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REQUIREMENTS OF MILITARY AND INDUSTRIAL MANPOWER

2 October 1950

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Colonel Emmett M. Tally, Jr., was born in Tavares, Florida, 23 March 1912. His present rank is Colonel, U. S. Air Force. A recent duty assignment was Deputy Commander of San Antonio Air Materiel Area at the Kelly Air Force Base. His education was received at the University of Florida LL.B, 1937. Supply experience was obtained on the following assignments general and technical supply officer of both Tactical and Materiel Squad 1941; Group S-4, 97th Bombardment Group, Heavy, which included its own service group as an experimental organization, 1942; Wing A-4, 5th Heavy Bombardment Wing, 1943; A-4 of the Pantellaria Command, 1943; A-4 of Provisional Fighter Wing, covering the Salerno landing, 1943; and combined A-4 of the 15th Air Force and the 15th Air Force Service Command, 1944. Other important war assignments were: chief of investigation, Wright Field, December 1944 to April 1945, and chief of personnel and administration of San Antonio Air Materiel Area, April 1945 to February 1948. He was graduated from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in June 1949. Following graduation he was assigned to the Munitions Board as chief of the Office of Manpower, which assignment he held until July 1950. His present assignment is assistant to the acting director of Production Management, Munitions Board.

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2 October 1950

COLONEL ENNIS: Gentlemen, our speaker this morning is Colonel Emmett Tally of the Air Force. He is going to discuss with us the subject of "Requirements of Military and Industrial Manpower." Colonel Tally was graduated from the Industrial College in the spring of 1949. Immediately upon graduation, he was assigned to the Munitions Board as director of the Office of Manpower and held that position until last fall. At present he is assistant to the acting director of Production Management of the Munitions Board. Colonel Tally gave us a very excellent lecture on this subject here last year, and it is with great pleasure that I present to you Colonel Tally.

COLONEL TALLY: Thank you. I guess you all should feel a little easier now because if I could graduate I guess any of you can--I did get through here.

There is a story that most of you may be familiar with, but I like to use it in opening a talk on manpower. The subject can be very simple, and I would like to recall for you the story of how Emperor Haile Selassie mobilized his country with a very simple order when the Italian armies invaded Ethiopia: "The country is now mobilized. All men and boys able to carry a spear will report for active duty. Married men will bring their wives to do the cooking; men who are not married will bring any woman they can find. The very young, the very old, and women with very young children need not report for active duty. Anybody else found at home after the issuance of this order will be hanged." That is how simple manpower can be. But it is not that simple in America. It is very fortunate for us that our country is not that way because you know what happened to Ethiopia.

Although the solution of manpower problems in wartime will be the responsibility of civilian agencies of the Government, the experience of the last war makes it clear that the Department of Defense must be prepared to assist in solving them. Consequently, our planning covers both the providing of adequate manpower for the armed forces and adequate manpower for our contractors and suppliers. These areas include manpower priorities, occupational deferments, timely adjustment of labor disputes, channeling of workers to essential production, and so on. Of course, all our plans must be within the framework of national policy and control measures, and, therefore, we work very closely with the civilian agencies of the Government which are responsible for planning the over-all manpower mobilization of the country.

The manpower problem, basically, is one of demand and supply. War generates an almost unlimited demand for manpower, but the supply is relatively limited, and it is limited not only quantitatively but qualitatively. A mere inexhaustible number of men and women would not

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necessarily meet all requirements. We have to find men with special qualifications and skills.

Considered strictly from a statistical standpoint, the implications are readily discernible. At present there are approximately 64 million people in the normal labor force, including those in the armed forces. If world conditions would warrant a full mobilization, thereby increasing the need for armed forces personnel by many times the approximate two million serving at the present time, these additional military requirements would have to be taken from industry's working forces or the potential force that we have for our industry. At the same time, the demand for special war material in an ever-increasing volume would overwhelm the industrial economy if the current civilian levels of production and consumption were also to be maintained. In the light of these facts, it is apparent that the manpower problem can be met only by the imposition of emergency controls operating within a framework of sound utilization policies.

Other statistics that complicate the present manpower problem are that a study of the present structure of the national population indicates that there are actually fewer males in the 17- to 35-year-age group than we had in April 1945. There are about one million less males in the 20- to 25-year group alone. This factor, taken in conjunction with a probable increase in military manpower requirements over World War II, means that a considerably higher percentage of the available males in the 20- to 25-year-age group would be required for service in the armed forces, compared to World War II usage of 70.7 percent of this age group, under World War II physical standards and rejection rates. Similar conditions apply to all other preferred military age groups. Therefore, the military must make a realistic lowering of its physical standards and do a more effective job assignment of persons of lesser physical caliber. That is preferable to placing greater reliance on older age groups since the latter contain more persons with skills essential to the operation of the war-supporting economy. Greater reliance on older age groups would also seem inadvisable for social and political reasons.

As you know, the National Security Resources Board, by law, is responsible for planning the over-all mobilization of manpower. That agency must evaluate the Nation's human resources and establish the policies which will afford the maximum satisfaction of manpower requirements.

At this time, I should like to review briefly several of the types of manpower controls that have been considered by the planners. First, I shall mention the major kinds of employment and labor utilization measures.

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The primary employment controls used during World War II included manpower priorities, manpower ceilings, and controlled hirings. These controls operated pretty much on a voluntary basis. A manpower ceilings program provides for the limitation or reduction of the number of persons that may be employed by individual employers and also controls all hirings so that persons released from less essential production by the imposition of manpower ceilings, and persons in the job market for other reasons, may be channeled to essential production.

However, the imposition of manpower ceilings on individual plants does not necessarily mean that specific persons must be released; this is a management or collective bargaining function. It also does not mean that those people who are not in the labor market will be forced into the labor market. It does not mean that a man who is released will have to take a particular job, but he will have a choice all the way across the board in all those industries that have manpower ceilings or manpower priorities.

In our planning it is considered that if the manpower ceiling program is used, it will have to be given a statutory basis with appropriate penalties provided for failure to comply. In fact, more effective implementation of other World War II voluntary manpower programs should be possible by giving them a statutory basis. In other words, we should be able to tell a race-track operator that "You can have only so many people." Then if he hires more than that number, we can put him in jail or fine him, or use an injunction, or whatever other method we have to force compliance. We could not do that in World War II.

In addition to manpower ceilings, indirect control of manpower may be obtained to some extent by direct control of materials on the theory that jobs will exist only in those industrial facilities to which raw materials, machine tools, commodities, components, and so on, have been allocated. This type of control is quite impersonal in application and not very effective unless coupled with other manpower controls, such as manpower ceilings. In contrast, the most drastic control is the national-service type legislation which was adopted by many countries in World War II. Essentially, this type of control applies compulsion in a very direct way.

Two other controls which affect industrial manpower utilization are wage and price stabilization measures and provisions for the timely adjustment of management-labor disputes. Wage and price stabilization measures, in addition to forestalling dangers inherent in an economy of scarcity, such as inflation, protect consumers and wage earners' standards of living, thus minimizing management-labor disputes normally induced by their impairment. They also forestall disruptive competitive bidding for labor which could otherwise undermine the effective channeling of workers into an essential production. Measures for the timely adjustment of labor-management disputes encompasses the establishment

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of an emergency agency to handle disputes which cannot be settled by collective bargaining, thereby eliminating the loss of man-hours as a result of a dispute.

Selective Service legislation is, of course, required to provide military manpower. Indirectly, however, by providing for occupational deferments from military service, it keeps certain persons with special capabilities where they are needed in industry. Naturally, this indirect control is only applicable to those who are liable for military service for age reasons or any other reasons that make it necessary for them to go into the military service. It does not affect those who are deferred for other reasons or who do not fall into those age groups, or women if they are not being called up under some form of Selective Service legislation.

Regardless of the type of manpower controls and utilization programs, it is certain that our labor force will have to be augmented by large numbers of persons not normally in the labor force. Without question, we shall again have to draw upon the secondary resources represented in the younger and older groups of the population and certain groups of women, who in peacetime generally remain outside the labor market.

As I have already stated, the National Security Resources Board is the agency that is responsible for the over-all national manpower planning. The Munitions Board is the representative of the Department of Defense in all dealings with the staff of the National Security Resources Board. In the field of manpower, we are working with that Board and other government agencies, Labor, Selective Service, and so on, in their planning for effective mobilization of manpower.

All of us recognize that the military services must obtain all the manpower needed to effectively prosecute the war. However, we must not lose sight of the fact that if the number of people in the military service is not equated against the over-all needs and resources in a rational manner, the progress of winning the war may actually be impeded.

There are three staff agencies of the Secretary of Defense that have responsibilities in the field of manpower and personnel matters-- the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Personnel Policy Board, and the Munitions Board. A joint agreement has been prepared by the staffs of these three agencies delineating the responsibilities of each in this field. This agreement has been approved by the Chairman of the Munitions Board and the Chairman of the Personnel Policy Board, but to date the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not formally acted on the agreement. The staffs of these three agencies are guided by its provisions.

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All three of these agencies have responsibilities in the military manpower and Civil Service field. The Personnel Policy Board's scope of responsibilities covers such things as recruitment and induction, and their standards, as well as standards of utilization and anything else that affects the individual. The Joint Chiefs of Staff responsibilities include the allocation of personnel between the military departments, personnel strength requirements of the military forces, and so on. The Munitions Board is responsible for manpower mobilization requirements in connection with the industrial feasibility testing program and is the claimant agency for military personnel on the civilian agencies of the Government.

The Munitions Board is the Secretary of Defense's only staff agency with responsibilities of what we term "industrial personnel." Munitions Board responsibilities in this sphere cover employees of private contractors and suppliers of the military departments and employees of government-owned, contractor-operated plants which produce the material and services required for the support of the armed forces. Munitions Board responsibilities include the fields of labor supply, labor standards, and labor relations as they affect the procurement of material and services.

While various civil agencies have prime responsibility for effecting solutions of most problems in these areas, the Munitions Board is the agency within the Staff of the Secretary of Defense which has responsibility for participation, representation, planning, policy, or coordination in connection with their solution at the national level. The three military departments are responsible for the field operations under the general policies provided by the Munitions Board in the sphere of contractors' employees.

During mobilization and with respect to planning for mobilization during peacetime, the Munitions Board is responsible for: participating in, reviewing, and evaluating National manpower mobilization plans in order to assure their adequacy for furnishing maximum industrial support for the armed forces; participation in evaluating the impact of Department of Defense manpower mobilization requirements on the supporting war economy as a whole; and for planning within the framework of over-all national policies the wartime actions and procedures to be undertaken by the Department of Defense and the Military Departments in order to minimize manpower impediments to the delivery of materiel and services.

These actions, policies, and procedures include, but are not limited to, the obtaining of adequate manpower priorities; occupational deferment of critical employees; expediting solution of labor relations difficulties; obtaining adequate housing, transportation and community facilities where necessary for the recruitment and retention of workers in critical plants; determining whether waiver or relaxation of Federal and State labor laws

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is necessary in particular cases and taking appropriate action thereon; determining whether wage adjustments, within the framework of over-all wage stabilization, are necessary in particular plants producing critical items.

There are other respects in which we plan to assist in the maximization of industrial manpower utilization. For example, we plan to direct the placement of military procurement contracts, where other factors may make it possible, to labor market areas where manpower will not need to be drained off from other essential activities. Similarly, we intend, insofar as possible, to locate new production facilities in areas where manpower is not in short supply.

In connection with these responsibilities and plans, we have outlined definite steps to be taken by the military departments in order to eliminate manpower bottlenecks. The framework for these steps is in the Munitions Board Outline Plan for War Procurement.

Coinciding with its responsibilities in the mobilizing of industry, the Munitions Board also acts as the central claimant agency for obtaining the necessary military and civilian personnel for the armed forces in the event of mobilization. To accomplish this function, it has developed methods of obtaining manpower requirements of the three services in such a form as will make it possible to collate these requirements with requirements of the rest of the economy and with total manpower resources. We must collect, analyze, and consolidate military manpower requirements, including uniformed personnel and civilian personnel directly employed by the Department of Defense.

The requirements of the military departments are based on strategic plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After studying the total requirements and consulting with the NSRB on their over-all feasibility, it is our further duty to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the total feasibility and recommend necessary adjustments of requirements which will tend to place the over-all strategic plans within the realm of possibility of successful prosecution of a war. In other words, it is our responsibility to see that the military forces, at different stages of the war, do not plan in such a manner that their manpower requirements will bog down industrial production, thus jeopardizing the entire war effort.

Our present planning contemplates that no personnel will be called to active duty in the armed forces until needed, until they can actually be used in the departments as planned, and until equipment is available for training and operations. Our objective is to phase the induction of military personnel with the expected availability of equipment and materiel so that if materiel is not forthcoming rapidly enough, manpower will be retained in the industrial economy for the production of the necessary materiel. Our planning also contemplates that during full

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mobilization there will be no competitive and disruptive recruiting of men for the military forces. We anticipate that, with the exception of reserve personnel and some few specialized personnel needed for special types of duty, all persons needed for military service during full mobilization will be procured through a selective service system. To industry, this means that people who have critical industrial skills can be screened out. To the military, it means that all three services will get the same chance at the same type of people.

I believe we now have a better appreciation of the value of critical skills and how to use them than we did in World War II. Approximately 300 skills that require two years to acquire and that are expected to be in short supply in wartime have been listed. The skills were expressed in codes and classifications most frequently used by industry, and they have now been converted by the Personnel Policy Board to codes and classifications used by the military services. Now when we speak of a particular skill, both in industry and in the military service, we are talking about the same type of individual--when they are on this particular list. I do not want to leave the impression that the military will not use lawyers to fire rifles or soda clerks to fly our planes. In wartime, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force will need skills that are not common to civilian life and approximately 75 percent of those who will be drafted will have to develop military skills other than those they had as civilians.

The Munitions Board also has important current functions in the industrial labor relations field. These functions are not limited to those problems arising during mobilization, but many of them apply in peacetime as well. Labor-management relations problems affecting contractors and suppliers are of concern to the Department of Defense when they interfere, or threaten to interfere, with the timely delivery of military supplies or services. In addition, the Department of Defense has certain responsibilities under various Federal procurement laws and Executive orders which cover labor standards with reference to wages, hours, discrimination, etc. Among these are the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Law, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Davis-Bacon Act. The Munitions Board coordinates the military departments in formulating uniform policies and procedures, where appropriate, for meeting these problems and responsibilities. For example, a policy has been established that the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force may not take independent action which would have the effect of establishing major policy, unless each such action falls within an announced policy of the Department of Defense, or unless prior coordination through the Munitions Board has been obtained.

It has also been established that any and all departments will be strictly impartial in any management-labor dispute and will refrain from taking a position on the merits of any labor difference. Neither shall a department undertake the conciliation, mediation, or arbitration of a labor dispute.

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The Department of Defense policy of noninterference in the merits of a labor dispute is derived from three fundamental premises, with which I am sure you will agree:

One, that in a democracy the military should not be responsible for, or intervene in, the solution of civilian problems.

Two, that under our scheme of governmental organization, exclusive responsibility for the handling of labor matters has been vested by the Congress and the President in other specifically designated civilian agencies.

Three, that the military must remain strictly nonpartisan if it is to maintain the respect, confidence, and support of all groups of Americans.

But our labor relations responsibilities make it essential that we analyze all current, proposed, and pending labor legislation, or emergency mobilization type of legislation to determine their possible effects on the activities of the Department of Defense, and that we maintain liaison with government agencies in order to represent the Department of Defense on varied labor relations and labor standards problems. In other words, we must comment and say how any proposed law, order, or regulation will affect the military. If it was intended to expand some of the recent labor laws that cover construction contracts to include ships and maybe on to airplanes and tanks, the military would be effected and we should voice our objections. We must be prepared to point out what it will do to us. If it hamstrings us so we cannot carry out our responsibilities in the Government, we must be able to explain why and try to stop it.

In addition to Munitions Board responsibility which I have discussed and the plans I have already mentioned, you are probably interested in some of the Board's other activities in reference to manpower. Sometime back the Munitions Board conducted, in connection with the NSRB, an industrial feasibility test of a Joint Chiefs of Staff strategic plan on certain selected items. One of these was manpower. At that time, it was found that the manpower requirements, as called for under that particular plan, would not be feasible, or the plan was not feasible because we could not furnish sufficient manpower to carry out the plan. There are many reasons why it could not be done. These reasons were given to the Joint Chiefs with suggestions of what steps should be taken to make manpower requirements feasible. A new plan has now been prepared by the Joint Chiefs and the first estimate of manpower requirements indicates that the present plan is feasible insofar as manpower is concerned. So some good has come from our industrial feasibility testing program.

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Let us look at a few statistics that I have obtained from the Department of Labor.

The first chart, "Labor Force 1945-1950 and War Potential," (chart was not reproduced) shows a general breakdown of where people were employed in April 1945 and in April 1950, and where they would potentially be employed in a future emergency. The first column shows the number of people that were in our labor force in April 1945, some 66.2 million. It shows the breakdown: .7 million unemployed; 17.6 million employed in civilian industry; 25 million in mixed war-civilian industry; 10.8 million in war industries alone; 12.1 million in the armed forces at that time. Actually at the height of the war we had around 12.3 million.

In April 1950, we had 3.5 million unemployed; 25.6 million in civilian industry; 25.3 million in mixed war-civilian industry; 7.8 million in war industry; 1.3 million in the armed forces, making a total of 63.5 million.

The last column is based on a potential manpower availability in wartime broken down as follows: .5 million unemployed; 12.5 million for the armed forces; 11 million for war industries; 26.1 million in mixed war-civilian industries; 19 million in straight civilian industries, making a total of 69.1 million.

This chart shows another breakdown of the same thing (chart was not reproduced). If you will check the aircraft equipment, you will see that at the present time we have only a few thousand. In World War II we had over two million; shipbuilding the same thing; transportation you will notice had about 3.3 million, yet we have nearly a million at the present time. That means people will have to be transferred into the types of industries needed for the war effort. You will notice that ordnance was very high in wartime; in peacetime, it is very low. Primary metals are a lot higher at the present time than they are in wartime, and the same thing is true with all other metal work.

Even if we should have a sufficient number of people available to fill the work force in time of war, you will notice from the charts that we still face a great problem in channeling the workers from a civilian type of production to wartime production. For example, in the spring of 1950 you see where we had 25.6 million in civilian industry, as shown in the second column. In the third column, you can see where we expect to have only 19 million in straight civilian industry; yet we expect 11 million for war industries and we had only 7.8 million in war industry in the spring of this year.

I would like to take this figure of 69.1 million apart. We show only .5 million unemployed. A good many people do not believe, including many in the Department of Labor, that it will be possible for this country to have such a small percentage of unemployed in wartime. We only got down to 700,000 in World War II.

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In addition to that, I believe the total available figure is larger than 69.1. If I remember the percentage correctly, these figures were based on only 36.7 percent of all women above the age of 14 being in the labor force. At one time during World War II we had as high as 37.3 percent. The reason given for reducing the number of women that we will have in the labor force in an emergency is that more women today have young children than the women of World War II, and also because of a change in the population age. We now have more older women than we did in World War II and less in their twenties and thirties who normally would be in the work force. I personally believe that having the proper community facilities and by having stringent controls, we can put more women in the labor force than anticipated in the chart. I base that on the experience in England and Germany in World War II where they had 45 percent and 46.2 percent, respectively. I believe we are able to do as well.

Thank you.

COLONEL ENNIS: I would like to take the privilege of asking you the first question. Last week we saw in the newspapers that the Department of Labor is setting up a new agency called the "Office of Defense Manpower." Could you give us any comment on that and explain anything about it? Have you had any connection with it?

COLONEL TALLY: Of course, we have been working with the Department of Labor, the National Security Resources Board, the Selective Service, and so on, on different problems. The National Security Resources Board is the coordinating agency. I don't feel that I am qualified to say what this office of manpower will be in the Department of Labor. My personal opinion is that it is to take the place of the old Manpower Commission and is going to be the manpower office just like the National Production Authority has now been put in the Department of Commerce. The President plan is to use all the present agencies and build them up instead of setting up an over-all separate agency for mobilization. That is my personal opinion.

QUESTION: I wonder in these figures "estimated war potential" if the following has been taken into consideration: (1) In order to increase the armed forces by 10 million, it would take at least two years to mobilize the men and have equipment available for them. During that period of two years two age groups grow into your armed forces age group, the 15- and 16-year-old boys become 17 and 18. Have those figures been incorporated in that manpower figure?

COLONEL TALLY: To be honest, men of preferable military ages are going out faster than they are coming in at the back end. Right now our number is going down.

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QUESTION: Because very few people are released from the armed forces during the war and very few people later retire from actual work, would that be so?

COLONEL TALLY: During World War II--to cite some figures--I think our highest was approximately 12.3 million. We processed over 15 million through the armed forces to keep the 12 million figure. During World War II we sent home from overseas those 38 and over. Men becoming of military age have been taken into consideration.

This is the same chart as the one in the book "Labor Market and Employment Security." I understand some of you have this book. Those of you who do not have it, I would suggest that you get it. It is the best study on manpower that is available. It is very good. We use it in the Munitions Board. Nearly all our labor figures come from the Department of Labor. All we do is push them around and try to prove one thing or another with them.

I believe that for the next few years, the number of people that we can draw from for the armed forces is going to go down. I think the figures appearing here were actually 1952 figures. It is forecast that we will have two million less between 18 and 25 in 1952 than we had in April 1945. And regardless of having a war, just somebody passing a law, somebody changing his mind doesn't make a man who is 45 or even 40 any more able to use the rifle in the front line and have the stamina to stand up under the physical strain. I think the French found that out as well as the rest of us in World War II. The French had too many older people in their Army. The Germans did not and neither did the Russians.

QUESTION: Would you discuss the working relationship between the Munitions Board and Selective Service as it pertains to the deferment of industrial workers, agricultural workers, and so forth?

COLONEL TALLY: We as well as the other government agencies are working with Selective Service on this matter. There is a special committee working on who should be deferred. We have a representative on that committee. My boss and Colonel Thompson are the representatives of the Department of Defense on the over-all committee that will approve the report of the committee on deferments. The actual individual is operated on this way--the Service or the procuring agency, is given certain policies and procedures which have been approved by the Munitions Board. The contracting officer under these policies and procedures supports before the local board, the contractor in obtaining deferments for his critical employees. After the contractor has initiated a request for deferment, the contracting officer may support it.

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The Munitions Board is now studying some kind of plan to set up an agency in the field that can coordinate these types of operations. You may have heard discussions of whether they should be field offices or a committee of the three services, should it be just one man or should there be a staff, so that we don't have the Navy asking for deferment of a man and right in the same town have the Army say, "No, we wouldn't support that deferment," even though it is the identical type of case. The Services will support requests for deferments under policies set up by the Munitions Board.

QUESTION: I was wondering if you could tell me what the Munitions Board is doing, if anything, or the Department of Defense, on recommending legislation for a change of the present antiquated Selective Service law to bring it up to date so that these policies and things can be carried out more effectively?

COLONEL TALLY: That is one of the problems that is being discussed by the main committee in Selective Service. In addition to that, the National Security Resources Board has prepared a draft of legislation for Selective Service, which is, in effect, an entirely new bill. In addition to that, the armed forces--we call up and coordinate between the three services--have prepared a bill. Representatives of the Secretary of Defense after a discussion with the staff of the National Security Resources Board and after ironing out certain difficulties, agreed to accept the NSRB's bill. Selective Service will also come up with a recommendation to the NSRB and everybody will get to express an opinion on that recommendation. The bill which NSRB has and which the Department of Defense agreed to, will require an Executive order after its passage saying that the new bill is nothing but an extension of the old one so we will not lose all the work that has been done under the present Selective Service system.

COLONEL THOMPSON: I might add a little bit there. In a letter from the National Security Resources Board to General Hershey, recommendations were asked for. General Hershey replied he would recommend no new legislation before January. He recommended that standards, both physical and mental, be lowered, and he recommended taking in people with fewer dependents, that is, fathers with only one child.

COLONEL TALLY: That's in the present act itself.

COLONEL THOMPSON: Yes.

QUESTION: In the control measures which you said were being considered, you mentioned National Service legislation, but you didn't elaborate on it. Would you care to give a few pros and cons on that subject?

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COLONEL TALLY: I can only give my personal opinion and I have heard a lot of other people who agree with it. Actually, I do not feel that National Service can be used in America today at the beginning of any war, for one reason and one reason alone--there may be others--I do not believe it is administratively possible to operate the thing. I think it will cause more confusion than it will do good. Some people say you can pass it on a stand-by basis but not use it. Knowing the American Government and the American people, some darn fool would try to implement it. So I am not in favor of it.

Now there are two exceptions. One exception is that I think we should have some kind of National Service statute drawn, to throw in if necessary in case of a big catastrophe; for example, if a dozen cities were knocked out by A-bombs and all the people going crazy, we could use National Service instead of having martial law--we could keep the military out of civilian matters. It should be administered by a civilian agency. That is one exception.

The other exception is after our people are well placed; that is when England used it. England didn't pass a National Service Act until about 1940. That is when England used it. Most of their people were well placed and the government only had to apply it to a few. Somewhere along in our mobilization if the effort got big enough and we got into a tight enough war, we might have to have National Service or some form of compulsion to compel people to go to do some particular types of jobs. That is only just my opinion. I don't believe the military has an official position on it. I have given that position at briefings for Mr. Johnson when he was Secretary of Defense and I have never been questioned. I don't know how Mr. Marshall may feel.

QUESTION: Is there anything being done to reduce the impact of manpower mobilization on the training of scientific personnel?

COLONEL TALLY: I can tell you one thing, the scientific people represented on the Selective Service Committee are doing all they can to see that they are protected. There are some pretty good battles over the training of scientific personnel, a lot of arguments. I will tell you the answers I have heard. One is, can you tell ahead of time who is a scientist even when he is in college? That is one General Hershey uses. In addition to that the Government should pay for the training, because I do not believe it fair under the American system that because Harry James is able to send his boy to school to be a scientist and Paul Brown cannot afford to, that Paul Brown's son would have to go to war and Harry James' son would not. I am against it on that principle. Maybe I am a radical. There are many other reasons. I think that there is one paramount reason regardless of the future. We will have no future if we don't win the war, and I personally think it is going to take every man, woman, and child that is able to do

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anything to fight the next war. Every figure I have seen indicates that. I don't think we can afford in trying to save the future to train people at college level even though it hurts us later. That is a personal opinion.

QUESTION: You mentioned that the Munitions Board has responsibility for personnel in industry engaged in military contracts. Now I presume that includes transferring people from one industry to another in case there is a lapse in war work in one industry. I mean if it is supposed to be over-all or pulling people out of the military back into industry if they are not immediately needed in the military and back to the military. Would you elaborate on that?

COLONEL TALLY: The primary responsibility of transferring people from one industry to another will certainly be in a civilian agency. That is what I meant to imply. We are interested in it--darn well interested in it--and we must be able to support it, help it, aid it in any way possible. We will do so by aiding the civilian agency. If a contractor needs people, we will help by supporting him in obtaining housing, transportation facilities, other community facilities, and maybe a wage increase for employees in that particular factory, manpower ceilings, and priorities are necessary.

There are many different ways that we can aid, to be sure the people go from here to there. If we do not have some kind of control service for getting people out of military if they are needed in industry. I believe the Munitions Board should be the first one to take steps to do so. Then that would be thrashed out by the Munitions Board, the Joint Chiefs, and the Departments and, if necessary, we would send the people back. We are the claimant agency on Selective Service. We are more or less a policing agency to see that people are not getting out of line, not asking for more people than we think they can use. We would not be a final say-so, but we would go back and say, "Please explain how you are going to use those," if it is away out of line. For instance, if they asked for 10 million pilots--taking a very fantastic figure--in the Air Force to be there at D-day, we know that they can't use 10 million pilots, so we question that claim in a hurry.

If the calls on Selective Service were more than we felt Selective Service could obtain, we would say, "Don't plan on that." Selective Service cannot do that. If they are over their allocations, we would get into that argument and point that out to the Secretary of Defense and let him tell the Secretaries of the Departments of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.

QUESTION: How much is the Munitions Board involved in the utilization of personnel in the armed services and in the industries supporting the armed services.

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COLONEL TALLY: Well, standards of utilization of military personnel and Civil Service personnel of the military departments are the responsibility of the Personnel Policy Board. Now we might comment to them if we felt it was out of balance and make a recommendation.

In industry, we establish policies for the guidance of the military departments in their dealings with their contractors. We have put out a policy that women should be used to the fullest extent. Another policy is that there will be no discrimination. We instruct the department contracting officer, "You can't help Bill James get a manpower priority or a manpower ceiling until he has used all the people that are available." That is the only control we would have on it. It would be through the services. We do not maintain an Inspector General's Department to follow up.

QUESTION: We have heard a good deal about some very scientific means of handling manpower problems, human resources, and so on. Would you like to comment as to what extent they have been brought in to the policy planning and this manpower planning you have been telling us about?

COLONEL TALLY: Well, I am somewhat at a loss as to how to answer that question because I do not know which one of the scientific means you are talking about. Manpower planning, regardless of what anybody says, is pure common horse sense. When I first went to the manpower office, its people used a kind of verbiage that scared me to death. You can ask Colonel Thompson. He has been in manpower only a short time. At first it is hard to understand what they are talking about. You go to a meeting and hear all this verbiage, but if they would use common high school or grammar school English, I might know what they were talking about.

So far as any big over-all scientific measurement, I am not aware of any applicable to the study of manpower other than computers and things like that. Maybe they can find a machine that will tell the military how far to go in saying that a guy with a critical civilian skill can only be used at that skill. But to the military there are many other things that are just as critical or maybe more critical than a person's civilian skill.

Right now there is one example in Korea. One of our greatest shortages is company officers, platoon leaders to lead the infantry. That has been worrying us more than all the critical skills in the country. So if a guy had a critical civilian skill, I still say that maybe at a particular moment it might be better to use him as a company leader. I am sorry I didn't answer your question.

QUESTION: Is there anything being done to insure that men with technical skills are transferred between the three services or within

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the services, to make it mandatory that technical skills be utilized so that we not only utilize the technical skills but prevent the maintenance of large training establishments to train men in technical skills while men with that professional experience are being diverted to other things in the military service?

COLONEL TALLY: Secretary Marshall signed an order Friday authorizing the Navy to call its reserve doctors and then transfer them to the Army and Air Force on loan. That is one right down the line you are talking about. That was done instead of calling doctors up through Selective Service at this particular moment. Quite a lot of studies have been made on it. What is actually going to be the outcome is unknown for the services have varying and different positions on it. There are plans available to be used. In wartime I am sure that if it is necessary to, people will be transferred from one service to another. Secretary Marshall already has done so. That is the first step.

QUESTION: You mentioned the fact that present mobilization plans call for employment of a phasing program so that personnel are not called out of the civilian labor force before they can be used effectively in the armed forces. Now are there any plans to carry that proposal one step further and work out some machinery to let the personnel in the civilian labor force who will eventually be called upon to join the armed forces know how much time they have or give them a minimum advance notice so that the best utilization may be made of their services while still in the civilian labor force?

COLONEL TALLY: That is a question that has been proposed to us by many people in industry who want to know about their people, especially those who have Reserve commissions, those in the National Guard, and so on. We are unable to answer that question at the present time. The plans change from day to day. If you noticed, the day after the Korean invasion we were only going to build up to 100,000 in the armed services. The President has already said we are going to three million. The plans vary so rapidly that anything you told them would be of no value. We would like to do that with the Reserve, but I think by the time we could make a study, the guy would be in. I don't believe the Selective Service could run such a load. I don't believe you would be able to, even if you knew how many people we wanted phased out over a period of a year. I don't believe we could go through the population and tell the people, "You are going to be called and you are not." It would depend on how many could pass the physical and mental tests, and many other reasons. It would be wonderful, but to do the job would not be worth the cost. That is my personal opinion.

Do you have something, Colonel?

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COLONEL MOSES: I can tell you this. We have developed a category plan for industry in which an individual plant may catalog its personnel in eight categories, by age, by sex, and this will give them a very good picture of the impact of Selective Service on their particular plant. It also shows the manner in which we are inducting from the age of 25 down and they can figure from local numbers, local calls, and local quotas just how soon we would get to their certain age brackets in their force.

COLONEL ENNIS: That is according to the sheet we have, gentlemen, the analysis sheet which is used for that by industry, along with the Selective Service directive regarding it. I have a copy of those which I will post on the student bulletin board at noon so you can see exactly the categories into which that is broken down.

QUESTION: I just wanted to ask why are the metals production less in war than they are in peace, or is that just a reflection of the extraordinary production we have had since the war?

COLONEL TALLY: It is part of both. There are a lot of things to be considered. As an example, use steel--the steel is going to go into bigger things which will in all probability take fewer people to work with it than required in making smaller items, such as refrigerators, things like that, or even going down to smaller gadgets. We are making tanks and ships. You see those people--we call it all other metal working. This actually is primary metals. (Indicating) This is the same. So that here the people going into shipbuilding have been pulled out of metal working, or they are going into aircraft from production of items out of aluminum or magnesium.

QUESTION: Referring to a previous question, where the Munitions Board attempts to seek out and adjust disproportionate numbers of people in any one activity, such as you said 10 million pilots for the Air Force, it would seem to me to require quite a sizable force in the Munitions Board in order to accomplish such a tremendous task. I wonder--which is related to the same question--to what extent are your manpower requirements for the next war reduced by that which has been reduced for the previous war, such as ships, and so on. I think the questions are more or less related. Take, for example, the construction industry. I think I have read some place that all during World War II we had very good supplies of manpower in the construction of buildings, that it seemed a disproportionate amount in that field. How in the world can you in the Munitions Board put your finger on the place where you have too many people?

COLONEL TALLY: In civilian industry we wouldn't do that. That is done by the Department of Labor.

What I had reference to a while ago is that if one of the services got out of line, the JCS in all probability would catch it before we would.

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But if they don't, as an example, if we saw that they were asking for too much, we would more or less collate it to materials more than we would to requirements in the services--"Have you got enough materials to use these people?"

As an example, in the feasibility tests, we found that the services couldn't house the number of people or train the number of people that they were asking for in the first 60 or 90 days of mobilization. They didn't have the equipment available to train or house them. It is just horse sense. The departments work up the detail. If something looks out of line, we would go back and ask them to explain it.

COLONEL ENNIS: Colonel Tally, On behalf of the Commandant, the staff and the faculty, thank you for a very fine lecture. I am sure we all have a better understanding of why the Munitions Board must keep on planning in this field. Thank you very much.

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