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CONSERVATION

26 May 1949

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COMMANDER POIND: General Holman, gentlemen: The subject to be discussed this morning, "Conservation," is one which is not usually properly understood or appreciated. Conservation is commonly thought to be something that has to do with reforestation, with measures to correct soil erosion, or with salvage activities or programs. Conservation is much more than this. It affects practically all the elements of the subjects which you are now studying.

Our speaker this morning, Mr. Howard Coonley, is well qualified by experience to tell us of the importance and scope of his subject and how it is related to the problems which you are now studying. Although you have had his biography available to you, I would like to emphasize one feature of his career.

Mr. Coonley was the director of the Conservation Division of the War Production Board and as such he is one of the few people who is qualified, I feel, to talk on this subject to you. At present he is chairman of the Executive Committee of the American Standards Association and president of the International Standards Organization.

It is a pleasure to welcome Mr. Coonley again to the College and to this platform. Mr. Coonley.

MR. COONLEY: It is a great pleasure to be back with you again in spite of the fact that you put me in a "hot spot" by making me follow Bill Elliott. Just in passing I want to say that I heard Dr. Elliott give one of the most magnificent speeches last Saturday morning that I ever listened to. It happened to be before a group of head masters of what we call independent schools. He spoke on the independent school of the future and the problem of educating our young people to understand their responsibilities and opportunities, and, particularly, to appreciate the freedom under which we have been living most of our lives--not all of our lives. He accentuated the necessity of educating our youth to feel that they have to give in order to receive, that this country wouldn't continue to be great if everybody expected to be fed out of a bottle.

Many of the things that Dr. Elliott touched on this morning had to do with conservation. I note with much interest and satisfaction that conservation is one of the major factors that you are going to consider in making your final analysis.

I want to indulge briefly in a little preliminary statement, largely to give you my own point of view before I go into the practical.

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questions of conservation, how conservation was handled during World War II and how I feel it should be handled in this postwar period.

The events of the past few weeks have led many to believe that the dangers of another world war in the near future have largely disappeared, that a formula may be found whereby capitalist nations can live peacefully and unarmed side by side with nations that exist under a system of communal property and state regulation. They forget that capitalism can succeed only where free institutions and individual opportunity exist, while communism germinates in the hotbed of dictatorship and is kept alive by fanning the flame of aggression.

Many times I have been accused of being a perpetual optimist. I hope I am. Yet I am not so naive as to believe that the dictators behind the Iron Curtain have changed their fundamental philosophy overnight and are extending the hand of friendship for humanitarian reasons.

It is essential that we keep in mind the fact that the two systems are basically different in their ideology. Capitalism thrives on the theory of more goods for more people, which, in turn, makes possible a higher standard of living. Communism, on the other hand, is nourished by unrest and strife. Yet it threatens to overwhelm a great portion of the world. This can be explained only by the sad fact that an appeal to men's passions often succeeds where a call to their finer instincts fails.

You may perhaps know that I spent the winter of 1944-1945 in China as the consultant to the Chinese War Production Board. Let me pause to say that when Dr. Elliott spoke of the type of organization that we might have in the next war, I thought I would have to procure for you what they call the "Organic Law" of the Chinese War Production Board. On the way to China my assistant, who was also a member of the War Production Board, James Jacobson, and I began to study the problem of what type of organization we would have to set up in China in order to do a quick and effective job. We took all the legislation back of the War Production Board, the Office of War Manpower, the Office of Defense Transportation, Defense Supply Corporation, Defense Plants Corporation--in fact all of the various agencies we had in this country and the laws back of them--and put them into a single package. Thirty days after we arrived in China, the package was converted into an "Organic Law"--as it is called in China--and became a very remarkable basic philosophy for the Chinese War Production Board.

My experience in China during the winter of 1944-45 and the trend of events since have made me skeptical of any possible neighborliness between Russia and her satellites and the rest of the world. In fact, the recent gestures over the Berlin situation lead me to believe more than ever

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that we must be on our guard. I had originally written "Beware of the Greeks bearing gifts." Then I tried in all the familiar books of quotations to find the correct wording. When I finally found the reference in Bartlett's Quotations, it read: "I fear the Greeks even when bearing gifts." The truth undoubtedly is that Russia has failed in her cold war against the western powers and has decided to concentrate on fields that give more promise of growing the unsavory grapes which they are eager to harvest.

This is a roundabout way of saying that the present is no time to relax in our preparedness. The lessons that are being taught here in the Industrial College, the work of the Munitions Board, the plans of the National Security Resources Board are essential to our safety, to the maintenance of the fundamental freedoms in which we believe, and to the contentment of mankind.

In both World Wars I and II, I had the opportunity to serve my country in a civilian capacity. While my duties as vice president of the Emergency Fleet Corporation in World War I were not directly concerned with conservation, the lessons that I learned made me conscious of the fact that conservation, while important to success in peacetime operation, is a prime essential in an all-out struggle such as World War II. In the recent conflict my work, first as Chief of Simplification, and, later, as Director of the Conservation Division of the War Production Board, was concentrated in the area which we are discussing today.

In spite of the lessons learned in 1917 and 1918, little progress had been made in the 23-year interlude between the two great wars. The laissez-faire attitude that was prevalent in that interim period should not and, I believe, will not occur again. Effective preparedness is not evidence of a warlike spirit. It is an indication that we as a nation value our way of life sufficiently to be determined to preserve it.

No one will question the fact that the various measures of conservation developed by the war agencies, both military and civil, had a large part to do with the amazing production records established by this country in the recent war. I will discuss these measures from the record of the War Production Board, for to that agency was delegated the responsibility of keeping military and civilian requirements in balance, and this was of itself not an easy task.

The conservation measures may be divided into five broad categories, and each of these, in turn, into a number of subdivisions. In the first category I place standardization. In fact, the importance of standards in a program of preparedness justifies placing it in a classification by itself. Unfortunately, few people have an understanding of what standardization really is, and fewer realize what an outstanding contribution it has made to the success of the American enterprise system. I remember with what amazement

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I discovered upon arriving in Washington in March 1942 to assume my simplification duties that a memorandum had been issued by one of the top executives of the Conservation Bureau, as it was then called, that standardization was not a responsibility of that Bureau but should properly be supervised by the Division of Civilian Supply. It required several weeks of vigorous campaigning to get standardization back where it belonged--in the Conservation Bureau. Strangely enough, this executive did not appreciate that specification, simplification and substitution were elements of standardization, for the Conservation Bureau had large staffs working on all three subjects at that time.

Dr. Elliott spoke to Joe Weiner who was, in the early stages, head of Civilian Supply. I struggled with him for weeks and weeks before I could get standardization away from him. I did not blame him for not wanting to release it, but it was definitely not part of his authority.

While preparing this paper I have had the privilege of reviewing the address on "Industrial Standardization" delivered at the Industrial College by my good friend and recent associate, Brigadier General Donald Armstrong, on 14 March 1949. General Armstrong covers this all important subject so adequately that I shall not try to supplement his statements, except to add to the list of subdivisions of standardization one that appeals to me as outstandingly important--that of supply catalogs. A fully developed supply catalog, including not only the name of each product but succinct descriptions and an identifying number for each, would be of inestimable value to the preparedness program. This and other features of standardization I shall touch upon in my summary of recommendations.

The category which I place second on my list of conservation measures is a survey and monthly record of the availability of critical materials. The records that were kept by the War Production Board throughout the entire war were of constant value to all of the war agencies, military and civil, and were essential to industry in its production planning.

Third on my list of conservation measures I place substitution. The savings that were accomplished of the most critical materials by substituting others in adequate supply, in many cases making possible an actual improvement in the end product, were remarkable. Inevitably some substitutions were made that interfered somewhat in the quality, but seldom did they interfere with the performance of the product.

One of the raw materials that was seriously short throughout the war was copper. The Conservation Division was called upon to find ways and means to save every possible ton of that crucial material. One of the rather interesting and unusual methods that was followed was to reduce the copper content of the penny, thereby saving 30,000 tons

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per year. I admit that the resulting coin was mongrel and has been a nuisance ever since, but at the time the substitution was fully justified (My friends never fail to twit me with it by saying, "Here's your penny".) In fact, the shortage of copper became so grave that some 19,000 tons of silver were used in bus bars to make available the equivalent tonnage of copper. It was the experts of the Conservation Division who worked out most of the substitutions.

Fourth on my schedule I place salvage. The vast programs that were planned and carried out to collect and make available scrap steel and iron, scrap paper, and waste grease, had a crucial bearing on the winning of the war. The requisitioning of iron and steel from nonessential uses played an important part in this program. The records of the Salvage Division of the War Production Board, originally part of the Conservation Bureau, are highlights of accomplishment.

As a fifth important category I list supply catalogs. The development and use of supply catalogs is the most effective way of avoiding such great waste of materials and manpower as occurred in World War II, because of duplication in supplies.

My sixth and final category has to do with international cooperation in the field of conservation. (During the war we called this "interallied cooperation") and naturally our efforts would be confined to those nations on which we could count for support should another emergency arise.

Soon after we became involved in World War II, it was apparent that some action was needed in unifying some of the specifications for components of airplanes, mechanized equipment, and such things as metal pressure containers between the English-speaking nations. Colonel Heis is familiar with part of this program. The United States was being called upon to furnish components to both Canada and Great Britain in large quantity and yet we had no unified standards of measurement, gauging and testing practices. Quantities of components that passed the USA requirements were rejected by our allies and many were claimed to be satisfactory that inspectors in this country would not approve.

To correct this situation a Combined Conservation Subcommittee was set up under the Combined Production and Resources Board, which arranged for a series of meetings of experts in London, Washington, and finally Toronto. The situation was only partially corrected during the war, but so much promise was held out that meetings were continued in the postwar period and resulted in a Declaration of Accord with respect to unification of screw threads, signed by representatives of the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States in Washington on 18 November 1948. Other steps toward unification are being carried on and much more can and should be done.

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To achieve the maximum benefits from conservation, there must be centralized supervision. This can be best exercised by a civilian agency with responsibilities and authorities similar to those of the War Production Board during the recent conflict. If I understand correctly the purposes and powers of the National Security Resources Board, it would be an ideal agency for this purpose.

Now my understanding perhaps is not so clear of the present status of the National Security Resources Board as Dr. Elliott's but I think it has the necessary power; I think that Board has the opportunity to do the job that he described as a skeleton War Production Board job. Naturally the Board cannot do the job until it is properly organized at the top. I have sympathized with those men who are giving their time to it today because many of them, extremely able, cannot accomplish what they want because of the lack of top leadership.

Before making definite recommendations for the plans and procedures of an organization which I feel would best administer conservation in the event of another emergency, I should like to review briefly what I believe to be the strength and weakness of our conservation activities during the late war.

Speaking first of the Conservation Division of the War Production Board, I can say without hesitation that it was strong in the caliber and technical ability of its personnel. For this I personally deserve no credit as the selections were made and the individuals secured before I became Director of that Division. At the peak of its activity the Conservation Division had 160 experts, almost all technically trained, and many on leave of absence from their companies. They represented the highest authorities in the broad fields of raw materials, finished and semifinished products; in the techniques of specification, simplification and substitution; all practical in their ideas, as they had been trained in industry. These men were constantly called upon to act as technical advisers to other divisions of the War Production Board as well as to the military and civilian agencies. I think almost every specialist in the Conservation Division was of the type that Dr. Elliott described. They would be needed in another emergency and could not be secured at an equivalent salary basis, but such men under extreme conditions were ready themselves and their companies were ready to give them leaves of absence to serve for any amount of time that was necessary. A large proportion of the men on the Conservation Division staff were dollar-a-year men.

Again, the fact that representatives of the Conservation Division held memberships on the Appeals Board, the Production Control Committee, the Facilities Bureau, the Order Clearance Committee, the Priorities Committee, the Production Scheduling Committee, and the Requirements Committee proved of great advantage both to these Boards and to the work of the

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Division itself. For the staff of the Conservation Division had a broader over-all knowledge of the availability of materials and of production facilities than any other government agency, military or civil. It was, however, a handicap that representatives of the Conservation Division were not allowed to sit in on the meetings of all the Industry Advisory Committees and were, therefore, not in position to influence some of the important decisions made by WPB. The conservation experts had basic knowledge that was not possessed by representatives of industry or of the other WPB Divisions.

Donald Nelson gave me as one of the compelling reasons why I should agree to go to China to assist in developing the Chinese War Production that my position as Director of the Conservation Division gave me a truer picture of the assets and liabilities of the War Production Board than any other member of his staff.

Yet there was one inherent weakness of the position of the Conservation Division. It was very properly a staff, not a line organization. But while in the early months of the war the chief conservation executive reported direct to the WPB Chairman, the Division was later made a staff activity of the Operations Vice Chairman. While I liked, admired and could work with each of the Operations Vice Chairmen to whom I reported (there was a succession of three), I had continual difficulty in obtaining from other vice chairmen recognition of the contribution the conservation specialists could make to practically every major problem that came under their jurisdiction. At one time it was so difficult to obtain approval of my Division's recommendations for simplification of product that I found it necessary to develop a measurement chart to prove the importance of each recommendation. Fortunately, this somewhat unique chart provided the key which opened the door to approval.

I realize that I have given a very brief and unquestionably inadequate picture of the conservation activities of the War Production Board, but I hope I have indicated sufficient of its accomplishments and failures to stimulate your interest and to assist you in reaching sound conclusions.

Now I should like to suggest an outline of the organization and procedures which I believe would be best suited for the present period of preparedness, with recommendations as to its expansion should an actual emergency arise.

As I have previously indicated, the responsibility for the conservation planning should be delegated to the National Security Resources Board.

For the time being, at least, a single director with a staff of four or five men, experienced in standardization methods, their use and control, with one specialist to cover critical materials, another salvage, would be sufficient. Naturally this group should have a complement of secretarial and clerical help.

The Director of Conservation should report to the Chairman of NSRB.

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Within the broad field of standardization there should be specialized activities in connection with specifications and simplifications.

Specification activities should be pointed largely toward measures for temporarily saving critical material by establishing emergency ratings of such products as structural steel, structural timber, and power units. We accomplished a great deal in the war emergency by reducing the requirements for steel and lumber and even by rating down motors. Now that sounds a little questionable but let me say that we rated them down to a ten-year life instead of a twenty-year life. We felt that the war couldn't last more than ten years and if we could reduce very largely the horse power and other requirements, the savings would be justified.

In the area of simplification, large savings in material, horsepower and machine requirements can be made by eliminating all unnecessary types and sizes of end products, thus concentrating on essentials for military and civilian needs.

The program could be expedited by making a study of the simplification provisions carried out under the WPB. More than 50 percent of the Limitation Orders issued by WPB included simplification provisions. It was estimated by experts that in those products where simplification provisions were established an average of 25 percent increase in production or savings in materials and machine time were accomplished. As an example of such savings we were able to reduce the number of items in fittings by over 65 percent and still meet all the end use requirements. You can see what a tremendous increase that made possible in the production of the remaining 35 percent, avoiding the additional work in process of semifinished and finished stock and the warehousing.

While substitution is generally considered an element of standardization, I have placed this in a special category because it should be treated not only in the sense of standardizing substitutes, but also in its equally important influence in keeping a running record of the relative availability of critical and semicritical materials. On the other hand, I do not feel that the National Security Resources Board needs to undertake such a record, for the present at least.

The Munitions Board has an effective program for the stockpiling of critical materials that may be in short supply in case of emergency. In connection with this work, the Munitions Board maintains records that would be sufficient for the present.

So far as salvage is concerned, a program for the orderly collection, warehousing and distribution of the most needed materials should be developed. Records of the Conservation Division, and later the Salvage Division of WPB should supply vital information, since in any future emergency there will undoubtedly be shortages of the same materials on which such an extensive successful salvage program was carried out during the last war.

In the case of supply catalogs, the only activities necessary for the National Security Resources Board would be to assist the staffs of the Munitions Board and the Bureau of Federal Supply in expediting the work which they are now carrying on.

With regard to the International Program, it would be necessary for the time being only to keep in touch and to cooperate with the present groups that are working on an expanded unification program. I may say there are some delegations going over to Paris next month in connection with some of the work that is still being carried on. Most of this unification work was and is being developed under the American Standards Association Committee B-16 activities.

If such a program as I have outlined should be adopted, I am confident that it would have the complete cooperation of industry. In fact, industrialists, I am sure, would be ready to give advice and form such task committees as might be needed to assist the Conservation staff. Such committees should be kept to the minimum and, so far as possible, should be chosen from similar task committees cooperating with the Munitions Board and the Federal Specifications Board.

The organization and the program which I have suggested is intended only for the period of preparation for an emergency which we hope will not arise. It is my belief, however, that both the organization and the procedures could be easily expanded in case of need without radical changes.

The Conservation Division was originally set up on a purely functional basis--specification, simplification, substitution, salvage, and interagency activities, each having its independent chief and staff. Later salvage was made a separate division. The Conservation Division was at that time streamlined, with two supervisors--one to cover raw materials and the other finished products. The technicians in each of these two departments covered all the functional activities. It is this type of organization which I think should be preserved.

Let me say in confidence that I had a very difficult time in gaining the backing of my own organization for the change from a functional to a line organization. Many men who had specialized in the field of specifications felt that they could not cover simplification and substitution, and some simplification experts felt that the specifications men could not possibly handle simplification. We proved to them that the background information necessary for each function was the same and it was simply a question of teaching the techniques which differed only slightly.

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Let me accent another thing that Dr. Elliott said. This work that I have outlined can be done only by the very ablest of specialists. It is not the number that will be brought together under an interim conservation program of this kind but the caliber and ability of these men that will determine its success or failure. I hope to see very promptly an outstandingly able chairman chosen for the National Security Resources Board and that he will retain some of the very capable men he has today and supplement them with others with experience and background to do an effective job. Because only on the basis of such an effective job can we hope to get under way with the speed which will be essential should another war occur.

This concludes my prepared remarks.

QUESTION: Sir, I am interested in the details of your specification group of which you spoke. I assume it was a comparatively small group since your whole organization was rather small. Did it attempt to review specifications for all products and to influence or direct those who were writing specifications toward a certain lessening of their standards? When I think of the thousands and thousands of specifications that are written, I wonder how you could have enough information on them. Would you care to give me a little more information on that?

MR. COONLEY: The Specifications Branch, as we called it when it was set up on a functional basis, was the largest technical branch of the Conservation Division. I think there were about 57 specialists in that Branch. Naturally they explored only those specifications where they felt and where industry itself felt substantial savings could be made for the emergency. One of their activities was the National Emergency Steel Specifications Committee. They worked day and night on a revision of specifications in order to reduce the metal content of some of their structural steel. They didn't try to cover the whole category of specifications naturally, but they did go into those specifications where considerable savings could be made. I remember one of the fields we explored without success--most of the time we were successful and we had good cooperation--but in this case we found that if we could get the railroads to specify welded boilers for their locomotives instead of riveted boilers, we could save six tons of steel per locomotive. A few of the railroads were willing to do that. The Interstate Commerce Commission was rather reluctant at first but finally approved. But by that time the available stress-relief capacity of the country was so limited we couldn't undertake the program. Yet it was in fields of that kind where important savings could be made that the Specifications Branch worked.

We set up during the war about 150 entirely new specification activities, and called them "Emergency Specifications." These emergency specifications have been reviewed since the end of the war and most of them have been approved as permanent standards. Some of them have been revised and will be approved as American standards.

QUESTION: What liaison existed between your specifications Group and the people in the Armed Services who were writing specifications for military end items?

MR. COONLEY: After the preliminary revisions were made we always brought in some representatives of the Armed Services, and both the Army and the Navy had conservation liaison men who were with us almost continuously. We, in turn, had conservation representatives as liaison men with the Navy and the Army. We never had one directly with the Air Force, but we did work with the Air Force. We did have liaison officers both ways.

QUESTION: It seems to me from your progress in the past and what you propose that you would cover relatively few specifications and would just handle the important ones. Shouldn't there be an agency, in the Munitions Board say, to review many more specifications than you did in your organization?

MR. COONLEY: I feel that we should have made much more progress between World War I and World War II and that we must continue to make progress from now on. There has been in the Federal Specifications Board an Industry Advisory Committee that was set up and has been operating for many years so that industry could keep in touch with the Board and the Board could, in turn, keep in touch with industry in developing federal specifications. That I know has been most helpful.

But we are not today doing the job we should be doing in developing specifications for war needs. We have accomplished only a fraction of what should have been done in the past. I remember that during the summer of 1942 or the autumn of 1942--at least after the first North African campaign, which was unsuccessful--I was called over to General Somervell's office and was requested by General Young to hasten and expand our work, because of the fact that we lost much of our motorized equipment on the field of battle due to some minor repair job. There was not even any standardization of bolt holes and bolts and nuts, so that when some minor accident happened to a jeep or a motorized gun on the field, it couldn't be repaired because enough spare parts to meet all requirements could not be carried. We started immediately an activity which should be going on now to see what we could do about standardizing small gas engines. I remember at the time there was something like 1.65 million gas engines on order. What they call a small gas engine is one from 50 horsepower down. We found there was no standardization between any two of the producers of these engines and there was absolutely no standardization between the engine parts of a single make. We did make considerable progress but I am sorry to say it is not being carried on today. That is the kind of thing that should go on because it shall be a must. Gas engines are essential to war campaigns, and the fact that they are not standardized to the point where repair parts can be interchanged is, I think, quite a catastrophe.

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GENERAL HOLLAN: It seems to me as though public opinion has a great place in this conservation chart. For example, placards were posted during the war for the Nation to conserve food and electricity. I wonder if you could elaborate on how these programs were generated, where they were handled, and the procedures along which they were implemented, or was that a part of the Conservation Branch under you?

MR. COONLEY: We had a small publicity department or promotion department in the Conservation Division, but all of our work had to be implemented by other divisions. There was a publicity department in the War Production Board through which we had to clear. Later, we had to clear through the Office of War Information. But the greatest help we had which is available today was from the Advertising Council. That Council did a superb job for us, not only for the Conservation Division but all through the War Production Board activities. That was a group that was brought together by the large advertising agencies and the national advertisers. They gave their time and most of their products free. If we had a serious problem we would call upon them to sit down with us and they would work out the methods of publicizing and promoting. They did a marvelous job in influencing public opinion.

I think one of the problems we have today is to make our people realize that a preparedness program is not necessarily an aggressive program. I tried to bring that out in my speech because we know very definitely that the only safety we have is adequate preparedness and the better prepared we are, the less likely we are to have another conflict.

COLONEL NEIS: Mr. Coonley, would you elaborate a bit on the initiation of the "L," "I" and "P" Orders and how they were processed?

MR. COONLEY: Most of the "Limitation Orders"--we gave that name to the over-all group of orders--were initiated by an Industry Division or by the industry itself which brought them to the Industry Division through the Industry Advisory Committees.

They would be developed in the early stages, started by the Industry Division, and we would be called in and asked to go ahead with them and implement them. In the case of Simplification Orders, I must say, we did the promoting of simplification because in the early stages it was very, very difficult. Fortunately, Donald Nelson was a great believer in simplification, and, of course, the Sears-Roebuck Catalogue is a simplified catalog that depends for its success on simplified lines of products. So Donald Nelson gave us a great deal of support. But in the first few months after I came to the War Production Board every simplification provision that was brought up was questioned and questioned seriously, and questioned by men, frankly, who know

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nothing about the results. And sometimes the Industry Division itself was not very sympathetic. But in almost all cases industry was sympathetic because it realized that production could be increased tremendously if the number of items could be cut down.

For instance, we cut the number of electric lamps from 2,700 to less than 20, as I remember it. You can see what an amazing accomplishment that was. But the Limitation Orders were generally initiated in the individual Industry Division. The conservation specialists were brought in to help them and to teach them the "know-how." When completed, the orders were cleared through the various policy committees of the WPB.

I also want to accent the importance of having conservation considerations tied into every activity of the over-all preparation work. Because, had the Conservation staff not been able to sit in with policy committees, it would not have been possible to give them the background and the knowledge that was concentrated in our one small unit. Generally speaking, our men were sitting daily with the various divisions of the War Production Board, whether they were Industry Divisions, Material Divisions, or Policy Committees.

QUESTION: You had an experience during the last few years in which you took the American war production experience and applied it to the Chinese situation. Can you tell us some of those experiences that might be of benefit to us in the future, applying past experience to what we find in the future?

MR. COONLEY: I don't think we could simplify our activities down to the point that we did in the Chinese War Production Board. There the whole organization was set up under a chairman and a vice chairman, with only six major divisions to cover all activities. While we did follow the United States pattern of Industry Advisory Committees there was only a small percentage of the number used in Washington. We did accomplish, however, what they told us was impossible to do before we went to China and we were able to gain the full cooperation not only of the government agencies but of private industry.

At that time in China about 75 percent of the plants were operated by the government.

But I should say that the most important lesson I learned was the importance of simplification. I would never set up as many industry divisions and as many control agencies within the War Production Board as we had in the last war. In China a great deal was accomplished in a very short time, but you must remember everything in China was on a very limited program. We could bring nothing into China except over the Hump. All we could get over the Hump was about 8,000 tons a month

of finished munitions and 2,000 tons a month of supplies to go into war plants and also to supply the needs of civilians. That was a pitifully limited amount, yet the Chinese did wonders with the very inadequate equipment and perfectly terrible raw materials with which they were working. I am sure we could have a much more simple setup in another war than we had in the last war.

COMMANDER POND: Mr. Coenley, your address has been a valuable contribution to our studies. On behalf of the Commandant and this group, I wish to thank you for your fine talk, sir.

(5 July 1949--450)S/mng.