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MANPOWER IN ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION

18 September 1950

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COLONEL VAN WAY: General Holman and fellow members of the Industrial College: In this discussion of manpower in economic mobilization I propose to introduce the course in manpower for this year. My plan is to talk first about the basic problems, the basic situation, of manpower in the United States; that is, to talk about the size and some of the characteristics of the population, and to talk about some of the requirements which we place against it.

Following this outline of the general picture I will turn then to a discussion of some of the areas related to it, such as recruitment, the development of additional resources, productivity, the matter of controls, which is uppermost in everyone's mind, the matter of migration, and, closely related to that, something on community conditions. These subjects are all very closely intermingled with the basic subject. Another one, which is not quite so closely related to it but which is of vital importance to us now is my last subject for this morning, which will be civil defense.

Now, in order to lay the foundation for a consideration of the basic picture, let me recall to your minds the material that was given to you by General Vanaman in his talk early this month on our manpower resources.

Chart 1, page 17.—As you will recall this picture, it sets up the total population, 151 million, broken down directly into two groups—the total population and the labor pool. The labor pool in turn is broken down into the labor force proper and the remainder of the labor pool—those which we call, somewhat confusingly, "not in the labor force." We select these things somewhat arbitrarily to fit the kind of statistics that we get as a routine matter through the Department of Labor.

As you will recall, we have in the labor pool those who are over 14 and who are able to work. In the labor force proper are those who have been habitually working for gain, leaving for the group "not in the labor force" students and housewives.

Now, this group, of 39 million, shown somewhat forebodingly in black, is comprised of the very young, the very old, and those who are in institutions. "Institutions" is a sort of euphemism for jails and hospitals.

Chart 2, page 18.—Let us now break this labor force and the whole manpower resources down more in detail. This United States manpower pyramid represents the same 151 million people that we had on the other chart. By the time we get through with it this morning, this black figure will look much more like the Christmas tree by which it is more

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popularly known. It gives a breakdown by age groups and by sex. The black line separates the sexes, with the women on the right. The age groups are indicated by the five-year bars, with the size of the group indicated in millions by the figures along the bottom.

There are a few interesting things to note in connection with this figure as it now is shown to you. First, in this line here, representing the mortality rate of our population, the slope is fairly uniform. Since we have an immigration which is virtually negligible, this is a true representation of our mortality rate, affected by our past birth rate and by our medical progress, which is lengthening our span of life.

You will note that in the 15- to 19-year group, there is quite a noticeable indentation from the normal slope. This is where the children should be who were not born during the depression. That same effect carries over to this 10- to 14-year group, and somewhat in here, the 5- to 9-year group, but considerably less. Happily, however, for the size of our population, the birth rate in the last five years has been exceptionally high in relation to what it has been in the last 25 years. Therefore we are beginning to re-establish this general picture of our pyramid.

You might notice also that this line here is somewhat shorter than the corresponding lines over here, representing the 131 and some odd thousand casualties we had in World War II, mostly males 20 to 29.

Now, let us see how our manpower pool looks on this figure. The lighter area is the over-all manpower pool, including both the cross-hatched and the dotted blocks on Chart 2. You will see that it runs from 14 on up to and including most of the adults. Some people along here and along here (pointing) are those who are infirm, incapacitated permanently, don't work for a living, or who are in hospitals or jails.

That doesn't include the unemployed. As you may recall from General Vanaman's talk, the unemployed are included in what we call our labor force. That is primarily for statistical reasons. It is a widely fluctuating figure. It fluctuates during the year and from year to year. It is much more convenient to count that directly in the labor force. Not from any similarity to the unemployed, we also count the military forces in that labor force, for a somewhat similar reason. The labor force is the original or immediate source for our military force, as we shall see.

Let us see where the labor force proper fits into our working pool. (Chart 2). You see this large dotted block here, which represents the dotted part in Chart 1. This does not mean that they run down to 10 years. This means that the 14- to 15-year group, which statistically we count in the labor force, shows in here as just a small block.

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Obviously, most of these are males, although we have a large segment of our female contingent working. These are students for the most part, and these are your most immediate source, together with these, for an augmentation of that dotted area group.

Let us see how big that is actually. There are about 37 million here in the group of females not in the labor force. During the last war we developed 12 million from these two sources alone. At that time the picture was a little bit different and considerably smaller, but we were able to develop 12 million, including some 7 million 6 hundred thousand young men and something less than 5 million women.

So much for that part of this picture. I know you are all wondering where the military force fits into the picture, and I wish to show that. But before I get to it I would like to introduce to you one of our instructors, who is our numbers man in the Manpower pool--Mr. Poluhoff. We have two committee problems on population, and they will be conducted by Mr. Poluhoff. He is always available with statistics of this sort and many other things.

I know each one of you are wondering where our manpower for the military forces, the uniformed forces, fits into this picture. I have a gimmick here which should display that a little bit (indicating the area shown in white on Chart 2).

Now, we have debated considerably how big a military force we should have. I know you have all talked about it, whether it should be 5 million, 10 million, 15 million, or what--have-you. I have heard various figures given. Name a figure and somebody will say: "That is what we should have for our manpower in the military services." One figure that has been given is 13.4 million. I have heard 15 million advocated. We have selected the figure 12 million, which is what we had in 1945, just about the top of our military manpower during World War II. We picked that partly because we were able to find out the age breakdown of that group, and also to avoid any conjecture as to any significance that this would have.

You will recall that this pyramid we have been talking about is as of now, 1950, with 151 million population. This military force is as of 1945, and it makes some slight difference there. However, you can see where that is. It comes right in the heart of our working force, and that at a time when we need the very utmost in production from that working force. Take a good look at it, gentlemen, because there is your manpower picture. That is the situation we face.

Now let us turn to some of the areas or fields in which actual steps can be taken to do something about this situation. There are plenty of them. The first thing that occurs to us is recruitment.

How do we get these people into the services? How do we get these people where they belong.

When we think of recruitment in this country, we think of selective service, which is simply our name for military conscription. Military conscription has long had popular acceptance in this country. I will not go into the history of that at this time, although it makes a very interesting discussion. Suffice it for the present to say that we do accept the principle of conscription of men for the military services.

We have not as yet accepted the conscription of women for such service or any other work, and we definitely have not accepted the principle of conscription on a general basis of civilians for other types of industrial endeavor. We do take certain indirect means to accomplish that same thing. But conscription as such for the present is limited in our acceptance to conscription for uniformed military service.

One of the reasons we accept conscription so readily in this country is because our system is based squarely on a democratic principle of individual action at a low level, at the local level. Decisions regarding individual selection are finally made by unbiased local boards, guided, it is true, by centralized policy made at state and national levels. But the actual final decisions are made by local businessmen, and professional men who know the individual concerned, who know the situation. Appeal machinery exists, of course. In fact, a man can appeal through proper machinery all the way up to the President. But the fundamental is that local determination.

However, despite the general acceptance we have for selective service, there are certain confusing cross currents that disturb the picture constantly. The first of these grows out of our long heritage of feeling that when the military forces set a certain standard, it must be met. Now, up to this current time it hasn't made too much difference in the economy and in the industrial potential of the Nation how many people the services draw from industry. It has been a rather negligible proportion. But, beginning with the last war and certainly for any trouble we are going to have in the future, the numbers involved in any military effort are going to have a real effect upon the industrial capacity to support that military effort. Therefore it is incumbent upon us to be prepared to reduce somewhat the high physical standards that we have always insisted on maintaining for our military personnel.

The next situation which tends to limit the number of people that we can draw from depends on our American respect for the integrity of the family. We respect the obligations of the heads of families. Therefore we have rather complex and sometimes rigid theories about deferments for dependency purposes. I don't criticize these at all. They are going to be with us and they should be with us. But I will point out to you that this still further restricts the number of people we can call on.

Beginning with the last war, we realized also that we had to consider the matter of deferments for workers in certain war-supporting industries in order to permit us to increase our output at the time when we needed it. These occupational deferments, plus those somewhat related deferments for educational reasons, are necessary; and, again, they restrict the number we can draw on. They also begin to restrict the quality as well as the number, and that is something that we have to keep well in mind.

At the present time we have uncovered another and very difficult dilemma which has not been present in former efforts. Heretofore in our wars our veterans were too old to be of interest to us. They stood back on the side lines and waved the flags at the lads that were going away in the uniformed services. But this time, as of now, we have a different situation with respect to our veterans. They represent a fine pool of trained and qualified, experienced individuals, many of whom are still young enough to be of military value. It presents a serious problem as to the ethics of pulling them in before we pull in some of the people who haven't had that experience. How are we going to do that? How are you going to weigh the factors pro and con of pulling in a veteran as against the factors pro and con of pulling in a father or a man who is in an important occupation?

We have, however, a way of developing additional resources which will help us in facing these difficult problems involved in pulling in these people from essential industries, that is, look to certain of the areas for our potential workers who can be pulled back into the industrial scene.

Obviously, the first group you think of is the students. They are growing up into the labor force anyway. We can make use of them both in the services and in the labor force. But by far the largest potential group, in numbers at least, is the huge group of housewives. They can be pulled in. They need training, and there are certain conditions of work that have to be followed. But about 80 percent of the jobs in industry can be done by these women, who are immediately available. With proper planning and with proper management this pool can be made use of very well.

Now, there are certain additional resources. These are the two main ones, the ones that you find in the cross-hatched blocks on both Charts 1 and 2. They are again the young and the aged and those in institutions. Of course, the young cannot do too much, but they can be brought into use on farms. They can do some of the services, which will release adults for other work. They can particularly help around the home and release the housewife for work in industry. The older people can be held in industry by putting off retirement, or they can be pulled back if they have not been retired too long. Their experience and their steadiness and reliability

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in general make them a very useful, if not very large, force to reckon with.

One other source is the handicapped. Much is being done on that now. We are going to be fortunate during this course in hearing from Dr. Howard Rusk, who is an expert on the matter of rehabilitation and finding useful occupations for those who are seriously handicapped. I think he will give you some fine ideas on this particular subject. It is a matter that has an importance far beyond the numbers that are involved, in the morale effect that it has on the other workers and in the general feeling that we are doing everything we can with what we have; and that is what we are trying for.

Now, we have another means of increasing the productivity of our labor force beyond that of increasing its numbers. I have talked so far of the several ways that we can increase numbers. But we are interested also in increasing the output beyond what those increases that we can make in numbers of individuals make possible. Captain Marcy has told you that in the last 40 years we have doubled the productivity of our workers by technological means, by good management, and by proper use of individuals. That increase of about 2.5 percent or so a year can not only be expected to continue, but we can expect it to increase under the urgency of a wartime expansion.

We can also gain almost immediately a large increase by lengthening the work week. It is quite obvious, I think, at least mathematically, that to increase the work week from 40 to 48 hours would effect about a 20 percent increase in our output. That doesn't hold true in actual practice, but it a very material possibility for a really marked increase in total product.

We don't know what the maximum effective work week is. We know that in the last war we reached only an average of something less than 46 hour a week. To an infantryman whose work week has 168 hours in it, that doesn't seem too large. Some industries, to be sure, went higher than that. The tool machine manufacturing industry, for example, went up as high as 54 hours per week for a short while.

There is no question but that under the press of the urgency of war expansion we can increase beyond 50 hours. To what extent we can expand we are not sure. Obviously those increases don't necessarily reflect the proportionate increase in output, because it is known that when you get beyond 45 or 50 hours a week, the hourly output may drop. We are not sure at what point the total weekly output drops, however. That largely remains a test of management, as to what level of production they can achieve, which will be the maximum for a week's work.

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We are going into that in some detail in one of our problems in this course. The instructor for that particular problem will be Mr. Al Maserick.

When we talk about increasing productivity, we naturally get into the matter of controls. The idea is to freeze everything, to tell everybody just what to do. That is very attractive in theory perhaps, but doubtful whether it will work out too well in practice. Actually, some of the best controls we have, the most effective ones, are those indirect ones which come on gradually without arousing the resentment of those who are controlled. By that I mean that we can't exactly put a freeze on wages. We can try to hold them down, because we all know that a rise in wages is going to cause a rise in costs; and that will defeat the purpose of the rise in wages. Not only that, but from the manpower point of view our objection to a rise in wages is that it forms an inducement for labor pirating and for shuffling workers around beyond the necessary redistribution that I will discuss later. Therefore, while some wage control is important, it is doubtful that we can be too arbitrary about it and do it too fast.

We also are interested in the question of people going from job to job. Too much of that, again, becomes wasteful of manpower. There is no stability in work. We lose the feeling of a man that he is working at a job where he will do his utmost. We waste training. We waste time. We expend needless supplies on transportation. We develop bad community conditions.

However, this migration is not an unmitigated evil. And here again we must talk with reservations. We can't immediately freeze, though it might seem desirable in some respects. Actually, when you start taking your military force out of the heart of your labor force, you are bound to create a necessity for the shuffling around of workers to fill those spots. You are bringing in some new workers from amongst the housewives and students. You have to move them in. You are closing out nonessential industries. You are building up new industries or you are increasing the size of essential industries. You must have people move into those. You are going to change some of the early emphasis of the labor occupation. You are going to develop some new industries where power is available. You are going to move from some areas to others.

The most effective way so far to accomplish the movement of labor that is necessary for new industries is by more or less voluntary, uncontrolled migration; and to that extent it is necessary. But as the war goes on and as these industries tend to stabilize, we must, by indirect means preferably, start some restriction on this uncontrolled migration. The reasons for that, of course, are quite obvious. But one of the worst situations we had in the last war, one that was probably as wasteful of our effort as any other, was that which grew out of our uncontrolled

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expansion of certain communities by virtue of the location there of large war industries, or in some cases also by the location there of military stations.

This gave rise to communities which were far beyond, in number of population, the sizes for which their sanitation, their transportation, their schools, and their hospitals were designed. It is hard to excuse drifting into such a situation blindly on the part of this country. We should be able to plan for that. We should be able not only to plan to meet those things if they arise--and we should be able to tell when they are going to arise--but we should be able, when we see that we cannot meet them in certain areas, to make some other arrangement to accomplish the necessary production without setting up these impossible community conditions that we had to cope with in some areas during the last war. We have a problem on that, which will be gone into in some detail. The instructor for that is Mr. Sam Hill.

As I said before, my last and concluding subject will be one that is very closely related to the whole matter of manpower, but is not really a part of our manpower utilization nor our manpower numbers; and that is the question of civil defense. This subject is in a state of flux, as you all know, right now. In fact, over the week end there were some announcements made that I don't propose to go into at this time. We are going to have one of the leaders in the civil defense setup talk to us on that later in the course. For the present I would like to mention a few beliefs that seem to be accepted in the field of civil defense. I started out by calling them principles, but a principle has to be fundamentally and eternally true. I am not too sure about these as principles. I believe in them, but they may not be true next year.

The first is the importance of self-help. Individuals and communities must be prepared to take care of themselves in the event of enemy action which tends to destroy or disturb the civilian security. It is a fine thing to expect help from and to rely on your neighbor; and he probably will help you; but at the time when you need him, maybe he will be busy saving his own skin. So self-help is the first thing to think about in connection with civil defense.

The next thing seems somewhat paradoxical, but it fits all right if you think about it a little while. That is the matter of mutual assistance. Of course we are all for self-help; but at the same time, when we can, we want to have individuals and communities help their neighbors.

Now, that is not simply a matter of good will. We have plenty of that. It takes something more. It takes planning. We must know something about the organization of the communities or other units that we may move over and work with. We must be able to move in under their organization and perhaps without too much confusion.

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We must be able to meet such simple objectives as insuring that the hoses in Minneapolis fit the hydrants over in Saint Paul. We must find some way of solving the problem of legal liability when a force from Baltimore, for example, is working over in Philadelphia. We have a problem on that also. The instructor for that is Colonel Tom Ennis, U.S. Marine Corps.

Now, that brings me to the end of the discussion of the areas in which we may be able to take action relating to our manpower situation. If you recall, I described the manpower picture, the size of our population, and something of its composition. I discussed briefly the 12 million possible bite we might put against it. In terms of numbers that 12 million isn't important. The thing for you to recognize is that, whatever it is, whether it is 5, 10, 12, or 20 million, it is going to come right out of the middle of our labor force. Then we ran over very briefly the matter of recruitment, which to us means selective service; the development of additional resources, that is, students and housewives, the oldsters, the youngsters, and the handicapped. We then discussed means of increasing productivity by means other than increasing numbers. I went over very briefly the matter of controls, including those on migration, and the community conditions which grow out of uncontrolled migration. Lastly, we finished on the subject of civil defense.

Before we go to the break, however, I would like to introduce two more officers to you who were not introduced during the early part of my talk because they don't belong strictly to our branch. We count them virtually as members of our Manpower Branch, but they don't officially belong to us. The first is Colonel Moses, who is liaison officer to the college from General Hershey's office of Selective Service. During our manpower course we adopt him into our group as a member of the faculty. He is here, always ready to give the students and faculty members alike fine help and wise counsel in matters of selective service.

We have in our own college another officer whose knowledge of labor economics and whose knowledge of labor unions and industrial methods is almost encyclopedic. I refer to Major McLay. He is in the Correspondence Study Branch, but for the time being we use him as a wise counselor and a helper.

Now, gentlemen, we have time for some questions.

QUESTION: I didn't notice any of the military personnel represented as women. Shouldn't they show up a little bit there?

COLONEL VAN WAY: Yes. That is a perfectly good point. I will tell you about that. Actually in numbers there are possibly 185,000 in the Army and, I think, about 80,000 or so in the Navy. Maybe a Navy man can correct me.

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QUESTIONER: Seventy-five thousand.

COLONEL VAN WAY: Something like that. Anyway, that is less than 300,000. I hate to be talking in such big figures as this, but if you put that along here, you would hardly see it. Actually it would be a hundred thousand in each one of these blocks, and you could hardly see that. It is not much wider than that. It wasn't that I wanted to over-look them, but you just couldn't see them there.

QUESTION: What about the women in the older age groups? I see you show them in blue as a potential part of the labor pool. You do not show any men, however, in the upper age groups as potentialities there.

COLONEL VAN WAY: That is a statistical oddity--the way they show the statistics. The only way I can explain it is that they call themselves housewives to the bitter end, whereas the men finally quit.

QUESTION: You pointed out that the break in the birth rate came about during the last depression. If we are going to have to fight Russia, maybe this preventive war that they talk about is not so bad, because in 5 or 10 years that break is going to start putting the pinch where it will be felt the most.

COLONEL VAN WAY: That is very sensible. I should have brought that out. Actually, in the next five years, that break in the birth rate is going to tend to offset our normal increase in population, which for the past decade has been around or a little less than 20 million. It has been fairly constant--almost two million a year. But, so far as the increase in the labor force is concerned, this situation in here (pointing) is going to neutralize that over-all increase.

We are keeping more people alive longer. So that also is one of the forces which is increasing our population from year to year. But, as I say, and as Mr. Robinson very sensibly pointed out, this will tend to offset our normal increase. So 10 years from now this will be up where this is. And it will make a very serious situation.

What will happen? Actually, there will be a tendency to absorb the unemployed pool, which is around 2.5 million--it is changing from day to day--but it will tend to absorb that pool and will also tend to push back the normal retirement age. So that actually our labor pool can remain as near constant as the demands will be on it.

QUESTION: What position do you feel the services should take on the question of the National Service Act, for strict allocation and control of all the labor force?

COLONEL VAN WAY: My personal opinion is that the services should take no position. That is a political question and not the problem of th

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Department of Defense. So far as we are concerned, if we get our manpower that we require, in the numbers and in the quality that we need, I think we have no business saying how the other workers will be brought into the fold.

My personal opinion as to whether or not a national service act would be effective is that I feel it would not. I believe we can accomplish much more in this country by voluntary measures and perhaps even by indirect methods of control than we can by something that we would set up and call national service. Something that was successful in some other country might not work here at all. We had better use our own methods, which are not those of the rigid controls implied when you say "national service."

COMMENT: May I take exception to a part of that? In the aircraft industry during the war they had a lot of people brought into, say, Los Angeles. These people were not friends of the local board members, and in a lot of cases they dipped pretty heavily into the manpower pool employed by the aircraft companies. This acted rather adversely to the aircraft production and we had a terrible time all during the war trying to keep the people in the aircraft companies that we wanted to keep there. The turnover rate was something like 80 percent every six months, which is pretty high. Now, if we don't have something to say about how they go out and dig into the civilian manpower and bring people into the services, I think we are going to get into the same situation again.

COLONEL VAN WAY: In the first place, you are more than welcome to take exception to anything I say, and almost any other instructor would want you to do the same thing. However, your implication that the local board did its work on the basis of friendship, which was very plain in what you said, is a rather damning one if it is true; and I don't doubt that in some exceptional cases it was true. But I believe there are local remedies for that, and I don't believe that it can be stated as a general principle that local friendships were the guiding rule.

Now, so far as failing to give due recognition to industry is concerned, the question comes up, What are you going to do? Are you going to give recognition to the armed services or to the industry? Or are you going to try to find out some way of working out the uneasy compromise you must have between those two things? Any compromise you work out is not going to be satisfactory to both parties. I don't know how you can possibly do it so that both the armed services and industry will feel they are having all that they want. The only thing you can do is have them feel that each one has had his say and each one has had his part at least of the compromise that is brought about. That is all I can tell you on that.

QUESTION: To go back to our Christmas tree again, it looks like we have a weak place creeping up from the bottom. Would you care to comment

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upon the possible effect of raising the immigration quota as a method of curing that?

COLONEL VAN WAY: Yes. Until about 1930 immigration was a real factor in the rapid growth of our population. It was very important to us. Beginning with the depression, of course, as you know, immigration was reduced to a point where now it is virtually negligible in terms of the huge numbers that I have been throwing around here with such abandon. It runs now less than 50,000 a year. So we can hardly count it as being a material factor in a population which is increasing at the rate of nearly two million a year.

Now, the suggestion was that we increase our over-all population by an increase in immigration. Of course, that probably would have a desirable effect in increasing the total and offsetting this particular indentation here. Whether the quality of those people would be what we want or not would depend on how willing we were to be tough about whom we let in. Normally, when we let them come in, we let anyone in who is having hard luck, and perhaps those are not the people we want to let in. If we want to be hard-boiled about it and bring in people who have better potentialities as workers, we might be able to offset that indentation by that means. But we would have to be much tougher than we have been in immigration so far to do that immediately. They are absorbed but slowly, and they present problems of their own which may offset the gain that we would make from them. So I don't know. I am not too optimistic about that as a means of overcoming it, but there is a possibility.

QUESTION: Along that same line, immigration was cut off about 25 years ago. If you look at that chart and look at the age group in which immigration was cut off, or virtually cut off, and then take all the groups above that, if you put on that chart the number of immigrants or the number of nonnative-born population, and take that off, wouldn't you get your curve going up in a much more even way although the population is as it has been since the last 25 years?

COLONEL VAN WAY: Let me see if I follow you. I am not too sure I do. In other words, let us say that the immigration would just about offset the black figures. I have seen that sort of curve.

QUESTIONER: I am not thinking of the black figures, but simply of continuing the curve from the bottom. You might get that tree effect. I don't know what the magnitude or level of immigration was during those periods, but I know from the period of 1900 to 1920 it was considerable.

COLONEL VAN WAY: It was very considerable.

QUESTIONER: And you might find your curve just evening off.

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COLONEL VAN WAY: If you continue that kind of immigration. No. There aren't even enough then to offset this depression difficulty. You see, your main difficulty in bringing the immigrants in is the labor pool. If you have a large unemployed pool, you are not going to get any encouragement at all to bringing in a lot of immigrants. That is what caused that depression indentation there--the fact that we had widespread depression and unemployment and that cut down the new families and cut down the birth rate.

COMMENT: I would like to go back to a couple of questions, one of them on immigration. I assume that the temporary importation of workers is really an insignificant thing--the Cubans and Mexicans.

COLONEL VAN WAY: Relatively so. Yes.

COMMENT: Also I don't think we ought to leave the impression that the armed forces don't have any say about the filling of civilian jobs. I think they have a big influence through the contractors, through industry itself, and also through their representation and liaison with government agencies, like the War Manpower Commission. I think they are quite influential in helping at least to support the decisions regarding the distribution of labor.

COLONEL VAN WAY: I think that is a very good point. Thank you.

COMMENT: In your outline of the course for the next few weeks you failed to mention anything about the utilization of manpower. I think that is an area in which there should be placed a considerable emphasis. You only have to look back on what happened during the last emergency to see how easy it is to waste manpower, and that applies both to industry and to the armed forces. Since we are going to be pinched here on the number of bodies, so to speak, that we are going to use, we are going to have to give a lot more consideration and a lot more management to better utilization of every individual.

COLONEL VAN WAY: Yes. I agree with you entirely. We do have a problem, which I didn't perhaps describe sufficiently, but which will go into that. In fact, we have that element in two of our problems, one that Mr. Maserick is handling, on the matter of labor unions and collective bargaining, the current trends in labor-management relations, and so on. We also have the matter in problem 6, I believe it is, in addition to the civil defense, which I didn't mention. We have problems on the utilization of individuals in the armed services. We also are going to take up the utilization of people in agriculture.

You are quite right. There is a waste of manpower in improper utilization, a waste that we can't measure. It may be more than all the other wastes we have talked about. It seems to be much more dramatic

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and singled out and measured. But the loss occasioned by improper utilization is a very material one, and it certainly calls for sound management; but, above all, effective management and good leadership.

COMMENT: In that connection, in the little bit of reading that I have managed to do on this subject so far I haven't seen any mention of the requirements in the services for technicians, machinists, welders, medical technicians, and people of that nature who are necessary to operate with the forces within the United States and with troops in the field. It seems to me that something about that problem should be brought into the picture, in order to get away from the idea that when we take a welder from a shipyard, for instance, we are throwing him to the wolves and never going to use him. It is up to the Army then to use him and use him intelligently and not make a machine gunner out of a welder when everybody is crying for welders. But I think that is one aspect of the problem that people don't seem to say much about.

COLONEL VAN WAY: Thank you. We are going to have something on that.

As you may know, for the past year under the auspices of the Secretary of Defense's Personnel Policy Board there has been an ad hoc committee, known as the Military Occupational Classifications Project. What it means really is that they are surveying the jobs that we have in the military services and trying to define them in a manner which not only will be uniform between the three services, but will be in the same terms as used in and which are intelligible in civilian practice. That way, when we talk about a machinist of a certain kind, we are talking about the same thing in the three services and in civilian industry.

Then comes the problem of being sure that we analyze what our own needs are, to be sure we get them high enough but not too high and ask for a master mechanic when a Sears Roebuck mechanic will do. If we have that, and if we make sure that when we ask for that kind of man, we put him in that sort of job, we will go a long way in the direction you are pleading for.

However, despite all of that, the best we can do in that line will not save us from the bitter reality that we face, of having to put most of our people into the business of being killers with a rifle; and there is no extensive civilian occupation known that will furnish us people like that. Our replacements in Europe had to be 89 percent in the infantry. That is a big figure. Of that 89 percent, about 75 percent had to be riflemen. The others could be machine gunners and so on.

Now, that doesn't imply that only the riflemen were knocked off, but it does imply that the riflemen stepped up and replaced the machine gunners that did become casualties. We brought these others in as

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riflemen. So you are going to have a large percentage of your people coming in as riflemen. We don't have any of those in civilian life; so we are going to have to take some clerks, bakers, machinists, and so on, and make riflemen out of them. I don't know how we can avoid it unless we can do away with the riflemen.

QUESTION: In view of the increasing number of service and supporting troops in the armed forces and the increasing technology, aren't we going to be forced to dip into the women population to cover those jobs to free men for the combat tasks within the services?

COLONEL VAN WAY: Yes. I am not sure of your question. Do you mean to bring the women into the uniformed services or bring them into the working force?

QUESTIONER: Bring them into the uniformed services, to take over some of the service jobs and free men for the combat missions.

COLONEL VAN WAY: Yes: That certainly is recognized. That is the reason that just a few years ago after the war we set up reserve women's forces in the regular establishment in all the services. We did that to keep a nucleus with a view of increasing the size of the force in an emergency.

Now, when we bring a woman into the uniformed services, we are from the standpoint of numbers releasing someone for combat; but that is not the only thing we are doing. We may be saving someone who is a machinist from being pulled from his machine into the services. We may be permitting someone to stay home. That doesn't make the best public relations to announce it that way; so we would rather go on the theme that we are releasing a man for combat.

In a way we are doing that too. When we put a woman on a switchboard, we are avoiding having to put some uniformed man there, so he can presumably go off to combat. Actually, if you look at this carefully, you see you haven't increased your numbers at all by doing that sort of thing. You are just moving people around.

But you do gain two things. First, you gain popular public support in the feeling that everybody is participating, the women too. The second thing, which I think is perhaps more important, is the fact that if you have a trained woman switchboard operator, it is better to put her in the service operating a switchboard than to take some lad off the farm and try to make a switchboard operator out of him. Let us make a soldier out of him and put the girl on the switchboard. Let us have the girl do the things that she can do best. There are certain jobs that they can probably do better than we can train men to do. Switchboard operating is one of them—also most clerical duties, typing, and that sort

of thing. They are pretty good as storekeepers. There are many things they can do in the services as well as, if not better than, the men can. Let us get them on those jobs. Let us release these men, but let it be a public relations job to say whether we release them for combat or to let men stay at home on the machines.

QUESTION: Would you care to comment upon what we can do possibly and what we have done in the increasing of available manpower by the abolition of featherbedding and such practices during wartime?

COLONEL VAN WAY: We have done nothing that I know of. That is a public relations problem. It is a union problem. If we can keep these people working, well and good; but I don't know of any official action we have taken or can take to do that. I don't think it is so bad as the stories you hear about it.


COMMENT: I just want to go back for a second to what you said about the influence of immigration on population growth. Once upon a time I knew a little about this field. I am rather foggy now. But it seems to me that it was held in population theory that immigration over a long period of time has absolutely no influence on population growth. It is true that if you let a million people into this country in any given year, you will increase the population by that amount. But they say that as a result of that influx of a million people the birth rate will be lowered to a certain extent because the economy at any given time is capable of supporting only a certain population. In the 50 years from 1880 to 1930 there was a very large influx of immigrants; but they say that, whether they had come in or not, our population would have grown to the very point that it was in 1930, because the community, the Nation itself, its resources and social institutions, made it capable of supporting that population. So from a short-term point of view, a year or two years, immigration is important, but from a long-term point of view it has no effect whatsoever on population growth.

COLONEL VAN WAY: That is a very interesting theory. I am not sure that I quite follow it. I don't believe I know enough about it to express a view on it beyond saying that it did have this effect: It gave the United States an older population than we would have had if that same increase had come about by a larger birth rate. Also for a time it gave us an excess of males over females. The proportion ran as high, I think, as a hundred and eight men to a hundred women. Now it is the other way around.

We seem to have run out of time. I do appreciate your interest and your fine questions. That will be all for this morning.

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


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CHART I

UNITED STATES MANPOWER PYRAMID

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CONSUMERS 
 LABOR FORCE 
 LABOR POOL 
 ARMED FORCES 
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