ESTIMATION OF MILITARY REQUIREMENTS BY THE JOINT STAFF FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOGISTIC IMPLICATIONS OF JOINT WAR PLANS

15 November 1950

CONTENTS

	Page
INTRODUCTION--Captain F. A. Davisson, USN, Member of the Faculty, ICAF	1
SPEAKER--Colonel Jesse S. Cook, Jr., USMC, Joint Logistics Plans Group	1
GENERAL DISCUSSION	10
CHARTS--Number 1	17
Number 2	18
Number 3	19
Number 4	20
Number 5	21
Number 6	22
Number 7	23
Number 8	24

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Colonel Jesse S. Cook, Jr., USMC, was born in Burgin, Kentucky, 14 July 1905. Upon graduating from the United States Naval Academy in 1927 he was commissioned in the United States Marine Corps. Prior to World War II Colonel Cook's duty assignments included Nicaragua, China, and "USS Chicago." He attended the Infantry School Tank Course in 1939-1940. At the start of the war he was attached to the Iceland base command, serving as Commanding Officer, 4th Tank Company and G-3. During World War II he served as G-3 in the 2nd Marine Division and the composite Army-Marine Division in New Zealand and Guadalcanal. He then served as G-4 with the 2nd Marine Division at Tarawa, and with the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific in Honolulu. Following this he served as G-4 and P&O Officer in various Pacific commands. He was assigned to the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in February 1948 and at present is a member of the Joint Logistic Plans Group.

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CAPTAIN DAVISSON: So far, gentlemen, all our requirements lectures have been rather general in nature. Today we are going to start a new series which will show us some of the specific aspects of the requirements problem and how they are met in the various organizations and agencies. We will start out with the Joint Chiefs because, after all, the real start of any cycle of requirements determination is right with the plans which come from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Now, of course, before we ever get that JCS stamp of approval, shall we say, on a plan, it goes through a number of processes. One of the early processes is the rapid appraisal of the logistics implications of the plan. That only means, Are the logistic requirements reasonably close to the estimated capabilities?

Our speaker this morning by virtue of his job for the last couple of years as a project officer in the Joint Logistics Plans Group has been intimately concerned with a number of these rapid appraisals. It gives me great pleasure to introduce Colonel Jesse S. Cook, Jr., United States Marine Corps, and to welcome him to this platform. Colonel Cook.

COLONEL COOK: General Holman, gentlemen: It is a privilege to be here and it is a pleasure to find so many friends in the audience. Of course, that last remark is subject to retraction or revision after the question period. Although the subject of my discussion today is the "Estimation of Military Requirements by the Joint Staff for the Development of Logistic Implications of Joint War Plans"--incidentally I didn't pick the subject--I would like at this time to review briefly the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization, the organization of the Joint Staff, the development of a strategic plan, and what a strategic plan contains.

Chart 1, page 17.--The Joint Chiefs of Staff is composed of three main committees: the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, the Joint Logistics Plans Committee, and the Joint Intelligence Committee. It is with these committees that we are mainly concerned today, and I will mention only them and only those functions of these committees which have a bearing on today's subject. As their names imply, strategic plans are developed by the Strategic Plans Committee; intelligence in regard to strategic plans in the Joint Intelligence Committee; and the development of logistic implications of war plans during the preparation, as well as reporting logistic findings to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is the function of the Joint Logistics Plans Committee.

The Joint Staff, which is the working organization for these committees as well as for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is composed of three corresponding groups: the Joint Strategic Plans Group; the Joint Logistics Plans Group; and the Joint Intelligence Group. I would like for you to pay particular attention to the organization of the Joint Logistics Plans Group. It is headed by the deputy director and three assistant directors, numerous project officers, and of most importance, the six technical sections. As you know, those Indians are divided into Supply, Transportation, Construction, Personnel and Units, POL, and Aircraft. Please note these in particular because they are the basis of the development of the requirements.

Where do we get a strategic plan? On the basis of national policies recommended by the National Security Council, together with the broad missions prescribed by the President and the Congress, the Joint Chiefs of Staff undertake the development of strategic plans. These plans are of various types and categories. Strategic guidance is provided for emergency, medium-range, and long-range, mobilization, NATO or MDAP planning. However, the procedure for the formulation of each type is similar.

A problem to develop strategic guidance is assigned to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee. It, in turn, assigns the problem to the working group, the Joint Strategic Plans Group. It further drops down the line to the Indians, a team in the War Plans Section composed of one officer from each of the three major services. Having been provided with guidance and having prepared certain general assumptions, this team then forwards data to the Joint Intelligence Group in order to find out from them an estimation of the enemy's capabilities during the period of time to be covered by the plan. Upon receipt of this information, the team then develops a concept of war calculated to fit the national objectives and evolves the joint outline strategic plan to fit this concept. During this planning, the team confers informally with officers on the planning staffs of the services. In addition, each service prepares and submits a list of forces available as of the assumed D-day and its best estimate of rate of build-up by months for the duration of the plan.

When this strategic plan is approved by the Joint Strategic Plans Group, it is sent to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee and the Joint Logistics Plans Group simultaneously. It must be remembered that this plan as written is not an operational plan and is not intended to be such. It contains the estimated enemy capabilities, the national war objectives, the assumptions under which it was conceived, the broad concept under which our military forces will operate, and the number of military tasks to be performed, along with the major tactical units which are to perform them. It might be well at this point to note that the major tactical units as shown on the chart are known as "Force Tabs."

Chart 2, page 18.--You will note that the chart contains only major tactical units by date which will be referred to later as "phase dates," and that there is a complete absence of any combat support or logistic support units. Note also that these forces as shown are in place and operational in the area under which they are listed. With that for background, I would like to proceed specifically with the subject of today's discussion.

The work in the development of the requirements to determine the logistics implications of a war plan is done primarily in the Joint Logistics Plans Group. Upon receipt of the strategic plan, the group conducts what is called a limited feasibility test. Although this is a rather detailed test, I would like to take you through the process in order that you may understand the purpose for which the test is conducted and also its limitations.

In testing a plan only six logistic features are considered. They are Supply, Transportation, Construction, Personnel and Units, POL, and Aircraft. You will note that these features correspond to the Technical Sections of the Joint Logistics Plans Group. Which came first, I have no idea; the formation of the group or the determination of the logistic features which are to be considered. The procedure for making this test is normally as follows:

Assignment of the task is made to a project officer who in turn is assisted by three other project officers and all the technical sections as well. Since the strategic plan is not an operations plan, it is necessary that certain broad assumptions in regard to logistic matters, and sometimes in regard to strategic matters, be made. There may be alternate courses of action given in the plan. In this case it is necessary, for logistic purposes, to select one of them. This selection is usually made on the basis of the logistic support required. There may be doubt as to the maintenance of an LOC. A decision must be made as to which ones might be kept open. An estimation must be made of probable effects of enemy action. Other assumptions applicable only to the technical sections involved must be made as the task progresses. In addition, the world areas are divided geographically for ease of computation of the requirements and for the determination of the factors which will be employed. The project officer outlines the procedure for the test, obtains the approval of the basic assumptions, and the work progresses somewhat in this fashion.

Chart 3, page 19.--This chart shows the mechanics by which the Personnel Section determines personnel requirements. Consider now what the members of the Personnel Section have available upon which to work. They have received in the Force Tabs the number and type of units, the major tactical units in place and operational by phase dates in various areas. They have taken these units by date and placed them in certain

geographical areas. To these they must add combat support and logistic support. In view of the fact that we have the Army member of the Personnel Section with us today, I hesitate to go further into the method he uses to determine combat and logistic support. However, I think I am on safe ground when I state that he pulls out of the air a big slice.

His determination of the slice, as I gather it, is based on climate, terrain, length of the LOC, and the attrition rates; whether or not the area is active, inactive, or semiactive; whether or not it is expected that logistic aid will be received from the allies or from native labor. The Air Force does something similar in determining its requirements. The Navy makes it rather difficult. The Navy lists the various combat ships and adds the supporting ships to them. Then it laboriously calculates personnel almost down to the last man.

Having determined these requirements that must be in place and operational in the various areas on certain dates, this information is then given to the POL Section, the Supply Section, and the Transportation Section for use in their own calculations. In order to determine, however, the numbers of personnel that are required in uniform, it is necessary now for the Personnel Section to phase back and determine what units must be in training and when to add in the various numbers that are required for the pipelines, combat losses, ineffectives, hospitalized, AWOL, and so on.

Having phased them all back and having determined the total numbers of personnel that are required--Army, Navy, and Air Force--the numbers are then consolidated and plotted against the estimate of availability of personnel which is received in the form of a report from the Munitions Board. This Munitions Board report is an estimation of the ability of the Selective Service to induct; and, of course, added on to the availability are the assumed D-day forces of the regular establishment and the civilian components. Having plotted, then, the availability versus the requirements, the Personnel Section draws certain conclusions which come out later as the personnel implications.

Chart 4, page 20.--The Aircraft Section obtains information from the Force Tabs for all the groups. The schedules may show unit equipment and types and numbers of aircraft. The Air Force member must add to this the aircraft required for support, tests, administration, and training. Members of the Aircraft Section go through the process in somewhat the same manner as the Personnel Section did for personnel, ending up with aircraft required on certain dates in certain areas for the execution of the plan. They, too, must make some assumptions. I believe I failed to mention that the Personnel Section, along with the calculations, had to grind in a little bit of spice in regard to assumptions as to whether or not the Selective Service would be operating

effectively on a certain date and various things of that sort. The Aircraft Section has to assume a certain sortie rate if it is not given in the plan; they have to determine plane attrition rates; and, if the plan is in the future, they may have to determine what types of planes will be in these various groups which are merely shown in the Force Tabs as medium bomb group, heavy bomb group, and so on. They may have to determine whether or not the planes will be jet or conventional.

Having determined the numbers of aircraft required in various areas on the various dates, they obtain an estimate of availability of aircraft. This they get from the Navy and the Air Force, based on current statistical reports, on inventory reports, and at the same time on a production schedule which is put out by the Munitions Board. The Aircraft Section also provides information to the other sections based on their study. It may be that the Construction Section will require some guidance in respect to air fields, the dispersion that is required, or some such features that the Aircraft Section feels the Construction Section should include in their calculations. They also provide the Transportation Section with the numbers of aircraft required to be waterlifted on CVE's or tankers, or, as I have it on the chart later on, on cargo ships--although I understand that is not cricket. From these comparisons of numbers versus availability, the Aircraft Section is in a position to write their analyses and come up with certain implications.

Chart 5, page 21.--We now turn to the Supply Section. Since no members of the Supply Section are here today, I think that I will be safe in remarking that our determination of supply requirements is rather weak in our test. As a matter of fact, in the Supply Section, the greatest contribution to the determination of requirements is in the calculations of cargo tonnages required to be transported to the various areas. For the purpose of calculating these, the Supply Section uses the various service publications listing factors, certain joint factors that have been approved, and certain other factors which they modify to fit the situation. For assumptions the numbers of this section, of course, must determine the levels of supply, the rate of build-up, and the organizational equipment factor if it is tailored below the normal TO/E.

Having applied the various factors to the personnel figures given to them by the Personnel Section, they then furnish to the Transportation Section the numbers of tons of dry cargo which must be in place in each geographical area on certain dates. Perhaps I was a little bit hasty in belittling the consideration of supply. Recently, the Supply Section has been obtaining from the services their estimation of the supply situation and have been highlighting certain critical items which should be noted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee when it considers the plan as a whole.

Chart 6, page 22.--We will turn now to the Construction Section. For the basis of their study the members of the Construction Section receive from the Aircraft Section, as I mentioned before, any special features which they feel are necessary for installations or for airfields. They also receive from the POL Section estimates of additional construction for storage of POL. They may receive from the Transportation Section estimates of construction that is required for pipelines, piers, and inland clearance facilities. They also receive from the Personnel Section the same basic form which the others have received, showing the numbers of personnel required to be in each area on each date. From the Force Tabs and the concept of operation the Construction Section determines locations of bases and estimates the deployment of the support units. In this they are assisted by the Personnel Section. For assumptions, they must determine, from information within the plan or from their own study of previous reports, the enemy damage to be expected to specific installations. The Construction Section must also assume what type construction will be used at the various bases.

The members of the Construction Section then determine what additional construction materials by tons will be required over and above the normal factors which the Supply Section cranks in for construction materials. They provide this to the Supply Section for addition to the figures which they have already calculated. The Construction Section goes farther in regard to personnel.

I might say at this point that the Personnel Section so far has not been interested in personnel by units. They have been interested only in over-all numbers. It would seem that we shouldn't high-light construction personnel without mention of signal construction, ordnance, QM, or transportation and other support units. However, the fact that we have a Construction Section, made up of forceful engineers, causes us to include certain data in regard to construction battalions.

So the Construction Section, having determined the jobs that are to be done, estimates the personnel available. Their estimation of the personnel available may be taken from the known service programs, the civilian components, and the state of readiness that they feel each one of the construction outfits is maintaining. They determine numbers of personnel for the Army based on the modified slice system which permits about 11.4 percent of the slice to be engineer troops and about one-third of those to be construction battalions. The Navy and the Air Force use a task analysis system and attempt to determine the exact number of construction battalions required and available. The Construction Section then draws up comparative charts, makes analyses, and deduces certain implications.

I might state that I am taking you through this rather fast, that there are many, many more points that each one of these sections consider. Actually, for the period which is allotted today, each one of these various features could take up the full time.

Chart 7, page 23.--The members of the POL Section obtain certain information from the study of Intelligence data in regard to installations which are in the various areas. In addition, they have obtained from the Personnel Section the numbers of personnel that are to be in each area on each date. They have also obtained from the Personnel Section the number of ships that will be operating, including combat and support ships in the various areas, and they obtain from the Aircraft Section the numbers of aircraft by type and by model that are deployed to the various areas on the various dates. From this information they then determine the type of fuel required for each of the areas and on each of the dates.

Having obtained the type of fuel based on certain factors which they employ--for ground fuel, they use barrels per man per day; for ships, they use barrels per type ship per day; and for aircraft, they use barrels per type plane per day--they then combine the figures by product and further reduce these figures to crude oil. They have taken into consideration certain factors, such as losses to be expected and the areas under control.

Having calculated their requirements, they now obtain from the Munitions Board Petroleum Committee the availability of crude oil to the military. This is based upon certain assumptions. One of the assumptions is the amount of rationing which will be put in force during war. That assumption is obtained from the NSRB. Having obtained the estimate of availability, this section graphically compares this with the requirements and draws certain conclusions.

It is very fortunate that the next chart is the last because if you aren't confused at the present time, I am sure you will be when you see this one.

Chart 8, page 24.--Bear in mind that we haven't included all that should be there. We have the members of the Aircraft Section throwing their requirements into the Cargo hopper, although, as I mentioned before, it is doubtful that planes could be carried on cargo ships. We also have failed to put in C-54 equivalents. However, as I said, it is probably sufficiently confusing.

From the POL Section the Transportation Section gets the numbers of barrels of oil which must be dockside in the various areas on certain dates. From the Personnel and Unit Section they get the numbers of personnel which must be delivered to the various areas on the various

dates. They also get an estimate of the personnel which must be airlifted. From the Supply Section, the Transportation Section obtains the tonnages of dry cargo which must be placed dockside in the various areas, and from the Aircraft Section they obtain the numbers of aircraft which must be delivered to the various overseas areas on a specific date--that is delivered by waterlift.

Having obtained all this information, they also use a few assumptions. One of them is the turn-around time of the various ships. They assume an amount of maintenance cargo which must be lifted by aircraft for the numbers of personnel in the various areas. They estimate destruction by enemy action to piers, inland waterways, and railroads. They also must assume a certain loss of shipping due to enemy action. Having all this information and using their assumptions and factors, they then determine the requirements for personnel shipping, cargo shipping, tankers, waterlift for aircraft, and C-54 equivalents. Taken into consideration along with the calculations of airlift have been the requirements for the Strategic Air Command. Also from static intelligence they have determined the conditions of the piers, beaches, roads, inland waterways, and pipelines. Having determined the requirements for the various types of lift that are required, they estimate the availability from an inventory of merchant ships provided by the Maritime Commission by way of CNO, and, with respect to transport aircraft, from an inventory of the military and civilian aircraft as well as from the production schedule which I mentioned in connection with the Aircraft Section.

During the course of the Transportation Section's calculations and analyses, it may have been discovered that the capacity of the various ports or inland clearances was insufficient. This information is provided to the Construction Section. As you will note, requirements go back and forth and must be stopped at some time or other. For example, the POL Section has given the requirements of POL to the Transportation Section. When members of the Transportation Section calculate the numbers of tankers and ships required to transport this, that gives us another requirement for POL. Now they hand that requirement back to the POL Section; they in turn hand the increased requirements back to the Transportation Section, which means more changes, and which means another return to the POL Section; it could go on and on. This test is a rather broad-brush treatment, but is considered adequate.

Having gone through this long process, which takes approximately 10 days, analyses are made from which certain logistic implications are deduced. One of the implications may be: The build-up of the forces is too rapid; that is, it is beyond the capabilities either of the services to assimilate the personnel or it is beyond the capabilities of the Selective Service to induct them. It may be that the over-all requirements of the services for men in uniform are beyond the numbers

estimated to be available and still maintain the production required for the prosecution of the war. Supply implications may indicate the necessity for greater mobilization of war reserves in order to insure provision of equipment during the lag between M-day and full production capacity.

Based on requirements of the plan, there may be indicated a shortage of certain types of equipment. The analysis of aircraft may indicate that the proposed production schedules are not in balance by type of plane although the over-all capacity for producing aircraft is adequate. An analysis of the construction effort may indicate the necessity for pre-D-day requirements for improvement of bases, a better state of readiness for the regular construction units and civilian components, or show a need for greater emphasis on training, organization, and equipment in construction units of the services. An analysis of ports and inland clearances required by the plan may indicate a lack of capacity to support the operation, and in considering various means of transportation, it may well be that, although men and equipment are available, the facilities for transporting them are inadequate, thus rephasing may be necessary.

While certain of these may be considered to be limiting features, they do not necessarily call for a complete revision of the plan. As I mentioned before, the proposed war plan is under consideration by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee. It is still a committee paper. It is to this committee that the Deputy Director for Logistics Plans presents the logistic implications. This is done before the plan is put into the "green"; that is, before it becomes a Joint Chiefs of Staff paper. Assuming that the plan does not require revision but is acceptable as a basis for further planning, it then becomes a report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee. A parallel report is submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Joint Logistics Plans Committee, setting forth the logistic implications of the plan and recommendations regarding preparatory or corrective action as required.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that the estimation of requirements for the outlined war plan as conducted by the Joint Logistics Plans Group is for the sole purpose of developing the logistics implications. The requirements are not submitted to the Munitions Board or to the services; that the logistics implications as developed from the requirements are developed in order to provide the basis for information to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee regarding the practicability of the proposed plan from the logistics standpoint before the plan is submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After the plan is submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it provides the Joint Chiefs of Staff with information regarding the limiting logistics features of the plan recommended for their approval. In

this manner the logistic considerations which are almost invariably the limiting factor in actual military operations, are integrated with strategy.

Thank you.

QUESTION: My question has more or less to do with how broad brush this treatment is that is given this 10-day feasibility test?

COLONEL COOK: That is indicated by the fact that we use the slice method.

QUESTION: You mentioned the translation of POL back to crude. You don't do that with the other supplies, I presume. Do you figure to come up with tons?

COLONEL COOK: That is right. The main function of the Supply Section is to come up with tonnages of supply that are to be transported so that the Transportation Section can determine the number of ships required. Supply, as such, is touched on lightly.

QUESTION: Would you please define clearly for us the difference between assumptions and factors and where each one is applied and where you derive the assumptions and where you derive the factors?

COLONEL COOK: A factor, if you get right down to it, is an assumption. However, it is not considered as such. So far as specific differentiation between them, I might say that assumptions deal directly with the plan. These assumptions may be different for each plan, but factors are something determined from experience and are applicable to all situations. They may be modified for certain climatic conditions or other conditions which are to be expected in the theaters.

QUESTION: Could you give an example of an assumption and an example of a factor, and where you get the assumption and where you get the factor?

COLONEL COOK: In the nature of assumptions, suppose the plan stated that all efforts will be made to keep the Panáma Canal open, but in the event it is closed you will have to go around South America. We have to make an assumption one way or another. Either assume that the canal is going to stay open or assume it is going to be closed during a certain period. A factor may be that each man will require 5/10 measurement tons per month of maintenance equipment, or each man will use one gallon of kerosene per day, based on the over-all forces in the whole theater.

QUESTION: I noticed in your Personnel and Units calculations that you take only divisions, and I was struck by that because I think the Army Corps units are rather large, particularly equipment, which makes transportation requirements quite different. Is there room for huge errors on that?

COLONEL COOK: I am glad you brought that up. If you will notice, the Force Tabs deal specifically with divisions and disregard corps headquarters, army headquarters, and the communications zone. For that reason, then, we determine a theater slice, and the slice is based on all of the supporting forces. We then multiply the slice by the number of divisions engaged to get the over-all population. I would like to read what the experts say:

> "When estimating in place and operational personnel overseas, a division slice of 25,000 to 47,500 is used. The factor selected for an area will depend upon such things as the expected aid from allies and indigenous personnel, the climate, terrain, length of lines of communications, degree of industrialization, and many other questions. The number of divisions operational at any one phase date when multiplied by the selected theater slice will determine the effective operational personnel requirements."

QUESTION: Does slice include strength of the division or is that over and above the strength of the division?

COLONEL COOK: It is the strength of the division plus supporting personnel.

QUESTION: Can you tell us how the Supply Section figures--whether or not it is industrially feasible for the petroleum industry, if you please, to furnish the amount of petroleum that is needed. Where do you tie in with industry on that?

COLONEL COOK: The estimate that is received as to the availability of POL is not only based upon the production of crude oil, but also upon the refining capacity. It may well be that, while there is plenty of crude, refining capacity is inadequate. If you will remember, the purpose of our test is not to determine the industrial feasibility of the plan. That can't be done until all the requirements are determined by the services and given to the Munitions Board. We do get, however, a fair idea as to the feasibility of the plan and that is done so that this long process that is required within the services will be eliminated for a plan that is not considered practicable right at the start.

QUESTION: How well have your factors held up in Korea? Have they required much revision?

COLONEL COOK: I don't know. These plans that I am speaking of didn't envisage Korea.

QUESTION: If I understood correctly, your transportation requirements are just those for the movement of troops, supplies, and so on overseas. Do you take into consideration at all the possibility of a shortage of transportation facilities in the zone of the interior in implementing a plan?

COLONEL COOK: No, we have made the assumption, perhaps erroneously, but we have made the assumption that transportation facilities within the United States, within the zone of the interior, are adequate.

QUESTION: Would you tell us something about what the continuing work of this Plans Group is? You mentioned that more or less 10 days to plan to get one of these plans through. There is a definite limit to possible siuations that could be planned for in advance. Is the group's time taken up primarily with revisions? What do they do after the 10 days are up?

COLONEL COOK: No, this function of the group is just one of the many. This group is the agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that handles practically all the logistic matters. If you will notice, there are other committees that handle certain logistic features, such as the Joint Military Transportation Committee and the Joint Munitions Allocations Committee. That is about all on that chart that I notice, but most logistic matters of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are handed to the group for study. This feasibility test happens not too often and, as I mentioned, it takes roughly 10 days for the technical sections to go through the procedure and approximately two weeks for the over-all test itself.

QUESTION: This is a littlt bit along the line of another question but I am interested in determining who establishes the loss and damage factor, for instance in aircraft. Is that determined in the technical section or is it determined by the Air Force and the Navy, or by your Strategic Plans Group?

COLONEL COOK: The information that the aircraft section uses comes mainly from the Air Force and from the Navy. If there is a doubt within the group as to the accuracy of this information, the group, of course, will use what it considers the best data. However, in general, the factors employed throughout the Joint Logistics Plans Group are those derived by the services themselves.

I failed to mention, once these tests are completed by the group, they go to our Joint Logistics Plans Committee, which is made up of service members plus the deputy director for Logistics Plans. Then the services get these tests and start tearing them apart if they don't like them. The test is not something that is worked up by the Joint Staff without regard to reality or without regard to the services. The services themselves comment on the tests and don't hesitate to state anything they find out of line. As a matter of fact, in order to test the procedure and the accuracy of our calculations, we have had ad hoc committees go through certain of the procedure. That was done in connection with construction and also with aircraft. But the job of the group is to join the various data from the three services and come up with a joint answer. The information which the group put in may be exactly that which is provided by each service and then again it may be a consideration by the group itself.

QUESTION: I notice that in the hoppers you have a lot of assumptions that are always poured in by each section. I am wondering when the Joint Chiefs of Staff war plan comes out, to what extent are these assumptions contained as a part of the plan so that the services and the Munitions Board, when they are conducting the over-all feasibility test, know what assumptions the Joint Staff has made, for example, the transportation in the ZI would be adequate. Maybe, if they knew that was being assumed in studying the feasibility of it, they might be able to have a revision on that assumption. To what extent are all these assumptions contained in the report?

COLONEL COOK: The assumptions used are for JLPG testing purposes and are subject to challenge as detailed planning develops. This whole test is for the sole purpose of stating that the plan is acceptable for further planning. The planning done by the services is based on their own information and their own determination of what their particular jobs are to be.

QUESTION: Aren't there some assumptions that go with the plan when it is turned over to the Munitions Board? Don't you have to make some assumptions for its guidance?

COLONEL COOK: This plan is turned over to the Munitions Board only for information. The plan actually, for working purposes, goes to the services. The services then make up their requirements and furnish them to the Munitions Board. As a matter of fact, in the first plan that was put out for mobilization planning purposes, the Munitions Board was furnished with what was called a "sanitized" version of the plan; it may not be furnished with the plan itself.

QUESTION: I am interested in the personnel that you have to staff these technical sections. I understand that there are only 100 officers

in the whole staff of the JCS. How many people are there in each of those six technical sections? Are they only members of this 100 as a total or do they borrow people from the services? Just who are in those sections and how many of them are there?

COLONEL COOK: The officers connected with the tests, four project officers and 17 in the technical sections--three in each one of the technical sections, with the exception of Aircraft, which has only one from the Navy and one from the Air Force. No members of the services are formally assigned to assist in the test. However, not only in connection with this particular work, but with all the work that is done in the Joint Staff liaison is maintained with the services by each one of these members of the technical services. They must know what their service is doing in regard to their specialty at all times. So you might say, based on that, yes, they are assisted by the services because they have accumulated that information. But there are no people actually sent down to assist. Now in the case of Aircraft, it may well be that, depending on the time that we have to conduct the test, all calculations as to the requirements of aircraft will be made by the Air Force and by the Navy and given to us for consolidation.

QUESTION: I think my question has been inferentially answered, but for my own clarification, I would like to ask it. I am more interested in these assumptions than in the factors. Factors seem to be based on experience; assumptions, not necessarily. But is the assumption made irrefutable or is it subject to rebuttal when it comes to the services for calculations of requirements. I rather assumed from the answer that assumptions were made for the purpose of determining whether the plan should be given further consideration and, in that sense, when it was given further consideration by the technical services, that the technical services could refute those phasing assumptions. I don't know. What is the situation on that?

COLONEL COOK: I gave the wrong impression. The outcome of this test is contained in a report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff which recommends that they note these various implications and the recommendations in regard to the plan. Then that report is finished. The JCS, in considering the plan as given to them, note these various conclusions and decide whether or not the plan should go forward; whether it should be returned for revision; whether they will revise it themselves right there; or what will happen. Only the broad outline plan goes to the services. They never have an opportunity to challenge these additional logistic assumptions or to use them except through the committee members.

The Joint Logistics Plans Committee is made up of members of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force and the deputy director of Logistics Plans. In the beginning, the logistics sections of the services have an opportunity to comment on these assumptions that have been used.

It is still a committee paper when they can challenge it. There is a logistic plan that is supposed to accompany the plan or follow it. But that is another subject.

QUESTION: You mentioned critical items only to the extent that the Supply Section was highlighting them. Can you amplify that a bit so as to indicate any special treatment they give and what kind of implications they come out with in regard to critical items?

COLONEL COOK: Obviously, it is not possible for the Supply Section to determine requirements for various end items. The time is too short and the personnel are too few. The section does get information, however, from each of the services as to what they consider to be in short supply. Now I will make up one.

Suppose that the Force Tabs called for a certain number of armored divisions at a certain date. They may be able to get the men, but due to the short period of time, they can't get tanks. The implication there may be, "If you wish to deploy these armored divisions on this date, they will be deployed with 50 percent of the organizational equipment."

COMMENT: Do you want to tell them a little bit about liaison in the beginning between JLPG and JSPG?

COLONEL COOK: Yes, thank you. I mentioned that this strategic plan was developed by a team in the War Plans Section of the Joint Strategic Plans Group. I failed to mention at the same time that a logistician of the Joint Logistics Plans Group was working with this team, that certain logistic implications, or features, or factors--whatever you want to call them--are taken up as the plan is developed, and that is where the concurrent planning really starts.

CAPTAIN DAVISSON: Colonel Cook, on behalf of the Commandant, the faculty and the student body, I thank you for a very interesting morning, a lively question period, and an instructive presentation, not to mention the beautiful charts. Thank you.

(21 Dec 1950--750)S.


NOTE: BOXES WITH BLACK SHADING INDICATE JOINT STAFF ORGANIZATION
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE J.C.S. ON MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE OF U.N.
DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF
SECRETARY DEPUTY SECRETARY & SECRETARIAT
HISTORICAL SECTION
JOINT STRATEGIC PLANS COMMITTEE
JOINT LOGISTICS PLANS COMMITTEE
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
JOINT STRATEGIC PLANS GROUP
JOINT LOGISTICS PLANS GROUP
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
ASSISTANT DIRECTORS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER
PROJECT OFFICERS
JOINT INTELLIGENCE GROUP
WAR PLANS SECTION
POLICY, TRAINING & ORGANIZATION SECTION
INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SECTION
PHOTOGRAPHIC AND SURVEY SECTION
TECHNICAL SECTIONS
SUPPLY
TRANSPORT'N
CONSTRUCT'N
PERSONNEL & UNITS
POL (PETROLEUM)
AIRCRAFT
JOINT METEOROLOGICAL COMMITTEE
JOINT COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS COMMITTEE
JOINT ADVANCED STUDY COMMITTEE
U.S. - CANADA SECTION MILITARY COOPERATION COMMITTEE
JOINT MILITARY TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE
JOINT MUNITIONS ALLOCATIONS COMMITTEE

CHART 2

DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMED FORCES

(IN PLACE AND OPERATIONAL)

ARMY-NAVY-AIR FORCE

	D-DAY	D+3	D+6	D+9	D+12	D+15	D+18	D+21	D+24	D+36
I. DEPLOYMENT OF ARMY FORCES										
DEFENSE OF AREA V										
INF DIV	2	3	5	7	10	14	20	16	8	8
ARMD DIV	1	2	4	8	10	14	16	10	2	2
A/B DIV	1/2	1 1/2	3	6	7	8	12	6	-	-
INF RCT	1	2	4	5	6	6	6	2	-	-
ARMD CAV REGT	1/2	1	2	3	3	4	5	2	2	2
AA BN	6	8	12	16	20	28	40	32	16	16
II. DEPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES										
OPERATIONS IN AREA "A"										
CARRIER STRIKING FORCE										
CV/CVB	1	4	8	8	8	10	12	16	16	18
CA/CL/CLAA	4	6	10	10	12	16	24	24	24	30
DD/DE/DD-E-R	20	24	48	48	52	60	72	80	96	120
BB/CB	1	1	2	2	4	8	8	8	8	10
III. DEPLOYMENT OF AIR FORCES										
SECURE AREA VI										
H/B GPS	2	3	3	4	6	7	8	8	4	2
M/B GPS	3	4	5	6	7	9	9	9	4	2
STRAT RCN GPS (WX)	1	3	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	3
STRAT RCN GPS (PHOTO)	1	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	2	2
ESCORT FTR GPS	7	7	10	12	14	15	18	18	10	5
TAC RCN GPS	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	4	3
A/C C & W SQS	2	3	3	4	4	4	5	5	5	4

NOTES:
1. ONLY ONE SERVICE IS NORMALLY SHOWN PER FORCE TAB.
2. EACH FORCE TAB NORMALLY WILL SHOW A RECAPITULATION OF UNITS DEPLOYED BY PHASE DATES.
3. PLANNERS MUST COMPUTE SUPPORT PERSONNEL AS REQUIRED TO BACK-UP ALL DEPLOYMENTS.


INFO & COORDINATION
FORCE TABS
PERSONNEL ASSUMPTIONS
PERSONNEL & UNITS
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TO CONSTRUCTION
TO TRANSPORTATION
PERSONNEL IMPLICATIONS
TO POL
TO SUPPLY

718


A/C ASSUMPTIONS
FORCE TABS
INFO & COORDINA-TION
AIRCRAFT
AVAILABILITY
TO POL
TO CONSTRUCTION
TO TRANSPORTATION
A/C IMPLICATIONS


CONSTRUCT-
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SECTION
PERSONNEL
&
UNITS
SECT.
INFO &
COORDINA-
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SUPPLY
ASSUMPTIONS
SUPPLY
SECTION
AVAILABILITY
TO TRANSPORTATION
SUPPLY
IMPLICATIONS

720


CONCEPT & FORCE TABS
PERSONNEL & UNITS SECT. DEPLOY-MENT
SPECIAL RQM'TS. FROM OTHER SECTIONS
INFO & COORDINA-TION
CONSTRUCTION ASSUMPTIONS
CONSTRUCTION
AVAILABILITY
TO SUPPLY
CONSTRUCTION IMPLICATIONS


AIRCRAFT SECTION
PERSONNEL & UNITS SECT.
INFO & COORDINATION
POL ASSUMPTIONS
POL
AVAILABILITY
TO CONSTRUCTION
TO TRANSPORTATION
POL IMPLICATIONS

722


AIRCRAFT SECTION
SUPPLY SECTION
PERSONNEL & UNITS SECT.
INFO & COORDINA-TION
POL SECTION
CARGO
TRAINED PERSONNEL
TRANSPORTATION
AVAILABILITY
TO CONSTRUCTION
TRANSPORTATION IMPLICATIONS
TRANSPORTATION ASSUMPTIONS

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