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1010

PROBLEMS CONFRONTING INDUSTRY IN
PLANNING FOR WLR PRODUCTION

4 March 1949

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
INTRODUCTION—Brigadier General J. L. Holman, USA, Deputy Commandant for Education.....	1
SPEAKER— Colonel John Slezak, Specialist Reserve; President and Director of the Turner Brass Company.....	1
GENERAL DISCUSSION.....	10

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GENERAL HOLMAN: Industry today knows how to produce munitions. Its magnificent record in World War II offers ample proof of this. But I am very much afraid that the experience had to be gained the hard way.

In industry, as in the Military Services, there are many thoughtful men who are continuously searching for better and less costly ways of keeping America strong industrially. Our speaker today is very representative of that group of leaders and planners on the industrial front.

He has had wide experience as a production engineer and in the field of industrial management. During the war he was the District Chief of the Chicago Ordnance District, reporting directly to the Chief of Ordnance and responsible for the production of hundreds of millions of dollars worth of ordnance equipment of every description. He has wide interests in civic, educational, and military affairs, in addition to his primary responsibility as the President and Director of the Turner Brass Company of Sycamore, Illinois.

I take great pleasure in introducing to you Colonel John Slezak, Specialist Reserve, who will discuss industry's planning for war production. Colonel Slezak.

COLONEL SLEZAK: General Holman, I only hope that I may live up to that introduction.

Gentlemen, I can assure you that I feel grateful for the privilege of appearing before you today; if our discussion brings about even a slightly better understanding of this very difficult problem, I will feel well repaid for my effort.

After sending to General Vanaman my acceptance of his kind invitation to talk to you, I began to make an outline of what I was going to talk about. I came to the tragic realization that the wrong man had been chosen for this job. So, as a way out, I asked approximately 30 outstanding men from industry for their views on this subject. Every one of these men represents a company that was active in production of war material during World War II. Some of the companies involved are large and others are small, the largest employing approximately 30,000 people and the smallest approximately 200 people. Some of them dealt with only one service and others with several services simultaneously. Some of them produced products similar to their peacetime products--only in larger volume--and others were producing articles completely unrelated to their peacetime products. Some subcontracted small portions of their work; others subcontracted as much as 80 percent of their work. Some expanded their

RESTRICTED

1245

volume of work a little, others as much as several hundred percent, and one expanded its annual production from approximately 800 thousand dollars volume a year to approximately 34 million dollars volume a year. All of the men asked to comment responded, and some of them wrote as much as twelve pages of typewritten comments. I am not going to read them all to you, but, gentlemen, I am sure you will agree that I have a large amount of combined experience behind me; I hope that I will be able to use it to a constructive purpose.

There is one interesting conclusion that permeates throughout these comments; that is, that men in industry have not only wholehearted respect for you men in uniform but also a tremendous appreciation of your integrity and loyalty to our basic institutions. Our country is fortunate, indeed, that the officer personnel of our Armed Forces have such thorough understanding and appreciation of our free-enterprise system, not only as a military potential but also as a way of life. I do hope and pray that Army, Navy, and Air Force will always remain our Army, our Navy, and our Air Force, and not a thing apart.

In time of emergency the job of industry is to help convert the economic resources of the Nation into military strength in the shortest possible time. So, then, what are the problems confronting industry in planning for war production?

I am sure you realize that a subject of this magnitude cannot be adequately covered in 30 or 40 minutes. As a matter of fact, I could talk on this subject by the hour. I could tell you of the difficulties encountered in acquiring the know-how of designing and procuring production gauges and measuring instruments, of inspection problems, of getting deliveries on machine tools, of getting deliveries on materials, of overcoming difficult machining problems, of improvising production with old and obsolete machine tools while awaiting for the new ones, of training management and production personnel, of dealing with labor problems, of subcontracting, of financing, and so forth. As a matter of fact, here I have a sizable book full of examples of such problems as they occurred to the Chicago Ordnance District contractors and how they were solved during the late war. But all of these are run-of-the-mill, prosaic problems which can and should be solved by good management as a matter of routine.

However, in preparation for this talk, it has occurred to me that I should rather deal with problems involving procurement and other agencies, problems not always susceptible of solution by the industrial management alone. It has also occurred to me that you may enjoy seeing some of these problems through the eyes of the industrial leaders who cooperated with me on this survey. They may not always be right in their conclusions, but, nevertheless, that is the way they saw them. Perhaps "seeing ourselves as others see us" may have some constructive values.

RESTRICTED

At the risk of oversimplification, I would say that the problems confronting industry in planning for war consist primarily of knowing what is wanted, knowing how much of it is wanted, and knowing when it is wanted. Simple, isn't it! And yet, gentlemen, most, if not all, of our major production difficulties during the last war originated in the failure of the military to give us reasonably workable answers to these questions. Oh, yes, I do understand and appreciate the problems brought about by the ever-changing conditions of war and warfare--the fluidity of war--but things can become so fluid that they are all wet and nothing is accomplished but a sense of frustration.

For instance, in January 1942 a midwest manufacturer was asked to quote on the cost of tooling up and price per unit on the M-7 light tank. The requested rate of production was 1,000 tanks per month. The job was extremely urgent and tremendous pressure was applied to get delivery on these tanks in the shortest possible time. Cost was no object. However, out of approximately 3,300 drawings covering this tank, less than 900 were available; after the contractor started working on this job, he was receiving design changes averaging at a rate of approximately one design change every 40 minutes. The story of how this capacity was created--buildings, machinery, tools, production organization, recruiting and training of both the supervisory and production personnel, and so forth--is in itself an epic. As a matter of fact, it was written up in the "Saturday Evening Post" in the spring of 1945. However, when all was ready for production a year later, in March 1943, the project was completely abandoned. Out-of-pocket loss to the Government was approximately 25 million dollars, and there were other losses that do not lend themselves easily to be calculated in terms of money.

I could quote you similar examples from artillery, small arms, and ammunition. For instance, on the carbine alone, after it was in production, we received over 600 mandatory design changes. You know what that means in planning for production. Of course, there was considerable improvement in this picture toward the end of the war.

My survey indicates that the question of requirements was one of the very important problems that troubled industry. Said one of the manufacturers, perhaps slightly exaggerating:

"In the morning you were told to produce 1,000,000 of certain fuzes; in the afternoon you were told to double it, and perhaps the next day, in the morning, you were told that they were not needed at all and to cancel them."

I am sure that you will be interested in some of the reactions I received from the manufacturers I mentioned to you before. Let me give you some examples:

RESTRICTED

1210

"I know that because war is fluid the requirements for war remain in a constant state of flux. But I believe that this very truism was too often used as an apology to cover blunders which need not have been made."

Right or wrong, that is the way that manufacturer saw it.

Another comment:

"You are well familiar with all of the procedures that had to be complied with in connection with procurement. Realize then what chaos was created in the individual business which had frequently to go through all of the mechanical procurement procedures only to be told that the requirements no longer existed."

Another comment:

"Another evil effect of these 'false procurement alarms' was the psychological. Those contractors who were unfortunate to have experience like this came to the belief that the War Department did not know what it was doing. A contractor so treated could usually be mollified once, or even twice, with the 'song and dance' about the fluidity of war, but after that he began to lose confidence, and with it, respect."

Let me give you another example. These are directly copied comments from these letters I received.

"We used to have a joke to the effect that ASF Requirements Division had a huge machine into which they poured a lot of hypothetical and imaginary figures. Then they turned the crank, pushed a button, and whatever came out of that machine were used as the material requirements for the moment."

One of the men who dealt with four services simultaneously during most of the war period put it this way:

"If only one improvement, from the procurement approach, could be made in the future I would vote for intelligent handling of basic requirements as being the Number One benefit that could be accomplished."

I personally had many similar experiences, but one sticks in my mind more than any of the others. We were driven hard to produce certain medium tanks. We got everybody in high gear--unlimited overtime--no Sundays or holidays off. I spent New Years Eve with workers at their machines. They wanted Christmas and New Years Days at home with their families but were persuaded to stay on the job. We met and exceeded our schedule, but on about 2 January we were told to stop all shipments. It was a blow to us how we were to explain this to our employees and how we were to explain this to the community, because gentlemen, you must remember that without the wholehearted support of the American people our maximum ability to produce can never be realized.

RESTRICTED

In conclusion of this phase of my comments, this much seems obvious: If we had unlimited resources of men and materials, this type of situation would be foolish and in time of war would be of relatively small importance; but with our limited resources, unrealistic requirements are not only wasteful but can cause tragic consequences.

To carry out the load placed on industry in wartime essentially involves men, money, and materials. Of these the most important item is men; if the problems of men and organization are handled well, the other problems become of secondary importance or tend to disappear entirely. For that reason, I will devote the remainder of my time to various phases of that problem.

It seems to me that in preparation for war production, if we had men in the procurement agencies who not only knew what was wanted but had the ability to convey this understanding to industry and make sure that industry's interpretation of specifications, etc., was what the Services wanted it to be, our problem would be relatively simple. And then if management of industry could be so organized as to be capable not only of rapid expansion of management functions but also of corralling the constructive forces of their respective communities so as to be able to utilize them in fulfillment of their mission, the problems that we are talking about would virtually disappear. Proper organization can go a long way toward making even mediocre men function effectively, and competent men frequently can get the desired results in spite of poor organizational setup.

Let me tell you of some of the production problems caused by organizational procedures and by men not equal to their jobs. These problems might suggest to you ways of doing the job better next time. Here are some of the typical comments that I have received:

"There was one period when we had to satisfy six different inspectors from six different services on the same spare part. That certainly does not make for efficiency, and it didn't help a critical manpower situation either when those six different inspectors did not have a single common way of achieving their own particular missions."

That is a problem that industrial management cannot solve alone.

Another comment:

"Based on our experience, we think that there must be a better coordination on inspection between the Armed Forces inspectors, prime contractor inspectors, and sub-contractor inspectors. Time and time again we had the experience, on the same part, of satisfying our prime contractor inspector, but not the Armed Forces inspector, or vice versa."

1850

The next one is interesting:

"Inspectors from one branch of the service should not be made responsible for inspecting work going to another branch. We found in such cases that the inspector was much more afraid to make decisions, feeling that he might be more quickly criticized by the other branch. We had an Army inspector assigned to inspect sub-contracts for the Navy Corsair plane, and we found it extremely hard to get decisions to speed up production and shipments under this assignment. That same man gave us immediate decisions on sub-contracts for the Army."

Another comment:

"We had one Armed Services inspector (chief inspector at that) assigned to our plant whose only pre-war background was with a trucking company, and with no technical education whatsoever. He was a fine fellow, but his lack of knowledge delayed us and increased costs."

Another comment:

"We think that the Navy inspection was too rigid. Our experience indicated that they were interested in little details that didn't basically affect the quality, and that caused continuous headaches in meeting production schedules."

Another comment:

"Procurement personnel should be selected more carefully in line with their responsibilities. We had illustrations of stock brokers attempting to negotiate and purchase all sorts of technical items, with practically no knowledge of engineering drawings or production operations."

Another comment:

"All kinds of procurement officers descended on industry. Many had little or no experience in manufacturing, and it appeared at times that out of pure frustration they were looking for someone to 'tag' with a contract."

Still another:

"We had many weeks when several auditors from several different Services were here at the same time. These auditors did not accept each other's audits or findings."

Put yourself in the contractor's place in that situation.

RESTRICTED

Now, gentlemen, while many of these things seem negative, remember that I asked them to let their hair down. They are not meant to be critical; they are meant to be constructive. Out of this "seeing ourselves as others see us" something constructive may come.

Then in conclusion to this phase of it there is one very constructive comment:

"There is one thing which we certainly think would be helpful to industry in general and that is the establishment of adequate procedure under which the consideration of deviations from any standard could be expedited."

This last comment brings to my mind the difficulties caused by faulty organizational setup. That is, it happened again and again that the individual responsible for production results did not have adequate authority over all elements of production to accomplish his mission. Let me illustrate by an incident from my own experience.

It was in November 1944 and the production of 8-inch shells was on a critical list. We were told to move heaven and earth to produce these shells. I was with the Under Secretary of War in the office of the president of one of the manufacturers of 8-inch shells. Chief among the reasons for not meeting the production schedules that this man gave to the Under Secretary was that the War Manpower Commission would not let him hire enough men to meet his requirements. The Under Secretary turned to one of his aides and directed him that this company's allotment of men be changed at once to the number requested by the manufacturer. Of course, it was obvious that the Under Secretary of War, even though he was responsible for production results, did not have authority to issue such an order.

Well, this is what happened: The local Labor Management Committee of the War Manpower Commission refused to budge. It was sustained by its regional director and finally by Mr. McNutt himself. And there it stood, dangling. The Under Secretary and Mr. McNutt somehow could not meet even though both were in Washington. In the meantime, days and weeks went by, and no action on this critical item. Finally, I personally managed to sell the local committee on changing its stand. That, by the way, is in itself an interesting episode of problems confronting industry in planning for war production.

I am sure that you saw the sequel to this story in the newspapers about two months ago.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

1337

Let me close this phase of the subject with another comment from my survey:

"On the positive side of procurement, I would like to mention that for efficiency I believe the solution to be decentralization and more decentralization. As I see it the central office, so to speak, should serve only two broad purposes: first, to disseminate the requirements, and second, to act as a service agency in supplying the basic legal ground rules and up-to-date national price information. It is almost always followed that when Washington got mixed up in a procurement, confusion resulted. I realize that the political pressures to which the 'main offices' were subjected by virtue of location makes complete decentralization a difficult problem, but I strongly urge that we should be working toward making the Washington office of all the branches highly efficient service agencies to assist the field offices in the actual procurement work."

I personally believe that decentralization of operations and delegation of adequate authority to the individuals involved would have eliminated many delays and unnecessary and costly nuisances. In the Ordnance Department we were very fortunate in this respect. The District Chiefs had adequate authority to do the job well and were close enough to the contractors to bring about friendly cooperation and mutual understanding. I think that industry could well emulate many of the operating practices or the Ordnance Department during the last war.

The operation of Selective Service caused many unnecessary headaches, and in the next war it may prove to be too costly a luxury. This is the way some of my friends in industry feel about it:

"The loss of personnel from our two plants through the draft was terrific. Out of approximately 1,000 employees we lost over 600 employees to the Armed Forces during the war period. In many cases these men were the 'cream of the crop' for production. We were up against one or two draft boards that simply didn't do an intelligent job on deferments. The chairman of one of these boards told us, when we objected to their policies, that his teen-age son could fill any job in our entire plant, and he was supposed to be an intelligent individual and was dictating the policies of the board."

Another comment:

"The individual inequities which resulted from the use of men were so flagrant that I can only hope for their correction through some kind of National Service Law which will view all of our available manpower as one pool from which assignments will be made solely upon the consideration of the good of the state in time of emergency and not upon benefits to the individual."

RESTRICTED

Renegotiation may not be considered a production problem, but believe me, gentlemen, it is one of the real parts of the whole production-procurement process. The problems caused by renegotiation created confusion on the part of some contractors and dismay on the part of others, because on one hand there was tremendous pressure against cost-plus contracts as being against the best public interest, while on the other hand all contracts, by virtue of statutory renegotiation, became cost-plus contracts. In my opinion, in a free democracy, renegotiation can never become a successful substitute for intelligent buying. Here are a few comments from my survey:

"Renegotiation in general seemed to dull the edge of incentive for smaller companies. It was difficult to understand and you never knew what it did to you until a long interval after the contract was well in progress or completed. You never knew whether or not you would lose some of your skin with your shirt. There was neither protection in case of loss nor much credit for doing an outstanding job."

Another comment:

"Neither industry nor labor should make a bonanza out of the war, but the terms of their pay should be clear and equitable."

Another comment:

"In renegotiations, efficient management should not be over-penalized as was done during the last war."

Another comment:

"Aside from the stupendous amount of work and expense, and the feeling that renegotiations were conducted as a punitive measure rather than that of obtaining a fair adjustment, renegotiation was effectively handled."

Another comment:

"Certainly its only justification can be that it implements the inefficiencies of the procurement process. If statutory renegotiation is to justify itself much more emphasis must be placed upon the rewards and much less emphasis upon the punitive factor."

Another comment:

"Actually, as you are well aware, over-all renegotiation was defeated per se in those many cases where a contractor performed inefficiently on one contract and efficiently on another. To actually accomplish the purpose of saving labor hours and materials, the whole system should be set forth and administered as an incentive rather than a deterrent to the contractors."

1281

That, gentlemen, is my story. However, in conclusion I believe that the solution to most of these major problems lies in setting up organizations both in procurement agencies and in industry that can accomplish their wartime missions in an atmosphere of confusion, and even though manned by the type of personnel they are most likely to get in time of major emergency.

As I have mentioned before, I have deliberately chosen for the purpose of this talk only certain broad phases of the problem. Therefore, I do hope that in the question period that follows, your questions will bring about discussion of phases of this problem which I have omitted and which may be even of more interest to you than the parts of the problems that I have covered.

Thank you, gentlemen.

QUESTION: Colonel, in all of our studies here about mobilization and production, the subject of a National Service Act always comes up. What would be industry's point of view on such a control of labor?

COLONEL SIEZAK: Colonel, I am neither qualified nor delegated with authority to speak for industry, but my feeling, gathered from those sample comments of 30-odd manufacturers and from my own experience during the war, is that industry, as such, has intelligence enough and a thorough enough appreciation of the problem to understand that in time of war there is only one major goal, and that is to win the war. It is very nice to talk about our social gains and so on, but I think industry, as such, would support the view of the best utilization of manpower, whether it is called complete regimentation or something else, for the production of whatever military and other needs might require.

QUESTION: Along that same line, I am curious about one of your correspondents who was victimized by the inadequacy of his local draft board and who then went ahead and suggested that we put everything into a national pot. Did he carry that further with any suggestions as to the practical aspects of administering such a thing?

COLONEL SIEZAK: Commander, you are referring to two different men. So far as possible, I did not quote from one manufacturer twice. It is rather interesting how the two comments tie in, but they were made by men from two different organizations, one employing about a thousand people and the other employing between 250 and 300 people.

However, I believe the feeling is--and I think I can speak on it rather positively--that if the organization for the administration of the Selective Service Act had been set up with a thorough appreciation of the problems that are apt to arise under the conditions that exist in time of war, and if the draft boards had been given not only authority but also responsibility to get certain results, the Selective Service Act could have worked.

Other situations were reported to me which I have not quoted here. One example is the case of a young man who was a banker's son. He was anemic and not physically fit, but the public opinion of the community was that the boy had to go in the Army. Originally he was rejected by the local doctor. Later on, when the requirements were lowered, he finally got in. I am using this case as an example because I know the boy personally and it is a case that was brought up by one of the manufacturers. He was shipped to the Pacific. I believe he became sick on the way there. The Army had him there for a few weeks, brought him back, and then kept him around. Well, that was strictly a question of organization. It didn't make any sense. But in that particular community the idea of that rich banker's son having to go in the Army was so prevalent that the board could not or did not resist it.

It seems to me there should be a way to have an organization by which that kind of pressure can be gotten around.

QUESTION: You spoke of the difficulties of renegotiation, and I think your statement was that intelligent buying is the answer to some of these problems. What would be your solution to the problem that arises when a new piece of equipment that has not been produced before is turned over to a manufacturer? How can you buy intelligently from that man when he has had no experience in turning out that equipment and there aren't complete drawings or a model on which he can base any estimate? I am referring to the initial stages.

COLONEL SLEZAK: That is a very good point, Colonel. I agree with you. But why not make renegotiation or some price adjustment scheme apply to specific cases instead of generalizing and including everything?

A further deterrent to war effort was the fact that renegotiation applied to you if you were producing ammunition but not to your competitor in the same town who decided that it was not wise to go into war work and that he could be kept busy on a lot of nonrenegotiable work.

I had exactly such a case come before me for renegotiation in my district. The organization that went on war work was allowed, before taxes, something like $10\frac{1}{2}$ percent. That industry was in the habit of making considerably more, but that is the way it came out according to the rules which, by the way, were set up right here in Washington. On the other hand, the competitor who very cleverly, from his viewpoint, did not do anything that came within the scope of renegotiation was making 23 percent before taxes.

QUESTION: You don't think that would be an argument, then, in favor of renegotiation at some stage in the contract?

1270

COLONEL SLEZAK: My argument is against the way it was. I would say this, Colonel, that a desirable renegotiation principle is to provide some sort of incentive to save materials and men. As it was, if you looked into the arithmetic of it, the more money you spent and the more material you wasted, the more profit you got, because you got whatever the percentage of profit was on that wasted material.

Rules could have been made in Washington—and again this is just my personal opinion—that might have allowed for an adequate reward for savings. The reward for accomplishments was small and the punishment for inefficiency or neglect was nil. What I mean, is that, if you did not produce, it was next to impossible to prove that you were negligent. As a result, the poor producer would be given let us say 8 or 9 percent profit before taxes and the good producer was given perhaps 11 or 12 percent profit before taxes on that work. But I can quote you some items on which we had prices ranging from 92 cents to \$1.86 a unit. Now, you know, that 2 or 3 percent additional profit frequently does not make up the difference. Do you see my point? If everybody, even those who were producing at the lowest cost, would have increased their cost so as to be able to charge the highest price, they would have made more money.

I am not making a case for that. What I am trying to point out is that whatever is done should amount to doing what comes naturally. In other words, when these men are doing what they think is for their best interests, they should at the same time be doing what is for the best interest of the Nation—and that requires some sort of incentive or reward. In general, as the rules were applied, statutory renegotiation did not work out that way.

QUESTION: Could you give us your views, or industry's views if you have them, on the present allocation system that is being practiced by the Munitions Board in its tentative allocations, leading toward mobilization planning?

COLONEL SLEZAK: Well, sir, that is a big one. A certain amount of planning is better than no planning; and certainly, when intelligently handled, much can be accomplished, so I am for it.

If you will permit me to go to an example, prior to World War II we had allocations of facilities to certain services for certain types of work. While a perfect job was not done, there was quite a bit of basic information available; I believe, if the original mobilization plan had been followed, we would have gained a great deal. I am more familiar with the ordnance end of it than that of any other service; the situation might have been better elsewhere. However, during 1940 we had to use competitive bids on such things as the carriage for an 8-inch gun. This actually happened. The manufacturer who had 80 or 85 percent of the production equipment needed on hand and who was in similar work was high

bidder. Another manufacturer, who had to buy 50 to 75 percent of the equipment, got the contract. You can see the disturbance to the over-all national economy that can be caused by that sort of thing.

I don't know whether it answers the question, but my feeling is that the more definite, intelligent planning one can do, the better.

QUESTION: Sir, do you think that if, during the war, your ordnance procurement district in Chicago had been combined with all the other Armed Forces procurement districts into one Armed Forces Procurement District for that particular area, better results would have been obtained, or not?

COLONEL SLEZAK: I frankly don't know. The whole thing stems out of this, Colonel: If all the services had known what they wanted and if their organization had been so set up that any deviations in design or deviations from standards could have been so handled that a quick answer could have been given to industry, I would be inclined to answer yes. On the other hand, when you have variations of personal opinion as to equipment design and use, that is another story.

What really helped the ordnance district system was a close understanding amongst the personnel. The plan had a lot of defects, but I never saw any discord among the district chiefs. There was a very high degree of cooperation. Even among the plants I control I don't get that kind of cooperation.

Now, if you have all of the forementioned conditions in existence, I would say yes; but when you are in a state of flux, when you are developing an organization, you have to have much better people to make it work than when your organization has gone through the test of fire and is functioning.

QUESTION: Colonel, I was interested in your example of the industrial organization that employed a thousand men, 600 of whom went into selective service. Do you think that industry has the general impression that it could, in a future war, retain more than 40 percent of its original employees?

COLONEL SLEZAK: Well, Commander, I don't think there is any definite impression on anything of that sort. It is a question of balance. Industry could be better organized; and if there is—and I hope there will be—closer liaison between the services and industry, their organization could be set up to be effective under more difficult conditions.

But when you are dealing with such things as the M-7 tank I mentioned, you need highly skilled men. You are wasting highly skilled men and losing time if you take those men away.

Any industrial organization--and I believe it is also true of the military organization--likes to retain a good team intact. Anyone is going to squawk when anybody attempts to break up a good working combination that he has.

It is a question of degree. Some policy-making body must make a common-sense decision, whether it is desirable to get quick results at the expense of wasting skills. I would say the better the planning, the less essential it is that we retain a large proportion of skilled men.

QUESTION: To carry that same thing a step further, did you get any specific comments on the current program giving Reserve officer commissions to many of industry's up-and-coming young executives and engineers?

COLONEL SLEZAK: Yes. I would say virtually all of the comments are favorable.

Now, there has been some talk that not only should Reserve officers be so selected, but that Regular Army, Navy, and Air Force officers, those who particularly will be dealing with procurement functions, should spend some time with industry, maybe several months at a time, and that they be not only interested observers but part of the team. They would, therefore, have a better understanding and appreciation of how to select an organization that will deliver what they want and also how to take full advantage of the capability of that organization. Of course, I fully realize you have the problem of rotation, and the man you train for procurement today might be sent to sea tomorrow, and so on. But, naturally, the more men we have who are trained and understand not only the possibilities and capacities of the industrial setup but also its limitations, the better results we can accomplish in time of emergency.

QUESTION: Will you comment on industry's reaction to the termination procedure, particularly mass terminations at the end of the war, and how that was handled?

COLONEL SLEZAK: Colonel, that is the bright thing in the picture. You just don't find anybody kicking about that except, possibly, on details. I think it was phenomenal. Most of the men in industry realized that when they did not get their money quickly, in 99 cases out of 100 they themselves were responsible.

Termination is the bright star, the glorious thing, for the services, because that job was well planned and well done. And thank God that there were men in the services who dared to act intelligently and who had the courage to act even before the Termination Act was passed. You know, it was quite a problem then.

When you go around among the men in industry, you hear nothing but praise on this subject. So I didn't cite it as a problem because I didn't think it was a problem.

COLONEL HOFFER: Colonel Slezak, on behalf of the College, I want to thank you for bringing out some things which, as you said, show us how other people see us. I think we can gain a great deal from reflecting on them. We appreciate your coming here very, very much indeed.

COLONEL SLEZAK: Thank you.

(29 March 1949--450)S.