

SELECTIVE SERVICE PLANS FOR THE FUTURE

6 November 1950

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SELECTIVE SERVICE PLANS FOR THE FUTURE

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GENERAL VANAMAN: Good morning, gentlemen. I see that Colonel Moses is with us this morning. The name Moses seems to appear prominently in draft systems, because the first recorded draft system was when the Lord spoke to Moses in the wilderness of Sinai and told him to select the children of Israel, males 20 years and older, by their numbers and by their polls.

The Director of the modern version of this draft system is with us this morning to discuss future plans of Selective Service. I am quoting when I say that he is probably the most praised, the most discussed, and probably the most cussed man in the Government in Washington today. I would like to add my bit to that quotation by saying that I believe that he is doing an outstanding job, based on an unselfish desire for direct contribution to the security of his country.

Each year General Hershey gives much of his very valuable time to the Industrial College. We appreciate it very much.

Now, I shouldn't introduce General Hershey to you, because all of you have a feeling that you are well acquainted with him already. Therefore I say simply, welcome back to our platform, General Hershey.

GENERAL HERSHEY: General Vanaman and fellow officers: My subject, as I understand it, is a discussion of the future plans of Selective Service. In a world that is confused for a number of reasons, not the least of the confusions probably stems from words and the different meanings attributed to them by different people, and the word "future" concerns me not a little this morning in my subject.

As an individual I have been confronted for some little time, longer than I care to mention, with the realization that, so far as my future goes, most of it is in the past. Some of the rest of you are troubled slightly by the same disease. But what we mean by the future is different, I am afraid, this morning from what it was two weeks ago, and it was different two weeks ago from what it was six weeks ago. So one of the quandaries, that we in our business find ourselves in, is trying to make up our minds on the particular things we should do; the little time in which we have to plan; whether we are going to get ready for an all-out altercation of some type or other; whether we are going to try to get ready to meet the problems of yesterday or the day before; or perhaps, if we get right up to snuff, the problems of today.

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I don't want to worry you with a lot of things that are of very little importance in the history of the world and will probably not even be above the horizon of my vision. My vision is pretty restricted, both physically and mentally. But at least, if you have both of them in tune, you are not bothered by the fellow who can see a long way mentally and very little physically or someone who can see a long way physically and a very short way mentally, and therefore gets into a lot of frustrations and has to consult a psychiatrist to help him get out of the trouble he is in. At least, if you are shortsighted both physically and mentally, you are in tune. You may not be very bright, but you are at least vibrating in both areas somewhat consistently. So the things that are perhaps of great consequence to us in Selective Service at the moment may be of very little consequence by and large. But, just the same, though it is not very easy to understand what we are thinking about perhaps on the long-range analysis, you may understand a little about what we are thinking about on the short range.

As you know, we have been created and extincted, partially recreated and partially choked again. When the Korean affair came along, we were in a state of living by definition but dead by most any sort of test that anyone less than an expert on manpower procurement could give. In fact, there were a great many people registered who didn't realize that they were registered. Of course, there were people in the Reserves who didn't know they were in; but that is another question, and I am not going to discuss that. But, just the same, there were people who had forgotten they were registered. They had forgotten that they had some responsibilities as registrants. So one of the things that complicated our trying to start to draft them was that we had to have so many people to answer their telephone calls and tell them what they were supposed to have done during the last two years that they had neglected to do because they didn't know the draft was running. There were some reasons for believing that it wasn't running.

We started to draft shortly before 1 September 1950 and before 30 September we did get 50,800, but it was 800 more than I expect we could have even hoped to get in September, because the call for 20,000 came with 50 days to work it out. It always required 60 days when we were operating. The second call, for 30,000, came with only a month to go. It looked all right to an individual who was many years away from being a doughboy. In the old days when we had to run and shoot at the same time, we never figured we were going to hit too much. We were engaged in deploying and quadrupling our local board clerks at a time when we were also trying to produce a reasonable amount of men for an organization that was dead. If the organization had been alive, 50,000 a month would not have been much of a delivery; but for one that was in hibernation it was a fair birth. We did get 50,800 in September. It might have been luck; it might have been a lot of things. But I believe we did fairly well in October. How many people we frightened into enlisting I don't happen to have at hand. It is really beside the point.

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While we were engaged in this mass production job we got into one of the most peculiar custom-tailored jobs that you could think of, and that was trying to frighten professional people into the service without touching any of them, trying to keep the threat always close but never quite committing assault and battery by the laying on of hands. How successful we are going to be with that I don't know. But any sort of custom job takes a great deal of effort, and with a moderately small organization, trying to make plans for the future while doing these things has some problems. But, be that as it may, we are confronted with a question as to what is this future? Well, if we can follow some of the things we hear over the radio or otherwise, obviously peace is what everybody wants and nobody has ever had. Sometimes the people who even hoped that it was in immediate prospect left some doubt as to their sanity, or their judgment at least.

The next thing we had to stop and think of the blackness of an all-out war. Most of your hopes would drive you away from that. If you had been to Leavenworth, or most any of the other schools, you know they taught you that, if there is only one solution, you must think of three, because you wouldn't be analytical and you wouldn't be scientific if you approached it with only one solution and accepted it, and went out and carried it out without having thought of two other things that you could have done, even if there weren't two other things to do. So trying to keep three things in mind is difficult. If we can't hope for peace--and a million years doesn't indicate that we can--if we hope we can escape total war, which doesn't look too hopeful some of the time, even at best we are left with what some people would call gray--perhaps my Navy friends would call it fogged. It doesn't burn off very rapidly. Therefore, we are plowing through an area that is beset with danger, a danger that we not only can't see, but we can't see the form or the size of it and therefore in plowing through there, you must as rapidly as possible carry a pretty good-sized stick.

Unfortunately, we are a little like the fellow in the story who said, "If I had known where I was going, I would have started from there." If we had known at the start that we were going to strength so rapidly, we probably wouldn't have chosen to start from where we started. But unfortunately, in this country we have to start at the beginning and proceed as rapidly as we can to where we are going.

I presume that our solution in the future will have to be to try to get selective service planned so we can meet the day-by-day efforts that must be made to reach a strength that is commensurate with a gray period, a period of stress and threat, and try to keep our steps such that if at any given time we are committed to an all-out war, we know where to go. Logically we might say that whether we are going uptown or going to the next building, our first step should be about the same size. That is a lot better in logic sometimes than it is in operations.

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One of the things we always have to think about is our resources. Unfortunately, our resources are seemingly not headed toward any one user. In our civilization, with its many advantages, with its many privileges, and its many luxuries that are called necessities, we find many people who are claimants for our manpower. If it gives us any satisfaction as men of the male variety, we can at least think that we are a pretty strategic thing and pretty much in demand. The only discount on that is to look at this group here. If we were going to pick out some men, we would not pick them your age. If we really had a choice, we would pick them a little younger, because there are so many things we can do with them that we can't do with a group of this age. Of course, we are important. There is no question about that. We certainly have a lot of advice that we haven't made too much use of during our years. We are very glad to hand it on rapidly to anybody who wants to take it, anyone who wants to take a whirl at it, and see if he can do anything with it.

Manpower is not short, but it is a little shorter at the present time due to the depression. Our income of manpower at the present time is 150,000 from the male standpoint and probably about 300,000 for both male and female, less than it was 10 years ago. It is probably 200,000 or 300,000 or more less than it will be 10 years from now. But, unfortunately, we are living now; and the income that we have to deal with is the present income.

We do have some reserve—reserve in the sense that it has been five years since the war. There are some people who are in an age group now that we can't treat as income, that our civilization, if you will, accumulated, due to the fact that we didn't train them when we should. That is an advantage if you want someone to train or serve now—someone that has not trained or served before. It is a disadvantage if they were not trained at a time when they probably should have been; therefore, you are getting raw material rather than finished products; and you are getting people who are by age, by inclination, by association, and by responsibility, less able to be used as income than those who are reaching the younger ages.

Now, it would seem, if we are going to stay in the gray period, assuming that for the sake of the argument for the moment, that we should as rapidly as possible get into a place where we use income to maintain our armed forces rather than depending upon the use of so-called reserves that have accumulated due to the fact that we haven't trained anybody and therefore they haven't served, because once they are used, they cannot be used again. There is a period, perhaps, where we can use some of these individuals to bridge a gap. But if we set our plans on the basis of using individuals that happen to be surplus at the moment or be reserve or be savings or call them what you want, it is not a good policy to try to set the number of people you must have larger than our income.

Now, I realize that I am going to get into trouble, because I have known of nations--we will not mention any of them by name--that didn't always set their expenditures on the basis of income. Sometimes it wasn't considered perhaps the most forward thinking to be so old fashioned as merely to tie your expenditures on to income. That would seem to be a theory that we probably have outgrown. But I think from the standpoint of manpower we almost have to do it. We have a lot of manpower on paper that we use in making our plans, but we are apt to get into difficulties when we try putting those men in the field, if they don't exist. It is a little easier to print paper money than to print paper men, for three reasons: One, we probably already have in existence enough men who are as good as paper men without printing any more. So we get into difficulties with men.

In looking over this manpower business, I want to talk rather briefly about a few different aspects of manpower in general. First, I want to talk a little about age--age is something that most of us have to a greater degree than we would like to have. It is something that comes to people without very much effort on their part. There are many things that seem to be better accomplished if the answer to how old you are isn't too great.

There are many things that come with age. Some of them actually do, and some of them are probably rationalizations by aged people to keep from being shot when they attain a certain age, because they are destroying food for no particular purpose, if they are to live. But, just the same, from the military standpoint--I don't know whether this could be proved or not; I think it could--most of the salvation of this country in massed manpower through the years has been boys somewhere in the late teens and early twenties. In the War Between the States very few men were above the age of 22 or 23. Some hundreds of thousands perhaps, but you could find millions below that age. The men in those days, in a pioneer age, probably matured sooner than they do now. I am not so sure that is true. I think that folks thought they matured a little earlier in those days than they do now. Nowadays most boys who are not so old think they are, and they are generally two or three years older than their fathers think they are. So I think that you could prove that our salvation from a military standpoint has been due to boys in the late teens and somewhere through the twenties, under the direction, undoubtedly, of people who were older, more mature, and more experienced, as we like to think of it.

Now, age never occurs alone. It gets complicated with some of these other things that I shall mention. But, by and large, it would seem that, even from the standpoint of age alone, as soon as they reach maturity enough to do the things that have to be done militarily, the sooner we use them, the better from an income standpoint of manpower.

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That is, if they can pay their military tax, and certainly they can if we are going to have an all-out mobilization, when we will have to plan to successively increase our forces until everybody is involved in some way or other.

The second thing I would like to touch on briefly is acceptability. By acceptability, I mean the acceptance of this person either by the armed forces as is provided in the present Selective Service law, or by some other agency, if in time of stress some other agency is given the power to decide who is acceptable for the several things that have to be done. This has the potential capacity of increasing our armed forces, probably beyond anything else that we have.

As I have gone from school to school in the last five years, I have never had any trouble with the student body about the fact that we must have better utilization of personnel within the armed forces, within industry, within agriculture, and everywhere else, than we had the last time. Everyone admits that as a principle. Everybody admits that the armed forces cannot have the champagne appetite that they had in World War II in rejecting individuals who might be emotionally immature or unstable, or several other things. Some of them were so unstable that they could earn only twenty-five or thirty thousand dollars a year, and yet there was nothing the armed forces could possibly find for a person so upset as this fellow was, especially at the thought of going into the armed forces. So I don't think there has been any question in the last five years that I have been going around the circuit, but that we would have to accept people.

One of the things that make life interesting is the difference between the acceptance of philosophy and behavior. It is one thing to say "Somebody ought to loan that guy five dollars." It is another thing to pull that five dollars out of your pocket, if you are so fortunate as to have it, and loan it to him. They are different propositions. The philosophy is one thing. Feeding the world is something that everybody goes in for, but reducing your ration is something that you have to give a little more consideration to. So it is not surprising that when we started to accept this year, the practice wasn't up to the philosophy. We turned down 60 percent of those we examined in July. They were a selected group and it wasn't quite a fair thing; but, just the same, 60 percent is high, even if they were bums. We finally got up to 50 percent rejections the next month and about 40 percent the next. I don't know what we did the last time. But all of those are unrealistic if you are talking about high acceptability.

I don't suppose it is any secret. I don't think we will ever solve it so long as we have procurement in the armed forces scattered through several boys in the family. I have had four kids and I have six grandchildren, and I know of the affection that exists between

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families. I know the competition too. They all like each other except when their own interests are involved and then it has to be considered in its proper light. But so long as one of the services is getting its people from us with the Congress saying that it has to take 70 on a GCT that we don't have any more, which equals 13 on the AFQT this week and I don't know what next week—I have no quarrel that 70 doesn't equal 13. Maybe it does if somebody says so, someone who has the authority to make that decision. Anyway, it is a little hard for me to sell to the public why 13 is 70; but when you get to understand it, it is very simple.

Just the same, we have been confronted with difficulties in acceptability. Just so long as we scare them into two or three of the intake places with a 90—I don't know what that equals, whether it equals 20 or what else, because these curves are not symmetrical so far as numbers go, and just because 70 equals 13 doesn't prove that 90 equals anything particularly. I don't know whether it equals 20 or 25. But, just the same, if two or three of the services are getting people by pressure which is placed on the other service and they are having a higher acceptability, you are never going to encourage the one that is dealing with you to buy some of your tomatoes that are not in too good shape so long as his competitor thinks he is getting a little different sort through another commission broker.

Therefore, if you are going to have to use all your manpower, somebody is going to have to use some bums, because we have them now; they are born. There isn't any law that will eliminate them so far as I know, and it certainly isn't good policy to let them have the run of the country without any responsibilities while somebody else goes out and sweats to keep the thing running. It gives them a great deal more freedom than they need, because there is nothing that has quite the approach to things that a 4-F for certain does, because he thinks he is as independent as the hog allegedly was on ice. I always doubted he was that independent. But for what it may be worth, the 4-F during the war was the one fellow who could just about express his desires on whether you should go, to anybody that he happened to meet, because there wasn't much you could do with him.

You can have national service, but sometimes it will take more than three men and a boy to get anything out of him. But if you are short of people, you will not help by having three or four people working him over. The armed forces do have trouble with them, but a certain percentage of them get shot and that at least uncomplicates that particular problem.

But acceptability does have the potential of a great deal. When you take the 200,000 people that we examined in the month of August, 44,000 of them couldn't pass this AFQT test. Now, you can see that in eliminating 44,000 there isn't a lot of difference whether you eliminate

44,000 by that test or for other reasons which found them unacceptable. And 44,000 is a pretty high percentage of 200,000. Not only that, you can't laugh off 44,000 in anybody's rat race for manpower. And yet 10 percent on a basis of 200,000 is 20,000 men. I have been away from the Army so long that I don't know whether that is a division or not. If it isn't, it is a pretty good start, so far as numbers go.

So acceptability is something that the armed forces have to get realistic about if you are going to have three million people and if you are going to let the load be carried without undue service on the part of everybody. If everybody isn't going to have to go into the forces and stay, and if the load is going to be divided up, more people are going to have to be war carriers; and one of the ways to get more war carriers is to get a higher rate of acceptability.

I might say just a word about acceptability in age. Obviously, the greater the age, normally, the less acceptability. I think the reasons for that are quite obvious.

The third thing that I want to say a word about is dependents. Dependency, theoretically and logically, shouldn't even enter into the problem. I think the Romans, although I wasn't there, said that the man who did not have land or a family couldn't be trusted with a spear. They were a little short on spears at that time. Industrial mobilization hadn't gotten into the swing yet. Therefore they said that unless a man had land or a family, they wouldn't trust him with a spear, because if he had only his life to lose, he couldn't be trusted with weapons. We have gone on a little different theory, probably much further than any other country in the world. I don't know all the reasons. But I do believe we have to recognize it as a fact.

Our people are particularly sensitive to fathers, and probably less sensitive to other forms of dependency. As an example, not counting the veterans who were deferred for other reasons, we have about one million out of the eight million between the ages of 19 and 25, inclusive, who have dependents of some kind. I don't know the breakdown. I don't know how many are taking care of their fathers, although fathers and mothers are a lot more popular when we have a draft law than at any other time. Many apparently heard from their sons for the first time in a long while. Many times there were heart attacks on the part of parents when they received money from their children after the draft act was passed. But you can go through the whole category of dependency, starting with those we call collateral—fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, and things of that sort—down through wives only, and the wives with children or children but no wives. Sometimes the wives have disappeared.

Now, we do have to consider that out of that million the services might get quite a few without taking fathers, but it is one of the

restrictions on manpower, because the public still hesitates a long time about taking a father. They will take a father gladly if he is not in competition with several other classes of people; but if he is in competition with some young squirt, I don't care how well he has learned radar or something else, if they remember the young fellow six months or a year ago as a young high school boy running around getting into deviltry and everything else, and now comes back as one of the experts, a pretty high rating--and no questions about it; many times he is--to leave him behind at a time when you take a father with three children goes against the grain of our public.

It gets into the problem of the educator. You can just imagine around most of our college places what we are going through now when you start talking about taking a father, although we have left that to the armed forces to do. We haven't gotten into that yet. But sometimes we are accused of running a program of taking fathers out of those communities at a time when we are leaving carefree 19-year-old boys under a postponement of induction until next spring, galloping around the campus and probably learning a great many things, but the trouble is the public sees him when he isn't. They see him engaged in a great many things that are non--I won't say they are noneducational, but they are nonscholastic.

So much for the dependency business. I would say that the relationship between dependency and age is that normally dependency increases with age up to the time that the age has become so great that even this dependency decreases and we haven't anything constructive left. So normally, as you increase the age, you increase the dependency.

I come now to an area in which you are particularly interested, and that is occupational deformation. It starts all the way from the highest type professional or scientific person and extends down to the lowest skilled person you can think of. Sometimes this fellow who is in a dirty, stinking job, who is unskilled, is in greater scarcity than those up at the other end of the line. A lot of people don't believe it, but that happened to be true during the war. I saw times when they would even trade engineers for people with no skill but who would put up with sweat and dirt and all that sort of thing. They didn't want them to know too much; because, if they did, they went off and worked in another factory, where they made more money and had easier work, and which was air conditioned. So the problem is not necessarily always on the question of training, what pay, and what type of work, as with what you do with it.

I think it is a fair statement to say that in relation to age, normally the higher the age, the more the skill, the more professional; the more technological things, and the more scientific. The exception, which is very embarrassing and very difficult to solve, is the student and the apprentice. Both of those are the reverse of the theory of age, because their existence is in the lower-age groups, where for every other

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reason you want the man, and the armed forces are likely to be immediately in competition for the apprentice and the student.

One of the most difficult things in the world with both is the fact that neither one of them can be expressed in any sort of formula with certainty. You know how many hundreds of those who try to be doctors, lawyers, scientists, or something else, get to be. That is all right; but whether John Jones, when you look at him, is ever going to be, no matter how much time you spend on him, no one knows. You have to take a calculated risk. But to go out and tell the mother whose son you took because he was dumb, or something, and you didn't want him, that her son is dumber than the one you left behind, is very difficult, because, in the first place, you can't prove to her then that he is ever going to amount to anything, and yet he certainly isn't going to become what you want him to become if you don't put seven or eight years on top of what he has now. But during those seven or eight years somebody else has to go out and die or there won't be anything for him to work at anyway.

That is the problem and there is no way to evade the problem. It has to be met and it has to be solved. I am not trying merely to build up the difficulties and then end up by saying that it can't be done. It must be done. But you don't do it by shutting your eyes and saying that there is nothing to it; that some board, somewhere, can decide how many of something we want, and therefore we multiply by eight because we are going to lose about that many as we go up and start deferring everybody because eventually we are going to need a few. It is going to take the very best we have in discernment, because the identification, even in the horse world, of a jumper when he is a colt, is hard, and we know a great deal more about horses than we do about people. Therefore the question of identifying some of these individuals, after they arrive, is almost impossible; and to identify them when they are starting, with eight years ahead of them to become something, test them as you will, proves very little. So there are a great many difficulties in this question of trying to decide what you are going to do in training people for the things we need.

I am not going into all the razzmatazz, that you hear without much trouble, about the quarrel between people on how many you need, and in what field, and whether or not anybody has the slightest idea what we are going to need five or six years from now, and in what field, because, if you don't know that, there is no use training people in something that it takes seven years to accomplish merely because you have a shortage of them now. Atomic scientists, I suppose, sold for about a nickel a dozen in 1935; and we have had many indications that people who had some qualifications such as they got by buying rugs, or some other thing, had the most critical knowledge that we needed anywhere. About the last thing we would want to do is to defer somebody to be a rug merchant; yet at times, rug merchants have furnished information you could get nowhere else. So who can furnish what is a difficult problem.

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I am not going to discuss veterans very long. Theoretically, you don't have veterans in this group; but, practically, you have a good many millions of them. If you are going into an all-out mobilization, theoretically, you would be smart to put them in first, because, theoretically, it doesn't take so long for them to train. Practically, they feel that they have already been on the duty roster, and we should let somebody that hasn't served go first. That is perfectly sound. So take your choice. You must do one, and you may have to do both, especially if we are going into an all-out mobilization.

The time of service is a very strong factor. You can assume that a million and fifty thousand is our income from men in any age group. If 250,000 of those are going to be rejected physically, mentally, morally, or otherwise, that leaves you about 800,000. Now, don't quote me as saying I ever was optimistic enough, even when asleep, to think we will ever get the rejection rate down to 25 percent. We would have thought we were doing very well, in saying "Why, that isn't too much," in regard to the 35 percent which we had the last time, as through 35 percent is any sort of solution, because I don't believe it is.

But, granting, just for the sake of the argument, and tossing around mathematics that we could have 800,000 that would be available if we eliminated only the physical, there are some other problems we will run into right away in your students and many other types of people. But 800,000 multiplied by our estimated 24 months would only get you 1,600,000 men a year, even if you had no losses in doing it. You just can't hope in peacetime, not to run a 6 or 7 percent loss a year, or more, for other reasons besides expiration of term of service. So, if you are talking about 3,000,000, unless you are going to get at least half of them, or more, who are professionals—and even if you get professionals, in that 800,000, they are going to be spread over all ages, and the 800,000 of your professionals in your 1,600,000 are going to serve at least four years—it will take a quarter of a million to keep your 800,000 going out of that income group. And if you take 250,000 out of 800,000, leaving you about 550,000, you have to multiply 550,000 by three years in order to have 1,400,000, which is the difference between 1,600,000 and 3,000,000. You can take them of older ages, and that is all right once; but you are going to use up very soon what few people we have above the age of entrance into our manpower field. So, if we are going into a gray period where we have to keep our 3,000,000, it seems to me, we are forced almost to the proposition of training just about everybody.

Now, whether you are going to have some people start off to be scientists, professional people, highly skilled, or what not after three months, six months, one year, or two years—I don't know whether you are going to combine your National Guard and your Organized Reserve, going to make those out of trained people or going to allocate to them some share of income, or are you going to try to double in brass and have

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the people who get three months to take the curse off them, given at least basic training, and then go about preparing to be professional people? Are you going to collect them through some reserve system by making them drill summer time or one night a week, or some other way? Or, are you going to let those people go on to become doctors or what not, and then require a couple of years of professional service out of them, because you have to have professionals? Or, are you going to let them go to whatever we have in our body politic and accept that as having served? Those are some of the questions that we are going to have to solve if we go into the gray period.

I suppose, if we go into an all-out war, our mobilization can go on other lines. But it seems to me that we ought to start out now in trying to meet the gray period by first, if possible, reducing the age to 18. Whether you can do it or not I don't know. There are two or three ways you can crawlfish on it. You can let them volunteer at 18; and, if they are certain they are going to have to serve a period anyway, a great many will get it over with as soon as they can, so they can be on to other things.

I am getting into a field that is probably out of my particular business. But I believe that we ought to start on the assumption that when a boy becomes 26 years old, he will no longer, short of an all-out mobilization, be compelled to serve, unless he belongs to one of two or three classes: one, a professional soldier, either an officer or enlisted man; and if an enlisted man, a person of probably the upper four grades; and, second, if he wants to be a professional semimilitary individual and become an officer or some of the higher grades in the National Guard or Organized Reserve. If he does that, I am afraid he is going to have to have some job that he can leave at the drop of a hat. Otherwise there isn't much use of having a fire department that has to be screened through two or three other agencies of the town government when the fire whistle blows.

I have just about come to the conclusion--don't misunderstand me, I happen to come from a National Guard outfit and a lot of people think I haven't gotten very far from it--that we have to re-examine very carefully what we mean when we talk about reserves. You can take your choice. You can either have some and have them available or not have them. I would much rather not have something and not figure on it than to figure on it and then find out, when I started to call on it, that somebody else had some mortgage on it. I am not quarreling with the mortgages; I just want to recognize them before we start asking for payment. I believe the person who is not in the officer, or higher noncommissioned officer, class of our reserves must be found below 26 years of age. I believe that when he gets to be 26--and I would like to see it at 24, if we could eventually work up to it, when our birth rate begins to catch up--that as the boys begin to become 18, and with a better birth rate, we can feel that men above the age of 18 are going to be called only in an all-out mobilization.

If we were going into an all-out mobilization, I would believe that the line of 26 should be held until every available man below 26 was exhausted. I realize that the word "available," leaves a lot of loopholes; but, if you are going to exhaust that group, you can't leave too many loopholes.

I have come to the conclusion that, if I would go above 26, I would go one age group at a time. I realize that this has not very much more originality than to go back to the so-called continental system. But they didn't arrive at that by guess. In the last unpleasantness we started registering people from 21 to 35. Then we went from 21 to 45; then we went to 21, and to 19, and to 18, and back to 38, and back to 35, and back to 31, and back to 26, and up to 30. It was a nice trip. The only difficulty is, you agitate and irritate and keep in turmoil millions to pick up a few.

At the present time there are those who would invade the classes up to 35 or 38 immediately. The reason I oppose that is because we have only perhaps 150,000 single men in that group, and you would have to register and classify and process 12,000,000 to find them. If there is anybody who can run a mining operation on that percentage of ore, I'd like to know who he is. That is one reason why I believe we should stay in our lower groups, war or no war. If we don't have war, then certainly we should stay there. If we do have war, let us exhaust those under 26 and then move up to 26, 27, and 28. If we have to go up to 70, all right; but let us go up one age group at a time. At least there isn't any uncertainty about a man getting out of it. At least he can forecast something about how long it is going to be before it arrives at him.

I believe that, whether you take any of the problems, if you take the problem of skill, or profession, or technology, or what not, you can find men in those classes below 26. But where you can find a thousand below 26, you can find millions above 26. Whether it is skill, professional and technological things, or what it is, if you take dependency, there are a million below, but there are 16 million above. So, if you want to escape the problems of dependency, don't go above 26. You will not escape them there. If you want to take the effects of age in slowing up people, if any of it happens before 26, you can see where you are going to be by the time you get to the middle thirties. You will be up to the place where, without inner spring mattresses and carpet slippers, you won't get too much out of the boys.

I think that our first task is to hold the line at 26, no matter where we are going. When we have exhausted that, then, if we have to go further, let us go, but go by age groups, because, in the first place, whatever the effects of youth, you will get all of it. As you move up,

whatever avoidance that comes with middle age or skills, or with ability to administer, you will come to it as late as you can.

Obviously, you are going to have to defer a great many people, as you pass up. But I do not believe it is good for the manpower pool to be running the lawn mower back and forth, unless you intend to cut some of it. This thing of running the mower around to clip off a few heads here and there is certainly not good for the mower and certainly is not good for the grass. We tried that the last time. I am satisfied that we should try something else another time.

Now, whether our future is going to be a gray one or a black one, I am quite sure it isn't going to be a bright one; and I believe our action can very well not be materially different. I think it was Johnny Appleseed who said he didn't know what the future was or whether there was going to be one; but he thought if he lived well today, it would be a good preparation for whatever it would be, whether there was a hereafter or not.

QUESTION: General Hershey, I gathered that you recommended that we take the bums into the armed forces and find some place to put them. My first question is whether you advocate putting such people in jobs that are ordinarily filled by civilians. Another question, tied right in with that, is whether you think we should take these people, that we don't really need and can't utilize in combat or combatant uses, whether that won't put an additional burden on the people who can fill those jobs and therefore our total numbers will go up in proportion.

GENERAL HERSHEY: Yes, the total number will go up. I don't think there is any question about that. But that is because of some other reasons that I won't go into.

I generally try to keep everybody angry at me. In the first place, I tell the armed forces that they were lousy in their utilization of manpower the last time, and they are lousy now in acceptability. But, on the other hand, in order to make the other side angry, I will say that any time we mobilize twelve or thirteen million people, the armed forces are entitled to six or seven million of the very best that we have, and I don't care where they have to come from or who has to suffer, because those are the guys that are going to fight; and I will go a long way in sticking up for the armed forces.

But I will tell you something that breaks me down. I saw, not far from this town during the war, a lot of problems in moving population, problems in sewage and schools caused by loading a lot of people into communities until the sewage almost couldn't be carried away. We permitted that flocking of people into communities because one service insisted on having civilians of the same type that we were not permitted to draft;

there was no need for them in the armed forces. They allowed families to come in there with the civilians and litter up the the place, merely because they wanted to.

There were some problems, there is no question about it; but those fellows were not combat people and they never could be. With all you hear to the contrary, you know very well that not only are there a great many people behind the line at any given time; but, if you study the history of the individuals who have been in, a lot of them never got anywhere else but behind the line. The only screwy thing about it was that we built up the MOS in the armed forces--I was attached for pay purposes in, I don't know what you call it in some of the others--but you build up the MOS's and there is a tendency to have most of the MOS's out of gunshot range, at least of medium-heavy artillery.

Now, all I want the armed forces to do is this: I will support one atomic scientist for every infantry or marine company. There is just as much reason for him there as in a lot of places that people try to justify. I would fight to have one chemist in every one of our fighting organizations, because certainly you should have somebody there who knows a great many forms of reference, who finds himself in a foxhole some morning and can see all the aspects that might come with the use of technological and scientific things. But, on the other hand, I will not support moving our best into the back areas and pushing all the dumbbells up front, which happened many times in the last unpleasantness. I remember we had 7 percent one time in some of our army divisions of number one men, and in two years it was down to less than three. And they weren't all killed, either. They had been transferred somewhere else.

Now, I'd like to see some of these guys that are good in these combat units, but there are places where you can use some of these bums. You won't use them too well; but which is better--to have them in a depot somewhere; or making a plane from which you are going to fall and break your neck, even if the enemy doesn't hit you? After all, some girl who has had about three nights as a supervisor is going to get this dumbbell if you don't put him in the armed forces. There they are. I don't know where we made them in the first place, but you either have to eliminate them or use them.

QUESTION: General, you spoke of deferring apprentices and also of deferring students. Would you talk a little bit about why you put the apprentices in the same category with the students?

GENERAL HERSHEY: Well, logically, neither group is doing anything now, but both are claiming that they are learning to become something. That is about the only excuse that I could think of for putting either one in a deferred class.

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We started World War I under the assumption that a man was deferred for what he was doing. In World War II we got one step further and we deferred many for what he said he would do if we would let him work at it. We are having a hard time right now getting some of the fellows that we set aside during the war and gave six or seven years and a lot of Federal money to get themselves prepared to do something. Now I have to scare them or draft them in order to recover that particular thing. It is one thing that makes the public a little hard to sell on—the guy who is getting ready to do something but isn't doing anything now.

I realize that there are probably many reasons why a fellow can serve a year or two and still be an apprentice, but that is a little hard to sell to the pressure group that says, "Well, can't a fellow serve a little while and then learn some of these things that he is getting?" The answer isn't too easy. Of course, a fellow who has worked up the professional thing so that it takes 8 or 10 years, where it used to take four or five, can say that unless he starts early, he just never can get this. If they keep raising the bars on the jumps and adding more intern years and more resident years, it is going to get so you can never get to the place where you can practice anyway. There are a lot of things in this educational mill besides the Government's interest. I say that advisedly and I say it with some fear. That is why I put them together. It doesn't happen to be my classification.

QUESTION: General, what are your views on the use of women by compulsory means of selection or any other technique?

GENERAL HERSHEY: I think one of the things we have to consider in connection with these 3,000,000 is that the more you can use the 1,500,000 or the 1,100,000—I don't know if that is the right figure; there may be a few more women even at that age than there are men—but the more you use them, to the greater extent you can have men to use in some other fashion.

During the years that have gone by I have never been one to believe that the country was moving too fast to compel women to do things. I have no doubt in my mind that, if we were faced with a reasonable necessity, the public would go along on compelling women to do whatever you want them to do. I don't think there is much question about that. I am not so sure you could sell, at the present time, the drafting of women. I don't know that we have to, because I don't know that we have found any shortage on the numbers that we decided to take. I wouldn't attempt to speculate on what Congress would do, but I think Congress would want to know, first, whether an effort has been made to get them voluntarily before it would be quite ready to use compulsion.

I am not very much disturbed that you could make a case if, first of all, you knew what you are going to use them for. One of the things that bother Congress and bother a lot of people is when we say we need a lot of folks and somebody says, "What do you need them for?" You say, "There will certainly be uses for them." They show you a thing that has the President in a rectangle and lines going down and lines going across and say, "Explain the function. If something is as good as that, you ought to be able to find some function for it."

QUESTION: How do other nations get along with their rejection rates, and can we learn any lessons from them?

GENERAL HERSHEY: I think we can find plenty of lessons, but whether we will learn them or not I don't know. It is pretty hard to compare an outfit that is fighting in its own streets on what it will accept with a country that hadn't been touched by any sort of invasion. In so many of the countries that we have to compare ourselves with, we find ourselves being compared with nations up against dire necessity. I have no doubt about what we would do.

I think I am getting into something I don't know anything about. In the first place, it has been 10 years since I had anything to do with the armed forces. I understand we have taken a lot of South Koreans into our armed forces, and I wonder if they had to go all through preinduction examination or whether they had them shooting at somebody in a day or two, or an hour or two. I am sure they didn't get a 10 day notice to come in for preinduction examination, get accepted, then have 21 days, and then come in and get rejected because the second doctor didn't agree with the first one, but rejected 6 or 7 percent of them the second time within 30 or 40 days because somebody said, "We can't afford to take them, because they are going to be on the Federal pay roll."

I think a veteran is a political question, not a physical one. When you get to be 40 years old and have been a veteran and you haven't made a success, you are likely to think it is time for the Government to step in and pick you up. I don't know why. I have said something along this line once just before another election, and it didn't go over so well at that time. I don't think it makes much difference. If you are going to support everybody anyway, why the devil don't you get as much out of them as you can? If some of them get shot, at least you can pay off their dependents and then you are through with them. That is more than you can say if you make them 4-F and let them stay behind, because then they can prove they have something wrong with them because you have said so.

We have had lots of men, just like we had lots of other things, that we felt we didn't have to use, because we had so many of them. We find that everybody writes checks, but nobody keeps track of anything on the stubs. The result is that we have more checks out all the time than we have money in the bank of manpower.

QUESTION: In the case of an all-out mobilization, as we go above this 26-year-age group, would you comment on the possibility of using skills in the armed forces as a basis for the draft rather than age?

GENERAL HERSHEY: Well, it is all right. The only thing is that most of the trouble I have had was the assumption that they were getting even by going across the board and deferring everybody that should be left out. I always got the impression that we were taking too many people with skills into the armed forces. I don't have as much faith as some people have in being able to catalog this country. I don't happen to belong to the registrars, that is, the people who solve problems by registering everybody, giving them a questionnaire about eight pages long and getting the thing so thick that you can't find anybody, and you haven't enough people left any more to look over them. We had some 311's that probably some of you made out during the war. They finally got destroyed all right, but it took time.

I am a little bit cautious about having everybody issue requisitions by skills and, then, having somebody else fill them. I am not so sure that if the skills aren't pretty good ones, you can't train them a little faster now than you can later. First of all, you just take the guy at what he says he is. You have to be a little careful on that one. Then you get hold of a couple of people who know less about him than he does and get their opinion. By the time he comes to you, if you are in some of the lower echelons, he isn't going to be worth very much. You know what happens to the good boys when they start going down through the echelons of organization. The smart ones are picked up. Perhaps we will have to come to it.

Personally, I don't believe you can fight a war if you go into all the refinements. We have, as you know, an occupational title book. If a fellow got into all the ramifications of that, I think we would get licked before we got there. I am not so sure but that the forces would be just as well off if we read back over what half of the employers, when they are extending a bit, say they must have. My classification would be, I think, to march them through some sort of gate and give each service whatever numbers they are entitled to, and tell them that leadership makes liars out of statisticians. "The statisticians said you have only so much skill in here. Now you got twice that much, and that will show you are a leader."

I am not speaking too much in jest about this. Our manpower is what it is, and there is no use talking about it. Some of them are bums and some of them will be bums if you let them be bums. Some of them, if properly agitated from the rear or elsewhere, will do some things you don't think they will. Some people, because they are afraid of being shot by you, will run some risks of being shot by the enemy.

QUESTION: General, under the assumption that there will be an all-out war and the going is going to get tough, would you care to comment upon the desirability and possibility of including the 17-year-olds in the draft?

GENERAL HERSHEY: I don't think there is any question that when the people up in the thirties get really frightened, they will go to the 17-year-olds and the sixteens before they will go completely up there. But until they get that frightened, they are going to allow a kid of 17 to enlist and get shot to protect them, and they are going to clap their hands. But if they are going to draft him, they are going to raise hell with somebody for getting him shot. I don't know why it is, but during the war we had boys that were being killed who had volunteered at 17 years of age and nobody worried particularly about it. I think they should. But let a boy of 18 be drafted and they find out he has had only four months of training and there is hell to pay.

On the other hand, if we get frightened enough, there is no question about our people being great hearted enough to send in anything that they think will stop the enemy. That sounds a little bitter. I am not bitter about it at all. It just happens that a 17-year-old boy is probably better than a 30-year-old man in a lot of places. Therefore, if we want to survive, society doesn't worry about words like "justice" or anything else. It worries about survival. And when the chips are down, the guy that can carry it is the guy that gets the load. It is no use loading it on the bird who can't carry it, whether it is his feet or his head that makes him no good at carrying it.

COLONEL ENNIS: It looks as if you have answered all our questions. We are winding up our series of lectures in the manpower course, and I believe it is very apparent to everyone here why we saved you for the last lecture. On behalf of all of us, thank you very much.

(27 Dec 1950--350)S.

