ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

7 September 1950

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ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

7 September 1950

COMMANDER NEEL: General Holman and gentlemen: Since 26 July 1947 we have had for the first time in the history of our country an organization for national security wherein our international objectives can be weighed against their military implications; wherein our resources and capabilities can be evaluated against the calculated risks in our domestic and foreign policies. This afternoon I want to discuss with you, (1) how this organization came about, (2) what it consists of, and (3) its present developments and trends.

You have read lectures by and heard from Dr. Hunter, Mr. Niklason, Dr. Rowe, and others of the varied experiences we have had in attempting to mobilize our men and resources for war in the past. How that in the Revolutionary War, because of the simplicity of equipment required and the small size of armies used, combat forces could be mobilized, equipped, and meet an enemy in combat within 24 hours. How that by the time of World War I, due to the increased complexity of armament and the increased distances to be covered, we required seven months after the declaration of war to get a single division into action against the Germans. How that after 18 months of maximum industrial effort, with the expenditure of four billion dollars during World War I, we succeeded in getting only 143 pieces of artillery to the Western Front in time to be used against the enemy.

You have heard of the Defense Act of 1920, with its provisions charging the military establishment with the preparation of mobilization plans; these plans when finally required, in 1939, were unacceptable, largely because they lacked public support. You have heard, also, how some 150 agencies, commissions, and boards, each reporting directly to the President, were created, altered, and replaced during World War II. And that, in spite of great effort, three years were required after the United States became involved in World War II before we reached the full volume of military production.

National Security Act of 1947

With this background it is not strange that after World War II those interested in and responsible for our national security were gravely concerned. They agreed that we could not spend three years mobilizing for another war. They knew that we would be involved immediately when the next aggressor attempted to conquer the world, and that we would never again be shielded by our allies while mobilizing our industrial strength. They agreed that everything possible must be done in peacetime to expedite conversion to a wartime economy. What to do and how

to do it were subjects given much thought in the Congress and executive departments of our Government and by leading industrialists, administrators, economists, and others of our country. Men such as Mr. Donald Nelson, Mr. Baruch, Mr. Eberstadt, Mr. Forrestal, and many others were called before congressional committees to present their ideas of our needs.

As a result of many months of study and debate, the National Security Act of 1947 was passed to strengthen the security of the country. This act, which has been issued to you, is well worth your study, although not on your required reading list.

But after two years of operation under the National Security Act of 1947, it was found that certain amendments were desirable, particularly those affecting the National Military Establishment. So the 1949 amendments were made. These amendments made changes in all except one of the major agencies established by the original act. A copy of these amendments also has been issued to you. Changes are still being made--the most recent being the President's Reorganization Plan No. 25, approved last June, affecting the National Security Resources Board. This afternoon I shall refer to the amended act as the Security Act and will limit my remarks to the present organization.

I shall not describe the organization of the military departments except to place them in their proper perspective in the Department of Defense. In addition to your present knowledge of these departments, you will later have lectures covering them in detail. Also no mention will be made of the security role of the peacetime civil agencies of the Government, such as the Departments of Agriculture and Labor, although it is evident that such agencies will have definite responsibilities in the total organization of the Government for national security.

The intent of Congress in passing the Security Act was fivefold, namely:

1. To provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States.

2. To provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security.

3. To provide three military departments, separately administered, for the operation and administration of the Army, the Navy (including Naval Aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with their assigned combat and service components.

4. To provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian controls of the Secretary of Defense, but not to merge them.

5. To provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces, but not to establish a single chief of staff over the armed forces, nor an armed forces general staff.

A simplified chart showing the national security organization has been prepared. You have been issued a copy of this chart, produced in greater detail, and will find it as Chart No. 1 in Munitions Board publication 40-1.

You will note that there are three main agencies in the organization for national security: National Security Council, National Security Resources Board, and the Department of Defense.

The head of each of these agencies reports directly to the President. This arrangement corrects in a large measure the major inadequacies of the National Defense Act of 1920 by providing for the coordination of political, economic, and military policies.

National Security Council

We shall discuss each of these three agencies, beginning with the National Security Council.

The function of the Council is to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and other agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively. The Council is composed of, (1) the President, who is Chairman of the Council, (2) the Vice-President, (3) the Secretary of State, (4) the Secretary of Defense, (5) the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and (6) certain other temporary members when appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. This composite membership assures that the military problems involved in a proposed political policy will be thoroughly explored by the Council. Thus, for the first time in history, we have a mechanism to weigh our political and economic objectives against their military practicability and on that basis to advise the President.

To fully appreciate the functioning of the Council, three important points should be stressed:

1. With the exception of the direction of the Central Intelligence Agency, the function of the Council is advisory. It recommends policies to the President and he makes the policy. In this way the Council cannot and does not infringe upon the normal operating responsibilities of the various agencies of government.

2. The agenda of the Council are by nature confined to matters requiring Presidential consideration. The Council, then, is a body to coordinate advice and not to achieve interdepartmental coordination among the officers represented on the Council.

3. The Council is not concerned properly with the implementation of policy. The Council recommends policies, the President makes policies, and the executive departments carry out the policies under Presidential direction. The Council is in essence a forum wherein the views of the various departments are presented and reconciled, or, if not reconciled, the views are clearly identified and the basis for them made known to the President in a clear, unmistakable manner. Note that unanimity of opinion is not mandatory. The President can, as a result of the discussion, consider all views and then make an informed decision as to policy.

A permanent staff of civil servants is provided to perform the administrative duties of the Council in carrying out its responsibilities. This staff is headed by a civilian executive secretary appointed by the President. Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., a lieutenant colonel in the Army during the war, is presently the Executive Secretary. The Executive Secretary attends the meetings of the Council and prepares its agenda. One important advantage of having such a permanent staff is its tendency to give continuity and stability to security planning and thinking.

The Central Intelligence Agency

Under the National Security Council, and reporting directly to it, the Central Intelligence Agency is the eyes and ears of the President and the Council relative to national security intelligence. Its purpose is to keep them fully informed of the intentions and capabilities of any nation which could affect our national security directly or indirectly.

In operation the Central Intelligence Agency must provide timely and adequate intelligence estimates to the various agencies of the Government by evaluating information found in "open" sources and correlating national security intelligence gathered by the State, Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments. Dissemination of such information is one of its prime functions.

The Central Intelligence Agency is not intended to displace the intelligence agencies in the various departments, but to give over-all centralized control through policy decisions in the field relating to

national security. Congress specifically prohibits this agency from the exercise of police, subpoena, law enforcement, or internal security functions. These are the responsibilities of the Department of Justice and its Federal Bureau of Investigation. The director of the CIA is appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Senate has recently confirmed Lieutenant General Bedell Smith, USA, as the new Director.

National Security Resources Board

Now let us examine the organization of the National Security Resources Board. The NSRB, created by the National Security Act, is the second of the advisory boards to the President on national security matters; its mission being to advise the President regarding the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization. Its creation was the direct result of the growing realization that national security is dependent not only on military mobilization, but on the mobilization of the entire economy. During the next ten months you will hear and study much about the National Security Resources Board (NSRB) and its role in economic mobilization.

The membership of the NSRB consists of its Chairman, Mr. Stuart Symington, appointed by the President with confirmation of the Senate; Vice-Chairman, Mr. Robert Smith; and such others as the President may appoint, at present--(1) Secretary of State, (2) Secretary of the Treasury, (3) Secretary of Defense, (4) Secretary of the Interior, (5) Secretary of Agriculture, (6) Secretary of Commerce, and (7) Secretary of Labor.

In advising the President concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization, the board has several functions, including the making of recommendations for:

1. Policies concerning industrial and civilian mobilization in order to assure the most effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the Nation's manpower in the event of war.

2. Programs for the effective use in time of war of the Nation's natural and industrial resources.

3. Policies for unifying the activities of Federal agencies engaged with production, procurement, distribution, and transportation in time of war.

4. The relationship between potential supply of and requirements for manpower, resources, and productive facilities in time of war.

5. Policies for establishing adequate reserves of strategic and critical materials.

6. The strategic relocation of industries, services, and government activities whose continuous operation is essential to the Nation's security.

Reorganization Plan No. 25 assigned these functions to the Chairman. This recital of functions makes it clear that the National Security Resources Board is the top agency of government for national security planning in all fields other than military and foreign policy. The creation of this agency gives us for the first time a means for the evaluation of our resources and capabilities in relation to the calculated risks in our domestic and foreign policies. Since the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board sits as a member of the National Security Council, there is automatic coordination between these top Presidential advisory agencies.

Unlike the National Security Council, the NSRB has no permanent secretariat, but the Chairman may hire civil service personnel as he considers necessary to carry out his responsibilities. Congress directed that the board utilize to the maximum extent the facilities and resources of the existing departments and agencies and thus avoid setting up a large staff. At present there are less than 300 civil servants in the NSRB.

You will hear of the board's organization in detail, its accomplishments, and problems from members of the NSRB who will be with us for lecturers and seminars during the next few months.

Department of Defense

The third new organization, with which you are probably more familiar, is the Department of Defense. Congress in establishing a single Department of Defense intended to promote the national security by providing:

1. For a single Secretary of Defense.

2. For a single Department of Defense, which includes, but does not merge, the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

3. For their effective strategic direction and operation under unified control.

4. For the coordination of the activities of the Department of Defense with other activities of government concerned with national security.

Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Defense, Mr. Louis A. Johnson, is the chief civilian adviser and principal assistant to the President in the President's capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Mr. James Forrestal, in speaking of the National Military Establishment, said: "Our business is to see that our military potential conforms to the requirements of our national policy--policy making is not our business." Although making national policy is not the business of the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense sits with the National Security Council and the National Security Resources Board and advises upon the military aspects of proposed policy.

While recognizing that the functions of the Secretary of Defense are changing as experience is accumulated, his basic functions at present may be described broadly as follows:

1. To serve as the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense.

2. Under the direction of the President and subject to the Security Act, to have direction, authority, and control over the Department of Defense. However, in granting the Secretary this direction, authority, and control, Congress imposed and wrote into the law several limitations, namely:

a. Combatant functions assigned the military services by the Security Act shall not be transferred, reassigned, abolished, or consolidated.

b. Military personnel shall not be so detailed as to impair such combatant functions.

c. The Secretary of Defense may not direct the use and expenditure of funds in such a manner as to effect the results just prohibited.

d. The military departments shall be separately administered by their respective secretaries acting under the authority of the Secretary of Defense.

e. Any secretary of a military department or a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may present to Congress on his own initiative any recommendation relating to the Department of Defense after first informing the Secretary of Defense.

Obviously the Secretary of Defense cannot as an individual discharge even a small portion of the various duties assigned to him. To assist him, Congress created the following agencies: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Armed Forces Policy Council, Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board. These four agencies are above the level of the military departments, and to be used as the Secretary's primary staff within the spheres of the respective activities.

In his immediate office the Secretary has, to assist him, (1) Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Stephen Early; (2) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legal and legislative matters), Mr. Marx Leva; (3) Assistant Secretary of Defense (budget and management matters), Mr. W. J. McNeil; and (4) Assistant Secretary of Defense (special programs), Mr. Paul Griffith.

Joint Chiefs of Staff

You are all more or less familiar with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consist, of course, of the Chairman, who is the presiding officer thereof but has no vote; the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force; and the Chief of Naval Operations. This agency has responsibilities for the preparation of strategic plans and the strategic direction of the military forces, as well as for the preparation of joint logistic plans and the assignment of logistic responsibilities to the services.

Under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Joint Staff, consisting of not more than 210 officers, approximately equally divided among the three services, is authorized. The Joint Staff operates under a director appointed by the Joint Chiefs. Rear Admiral Arthur C. Davis, USN, is presently the Director of the Joint Staff.

Armed Forces Policy Council

A second agency in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, with which you are perhaps less familiar, is the Armed Forces Policy Council. This council is composed of nine members, of which the Secretary of Defense is Chairman and has the power of decision. In addition to the Secretary, the membership consists of the following, (1) Deputy Secretary of Defense, (2) Secretary of the Army, (3) Secretary of the Navy, (4) Secretary of the Air Force, (5) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (6) Chief of Staff, United States Army, (7) Chief of Naval Operations, and (8) Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. The Armed Forces Policy Council advises the Secretary on matters of broad policy. It and the newly formed Joint Secretaries are the only agencies in the Department in which all the civilian secretaries are members.

Munitions Board

The Munitions Board's duties are primarily in the industrial and material fields. The board is composed of a Chairman, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and an Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary from each of the three military departments. The present Chairman is Mr. Hubert Howard.

Among the many responsibilities of the Munitions Board are:

1. Planning for industrial mobilization for the armed forces.

2. Stockpiling critical materials.

3. The assignment of procurement responsibilities among the military departments.

4. Assembly and review of material and personnel requirements presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Munitions Board works closely with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Research and Development Board within the Department of Defense and with the National Security Resources Board. If you think of the National Security Resources Board as dividing the economic pie of the United States among military, civilian, and foreign claimants, the Munitions Board further divides the military share among the Army, Navy, and Air Force. We shall study and have future lectures and seminars on the organization, activities, and problems of the Munitions Board during the next months.

Research and Development Board

The fourth statutory board is the Research and Development Board, whose duties are:

1. To prepare complete programs of research and development for the Department of Defense.

2. To allocate research and development programs to each of the three military departments.

3. To work with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in considering the relationship of research and development to strategy.

The Chairman of the Research and Development Board is appointed by the President and is subject to the authority of the Secretary of Defense. The present Chairman is Mr. William Webster. In addition to the Chairman the membership includes two representatives from each of the military departments, who are designated by their respective secretaries.

The following are the present members: Army--Under Secretary A. S. Alexander and General Mark Clark, USA; Navy--Under Secretary D. A. Kimball and Rear Admiral R. P. Briscoe, USN; and the Air Force--Assistant Secretary H. C. Stuart and Lieutenant General B. W. Chidlaw, USAF.

Military Departments

I am sure you are aware that since 1949 the military departments are no longer executive departments of the Government. The Department of Defense is the single executive department which embraces the three military departments.

In summary, we find that our organization for national security consists of three primary agencies: National Security Council, National Security Resources Board, and the Department of Defense. Through these agencies the political, military, and economic problems inherent in our national objectives and policies may be studied and discussed; and through them the most enlightened advice on required action may be given to the President.

There we have the organization. The question naturally arises: Has it accomplished anything? Tomorrow at the class seminar, with panel members from the Munitions Board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Resources Board, you will be able to question directly members of the major agencies in this organization for national security regarding its accomplishments. In the meantime, I will mention a few of them.

1. The NSC can make rapid decisions in emergencies, as was recently done when the Communists invaded South Korea.

2. The NSRB is actively studying 257 problem areas deemed vital to the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization.

3. The Department of Defense has increased efficiency and obtained savings by coordinating among the services many programs, such as personnel policy, military budgets, procurement, weapons evaluation, sea transportation, and air transportation.

4. Standardization of military catalogs is under way in the Munitions Board; although I understand we now use 17 different catalogs for ordering material and that the present program won't be finished for several years.

5. The stockpiling of critical material is a most important program involving several of the agencies of government. The Munitions Board under NSRB's general supervision recommends the items to be stockpiled, and the Federal Supply Service buys and stores them. About 70 items which the United States either wholly or partially lacks are being stockpiled. However, like the standardization of military catalogs, much of this stockpiling is yet to be accomplished and our supplies of many scarce materials are insufficient for all-out war.

6. Liaison among governmental agencies responsible for national security has been enhanced both formally and informally by membership on organized boards and councils.

Thus we have some of the results of the Security Act.

COLONEL BARNES: The meeting is open for comment and debate.

QUESTION: If you consider that chart of our organization for national security, don't you think there are some important omissions? You have there on the civilian side a purely advisory planning body, with no indication of anybody taking any action. While we may not have it in being today, don't you think there ought to be some blank spaces on that chart for action agencies on the civilian side?

COMMANDER NEEL: Are you referring to a need for action-taking agencies as well as advisory agencies?

QUESTION: I am also thinking of the War Production Board type of operation.

COMMANDER NEEL: This organization has gone through some changes, as I mentioned to you, particularly the National Security Resources Board. You will recall that when it was first established, Mr. Hill was made Chairman of the board, and he had the concept of his office as being the nucleus for a future War Production Board--an action-taking agency. He started organizing as such. He was the proponent of a blueprint organization plan. That approach was not acceptable to the President, apparently, because Mr. Hill resigned; and for a year and a half no new chairman was appointed to the NSRB. During that year and a half there was some change of direction; but when Mr. Symington was appointed and the NSRB began studying problem areas, it was especially clear that NSRB was to be an advisory board.

Now, in just this morning's paper you may have noticed an article about the new agency that will direct price and wage stabilization--"President to set up an office for controls to plan for actions needed in the future." The article goes on to say that an Executive order is now being circulated among the interested agencies about setting up this

office of controls, which will be charged with planning and carrying out those plans if needed--considerable economic controls. Perhaps that will be one of the action-taking agencies that will fit into this picture and fill some of the needs that you feel belong there. Is there any other comment you want to make on that?

QUESTION: Well, of course, it could be that the NSRB would be an action agency, I suppose. We have had every indication so far that it would not be. Is that right?

COMMANDER NEEL: That is right.

QUESTIONER: It may be that it will be the regular departments of the Government as we now have them--Commerce, Labor, Agriculture, etc.--through their own divisions. But my only point was that if we think of that as the total security organization and not just the defense organization, those elements belong in there as part of the total picture in whatever shape or form they may develop.

COMMANDER NEEL: That is correct. As they develop, they should be included in the picture. At the present time they have not developed to any great extent.

QUESTION: To what extent is the Research and Development Board proposed to control or supervise the details of research and development programs within the individual services?

COMMANDER NEEL: The Security Act provides that the Research and Development Board (RDB) is charged by law with the following duties, (1) to prepare complete programs of research and development for the Department of Defense, (2) to allocate research and development programs to each of the three military departments, and (3) to work with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in considering the relationship of research and development to strategy.

It would appear from this that members of the RDB wouldn't be involved in the administration of the research and development programs of the military departments once they had assigned them to the departments. But I am sure they would be interested in monitoring and keeping abreast of whatever is being done.

QUESTIONER: My point is this: I had some contact with members of the RDB. They required each project to be submitted to them for approval before the contract could be let. It seemed to me that they were going far beyond any general supervision. I think their province should be to approve a general program and then leave the execution of

that program to the services, and allow the services within certain latitude to select the contractor and say exactly how much should go into a particular project. It was particularly true of the Committee on Atomic Energy, and in my opinion they were going beyond their charter in supervising too many details of the program.

QUESTION: When the RDB representatives would not let you make a contract until they had approved the project, did you state in your project with whom you intended to let the contract?

COMMENT: Yes. They wouldn't approve it unless they knew definitely what university or contractor was going to get it and exactly how much. They had to go over the project before they would let us commit it.

COMMENT: I would like to throw a little more light on that, if I may. So far as the Quartermaster Corps was concerned, the Research and Development Board never stepped down into the letting of our contracts; we had complete freedom as to whom we let them. Even the general staff was not too much concerned about with whom the contract was let. The RDB, so far as we were concerned, functioned very satisfactorily.

The NSRB members were following out their directive, which was to advise the President on development programs. They maintained a panel, made up of people in the operating departments, who would advise them as to what was going on; and then they, in turn, through that panel up to the head of the RDB could influence the way in which the Department of the Army executed those contracts. So our experience has been just the opposite to yours, and it may have been due to the size of the contracts.

COMMENT: No. It was true even in smaller contracts, for sums as low as $20,000. I think it was primarily due to the characteristics of the Committee on Atomic Energy. We all felt that this one committee was going far beyond its stated responsibility. The AEC had its panel, and before we could initiate a particular project, we would have to call up that panel or go to see the head of the panel and get his personal O. K. We had to do that before we could sign the contract with a particular individual.

COMMENT: I think I can shed some light on that control question. Even though the charter of the Research and Development Board doesn't give it authority to direct research and development projects, the Bureau of the Budget has insisted that prior to its review of a research budget it has to be coordinated through the RDB to insure that there is no duplication. Therefore, even though the RDB charter doesn't directly authorize it to direct research, in a sense, because of the Bureau of the Budget, it has a pretty good control over it.

RESTRICTED

QUESTION: You brought out a very important point--that the Bureau of the Budget has unlimited power. Where does that fit into the picture?

COMMANDER NEEL: The Bureau of the Budget is also an advisory agency to the President. We will have a speaker from the Bureau of the Budget here before the course is over. He will take sharp exception to your saying that the Bureau of the Budget has unlimited power. We realize what power it does have, but it also is part of the Executive Office of the President, and is called on to advise him.

And another point--when you speak of the National Security Resources Board being only an advisory agency and therefore not carrying much weight, you have to remember that the Bureau of the Budget is also an advisory agency, and the Office of Selective Service is an advisory agency too; but they manage to carry considerable weight in the operations of the Office of the President.

COLONEL BARNES: Further answering this question, the chart shows just that part of the Federal Government that is concerned with national security. The Bureau of the Budget is not on that specifically, and neither are its functions. Each of you has been issued as part of your room set a U.S. Government Manual, I think, the 1950 edition. You probably haven't developed your specific interest in that as yet. If you turn toward the latter part of the manual where the charts begin, you will find the first chart to be that of the Executive Office of the President. The Department of Defense and all the other departments are listed on there, and the Bureau of the Budget is in there too.

QUESTION: There are conflicting views from very prominent sources, in my opinion, on the Department of Defense. In that regard, from my background reading it appears that the Hoover Commission and others have indicated strong recommendation for more power for the Secretary of Defense. In other words, the tendency, in my opinion, seems to be toward further unification, if you want to call it that. Yet Congress has very pointedly indicated its intent by the restrictions which have been placed by law upon the Secretary of Defense in his functions. They seem to be such opposing forces that there is some doubt in my mind as to which is the better of the two approaches. Certainly most of us have confidence in the Hoover Commission and its investigations, primarily because of the importance of the men that were on that commission. I am wondering if there is, or if you have ever found, any indication of what was in the minds of Congressmen as to why they placed those limitations on the power of the Secretary of Defense.

RESTRICTED

COMMANDER NEEL: It may be worth taking a couple of minutes to read from the Hoover Commission's recommendation. I have the recommendation right here. It was made prior to the 1949 amendment. That amendment, I think, considerably strengthens the position of the Secretary of Defense. It was that amendment which created the Department of Defense. The Hoover Commission had this to say:

> "The National Security organization as legislated in 1947 to establish unification of the Armed Services and unified national policy on security has achieved gains. Further improvement may be expected since the organization is still young, but there is evidence that the utmost that can be accomplished under the present statute will fall far short of national needs. The Commission on Organization of the executive branch has had the benefit of an investigation into the National Security Organization by a distinguished committee. The committee found continued disharmony and lack of unified planning. Extravagance in military budgets and waste in military expenditures show a serious lack of understanding as to the effect of military costs and spending upon the total economy. True national security depends more upon economic stability and political strength than upon military power."
>
> "The authority of the Secretary of Defense, and hence, the control of the President, is weak and heavily qualified by the provisions of the Act of 1947 which set up a rigid structure of federation rather than unification. In direct proportion to the limitations and confusions of authority among their civilian superiors, the military are left free of civilian control."

That was the gist of the Hoover Report. As I understand it, those who took the opposition were, on the other hand, largely the military committees of Congress, who, according to the written reports of their hearings, were hesitant about placing too much power in the hands of a single secretary. They thought they were giving the Secretary of Defense, as is, more power than they had placed in the hands of any other secretary up to that time. They were resisting placing more power in his hands.

QUESTION: You made the statement, I believe, that the primary responsibility for internal security of this country was with the Department of Justice, the FBI. I am wondering why that organization has not been brought into this organization chart for national security. It seems to me a very important part of our security organization. I particularly wonder why they were not put on this National Security Council.

COMMANDER NEEL: The reason the FBI in particular has not been brought into the National Security Council is that the FBI is a more subordinate agency than those that are advising on foreign and domestic

policies. They are below that level. I am sure that the FBI consults freely with the Central Intelligence Agency. If there is anyone in the audience who knows more about it, I would be glad to hear from him.

COMMENT: There is under the National Security Council the Interdepartmental Intelligence Council. The subscribing agencies include the FBI. Mr. J. Edgar Hoover is Chairman of that council or conference. The Air Force, the Navy, and the Army are also represented on that. They, in turn, of course, are subscribers to the recent limitation agreement which has to do with internal security. They have authority from the President and are under the National Security Council, according to my understanding.

QUESTION: I am inclined to look at things a little critically at times. I am particularly interested in the Armed Forces Policy Council. I can understand its function, but I don't understand including it in a chart of the organization for national security, because, in the first place, everyone who has a part in that council is a subordinate of the chairman and as such is on call to advise the Secretary of Defense at any time. It seems to me that we are fooling ourselves when we place that as part of a chart for the organization of national security.

I once had a small command, and I know I didn't need little blocks on my chart in which to put my adjutant, my executive officer, and my supply officer so I could call them in to have a little confab. I think that is padding the chart. I wonder if you would like to comment on that.

COMMANDER NEEL: I believe that to a certain extent the Armed Forces Policy Council is similar to the National Security Council. Everyone on that council is a subordinate to the President. Everyone on the Armed Forces Policy Council is a subordinate to the Secretary of Defense. Matters which concern personnel, joint codes of military justice, things of that nature, which are the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense, are discussed in the Armed Forces Policy Council.

Until last month it was the only place where the three secretaries of the departments could get together on their mutual problems. Within the last month the Secretary of Defense has set up the Joint Secretaries, which is composed of the secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

COLONEL BARNES: I would like to make a comment on that. It seems to me that the weakness you have suggested in that organization exists in any staff organization that is under a commander. The Secretary of Defense, if that weakness actually develops, can take corrective action by changing his senior staff officers for whom that subordinate staff is working. In other words, the President relies on his Secretary of Defense for advice on military matters.

The Secretary of Defense has here a statutory organization, a place where he can call his three civilian secretaries in, and the Chief of Staff and his under secretary, and get together around the table and talk things over. Everyone makes up his mind. Perhaps there is a little argument. Nevertheless the Secretary of Defense is responsible to the President for setting forth the military policy.

If the Secretary of Defense is not satisfied with his assistants, he can change them. If the President is not satisfied with his Secretary of Defense, he can change him. But the inherent weakness that you point out is, I think, just a matter of personalities and has always existed where you have staff relationship to command. Don't you think so?

QUESTIONER: Yes. I see your point. My point is that as to any of the people stated there, they are always available to advise the Secretary of Defense. So I maintain that we are fooling ourselves by placing that on the chart as a separate council. Since they all work for the Secretary of Defense, they are available to be called into his office at any time to confer with him on any matters. To set them up as a separate unit of our security organization just appears to be padding it.

COLONEL BARNES: You are thinking of it as a working body. They come together to exchange ideas and to reach a decision. The one who submits the decision is the chairman, and in this case it is the Secretary of Defense.

QUESTIONER: I will concede it makes a good picture.

COMMENT: My mind has been running in the same line. My boss can call in all of us for help at any time that he desires. By putting that council on the chart, you legalize it, but that doesn't force the President to consult it. The President always has had a Secretary of State to advise him on foreign policy and he has the Secretary of Defense to advise him on military matters. In addition to those, he now has the National Security Resources Board to advise him on domestic matters.

It seems to me that it is clearly padding the chart to put in an internal advisory group that simply needles the others. You are just formalizing that advisory control. There is nothing to force the President to call upon that council if he doesn't want to do so. Its members can gather as a group of their own accord, and they can turn in all the advice they want to, but the President needn't do anything about it. I think it offers a sort of cloak of security that perhaps is not there.

COMMANDER NEEL: Your statement that there is nothing that requires the President to follow their advice is correct. But the thought that he would not follow their advice would appear to me to be very remote. I don't believe we would have a President who would go completely off on his own initiative without asking advice from other people.

The present organization improves the previous organization to this extent: There is a permanent group of people now who are concerned with such matters. That is the National Security Council, headed by Executive Secretary Lay. They surely will be able to devote more time and come up with more ideas than any previous organization which had no such group. Whether their advice is followed or not is, of course, another matter.

QUESTION: Did I understand you rightly to say that the responsibility previously vested in the NSRB has been amended to rest on its chairman?

COMMANDER NEEL: Yes.

QUESTION: In most boards, commissions, and so on, the responsibility is given to the board; it naturally follows the advice and leadership of the chairman. Why was the responsibility made that of the chairman rather than of the board?

COMMANDER NEEL: In the reorganizational planning to which I referred it was done, I assume, to strengthen the position of the chairman. The chairman now has the board to advise him, but he is the man who makes the decision. It is not a matter of vote, not a matter of a majority. He has the responsibility and the authority that was previously conferred upon the board. It would appear to me to strengthen his position to have that authority.

QUESTION: If the chairman now has the authority and the board is advisory only, does that mean that the chairman alone has authority to make recommendations to the President? Can he disregard every member of the board? Does that mean that the other members of the board have no authority to make any recommendations on matters under the cognizance of the National Security Resources Board to the President? Is that what this implies?

COMMANDER NEEL: I believe you have worded it properly. The other members of the board now advise the chairman.

QUESTION: I understand there is a limit of 210 officers in the Joint Staff. Is there any limit to the number of officers that may serve with the Munitions Board, or do you know how many officers are now serving with it?

COMMANDER NEEL: There is no limitation written into the law on the number of officers who may serve with the Munitions Board. At present there are about 140 officers and 580 civilians working for the Munitions Board.

QUESTION: Does the Armed Forces Policy Council have a secretariat, or is it simply an assemblage of principal people?

COMMANDER NEEL: To my knowledge there is no secretariat or permanent staff for the Armed Forces Policy Council.

COLONEL BARNES: Thank you very much, Commander Neel.

(24 Oct 1950--350)S.