

NATIONAL SERVICE IN WARTIME

2 February 1950

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Colonel Lewis Sanders was born 11 June 1877 in New York City. He was graduated from Stevens Institute of Technology with an M.E. degree in 1898. He has had extensive experience as a research, mining, and industrial engineer. A reserve officer since 1915, he commanded a field artillery battalion through World War I. During World War II he served as Chief of the Reemployment Division of the Selective Service System and also served as consultant to the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, particularly with regard to a National Service Act. He is now an industrial consultant with offices in New York City. Colonel Sanders acted as manpower adviser to the Hoover Commission on Reorganization of the Federal Government.



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COLONEL VAN WAY: Colonel Baish, fellow members of the Industrial College, Mr. Galvin, and other distinguished guests: Despite our success in winning the shooting part of the last war, we did our manpower part of the job wastefully and not too well. Inequalities in the treatment of individuals in many cases were the rule rather than the exception. If we are to be successful in another emergency, we must have probably more stringent controls and certainly more efficient procedures if we are to obtain the maximum support of the people, without which we cannot achieve the best utilization. National service has been frequently brought up as a solution to our troubles. Whether it is or not depends on many things, not the least of which is the definition of the term.

Our speaker this morning is well qualified to give us guidance on that point as well as on many other points connected with what we understand by the term "national service." As Chief of the Reemployment Division of the Selective Service System and as expert consultant to the Senate Military Affairs Committee during the last war, Colonel Sanders had an ample opportunity to get adequate background of knowledge and experience on which to base his words this morning. We take great pleasure, therefore, in welcoming back to the Industrial College our old friend Colonel Lewis Sanders, who will talk to us on "National Service in Wartime."

COLONEL SANDERS: Colonel Baish and fellow students: It is always a privilege to participate even to a very minor extent in the work of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. As we have no actual national service law on the statute books, I will base my discussion on the Austin-Wadsworth Bill, with some slight amendments which I think are needed on it and the rules and regulations I drew up for that bill and discussed with Senator Austin and which were approved by him.

Until 1959, the United States will have available less military and industrial manpower than it had in 1942, owing to a zone of shrinking population covering a period of several years. Unless more efficient use is made of manpower by both the armed forces and industry and agriculture than was the case during World War II, the United States will be unable to make as great a war effort in a new world war as it did in the last; however, all the signs indicate that in such an eventuality the need will be for a substantially greater effort on our part in a new war if we are to have a reasonable expectation of victory.

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In 1943 we fell short of attainable production objectives on over 30 items of military equipments by amounts of from 3 percent to over 30 percent. Although there was more than sufficient idle labor available for the work, it refused to undertake it. In 1944, it was necessary to take equipment from divisions in training to supply the needs of the theater of operations, and in October of that year we ran out of infantry replacements in the European invasion. Our lack of efficient use of manpower would have led to a prolongation of the war with increased loss of life and greater expense if all the uncontrollable elements had not broken in our favor; that is not apt to occur a second time.

The successful operation of a national service act is mainly a psychological problem and it will be first studied from that aspect. The opposition to national service legislation may be considered in several groups based on the reasons for the opposition.

Most important both in size and influence is organized labor. Its opposition stems from two major considerations:

1. The traditional opposition of the leaders of organized labor to the interposition of any form of authority, obligation, or loyalty between themselves and the members of their unions. The leaders seek to be the sole representatives and voice for their membership; they want mass loyalty to the United States through themselves as representing labor rather than individual loyalty by the members of the unions. You understand that is no reflection on the loyalty of organized labor. It is merely the way the leaders want to present it. The leaders of organized labor have consistently opposed national service legislation, Selective Service legislation and service in the National Guard.

2. The leaders of organized labor are afraid that national service legislation will be used to break up their unions although they have never been able to show any manner in which a national service act could be so misused.

Next in importance, although not in influence, are the manufacturers. A majority of the manufacturers object to national service because they fear that they will be deprived of all power in selecting employees and will be forced to take people whom they do not want into their establishments. The manufacturers had just the opposite fear to that of organized labor; they were afraid that national service would be used for the purpose of building up strong union organizations in their factories. This feeling was particularly strong when they were dealing with government officials, many of whom had been using the power of government to build up unions or to favor a particular union and who were attempting to force their private brand of social philosophy upon industry.

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The pacifists constitute a numerous and very articulate group. Their objections rest on wishful thinking and ignore facts. There is the same type of difficulty to be faced in discussing national service with them as there would be in holding a serious discussion with the inmates of a lunatic asylum. This group is also used as a smoke screen and cat's-paw by groups acting in alien interests. It has been proved a sheer waste of time to argue with this group; the best tactic is probably to explain the fallacies of their statements to the sound minded majority of the public but to otherwise ignore the pacifists except where they resort to overt or obstructive acts.

The final residue of opposition is the "lunatic fringe" that exists on nearly all questions of importance. These are the people who charged that national service was intended to permit the President to make himself a dictator by giving him power to send any opponents out of the country. They also charged that it was intended to "nationalize women."

The great majority of the public was apparently in favor of some form of national service and merely wanted some disputed points made clear. This great majority did not belong to any group that could give them strong representation and their opinions were largely unrepresented in discussions of the subject.

The first steps in the successful operation of a national service act are:

1. Educate the general public as to the necessity of the act, specifically what it seeks to accomplish and a detailed explanation as to how the act will work as it affects the individual.
2. Establish adequate safeguards against the misuse of the act to disrupt organized labor and educate labor leaders in the operation of the act and convince them that their fears are groundless. Use the leaders of organized labor to as great an extent as is practicable and fair to unorganized labor in the administration of a national service act.
3. Set up safeguards preventing government officials from using the act for any purpose other than that for which it was intended and organize its operation so as to block any attempts to misuse such legislation. Educate employers to the fact that in time of a national emergency a national service act provides the most efficient manner of securing the best available quality of employees uninfluenced by anything except the serving of the national interest.

There are several major purposes to be served by national service legislation. They are as follows:

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1. Keep people at their accustomed jobs, serving the war effort, until there is a definite reason for their changing their jobs.
2. When people are allowed to change their jobs for their own interest, make sure that it is not detrimental to the war effort.
3. Insure the full development of the manpower resources of a community before outside labor moves into it, which always creates additional housing and transportation problems.
4. Distribute skilled labor between expanding industries so as to obtain maximum total production and avoid the waste of manpower and resources that result through employers raiding each others labor force by outbidding each other in the matter of wages.
5. Move surplus manpower from areas where it is not needed for the war effort to locations where it is required.
6. Hold labor turnover to normal proportions.
7. Keep absenteeism down to a reasonable amount.
8. Arrange training programs to train skilled replacements for men drawn for the armed forces.

The foundation for the operation of a national service act is a manpower inventory or census. For this purpose, the registration under the Selective Service Act should be extended to include all males and females within the range of working ages. This was a provision in the original draft of the Selective Service Act of 1940. Social Security numbers should be entered on the registration card to permit correlation with the Social Security records. Selective Service Boards should be used for this registration, but the records should be processed by the Bureau of the Census and the Bureau of Labor Statistics which are experienced in and equipped for this work. Selective Service has neither the necessary experience nor equipment.

A fundamental requirement for the most efficient and economical operation of national service legislation is the maximum use of existing government agencies in the field of their experience and equipment. It will be necessary to hold a check rein on them to prevent their seizing upon the opportunity for permanent aggrandizement of their own agencies.

It is important to keep track of shifts in employment, not only of the quantitative movements, but of the shifts of individual skills. Reports of such shifts are regularly made in connection with Social Security and the mechanism already established by that organization should be used for this purpose instead of setting up a new agency.

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The Social Security System can also be used in time of peace to provide a perpetual inventory of skilled labor, together with its location. This will be of great aid in advance planning for a possible emergency.

In World War II it was necessary to improvise an agency for handling the mobilization and utilization of nonmilitary manpower. The result was a compromise organization that, by its very nature, could not be efficient.

The first objective would be to prevent undesirable shifts in the labor force motivated by self-interest but injurious to the national interest. This could be accomplished by a regulation prohibiting any employer from hiring a person not cleared for employment by the proper government authority. While this is tantamount to forbidding an individual to seek new employment without government authority, it is psychologically the better approach as the individual feels less regimented; the regimentation being directed to the employer.

Such an order should probably allow freedom of employment, within an industrial community with the exception of specified critical industries, but clearance should be required for movement from one community to another.

While the power to regulate assignments to tasks in time of war should be comprehensive, its exercise should be restricted to the minimum required for the accomplishment of our objectives. There should be no regulation for the mere sake of regulation. People should not be "directed" to remain at jobs at which they are already employed and where it is desired that they continue. They should be subjected to direction only when they seek to leave such jobs without adequate reason and when their contemplated change of occupation is detrimental to the war effort.

The regulation suggested is in the nature of an emergency measure intended to maintain stability of manpower resources while detailed plans and regulations are being worked out. Such plans should be ready long before any emergency as a basic part of any strategic plan.

The policy governing the utilization of manpower must first be established. The major elements entering into the determination of the policy are:

- a. The size of the war effort.
- b. Size of the armed forces.
- c. Equipment and supplies for the armed forces.
- d. Equipment and supplies for any allies.

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e. Requirements from agriculture.

f. Needs of the civilian population.

g. Location of new plants for war production.

Policy determinations must be made on the following items as a basis for regulations under which both the Selective Service Act and a national service act must operate.

1. The percentage of its requirements for skilled men and specialists of the armed forces which shall be supplied by drawing skilled men from civilian occupations. This is a critical decision; if insufficient men of the necessary skills are supplied, the armed forces will be retarded in producing a trained force ready for combat; if too many men are withdrawn from industry, the equipment and supplying of the armed forces will be retarded and they will have defeated their own objectives through having depleted the production forces upon which they are dependent. The optimum point must be sought that will produce the maximum trained, equipped, and supplied armed forces in the minimum time.

2. The use of limited service men by the armed forces.

3. Determination of percentage of their requirements for skilled men to be furnished each type of industry.

4. Determination of the percentage of normal requirements to be allowed as a rationing basis on all the important items for civilian consumption. There are in excess of 154 major items involved and many more that are important.

5. List of industries that are to be limited in their use of manpower.

6. Industries and occupations that are to be denied manpower as the need for the services of those engaged in these occupations arises.

7. Policy on supplying manpower needs for agriculture; it cannot again be allowed to become a refuge from military service.

8. Policy as to rate of withdrawal of skilled workers of combat age from industrial and war production jobs. I have been unable to work out any policy on this subject which is both efficient and equitable. The policy that will most nearly serve the national interest is to defer the drafting of such skilled men to the last possible moment in order to keep production at the highest

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possible point. This is unjust to the individual because by the time he enters the armed forces all the skilled jobs have been manned, non-commissioned officers appointed, and the most promising men from the ranks sent to officers training schools. The armed forces are unable to use these late comers to the extent of their ability and must use them as basic riflemen or the equivalent.

While the national interest takes precedence over personal interest, it must, nevertheless, be exercised with due regard to equity and also with consideration of the effect on general morale. The policy which I would recommend would be that, after the requirements of the armed forces for their initial cadre of skilled men have been met, the volunteering of skilled men be permitted on a quota basis. The Munitions Board could determine on a month-to-month basis the number of skilled men in each locality and by types of skill who could be allowed to transfer from production work to the armed forces; volunteering could be permitted up to that number.

Items on which policy determinations must be made continue as follows:

9. Policy as to shifting skilled workers from plant to plant and between localities.

10. Policies on training new workers, both on the job training and training in schools.

11. Policy on introducing new workers in plants covered by union contracts. Unions have argued in court that reemployment provisions of the Selective Service Act were invalid when conflicting with union seniority rights because it invalidated their contracts. On the other hand, our various pieces of war legislation make the needs of the Nation supersede and cancel any private industrial contracts with which they conflict. The point to be covered in this policy is to prevent union contracts from obstructing or retarding the war effort, but to insure that the war controls over manpower are not used for either the purpose of undermining the position and rights of the union or the purpose of changing the labor relations of the employer so as to serve the objectives of a union.

The following facilities are needed for policy making and administration:

1. A modification of the Selective Service Act making it possible to both call groups of men by occupational skills and defer groups by skills.

2. Manning tables prepared for all industries, showing the employees needed by skill and number for a given production. These proved their value in World War II in determining manpower needs of an industry and the rate at which withdrawals could be made by Selective Service for the armed forces without retarding production. They are the most effective means of determining the legitimate needs of a plant for manpower and an effective tool in preventing labor hoarding and waste.

3. Organization tables for the armed forces showing numbers, skills, and physical requirements.

4. Point evaluation of industrial jobs--essential for the evaluation of a manning table and in determining replacement policies. Many industries already have such systems and the procedure is well established.

5. Manpower analysis and inventory for the Nation.

6. Determination of the requirements for maintaining the civilian population on a wartime standard of living adequate to maintain morale through a war of several years' duration.

The following agencies would be required for policy making and for administration:

1. National Security Resources Board for over-all policy making on behalf of the President.

2. The Munitions Board for reconciliation of the demands of the armed services, War Production, and Civilian Supply, and Services for Manpower.

3. Selective Service System for the registration of all persons and for determination of those who are deferred from work calls, those who may be called for work only within the area in which they live, and those who may be called for work outside their area of residence.

4. Bureau of the Census to tabulate and maintain current all registration data and to furnish population data.

5. Bureau of Labor Statistics to analyze all data particularly manpower needs for war production and industry.

6. Department of Agriculture to analyze needs of agriculture and to administer cooperative plans for efficient use of manpower, equipment, and fertilizer in agriculture.

7. Department of Commerce to analyze needs of civilian population for consumer goods, nonessential industries, etc., and to work out plans for the most efficient use of existing production and distribution facilities.

8. United States Employment Service to act as the administrative agency in transmitting directives, at the local level, on the use of manpower; also as the office of record for manpower utilization.

9. Social Security Agency to maintain records current on shifts in the labor force.

10. War mobilization centers, to be formed by civilian volunteers, to organize community services, such as child care, marketing, etc., so as to release the maximum number of persons for employment in production. Also to conduct campaigns for securing volunteers for production work from among those not normally in the labor market. Help solve personal problems, secure closing of unnecessary establishments, etc.

11. Shop committees of labor and management to solve questions arising within a plant.

12. Industry committees to complete job rating within each industry, to secure generic job titles and descriptions, etc.

In regard to procedures, it is assumed that at the outbreak of a national emergency there will be in existence military and industrial mobilization plans which will guide operations for at least the first few months. This permits the making of decisions in conformity with comprehensive plans. The requirements of the armed forces for the first six months both in raw manpower and cadres of skilled men would be known; war production schedules for six months with allocations to specific factories and needs for manpower would have been determined; and a partial inventory of manpower through the statistics of the Bureau of the Census and data furnished by other government departments would be available.

The following steps are suggested as a logical approach to the mobilization and utilization of the manpower of the Nation to meet a major emergency:

1. A proclamation by the President setting forth the imperative need for the effective mobilization of the human resources of the Nation and outlining the steps to be taken.

2. An Executive order prohibiting:

a. Any employer from hiring a person not at the date of the order regularly residing in or regularly employed in the district in which the employer is situated unless the employee has a clearance card from the United States Employment Service at the point where the employee regularly lives or is employed, countersigned by the United States Employment Service for the district of the employer.

b. Any employer from hiring employees from certain specified types of industries within his territory, unless the employee has been cleared by the local United States Employment Service.

3. Selective Service registration:

a. of all persons, male and female, within the age limits of the Selective Service and National Service Acts, registration cards to contain information on employment.

b. processing of registration cards at local levels, by volunteer teams of schoolteachers and pupils and entering data on punch cards by local concerns possessing punched card accounting equipment.

c. Classification and analysis of punch card data at local level by industrial concerns in accordance with instructions of the Bureau of the Census.

d. Furnishing of local data to the local agencies of Selective Service and the United States Employment Service. Transfer of data to the Bureau of the Census.

4. Public education campaign on necessity for and operation of national service.--This must include clear information which will enable each citizen to do his or her role in the national defense and will be the means of receiving information when in doubt. (I dare say that it is one-third at least of the successful administration of any law whatsoever).

5. Call for volunteers, having specified skills, to furnish the technical and artisan cadre for the armed forces.--Volunteers would be limited by quotas in each area and within critical war production industries. Also instructions to Selective Service Local Boards for calling registrants with the requisite skills should there be any deficiency in the number of volunteers to meet the call.

6. Call for volunteers with requisite skills to meet initial assigned requirements of war industries undergoing rapid expansion.--This call to be on a local basis with the number acceptable from each

district and from what industries specified. Many of these persons would be called for temporary assignment to serve as instructors in training the local labor supply for war production jobs.

7. Organization of war mobilization centers in each community manned by volunteers representing all types of organized effort in the community.--The primary task of these centers is the developing of all the resources of the community to the support of the war effort. Their first task will be making available for war work of all types the maximum possible number in the community.

8. Preparation of "Manning Tables" for all industries determining the number of persons and degrees of skill which each plant is entitled to employ; and the preparation of "Replacement Schedules" determining rates of withdrawals, by classes of skill, by Selective Service for service with the armed forces.

9. Preparation by the local boards of Selective Service of lists of volunteers for war production or other industrial jobs; and persons to be allowed to volunteer in any of the following classes:

- a. Unlimited, accepting any assignment tendered.
- b. Unlimited as to location, but limited as to type of work.
- c. Limited to specific localities, unlimited as to type of work.
- d. Limited to specific localities and to specific types of work.
- e. Limited to home community, but unlimited as to type of work.
- f. Limited to home community and to specific types of work.

Volunteers shall not be called for any other class of job than the ones for which they have volunteered. If called for the type of task for which they have volunteered and the assignment is refused, the local board shall classify them as to liability for call under the provisions of the national service act, but without prejudice because of their refusal of the assignment.

10. The local boards of Selective Service shall determine the liability under the national service act of all registrants who have not volunteered, under one of the preceding classes--(a) to (f), inclusive. Initial classification shall be in the lowest class

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justified by the circumstances of the registrant but always subject to reclassification if the manpower situation becomes critical.

In classifying women and males under 20 years of age for liability for service outside their home area, account shall be taken of the presence in other localities of relatives and close friends with whom the registrant might live if assigned to duty in such area. These registrants shall not be assigned to other than these areas unless there is a manpower shortage preventing filling of these posts by other registrants.

11. Establishment of joint management labor committees in each plant for handling manpower problems.

12. Promulgation of regulations governing the hiring and recruiting of labor.--These should cover the following points:

a. The United States Employment Service will be the administrative agency for carrying into effect the policies on employment; it will have no policy making powers.

b. Local U. S. Employment offices will be the office of record for employment in their district.

c. Employers will advise local United States Employment Service offices of their need for employees and will be advised by them of the allocations made to them from the current supply of manpower.

d. Requisitions on local boards of Selective Service for industrial manpower will be made through the local USFS office.

e. Local USFS will notify the local war mobilization center of the needs for recruiting people not normally in the labor force for industrial work.

f. All clearances of individuals for changing jobs or moving to other areas for employment will be made through the local USFS office. No person moving into an area will be eligible for employment without a clearance card from the district of origin countersigned by the office of the district to which he moved.

g. All employers may hire at the gate but only in accordance with the quotas of which they have been notified through the USFS. Employers shall notify the local USFS office of all hirings and severances.

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h. USES offices shall direct those seeking employment to employers in accordance with the directives they receive from the regional manpower directors representing the National Security Resources Board and the Munitions Board. They shall not attempt to hire or assign workers to specific plants except as requested by the employer. The employment function of the USES will probably be used mainly by employers who do not maintain their own employment offices.

i. When a call is made upon a district to supply industrial manpower to another district, the local USES office shall call up from the lists of volunteers supplied them by the local Selective Service Boards those persons who have volunteered for the localities and types of jobs specified in the requisition. Those volunteers who refuse to accept jobs in the classification for which they have volunteered shall be certified to their local board for classification.

If the requisition cannot be filled from the list of volunteers, the war mobilization center shall be called upon to secure additional volunteers. Any deficiency not covered within 10 days shall be met by impartial selection from the proper group classifications made by the local boards of Selective Service.

When local employers have labor that has been declared surplus or beyond their quota, the plant "management-labor committee" shall certify to the local boards for examination and classification those employees whom they consider the most equitable and most efficient to transfer to other plants.

If volunteers are insufficient to fill the needs for industrial manpower, only people without immediate dependents should be called up to fill vacancies in the first instance. Only if these two sources are insufficient to fill the call, should registrants with dependent families be called. Since national service is part of the obligation of every citizen to contribute to the national defense in time of emergency, there is no more reason for moving the family of an industrial worker with him to a job assignment than there is for moving the family of a man called to serve in the armed forces to camp with him. The movement of the family puts additional strain on overburdened housing and transportation facilities.

Some of the specific problems--moving of the family with the worker.--This was provided for in the national service legislation drafted during World War II, but it is in my opinion unsound and detrimental to effective prosecution of a war. It represented appeasement directed to reducing opposition to such legislation.

Moving a worker to a lower paid job is largely an academic question. With few exceptions, pay is proportionate to skills; war production requires a great increase in skilled workers so that in nearly all cases it will be a matter of upgrading workers called for

job assignments. In the exceptional case, where circumstances force the assignment of a worker to a lower paid job, the worker should be paid only the regular wage of the new job. Men in the armed forces are paid service pay regardless of what they earned in civil life. The same sacrifice, when necessary, must be made by the industrial worker since his obligations derive from the same source as those in the military service.

Reemployment rights.--Persons assigned to jobs through calls or who volunteer for such jobs in response to calls should enjoy the same reemployment rights as members of the armed forces. Those changing jobs, except as above, should not have any reemployment rights.

Seniority of male workers.--Under most union agreements, workers with the highest seniority have the first call on day-shift jobs. The exercise of this right interfered with war production in some cases during World War II because male workers insisted on day jobs when it forced women onto night shifts, for which it is far more difficult to secure female labor. Union seniority rights of this type should be suspended during an emergency when they interfere with the war effort.

Assignment of workers to closed and union shops.--This should be to the extent that the available supply of workers permits preference in assignment to shops covered by agreements of this type, and preference should be given to (a) persons already members of the union concerned, and (b) persons who state that they are willing to join the union. Persons joining a union because of assignment to a shop covered by agreements of this type should not be required to pay the full initiation fee--perhaps equal installments over a period of 20 months. No one should be compelled to join a union because of assignment to work in a closed or union shop.

Labor turnover.--This posed one of the most serious obstacles to the efficient use of labor during World War II. It averaged 84 percent per annum. In essence, it is a psychological problem. Prevention of unplanned and undesirable labor shifts, as previously outlined, should substantially reduce the cause of labor turnover.

The objective of national service should be to control and regulate labor turnover, not to abolish it.

I would suggest an objective of 1.5 percent turnover per month or 18 percent per annum and that each establishment be allotted a quota on this basis on which applications for severance could be processed within the plant by the joint management-labor committee with right of appeal to local boards on the part of those whose applications were denied. In the case of small employers, the quotas could be set on a community basis where the number of employees is too small to use a plant quota.

Application for a severance permit should be made on an official form and filed with the plant committee or the community center in the case of small shops.

The reasons for requesting severance should be clearly stated as well as the intentions of the applicant in the matter of future employment. Every assistance in filling out applications should be given employees by personnel departments or special advisers at the war mobilization center, both to see that a clear statement is made and to find the basic reasons for the desired severance. Frequently some advice and assistance at this point may solve the individual's problem and result in a withdrawal of the application.

A list of priorities should be established for reasons for granting a severance permit. At the top of the list should be family hardship cases and at the bottom mere restlessness and dissatisfaction.

An application should be good for three months after filing or until acted upon. An application should be renewable at the end of three months and upon such renewal should retain its relative position on the list of applications.

For psychological reasons, there should be a provision for granting even unreasonable requests for severance after a sufficient lapse of time regardless of merit or quota. I would suggest, as a trial regulation, that any application for a severance permit that had been renewed each three months should be automatically granted, nonquota, at the end of 24 months.

There should be emergency powers granted the local agency of the NSRB to grant severance permits in exceptional hardship cases outside quota limits.

Discretionary powers should be vested in an appropriate committee to grant severance permits, outside quota limits, for movements within their area which will not adversely affect production--for example, an exchange of workers between local plants. Applicants for severance permits whose requests have been denied should have the right of appeal to a local appeals board established by the NSRB. This board should also handle the nonquota local severances above.

Absenteeism is probably the second most serious obstacle to efficient use of manpower in war production; it was generally over 7 percent during World War II. An absentee rate of 3 percent looks like a sound objective. The problem is a combination of psychological and physical factors requiring much skill for successful handling. So many factors are involved that only the salient points can be touched upon here.

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1. While the solution must be fundamentally on a constructive approach, certain disciplinary features are necessary.
2. No overtime for Saturday or Sunday work should be paid any worker who has not already worked 40 hours in that week.
3. Every worker absent without authority should be obliged to appear before the management-labor committee of his shop to explain the absence. Any unexcused absence should be noted on the worker's record and reduce the seniority by some specified amount.
4. An honor roll should be posted in each department, listing those with a satisfactory record of attendance. There should also be listed the person with the poorest record of attendance if it is below a certain standard. I would not list more than one delinquent as it is a greater incentive to other delinquents to keep off the list than it is to get off it after being publicly posted.
5. Education is the first constructive step and this is particularly necessary with women and girls not normally in the labor market. During the last war, many in this group became intoxicated with the easy and liberal spending money they were making. Their wages were nearly all net spending money since most of this group were not under the necessity of working for a living. They were prone to take a day off for shopping, to get a "permanent" or to entertain a visiting friend. They need education as to the vital importance of their job to the war effort. The support of which they deprive the armed forces when absent from work and the patriotic service which they owe their country.
6. On the constructive side, arrangements should be made for stores and beauty parlors to remain open several nights a week for the exclusive use of war production workers; service to be denied anyone not producing an employment card.
7. A general education campaign against absenteeism should be conducted by the public relations committee of the war mobilization center and people should be invited to submit for solution personal problems that interfere with their regular attendance at a job.
8. Committees should be set up in each section of a community for local service. Every worker should know how to get in touch with the local committee when help is needed to meet an emergency. Local committees should be notified by the employer of all employees absent without known cause so that a committee member can make an immediate call at the worker's home to see if help is needed or to uncover cases of unnecessary absence. A type of case where prompt assistance can be rendered is where a girl is being held from her job because her mother,

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who has younger children, is ill and the girl has to take over the household responsibilities. In most cases, it can be arranged for a neighbor to take over care of the household.

Some of the types of cooperative services that can be arranged that will release people for war production work are:

1. Where several young mothers live in the same neighborhood, one can care for the children of the group during the day, for which service the others should pay her, thus releasing the others for production jobs.
2. Marketing for workers to be done by neighbors.
3. Home laundry and mending for workers by neighbors who are unable to undertake jobs outside their homes.
4. Washing dishes, preparing meals ready for cooking, etc., for production workers.

All of these services should be paid for by the worker but they will require organizing and supervision by the community center.

There are a number of items of importance in the efficient use of manpower, which I shall not take up your time to discuss since they are not peculiar to the administration of a national service act. Among them are:

- (a) Apprentices schools and rates of pay during training.
- (b) On the job training and rates of pay.
- (c) Equalization of wages.
- (d) Incentive wages.
- (e) Cost of living adjustments.

There is one point, however, which should be discussed because its importance and its effect were almost completely overlooked during the last war. This is the overmanning of a plant, not in respect to its equipment and scheduled rate of production but in relation to the actual rate of supply of materials and subassemblies. This was productive of much inefficiency and waste of labor.

The employer's hand was largely forced in this matter because, in the absence of any governmental authority to assign labor, each manufacturer had to grab labor when he could get it and keep it on his

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pay roll even when only half busy; otherwise he had no assurance of getting labor when badly needed.

The greatest output over a period of months will be obtained when labor supply is so regulated in proportion to materials supply that there is always a slight surplus of the latter on hand and not when a plant is so overmanned that it is constantly using up all materials on hand and having to wait for fresh supplies.

To summarize--the sole purpose of a national service act is the efficient mobilization of the Nation's manpower in time of emergency.

Regimentation of the people is no part of the objective of a national service act.

The primary means of the administration of a national service act are: (a) public education, (b) individual information, and (c) leadership.

Policy and principles must be made at the national level.

Administration must be at the local level with ample discretion vested in the local officials to handle intelligently all problems arising without being hampered by inflexible rules and regulations. Local authorities should primarily administer principles and policies rather than rules and regulations.

Powers to assign labor and the police powers of a national service act are essentially for that small minority who not only refuse voluntary cooperation in any community effort but who also make effective cooperation by the majority impossible. Traffic police are for the small number of motorists who through their violation of common sense traffic regulations would make it impossible for nearly all other motorists to comply with such regulations.

I want to emphasize that no law and no regulation is a substitute for administrative ability and leadership, but on the other hand, the ablest administrative ability and leadership are helpless without the power to enforce discipline. The ablest commander in the world couldn't win battles without discipline and the toughest disciplinarian without leadership would only lose battles.

COLONEL VAN WAY: We have a number of guests here and I would like to assure them that their questions are as welcome as those of the students.

QUESTION: You spoke of the National Security Resources Board as being the central board or agency for policy. Now, when you get into the operation of a total war, I don't see how you are going to

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prevent all these agencies from encroaching upon the rights of one another. If we go into a national service act, do you think we will need a separate agency for control of operations?

COLONEL SANDERS: My understanding is that the plans are that in an emergency the National Security Resources Board will develop out of its existing structure the necessary operating agency.

QUESTIONER: That is the objection we find with the present setup of NSRB. It is just a policy agency in peacetime and there is no setup to translate it into an operating agency for war.

COLONEL SANDERS: Well, I can't answer that very well because that is a matter of legislation and Presidential policy, neither of which I am in a position to speak for.

If the National Security Resources Board has abdicated its functions as a planning agency and reduced itself to a mere advisory capacity then, of course, it will become necessary in an emergency to create a special agency to perform the functions which it was expected would be part of the work of the NSRB.

Such a special agency will have to be at Cabinet level since all policy making in connection with the mobilization of manpower in a national emergency is a function of the Presidency and all policies must reflect the President's views.

It should be noted that under the plans that have been discussed various established government departments and agencies have been entrusted with only those functions that are normal to their peacetime activities. That none of them are given any policy making powers but, on the contrary, they merely execute policy that has been determined at the Presidential level. They are given the minimum of opportunity for self-aggrandizement or for using a time of war for putting across pet projects for which they have been unable to obtain approval in time of peace.

QUESTION: Colonel Sanders, from your very excellent presentation I assume that you are in favor of national service. I would appreciate some comments as to why you feel it is necessary and how we can insure that we can get out of these controls and, let me say, down our present democratic road after the emergency?

COLONEL SANDERS: First, we fell below possible production in World War II by over 15 percent directly due to the lack of such controls, as proved positively by our production figures and the idle workers in the country that we couldn't get where we wanted them; secondly, national service legislation is essential at the very beginning of a war and not,

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as a lot of people advocate, waiting until you find out that you need it, because some of the objectives of national service legislation become impossible of attainment if you don't have it from the start-- primarily mass migrations of labor which upset the entire economy and planning of the country. You can't undo those things once they have been done; there was a vast amount of housing that would have been unnecessary if we had prevented those mass migrations.

As to following the democratic road, there is a complete illusion that a democracy is a sort of go-as-you-please affair. That is only anarchy, not democracy. Democracy is built not on everybody doing as he pleases, but on everybody having an equal obligation. You haven't a single fundamental thing in a democracy that is voluntary. Taxes are not voluntary; going to school is not voluntary; public sanitation is not voluntary; traffic regulations are not voluntary. It is the equal obligation of every citizen that makes a democracy. There is no such thing as saying, "Everybody go as you please and the devil take the hindmost." If you want to know why you can't do without controls, you only have to look at rationing. Voluntary rationing is an impossibility because one woman will not curtail the food of her children whom she considers more important than the Nation. The woman next door who is patriotic and willing to go along and cut down on her children's rations will not do it when she sees her neighbor failing to comply. She is willing to do her part, but she will not carry the other woman's responsibilities. She will carry her own load but not the other woman's.

In the last war we tried to take off the restriction on gasoline and go on a voluntary basis when we got a surplus of gasoline, but we had to go back because everybody was violating it without any conscience.

QUESTION: Inherent in your definition of democracy, I suppose a corresponding system should also be a universal conscription program for the conscription of industry in time of war. Would you comment on that, please?

COLONEL SANDERS: Are you distinguishing between a Selective Service System and a conscription system? In other words, we have set up Selective Service for the military obligation of the citizen rather than conscription service which differs in principle.

QUESTIONER: That applies, sir, to people. How about production facilities?

COLONEL SANDERS: We already have production facilities under such obligation. One of the paragraphs of the Selective Service Act of 1940 placed every industry in the country at the disposal of the Government, with penalties to the employer of having his industry taken out of his control if he failed to comply.

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QUESTION: I am really referring to some concept of universal service that we have heard and studied about which indicated that it should not only refer to individuals but also to things like capital, profits, and so forth. It appeared to me inherent in your definition of democracy, the common responsibility and obligation of working, that there might be some comparable extension of that concept. Do you think there should be some comparable efforts in these other lines?

COLONEL SANDERS: I do, and they already exist. We have them in the Selective Service Act.

QUESTION: To carry that thought a little further, some people have expressed the thought that labor would object to national service unless there is also conscription of facilities and national operation of plants, and that sort of thing. Would you care to give us your views on the validity of that thought and the sincerity of the people who expressed it?

COLONEL SANDERS: Yes. Largely that was an illogical objection because we had already conscripted industry. The only argumentative point there was that, I believe, some labor leaders contended that profits should be restricted. If you applied their logic to the profits, then you would apply it to wages, and they would have been estopped from wartime wages. In other words, it was incentive profits, counterbalanced by taxation of excess profits and renegotiation of contracts on one side against incentive wages to labor on the other side. In other words, we in a democracy have apparently reached the point where during war we bribe all our citizens to be patriotic. If it is on that basis, it should be on the basis of equality. If you bribe one, you have to bribe them all.

QUESTION: I understand from your presentation that you do propose to maintain wages as a kind of incentive to labor to go along with this plan. In other words, you don't propose to pay the workers who are being forced to work under this plan or whose work is being regulated under this plan, in accordance with the pay of military personnel?

COLONEL SANDERS: Oh, not at all. Pay them the going industrial wages. What we should avoid is the crazy thing we had in World War II where we had employers bidding against one another for employees, because there was no other way to man their factories. They just kept bidding up wages. It was not a proper incentive. I believe incentive wages are economically sound, but they must be put on an economic basis.

QUESTION: Getting back to the democratic principle, it is recognized that people can be drafted into the military service and the wages they get there don't amount to nearly so much as incentive wages that the other boys will continue to draw even under the Selective Service Act,

and that has been a factor in the morale in the armed forces to a certain extent. Once you have the Selective Service Act, isn't it better to take the step first and recognize the obligation of the citizen to support the country's war effort and equalize that wage?

COLONEL SANDERS: I doubt the soundness of that psychologically and economically. After all, leadership of armies and leadership of industry are all psychological. I have never led troops that, after you had really welded them into a unit, ever thought about what their pay was or thought about what the pay in industry was. They became soldiers and had the feeling of soldiers and the esprit de corps of soldiers. You would have the impossible situation in industry that you would get if, for instance, you had the Regular Army on a peacetime scale of pay and then for war you had a volunteer army that you were paying twice as much right alongside of them. You would have the same trouble in industry with two sets of people, one with one rate of pay and one with a completely different rate of pay. We should have incentives. We should have regular industrial wages, but we should not have the same competitive bidding for labor on the basis of pay that has no relation to production. That was the mistake we made.

QUESTION: Colonel Sanders, with respect to the workers themselves being shifted from job to job, how about the seniority rights that they had in their other jobs and how about the happiness of the workers themselves? Of course, in wartime your happiness goes by the board, but the contentment of the workers is sine qua non, it seems to me, to make the plan work. In a military outfit a guy can get unhappy, but he will land in the guardhouse, and he knows it, so he keeps his disgruntlement to himself. If a man is disgruntled on the job in civil life, and on a large scale, it seems to me that would operate to keep the plan from working.

COLONEL SANDERS: That is what I pointed out as being a major factor in the operation of any national service act, that it is psychological and rests on the basic idea primarily of people volunteering for the job and only assigning people where you couldn't get sufficient volunteers and where you would have the support of the whole community. Under that type of administration, I think you would have as disgruntled people only malcontents that you never can satisfy under any situation whatsoever, the people who are like the Irishman who was cast up on a sea coast. When he came to, he asked where he was, and then he said, "Whatever the Government is here, I am agin it."

QUESTION: My question concerns the responsibility of the military and of the civilians for doing detailed planning on the working level to make national service legislation work. In our past lectures, panels, and reading, we have run into the arguments from one extreme to the other: First, merely saying the American people cannot be coerced and regimented; you can lead a horse to water, but you can't make him

drink; that they are unpatriotic and need wage incentives; secondly, that the American people are more patriotic than we give them credit for; that if they are really sold on national service legislation they will accept it, especially if they are brutally shocked by sabotage or atomic bombing or something of that sort. In view of that possibility that war may come in that brutal way, the American people will be sold much quicker than we think on the legislation, and it would be the unforgivable sin not to be ready with industrial planning of the work load. My question is, therefore, who would be responsible for doing this planning at this time, the military or the civilians, and to what extent, and what would you suggest might be done further in order that we might be ready?

COLONEL SANDERS: I think it is a joint military and civilian job because it is the correlation of war production and civilian maintenance during war and the building up of the armed forces, interlocking the whole through planning agencies. At present, start with the National Security Resources Board and the Munitions Board and government departments, such as the Department of Labor, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Agriculture. What we have to avoid is the kind of planning we suffered from in World War II, in which we had very carefully drawn up plans, but not one of which was followed when the war was started; everything was improvised.

I think one trouble was that the President for certain political reasons didn't want to follow those plans. The other reason was that every man familiar with the plan immediately leaves the desk where he has been working and the new man on the job is asked for something in a hurry, and is faced with nine volumes of plans. It is much quicker to improvise than it is to look through all those volumes to find out how to do it. So any plans must have tied to them a cadre at least familiar with them to make them continuous; otherwise they are just dead volumes in a library. In other words, plans will rest on their administration. If you haven't anybody there that knows them except by looking through an index from day to day, they simply won't work.

QUESTION: Sir, in your plan have you taken into consideration the education of scientists and medical doctors; if so, how are you going to get those people in that field into the desirable service, in the military or in industry?

COLONEL SANDERS: Yes. During World War II, I advocated the theory in relation to those in education that no man should be deferred on account of his training for a profession, provided that he would not, within the space of two years, be able to function in his chosen profession. We simply did not have enough manpower to leave any of them out of the armed forces for the sake of their future; otherwise there might not be any future at all.

Second, in regard to your scientific manpower already in industry, my own analysis of a number of industries during World War II showed that this division of irreplaceable men varied between 7 percent and a maximum of 11 percent of the personnel in industry. The majority of those men were well beyond military age anyhow, so there you came down to a very small factor in manpower. The electronics industry is probably an exception to that, where the bulk of irreplaceable men are young, but in most industries, that is not true. Following the 7 percent to 11 percent of irreplaceables we had about 10 percent of the men who could be replaced in two years and other groups of 10 to 15 percent to a group who could be replaced in periods between six months and two years, and 50 percent of all personnel in any type of industry who could be replaced in one night. Of course, you couldn't take out 50 percent in one day, but any individual could be replaced in one day, and all you had to do was to schedule orderly replacement because anybody, even a day laborer pushing a wheelbarrow has to know where he is going to push it. You could take 50 percent out of the factories under a planned schedule without any impairment of production, but when you took them out helter-skelter, it stood production on its head.

QUESTION: Sir, I can visualize the application of your plan to industry. Would you cover how that would apply to farmers? The thousands and thousands of small farms we have contribute to the food of the Nation, but they are privately owned and maybe employ only one person each.

COLONEL SANDERS: In the first place, the small privately owned farms practically don't contribute anything to the Nation. One-third of our farms produce only 3 percent of our total output; another third produces about 17 percent; and the remaining third produces 80 percent. Now the situation of the small farmers is one that needs careful handling because the little independent farmer is one of the backbones of democracy, but it has also come to be a refuge from military service. Plans can be worked out by cooperative efforts by which their farms can be managed while they have to go into war production or go into military service. We took 2.5 million more people off our farms in the last war than the agriculturalists said could be taken off. They said it would destroy agriculture. Instead of that agricultural production went up. You should have seen the way people flocked off the farms when they saw the factory wages and the way they flocked back to the farms when the order went out giving deferment to men working on farms!

QUESTION: Colonel Sanders, in your presentation you discussed many subjects which were deficiencies in our production plan during the last war and which you attributed to lack of national service--some of those things like too many houses and the migration of too many workers. I would like to know on an over-all percentage basis--we possibly were 40 percent less productive than we would have been through national service--how much of that can be attributed to lack of national service

and how much can be attributed to other factors? We didn't have any type of production plan. We put contracts out without considering where they went. We weren't efficient because we built plants we had no use for. We didn't control our materials. I would like to get from you an expression as to what percentage of the deficiency we could cure through national service and what percentage we could cure through determining what we wanted and where we wanted it.

COLONEL SANDERS: On the things that were attributable entirely to the handling of manpower and to the question of location of plants and building them where they should have been built, we suffered in lack of production between 15 and 20 percent from the lack of ability to manage manpower. Now there were a lot of other production troubles, due to the things that you cite. One notable example, for instance, was the building of two huge bombing plane assemble plants down in Oklahoma which were to draw their subassemblies from Willow Run, with the result that if the Willow Run plant was tied up, it tied up both of those plants. You had a 900-mile road haul for all the parts between the two plants. You had a chain target. The enemy only had to hit one of the three targets to put the whole thing out of business.

MR. FITZPATRICK: Was there, in fact, any mobilization plan for anything, except some charts on organization in 1940?

COLONEL SANDERS: Oh, yes.

MR. FITZPATRICK: Who had them and where they?

COLONEL SANDERS: They were in the possession of the Ordnance and the Quartermaster Corps. There were detailed setups.

MR. FITZPATRICK: What I meant was a national plan, not down here at the Signal Corps and those places, but was the 1939 Mobilization Plan a plan?

COLONEL SANDERS: So far as I know, there was none on the armed forces, but there was one on war production, all of which was thrown to the four winds and never put into operation.

MR. FITZPATRICK: Was it any good?

COLONEL SANDERS: That I am not in a position to pass on. It was a voluminous thing. I remember seeing the national coding machine records on it that showed where you obtained military equipment including quantities and times for delivery. It was done in great detail. It may have been swamped in its own detail. We didn't even know how big a war we could fight at that time.

QUESTION: Will you amplify your understanding of the induction of limited service people into the armed services?

COLONEL SANDERS: Yes. We did not utilize limited service people to start with, and I believe one reason was that the Army, particularly, figures that rehabilitated wounded men would fill all such jobs ultimately and assigned men practically regardless of age to combat units. In 1944 our infantry divisions average age was over 27 years, the Navy's average age was  $24\frac{1}{2}$ , and the Marine Corps' average age was 22 years. The consequence of that was that in October 1944 we were out of infantry replacements in France and had to grab men helter-skelter out of units, where, in my judgment, they never should have been, give them very brief training, and then shove them over into infantry units. If we had used our limited service men and allocated those men by age, and not merely by calendar age, but by physical age, because some men at 25 are old men and some men at 45 are young men, we could have had an average age for our infantry and our tanks of around 22 or  $22\frac{1}{2}$  years, and all our combat units could have been young men from exactly the same group of men. Our supply depots and our lines of communication could have been manned progressively by older men. You get even a better use out of your older men by that, because a lot of the older men can be conditioned for combat if you do with them in a year what you do in three months with a fellow who is only 20 years old.

You can also fight wars with older men if you fight your war accordingly. Belgrade was taken in the First World War by a German commander whose forces were land wehr divisions, ages 40 to 45. He did some trial maneuvering and found that by marching 9 miles a day he got the same combat efficiency as a young division that had marched 12 to 15 miles. So he planned his campaign at nine miles a day and captured Belgrade. We can very much increase the effectiveness in given manpower if we will use the Army, in jobs that don't require fully physically fit men, men that are capable of filling those jobs. All you had to do was walk down Pennsylvania Avenue or Constitution Avenue all during the Second World War and you would find fine, young combat soliders just presenting arms in front of doors. They ought to have manned those places from the Old Soldiers Home.

QUESTION: I notice that the House of Representative Commission reported quite a few agencies that were independent. I don't quite seem to know where they belong, who they reported to--quite a jumble of organizations during the war. In your talk you apparently visualize no place for an organization such as the War Manpower Commission, such as we had in the last war. Could you elaborate a little bit on just how you think we should go to war next time without Presidential authority for war emergency power or planning and how avoid some of the mistakes we made in the last war so far as organization of agencies is concerned?

COLONEL SANDERS: Yes. I would not have an agency similar to the War Manpower Commission. I would have a branch of the National Security Resources Board with local administrators having ample authority for passing upon policies and plans in each locality. I would use as the administrative agency, without power to make any policies whatever, the United States Employment Service as an agency for transmitting orders, and keep out of the hands of the NSRB local boards' actual administrative functions. They tried to do both under the War Manpower Commission and they became completely bogged down between the two of them. Everything was improvised. They had no direct power. Everything was done by indirection. If you wanted something done over here, you pushed that way, in the hope that something would jump out over there. You would push that one because you had nothing that you could legally push where you needed to. You frequently got results that you didn't expect.

COLONEL VAN WAY: I think we will close on that note. Colonel Sanders, we are greatly indebted to you for a most excellent presentation of a difficult and controversial subject that had engrossed us all. Thank you very much.

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