urban fringe or the suburbs or the satellite cities. That is to say, if since 1910 the average big city increased, let us say, 50 or 60 percent, the suburbs would increase, let us say, 400 or 600 percent. In other words, the fringe is growing very much faster than the central city.

The common assumption is that this is itself a dispersal. But one or two writers on this subject have said that it is a mistake to interpret it as a dispersal; that it is not a dispersal at all. It is simply a growing of a city in the only place where it can grow--on the outskirts. In other words, they deny that there is any such thing as a dispersal going on now. Curiously enough, we do not have from our Bureau of the Census the figures to answer that question.

I have answered it for the city of Cleveland, where we have had some special tabulations made that I am able to use. The answer is this: The population of the fringe or the suburbs of Cleveland has been tabulated from their places of origin. We find that of the new population from 1933 to 1940--that is just a small interval of time and this is for the city of Cleveland--a quarter of the population of this fringe came from other parts of the United States and three quarters came from the city of Cleveland. So for Cleveland the answer is deconcentration of the city.

We also have for many other cities figures to show that not only the population of the band or area of a city around the central shop district but within the political city has been declining. For instance in Chicago from 1930 to 1940 a zone of four miles from the Loop, the center of the city, showed a loss of population of six percent, whereas the population beyond four miles showed an increase. So we do know that within the center of this political city there is a loss of population and a deconcentration.

The figures I have given you are up to 1940. Since 1940 of course we have no Census figures. But I took the registered voters in and around the city of Chicago and traced those from 1940 to 1948. I found that the increase in voters within this city was about 10 percent and the increase in urban fringe outside the political city was about 45 percent. This indicates that the deconcentration movement or the spreading of the city outward has continued up to 1948.

So much, then, with regard to facts that I have been able to gather on the actual movement at the present time in the deconcentration of population. I will next discuss with you what little I have been able to gather on the deconcentration of industry as contrasted with population. I have fewer and less satisfactory figures on industry than I have on population.

So far as I have been able to find out, there has been only one report issued on this subject. The Census has nothing. That was a report of a National Industrial Conference Board which attempted to find out where new plants were being constructed by the members of the economic organization. They did not report the distance from the center of the city, but they did report the size of the places in which the plants were located. Their summary report, I believe, uses these exact words: "That there is a tendency for new industries that are to be built to be located in smaller places."

Then I have some figures for the city of Chicago which show that of the plants which cost a million dollars, 65 percent of those in the Chicago industrial region have been placed in the fringe, that is not in the city.

So we see from these fragmentary data that from before 1940, and even after 1940, the tendency or trend is for industries to be located out from the city. It is not a particularly overwhelming trend. It is a trend, however.

Of course we speak of this trend because the question is whether a trend line can be extended. I mention here an abstract point that interests me. I have studied the future a great deal with reference to the projection of trends. I have in my office collected about 350 trend lines over a time series, and out of those 350 trend lines only about a dozen have changed their direction radically. That is a first rate point. Why? It means that if you have a trend line moving in a

certain direction, the likelihood is that it will not suddenly change its direction, hence you can forecast roughly that it will go ahead. You don't know whether it will go a little this way or a little that way, but still you know it will go forward in that same general direction. A trend is not always a straight line; it may be a curved line. Therefore it seems as though this deconcentration will be going on.

The next thing we do when we try to look into the future is to try to find out what the reasons are for the course of trends. It would take me a very long time indeed to find out why people move out of cities or why plants locate elsewhere. But I would like to single out for your consideration one factor--transportation. By transportation I really mean local transportation.

I have indicated to you that when cities first grew up, the only local transportation we had was muscular. The invention of the electric streetcar in 1886, the coming of the automobile in the first decade of the twentieth century, the construction of interurban electric lines, and, of course, commuter trains were all inventions of local transportation that enabled the cities to spread outward. The question is whether these factors will continue in the future. That is the point.

The tendency in most of the cities of the United States is to build what they call super-highways, nonstop highways leading into the city and from one city to another. New York City is a pretty good illustration. Washington has very good highways leading in. They get broader as you come into the city and have no crossings. Then, of course, with better roads the vehicles are fast enough to take you in pretty rapidly.

I would like to mention one other contribution; that is, the possibility of the helicopter accentuating the deconcentration movement. We have helicopters now that will carry about 13 or 14 passengers. Of course, I think it is only a question of time before the family helicopter will put in its appearance. That is more remote. We will probably have helicopters which will run along on four wheels after they have landed on the ground. So as you look at the inventions of local transportation, as you look at these trend lines, you come to the conclusion that there will be a continuation of deconcentration.

The next question is, At what rate will this deconcentration continue? Well, it looks as though it will be a relatively slow rate. I will make a rather loose guess if I am permitted to do so here without being held to account too much. I will say that our grandchildren may see within 100 years from now loosely built, widely scattered urban areas instead of cities. You might find, for instance, around the southern end of Lake Michigan not particularly Chicago, but an area maybe 150 miles in diameter, in which you would have a lot of cities of different sizes all scattered around. You would have an urbanized

area instead of one city. Maybe I am wrong on this 100 or 150 mile area--and you can't see more than about 20 or 25 years ahead--but it looks as though the trend is moving in that direction.

From that angle you see that the problem of deconcentrating the cities takes on a little different aspect. If you are trying to fight these things, that is one thing from a practical point of view; whereas, if you are accentuating them or speeding them up, that is something else again.

I would like to take a couple of minutes in passing to say that this movement will be resisted, particularly any rapid movement. That is really what I ought to talk about, since it is in the field of social psychology, and sociology is my specialty. But the resistance to this movement, if we try to speed it up or hurry it along in any way, is likely to be pretty strong. I should mention, by the way, that we ought to hurry it along a bit. Even if we avoid a war in the next three or four years, it would seem that there is quite a probability of a war maybe 25 or 30 years hence or something like that. I suppose I shouldn't say "probability," but Russia will become a highly industrialized state during the next 50 years anyway. Its heavy industry will be built up considerably within the next 25 years, I imagine. Russia will certainly wish to reassess this zone of influence around her, particularly to the South; and whatever settlement may be made of Berlin and China, there will have to be a readjustment of it in 25 or 30 years from now. So it would be a very good thing if this problem of deconcentration could be speeded up for some short period of around 25 or 30 years.

But in order to do that, there will be, as I say, resistances. These resistances will come from what sociologists call the vested interests. These resistances can be seen clearly if you visualize someone interested in real estate within a city. He would resist such a movement, which would mean losing the value of his property. You can see also how members of a big corporation like a telephone company would resist it, because their plant will become obsolete within the city and they will have to build new equipment outside. So mayors would resist it, because any movement of industry and population outward will cut down the tax base and make it more difficult for them to finance municipal services. Of the other groups that will resist it, one is, curiously enough, the idealists, who sometimes don't want to see any preparation for war, because they want to prevent all wars.

I would like to spend the remaining time in making a quick general appraisal. I would say that this movement, the effect of deconcentration, will be attractive to the population if it doesn't cost the economy too much. I canvassed about 1,000 members of the population living in all sizes of cities, of different ages and different marital conditions and different sexes. I found some very interesting conclusions that can be made.

Of the 1,000 population there were only about 100 that preferred to live in the big cities. Of those who lived in a big city, about 28 percent preferred to continue to live in a big city. The great desire of the population was to live in the suburbs, particularly in places of around 40,000 or 50,000, some little distance from the city. Of those who lived in these suburbs out from the city, 75 percent wanted to remain in them, as contrasted with 28 percent who wanted to remain in the big cities.

We have many figures on choices of places in which to live. They are conclusive that the population of the United States in the main wants to live away from a big city but somewhere near one. People don't want to live in a remote region.

The next question is, What would a changed economy of this kind be like in terms of costs? If it took place over a 100-year period, or if it were speeded up to 25 or 30 years, I think there would be a considerable amount of cost due to transportation--there will be more commuting, more going into the big cities for merchandizing, for buying special things. In order to make this not too costly, it would be essential to have a transportation system which would not cost too much. I also think it would be necessary to have a fairly convenient schedule and a fairly fast-moving one. I don't think there would be very much difficulty with speed and frequency of schedule, because helicopters could make a fast trip; and, being small, they could run on a frequent schedule.

Regarding the cost of such a transportation system, it would of course not be so cheap as streetcars and busses for a city. There is no question about that. The city has an economic advantage there.

As to whether we would lose much by losing the attractiveness of a big city is a question. It is true that artists and literary people would resist such a movement, because they tend to live in big cities. They like to be near the museums, publishers, and art schools. As for the metropolitan press, it could easily be distributed to the suburbs and satellite towns, as it is now. I presume that people could come into the city to visit the museums. We have been collecting figures to see how many people in the cities go to the museums in a year. Not so many of them go. I suppose one could come into the city on week ends to see that sort of thing. There would probably be some little losses from deconcentration; perhaps not so many as is popularly supposed.

My next two points tend to deal with this question: If we wish to do anything about congestion and deconcentration, what should we do? I am convinced that if this movement is to be speeded up, it will not be speeded up by putting the work in local Offices of Civilian Defense. If a dispersal movement is carried out by the states and localities, Civilian Defense will resist it. Civilian Defense with regard to

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blackouts and similar things should be put in the hands of the states and cities. But the only groups that can speed up deconcentration will be either state associations or national units like the national trade associations. I think the politicians will tend to slow up and not support such a program, because they get their votes from cities and towns except from farming areas.

But the Armed Forces could take the lead in this, because the problem of the Armed Forces is to defend the country and not to defend business or any particular real estate holdings. Your problem is to defend the urban population.

The question, of course, is: How can this be done? This is my last point. I don't know that I am particularly competent to speak of what unit should concern itself with dispersal. Offhand, it would not seem to me that any of the three units of the Armed Forces is especially adapted to it. I do not think the Army or Navy or Air Force would by itself be especially competent, for it deals primarily with economic, social and political forces. It is a task for some special board or some Department such as the Interior or Commerce. If I were the Commander-in-Chief of our Armed Forces, I would appoint a commission of experts to report to me on what should be the organizational setup for the dispersal or deconcentration problem. In the meantime, until that is done, I presume that the Armed Forces could play their part in it, although they are planning no doubt to do other types of defense like building antiaircraft guns and fighter airplanes and setting up a radar network.

To my mind this problem is not going to be solved without some preliminary research and investigation. I happen to believe that you can't solve that problem by calling a committee of the best minds together in Washington and having them sit around for two or three days. I have no objection to the best minds and I like their work, but they must have information and data to go on. This means research. Until you have that data to go on, you are handicapped in making these decisions. There ought to be very much more research under way.

At one time I laid out about 50 research projects which I figured would cost about a million dollars. These research projects would only give the information on which to base a decision. They wouldn't tell you whether to do this or not. It would take a year or two to get such information, by the way. Then, when we have this information we might call in some of the best minds to see what they could do with it. But there are two preliminary tasks. One is to decide on the organizational setup for civilian defense. The second is to try to get new research data, particularly from units like the Census and other government agencies that can gather such data.

To sum up, I think the problem is serious enough and big enough so that anyone can see it. But it is more realistic if you look at it

from this practical approach that I recommend, that is, to approach it not too rapidly and on the basis of a partial deconcentration. I think it ought to be approached in some such realistic manner.

That concludes all I am able to say.

COLONEL HORNOR: I am sure this lecture of Dr. Ogburn's has raised some questions or inquiries in your minds. We are ready for questions.

QUESTION: Would you consider that taxation within cities has a lot to do with the moving of the population out to the suburbs in addition to increase in transportation?

DR. OGBURN: I don't think so. Taxation has something to do with it, I suppose. We have a good many questions on that which we have not tabulated in this research I am doing. Most of the students of annexation of suburbs do say that the suburbs do resist being annexed to the city, because of taxation. That would look as though there is a little something behind your question; namely, that people do move out to escape taxation. But I think if you broke the question down and asked about plants, most plants move because they want more space or because they want more parking places for the workers. I suppose they do expect to find their land less costly in the suburbs. That is the same thing as taxation, because the land taxation would be higher in the city.

Another reason people with children in the suburbs give for not wanting to move to the cities is that they like the schools. They want their children to attend schools that they like. They are not willing to put these children in the large, city schools--sometimes they are mismanaged. Taxation may exercise some influence, but most people think of it in other terms. We had a survey made in Milwaukee and put the question to them: "Why did you move?" Most of them moved because they wanted a larger lot or wanted a little place for their children to play, or wanted a little smaller place to live in.

QUESTION: Do you think television will have any effect on this movement?

DR. OGBURN: I don't know. It is generally said that populations find the suburbs a little more livable because of certain social attractions. One of these is the chain store. That means you can get good food cheap in the suburbs. Another is that you can get entertainment, namely, through the movies and radio. The movies haven't exactly caused suburban development, but they make suburbs a little more pleasant in which to live. Then there is the radio. Now we have television. That will reach out about 60 miles, depending a little on the height of the antennae. I suppose television will also make living in the suburbs somewhat more attractive. But I should think it would be a relatively minor factor compared with the others.

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QUESTION: I was thinking from the standpoint of people staying at home more. I mean, people aren't reading so much with television in their homes. Do you think that people will stay home more because of television, and that television will make the suburbs more desirable?

DR. OGBURN: Oh, yes. We have had a great many surveys made of television. There seems to be no doubt at the present moment that television does tend to keep more people at home evenings. How long that will last is another question, especially if television is put in the movie theaters.

QUESTION: Would you comment on the recent large housing development in New York City? Was it put within the city area because of economic factors or because the owners of the project think the people will continue to want to live along the East River?

DR. OGBURN: I don't know why they built it there. But I imagine that in peacetime, if you are not very much alarmed about war, you will find a good many people who would like to live in cities or near where they work, just like you find a great many more who would rather live outside.

I think that the clearing of slums and the construction of buildings in the slums is to some extent related to economics. Suppose you destroy the slums; you really take away property, because the property isn't worth anything to the people who own it if you don't permit them to build on it. I suppose the courts would interpret it like that. Then the question would be: Would the city take it over? Well, that would be costly, because it would take away a source of revenue. It would also cost something to buy it. Therefore I would say that while we might like to have the cleared space in parks or parking places for automobiles, it would prove costly to the city and they wouldn't do it.

One other thought enters my mind. Suppose you cleared off all the buildings from several acres of slums, and then, instead of spreading the buildings out horizontally, you put them up vertically. You would then have one tall shaft with people living in it and a lot of play space and parking space around it. Of course, it would be more protection against bombing, and be in less danger from bombing than it would be if it were spread out over the grounds. It is one way in which we might meet the difficulty.

QUESTION: Doctor, what success are you having toward getting your questions in on the new census? I know you can't get every one of your questions in on such subjects as research, but you might get pretty fair priority on subjects of general interest.

DR. OGBURN: I happen to be on the committee that runs the census and I did help to frame the questions. I want to say right now that I

couldn't get many of my questions on. It would cost an awful lot to put them on and to process them. Congress has cut down the appropriation. You are familiar with that expression. We thought we required 100 million dollars, but the Bureau of the Budget has cut it to 70 million dollars; I think Congress will cut it still more. I don't believe we can put anything we want on the schedule of the Census.

Anyway, one individual has no luck with the Census. It is pressure from some group that counts. If the Chamber of Commerce wanted something or if the Parent Teachers Association wanted it or a broadcasting unit wanted it or the Army wanted it, the Census might be more responsive than to an individual.

QUESTION: It seems to me that this problem of security due to dispersal is so great that it would require a complete redesign of our present architecture of living. I am somewhat skeptical that we can do much on that. It seems to me that if we are going to be bombed, we are going to have to look for other means than to just sit there and take it. But that is what is going to happen unless the people themselves will counteract these enormous forces of economics and politics by reason of their fear for their own safety. My question is, Have you noticed in this study whether there seemed to be any realization of fear on the part of people which might urge them to think along these lines?

DR. OGBURN: That is a very good question indeed, but I have only fragmentary answers. The general impression I have is that fear doesn't last very long and that you must have quite a little of it to impress itself upon you and make you act in accordance with it. Recently, there was a summary in the paper of the problems that are facing the American public today. The problems were listed in the order of their importance as viewed by the citizenry. There were seventeen of them. The first one, which was considered the gravest problem facing the people today, was the cost of living and inflation. The last one was the atomic bomb. I would guess that if New York and Washington had been wiped out with an atomic bomb, people might then be a little more willing to disperse their cities quickly. But I doubt whether they would do it even then. If you take London as an example, the rebuilding of London is taking place similar to what I have indicated here. They are building suburbs somewhat removed, but they are not breaking the city up in any great way. I have inquired about what is likely to happen in Berlin and other places. There is little or no movement to restrict the size of cities.

There may be others who are better informed on that than I am. This is just information that I have picked up. It is only a rough indication that suggests to my mind that one bombing or one war in itself would not be quite enough to put the fear of God into people so they would move outward. That is a curious thing too, because the attractiveness of living in somewhat scattered urban areas seems to be rather great. One gets more sunshine, and one's health would be better.

There is more space for schools, it is better for family life, and so forth. Yet when one talks about dispersing a city, one gets the answer: "It is too much trouble. We will lose the value of our buildings." It is true that when thinking about the dispersal problem you should not think about whether you are going to be inconvenienced right now. You should think of how much you would lose if bombs wipe out the whole city. But I think that fear as an incentive to moving outward is not going to be so strong as many people think.

QUESTIONER: We have often heard the statement that if you took all the money in the country and distributed it amongst all the people it would be only a matter of a very short time before it all got back where it came from--concentrated in a few hands. I think dispersal may be in the same category. There are certain places which because of natural location have become big cities. You could break them down but we will always have big cities in those places. You can look at other countries and see that there are 10 or 12 large cities where what happens to those cities determines what happens to the country. So why disperse, because, after all, what happens to New York and possibly Los Angeles and Chicago and a few other cities is going to determine what happens to this country. You can't wipe out those factors by law or anything else. Disperse the cities, but they will still be big cities.

DR. OGBURN: Is this a question or a statement? If I were to comment on your statement, I would say that it seems to me you neglected what I said about trends. My point about this is that there is a trend for cities to be breaking up and spreading out.

Again, if you talk about it in terms of deregionalization, I would say that the facts of American history would also be against you. If you had made this remark in 1860 or 1870, you would have argued that cities will be built where they are now. But Los Angeles has been built up where there was no city in 1860. We have had cities built up in other regions. The West--Oregon, Washington, and California--has grown at the rate of about 40 percent since 1940. I think there are shifts of population so far as regionalism goes.

COLONEL HORNOR: Doctor Ogburn, in behalf of the College staff and faculty I want to thank you for a most interesting and stimulating lecture.

DR. OGBURN: It has been a great pleasure to be here.

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