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CRITICAL TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS IN THE ARMED FORCES

1 March 1951

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MR. HILL: Today we have the third and final lecture on transportation. The first one described the part which transportation plays in industrial mobilization; the second stressed the role of the railroads, which provided the bulk of the transportation effort in World War II; and succeeding lectures and seminars have brought out the operating problems of several types of carriers.

But it is important for us to know the part which the armed services play as users of the transportation service. Colonel Viney, our speaker this morning, is in a position to discuss this matter. He is the Deputy Director of Military Traffic Service, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which is a traffic-management group. His subject, "Critical Transportation Problems in the Armed Forces," is of vital interest to all in this class.

We welcome Colonel Viney to this platform, as an alumnus of the Industrial College, class of 1948. Colonel Viney.

COLONEL VINEY: Thank you, Mr. Hill. General Holman and gentlemen: It is, of course, an honor to be called upon to present a subject to this college. It is also a responsibility of some magnitude to attempt to outline in a useful form some of the problems of the armed forces in the field of transportation. As with every problem closely involved in our progress toward unification, it is not a simple static situation which I must discuss. The fact that substantial change is going on, however, makes it important for you to gain a degree of familiarity with what is current.

As students of logistics you are fully aware of the importance of transportation and of the importance of transportation serving the military need. If you can't deliver an item to the place where it is needed, you not only might as well not produce it, but you'd better not waste the production.

Transportation is involved in every aspect of our modern economy; and since every resource of that economy must be used to support a modern war, no transportation problems exist which may not be of military concern. This, I am sure, has at least partly come home to you in your studies of production and resource problems. The very fact that we must interest ourselves in so many matters beyond the mere movement of men and supplies in a campaign makes organization to consider these many interests complicated.

Also, it is not possible to take the command aspect of "what" and the technical aspect of "how" and keep them completely apart. This fact may be either ignored or overstressed at times. I mention it because that, as

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well as habit and tradition, also contributes to the sort of transportation relationships we have in our Department of Defense.

I have no chart of transportation to show, since I am sure that by now you all have a clear mental picture of the way the three military departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense fit together.

At the top, of course, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for the strategic and logistic plans; so they set up many of the basic requirements for transportation. The Munitions Board, in its industrial mobilization planning, may establish additional requirements. Under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Military Transportation Committee handles the matter of priorities and allocations. Within the Munitions Board is a section which must plan programs and analyze the effects of mobilization upon our commercial transportation system.

Subject to the transportation policies and guidance from these sources the three departments must operate. Their operations range from local trucking at an installation to the running of extensive systems like the Military Air Transport Service and the Military Sea Transportation Service, or the railroads of Korea. Planning for these jobs and procuring the equipment and trained personnel is a part of the operation. Another part is the dispatch and receipt of freight from the small parcel-post package to the trainload or shipload quantity.

The departments are not alike in the organizations through which these functions are performed. MATS, for example, operates under a JCS charter and MSTS under a directive from the Secretary of Defense. The Army concentrates substantially all operation under a chief of transportation, while in the Navy bureaus other than Supplies and Accounts have substantial functions. The Air Force tends to delegate more authority to field installations, and the Army to retain more at the departmental level. These differences do not arise because of "wrong-headedness" but have largely developed for good reasons, often intimately connected with the characteristics of the supply system and the operating forces.

So much, briefly, for the internal organization of transportation. I should like now to touch upon traffic management. That is a relatively new term in the military vocabulary and, in fact, is not too old in American business. Basically, it pertains to use of commercial transportation--how to move the traffic most efficiently and economically. It is not concerned with determining what is to be moved, when, or to what destination, but is concerned with the means to be used, the routes to be followed, and the costs.

Recognition of the need for good traffic management existed for several years before a mechanism to obtain it finally emerged. The military departments individually made efforts each within its own field, but being uncoordinated frequently failed to accomplish as much as was desired. Ultimately, and after much travail, an office known as the

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Military Traffic Service was established in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It is a nonoperating policy and coordinating office and has so far succeeded admirably in avoiding empire building.

In the most part, the Military Traffic Service works on a relatively informal basis directly with the three departmental agencies--the Chief of Transportation of the Army; the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts of the Navy; and the Director of Maintenance, Supply and Services of the Air Force. They in turn work through their field agencies, ZI Army and installation transportation officers, Naval Central Freight Control Offices, and Air Commands and Air Forces.

I'll give you a couple of examples of traffic management functions so you will recognize what they are like.

A couple of months ago the railroads requested the Interstate Commerce Commission to permit canceling tourist fares. Now many troop movements are made on tourist fares at real savings. The military departments succeeded in having the cancellation suspended pending a hearing and then presented at the hearing their reasons for continuing the tourist fares for military use. The decision has not yet been announced but in the meanwhile we are saving about a million dollars a year.

A system, nationwide, has been set up to provide ready means for obtaining permits, when essential, for the movement of overweight military cargoes over the highways. This both facilitates essential movements and helps to save the highways from irresponsible truckers who like to claim military need when they are caught.

Everything, however, is not so simple and straightforward as might seem from the foregoing. The armed forces are not the only agencies concerned with transportation and traffic management. You all know of the regulatory bodies--the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board. There is, in addition, the Department of Agriculture involved in transportation of agricultural products, the Department of the Interior involved in pipeline transportation, the Bureau of Public Roads, the Maritime Administration, the Inland Waterways Corporation, and the General Services Administration among the permanent agencies, and under the Defense Production Act and the Executive orders there are the Defense Transport Administration and the Office of Defense Mobilization in addition to emergency responsibilities imposed on the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Department of the Interior, and the Department of Commerce.

Time would not permit tracing out for you either the operational and traffic management functions of each or the complex relationships which exist among them and with the Department of Defense. It is not important for you to know those details, but it is important that you realize they

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exist and that proper understanding of them is essential to the accomplishment of the mission of the Department of Defense. Those details can materially affect both production and the support of forces.

Now, it is perhaps well to consider what goes into the making of transportation policies. The effects upon the supply systems and pipelines are so familiar to you that the point need not be stressed beyond noting that any policies which can increase responsiveness and velocity of flow will permit reductions in stock levels and produce pyramiding economies. Too, transportation policies must always be made with full appreciation of the responsibilities and authorities which must inhere in command. Contrarywise, it is important that command not abuse its authority and so defeat its own needs. Because transportation is so essential, and because the organization and procedures of the departments are different, transportation policies have evolved very slowly and even now are quite broad and general. The matter of assignment of responsibilities, a purely policy matter, is indicative. I merely invite your attention to the background involved in the establishment of MSTS and MATS, and to the matter of land transportation responsibility in overseas areas.

Clearly, too, policies on transportation must be such as to permit good traffic management, assure fullest use of all transportation resources, and must result in there being adequate transportation for production and the domestic economy generally. Policies which will promote a strong and diversified commercial transportation system are obviously desirable.

Almost all other logistical functions either affect or are affected by transportation policies. Packaging, storage requirements, contract placement, and site locations are among those which come to mind.

There is no single compilation of transportation policies. From the organizational arrangement I described earlier you could scarcely expect one. There are policies on specific points enunciated by the Munitions Board or the Joint Chiefs and the individual departments have policies set forth in the form of regulations or directives. One example of a Department of Defense policy statement is that pertaining to traffic management. As I said, this pertains basically to the employment of commercial transportation. This policy statement covers four major subjects; (1) negotiation, (2) routing, (3) equipment use, and (4) highway utilization. It was prepared giving due weight to the various factors I previously mentioned. After preparation, it was issued on a preliminary basis for a 60-day tryout, was then modified in the light of that experience, and placed in full effect in its present form.

In order to make such a set of policies work, something more than mere publication is necessary. Procedures must be established which will cause action and obtain participation by all appropriate elements of the several departments.

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In the field of rates and rate negotiations, two means are employed. First, there is a committee which meets weekly to consider specific topics. I have here a typical agenda from which I will read a few of the subjects. Second, a compilation has been made of negotiations currently in process by the three departments. The first such compilation disclosed a total of 163 cases, but review and examination in the committee is resulting in weeding out many of trivial value and is concentrating effort on those of importance. One negotiation of major interest has to do with transit privileges for ammunition. "Transit," for those unfamiliar with the term, is an arrangement which permits stop-over for processing and subsequent movement to final destination at the rate which would have applied on the through movement. Success in this negotiation is estimated to be worth at least \$300,000 per year under present conditions.

A similar approach is used in connection with loading rules and techniques. Proper loading is of major importance in preventing loss and damage. Aside from the economic loss, military shippers are concerned that the needed items do arrive on time and undamaged. Insurance cannot compensate for lack of a critical item in combat. Arrangements are now being completed for holding seminars on rail loading at various military installations throughout the country.

What I have so far discussed is more or less by way of background. I am also supposed to present to you some of the current transportation problems we face. They have by no means all been solved and some of you, before too many months, may be working on one or another of them.

A number of related problems exist in the field of equipment supply. Questions presently being considered include:

1. The types of locomotives that should be procured for overseas use. Should they be Diesel, the most efficient and trouble-free or should they burn coal, to use indigenous supplies?
2. Should we continue 100 percent reliance on airlift for movement of the wounded in the United States or should we provide hospital trains for some or all?
3. In the face of probable reduction in automotive production how shall the supply of parts for military-owned commercial-type vehicles be assured? What steps should be taken by the Department of Defense to assure parts for commercial truck and bus operations?
4. Tank cars, particularly pressure tank cars, are needed in greater numbers to support defense production. Since they will be in commercial service, should the military departments be concerned? If the number exceeds those that can be used profitably after a period of defense production, can industry be expected to make this investment?

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Administrative problems can be important too. Many small shipments are made, sometimes for local convenience and sometimes to meet urgent specific shortages. Many such shipments go astray and a means of follow-up is needed. Also, on most such shipments the paper work is just as complicated as on a large shipment. There are over 2 million shipments a year now and that figure can be expected to go over 10 million in full mobilization. Each one has 10 papers. The sheer mass of 100 million papers requiring action is appalling and each set of 10 costs about \$7 to handle. Presently over 40 percent of the shipments are "small," involving a transportation cost averaging about \$9, that is only slightly more than the paper work costs. Consolidation into larger shipments will help. Simplification of the paper work would help still more--if a satisfactory way can be devised.

Another knotty problem has to do with motor-carrier service. As you are probably aware, such carriers are licensed by the Interstate Commerce Commission and in order to secure authority to operate must, in general, show that public convenience and necessity will be served. Where military installations are served by rail, the question as to whether or not additional service by motor carrier is needed frequently arises. Motor carriers, of course, in the interest of increasing their business often solicit support. The position generally taken is that where use can be anticipated of motor carriers, the existence of such service should be supported although no individual carrier as such should receive the support. Emergency rights for motor carriers to meet specific unusual problems can be secured without difficulty from the Interstate Commerce Commission. Therefore, the problem involved is one of long-term policy rather than of emergency character, and being of a long-term nature relates closely to the establishment and maintenance of a strong and vigorous transportation system.

I referred previously to the matter of tourist fares. The method by which that action was handled is fairly typical. It was first determined through conferences with the departments that a real basis for military participation existed. The Department of the Army was then assigned the responsibility for the preparation of the case and its presentation. That department, using both transportation and legal personnel and working closely with the Departments of the Navy and the Air Force, prepared numerous exhibits analyzing the costs of operation, the returns to be anticipated based on the occupancy normal to troop movements, the frequency of troop movements, and similar related information. This particular case was the first major one so handled and the quality of the presentation and of the testimony was markedly superior to any previous instances.

Another problem of considerable interest has to do with the position the Department of Defense will take with respect to locomotive construction. You undoubtedly have made studies in your earlier courses on the petroleum requirements and availabilities. Everyone recognizes that a Diesel locomotive is more economical and efficient than is a coal-burning steam locomotive. But even so, can we afford to build more Diesel locomotives?

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Some months ago the Department of Defense quite informally discussed the problems of transportation with representatives of the Association of American Railroads and urged that no further scrapping of coal-burning steam locomotives having in excess of 50,000 pounds tractive effort be permitted. The railroads acceded to this suggestion and, in addition, are retaining those associated facilities such as watering and coaling stations which had not previously been dismantled or disposed of.

The Petroleum Administration for Defense has been requested to make a further careful evaluation of the energy situation in order that the Department of Defense may determine what position it should take in supporting proposals for Diesel locomotive construction during the third quarter of this calendar year.

Perhaps a sketch of the problems posed by the recent rail strikes would be of interest. As you know, road-haul operations were not greatly affected and many yards and terminals were likewise involved either briefly or not at all. A number of major centers, gateways, and major interchange points were seriously impeded. Freight movements, particularly transcontinentally, were rapidly coming to a halt.

The Department of Defense had spearheaded a series of meetings after the December strike to try to work out a means of coping with such interruptions. This group included the military services and numerous civilian agencies, the Defense Transport Administration, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Post Office Department, the Civil Aeronautics Board, Civil Defense Administration, Petroleum Administration for Defense, Department of Commerce, and so on. Some 16 orders had been prepared for use as needed. Only a few actually were used. The postal embargo was, of course, the first; then each railroad was authorized to embargo itself and to reroute traffic to avoid the trouble spots. An Interstate Commerce Commission order established an agent for controlling tank car use and movements; commercial truckers were ordered to give priority to military and postal cargoes. Concurrently the military departments reduced all but the most urgent shipments, assisted the railroads to locate cars of critical nature, transferred many shipments to truck, accepted and unloaded tank cars around the clock, and provided local help for stranded personnel.

The net result was that urgent and critical materials of the military got through, troop movements were only slightly delayed, and ships were able to sail about as scheduled. However, many producers were being shut down and, in time, a definite decrease in overseas shipments would have been inevitable. Summaries of the lessons learned from each of these strikes were prepared and will assist us in the future. The so-called emergency committee is to continue to function, although responsibility for its activity has now been transferred to the Office of Defense Mobilization.

I hope, gentlemen, that what I have given you will be helpful not only in your course here at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces but

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in your work later. I have tried to indicate to you the organizational and policy situation existing and the sorts of problems being faced by the whole Department of Defense; I have refrained from touching on the detailed problems of the individual services. If you have received the impression that change and adaptation are proceeding rapidly, you will be correct. Do not, however, let that lead you to believe that the situation is formless or that a competent job is not being done. The services have done and continue to do excellent work. They are more and more working together and depending upon each other to the benefit of all.

Thank you.

QUESTION: Colonel, in the last emergency several instances arose where one service was competing with another to move a body of troops-- "right now!" Where is that competition resolved at this time? Is that done in your shop?

COLONEL VINEY: We are working in that area now because of the fact that transportation equipment is beginning to become critical. Policy is presently about to be issued which will prescribe the procedures for moving back into less and less desirable sorts of accommodations as further shortages arise. We are not attempting at the moment to place it all under one head. We believe the time is too early for that. We are not attempting at the present time to make mandatory use of coaches, for example, for 36-hour trips. The time has not yet reached the critical phase on that. However, I think that will later be required, at which time we will establish the policy in that respect and, where necessary, will establish a control point on that.

QUESTION: Along that same line, I know in the lower levels of the Army there has been a great deal done in consolidating cargo shipments. I have known of several instances where there would have been a lot of money saved if there could have been consolidation by the Army and the Navy--we'll say both--having installations in the same area, having one consolidating point from the LCL shipments.

I wonder, has any progress been made or considered along that line?

COLONEL VINEY: Yes; that problem is under consideration at the present time. You may recall that in World War II there were established some central consolidating stations. One of the major operations was in Chicago where small cargo was consolidated and moved in carload lots to both the west and east coasts. Both the Army and the Navy participated in that. The Army ran it and the Navy used it. This present study derives partly from certain experiences during the strike and the inability to locate critical, small lots of material. A test is being run, which will start 15 March 1951, on the use of the commercial freight forwarders. They will provide a manifest service, will do the consolidating in specific areas, and transport in carload lots at reduced rates to specific destination areas. We are not sure how successful that is going to be, but it is an attack on that problem.

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QUESTION: Colonel, my question involves a phase of transportation you only lightly touched on, that is, management control, which does not really become too important until the squeeze gets on transportation.

During the last war, ODT was established as the controlling agency and the Chief of Transportation acted as its agent, particularly in releasing the export shipments that went out. What is proposed as a coordinating agency for that function in case of another emergency? Is your MTS going to go into that operating business or is there a plan to delegate that to one of the departments?

COLONEL VINEY: We are not going into the operating business. I can assure you of that. For one thing, we simply could not handle it. We do expect that there will be a consolidated operation. It has not yet been formalized or worked out in detail. There is agreement on the part of the Navy to use the installations of the Army by placing their own people in them to handle the export releases and traffic control problem involved there.

Now, going back one step further, on the traffic control we try to distinguish that as a command responsibility rather than a technical coordinating responsibility such as Traffic Management has. We do not attempt to affect urgencies or priorities.

QUESTION: You mentioned that for each procurement transaction you had to prepare 10 copies. From that I gather that there were an awful lot of different agencies double-checking on each other. Would you please go into where those copies go, and what they do with them after they get them?

COLONEL VINEY: No, sir, I will not. I cannot tell you where all 10 copies go. There are about eight copies of the original bill of lading itself. Certain of those copies are turned over to the carrier to use. They make their final billing on them and submit them for recheck. This whole batch of supporting vouchers are finally billed, paid, and then referred to the General Accounting Office where, again, there are additional supporting figures. But I cannot describe their destination.

QUESTION: I am interested in your observations about planning for overseas rail transport. It seems to me that one of the problems under discussion is the advisability of Diesels vs. coal-burning locomotives. Are you also considering the problem of differences in rail gauges that you might run into?

COLONEL VINEY: No. We are not a planning organization in that area. I know they are considering it in the Army Transportation Corps.

QUESTIONER: But if we get into any operation on Russian soil or on Spanish or Portugese soil we will run into broad-gauge railroads; whereas in many of the countries in the Far East we run into narrow-gauge railroads.

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COLONEL VINEY: That's right. That is a mobilization and strategic planning responsibility which falls under the jurisdiction of the Munitions Board and the departments. It is being considered; I can assure you of that.

QUESTION: Colonel, you mentioned transit freight rates. To what extent are we able to get transit rates on supplies destined for overseas? Are there an awful lot of holding and reconsignment points?

COLONEL VINEY: At the present time we are getting almost none. As I said, there were some transit privileges granted during the last war. We hope to broaden those. The railroads are pretty generally in agreement that they will grant transit privileges on ammunition. They have not yet made a statement as to other commodities.

That is all tied up with another long series of complications stemming from the so-called reparations cases. You will recall that as a result of certain congressional and other investigations that were made back in 1945 and 1946 the Department of Justice entered cases against the rail carriers for several billion dollars primarily because of alleged overcharges. Now the railroads are a little bit cautious about entering into any further agreements until they know the outcome of those cases.

That takes me back to one other point which I might touch on briefly, and that is this so-called section 22 agreement. Under the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Law, any carrier is authorized to transport for the Federal Government or for other government agencies at a reduced cost or for free if they want to do so. It was those sorts of agreements that led finally to the reparations cases. In other words, the allegation was that while the railroads made a concession, they should have made a greater concession.

Now, in the past the form of the agreement has been pretty nebulous. Looking at some of them, we found, as a matter of fact, some of them on the backs of envelopes and in other places. They were offered in 1897 and are still in effect. We are now attempting to draft an agreement the railroads and other carriers will find acceptable which will give them a little more protection against such antitrust and excess-charge cases as those present reparations cases.

QUESTION: In order to help this picture that you painted about the average cost of shipment being \$9 and paper work about \$7 for those shipments, do you know what percent of our tonnage is carried in carload lots?

COLONEL VINEY: No; I can't give you that figure. I have it over in my office, but I can't give it to you now. (Slightly over 70 percent of tonnage in carload.)

QUESTION: The legal barrier to movement in interstate commerce by highway has been a rather serious nuisance to military traffic. At the time of the last emergency there was a special order issued covering

those shipments, which order I think was rescinded at the end of the emergency. What is the status now of any legislation or order that will permit the free flow of military goods by highway?

COLONEL VINEY: I know of no legislation pending on the subject. The Administrator of Defense Transportation has a committee which met for the first time yesterday. That was one of the subjects on the agenda. There is a great deal of conflict in it. It is not an easy problem to solve--I mean conflict from the Federal level as to what is the right answer.

We have, on the one hand, the military and other government shippers and those interested in the shipment of defense material by commercial bills of lading, who would like to see that limitation made uniform and higher. We have also in the Federal Government the Bureau of Public Roads; it would like to get 5 billion dollars to build more highways and repair existing ones. But we do not want to put 5 billion dollars more in taxes out on that sort of thing. It is a question that is going to have to be solved, not solely on the basis of its being the easiest and most efficient way of moving traffic. But it is under consideration, as I say, by the Defense Transportation Administration and its advisory people.

QUESTION: Colonel, could you tell us what the plans are in a full-scale war for moving oil to the east coast? Are we going to build more pipelines, inland waterways, or what have you?

COLONEL VINEY: I cannot answer that question. Perhaps I had better make my position a little clearer. Military Traffic Service has rather religiously stayed out of long-range planning. That is a Munitions Board function and has to do with transportation and production, the long-range aspects. I know of no definite plans for that. That is going to be a problem, but how much of one I think will depend on enemy action.

That is the best answer I can give you.

QUESTION: How does the Military Traffic Service tie in with the Defense Transportation Agency, or whatever it is? Do you have to depend on them for priority orders? Are those planning agencies taking care of the priorities, and so on?

COLONEL VINEY: The Defense Transportation Administration is only one of the emergency agencies interested in transportation. They have the land transportation responsibility in the ZI, including ports but excepting pipeline transportation. The Department of Commerce, with its CAB, Bureau of Public Roads, and Maritime Administration has another substantial chunk of the transportation problem. The third is the Interior Department with the pipeline problem.

There is no very formal and tight coordination except through committee and good will. So far, the military establishment has had no

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difficulty in dealing with those agencies and getting what we want. They will have to establish certain priorities, or have them established, at a still higher level. ODM has to allocate transportation capabilities between the domestic economy and the military. That will be probably a major problem and that problem is being met through the steps now being taken. Yesterday an Executive order was issued which more accurately defines the relative responsibilities of DTA and Commerce--Commerce on the two sides--Maritime Administration and CAB. Under DTA, as I indicated earlier, there is a committee on which a wide variety of people are represented, including those I mentioned as having a transportation interest. There is to be established under Mr. Wilson a high level committee on transportation, which will be basically a referee committee. In other words, where they cannot get mutual agreement, it will decide.

QUESTION: Colonel, you mentioned a study that is going on as to whether or not we would continue procuring Diesel railroad locomotives. It appears to me there are two areas where a greater petroleum saving could have been made and still increase your haulage capacity; that is, to supply your railroads with Diesels and cut out your motor freight and also your fuel-burning steam engines.

Now, is anything going on in that study or is it all going to be limited to Diesels?

COLONEL VINEY: No. The energy study that we have requested PAD to conduct for us, and which of course will be thoroughly checked by our own petroleum board, will cover the whole subject.

But as to the motor freight, there is no possibility of cutting that out. We found that out very definitely--if we needed to find it out--in these last strikes. Motor freight is involved in almost every move that is made. Even though the long haul may be by rail, there is the delivery problem and the pickup problem at either end. The flexibility of the motor carrier is something we cannot lose. We must retain it and retain it pretty actively. The motor industry does expect to have some reduction take place in its ability to haul as the war goes on; but it cannot be a very major one.

QUESTION: You mentioned the critical shortage that is developing in the movement of troops. Do you happen to know what the status of the World War II fleet of tourist sleepers and troop cars is at the present time? What plan is being made to augment the existing transportation handling of troops?

COLONEL VINEY: First, I would like to correct an impression that you seemed to have gained. We do not consider the present situation critical so far as troop movement is concerned. It is becoming difficult in some spots, but it is not critical yet. We expect it may become so, however.

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Now, the troop-sleeper fleet that was produced late in World War II-- in fact, a substantial part of it was not completed until after the war-- was largely dissipated. They were really modified box cars. The tourist fleet of the commercial carriers has been reduced considerably below that available in World War II. As a safeguard, the Army, about two years ago, requested the Pullman Company to place certain of those cars on Army tracks where they would be given free storage in return for the Pullman Company not scrapping them. There are some 321 of those presently under discussion. Negotiations are going on today with the Pullman Company for the rehabilitation of those cars and placing of them in service. The possibility exists that they will be purchased by the Government--not by the military establishment, but by General Services-- and placed under operational agreements with the railroads. That is only the first step.

A design has been worked up for a 3-deck sleeper on a standard steel sleeping-car or coach-car frame which will permit reconversion after the war. We may soon have to go into production of that type of equipment. The problem at the moment is pretty badly complicated because the Pullman Company has also entered a request for an increase in tourist fares. The agreements, you will remember, that were entered into in World War II for the troop sleepers, to which you referred, had to do with cars having an occupancy of 28 people. Now we are talking about cars with an occupancy of around 54. I do know that is a problem that is under consideration.

MR. HILL: In that connection, sir, it seems to me a very good point has been brought out, namely, that the trend in the construction of sleeping cars is toward the roomette type which, of course, is not a volume carrier. Have you come to any conclusion regarding the attitude which you will take toward the taking over of the deluxe equipment? In other words, will you have a program of renovation and re-establishment of the 12-section drawing-room cars in lieu of the roomette?

COLONEL VINEY: No. We have not proposed to go into the deluxe equipment. There are some over 2,000 of the standard type cars, either standard Pullman 12-16 section Pullmans or of the tourist-type Pullmans available, one way or another, at the present time. The only consideration towards the use of the so-called deluxe type that has been given has to do with their use as an emergency means of moving patients.

The general attitude is that the present fleet of sleeping cars probably will wholly be required to meet the domestic requirements, including individual military travel that will occur in time of mobilization. We cannot afford to reduce that below its present level because, bear in mind, concurrently we will be reducing air capacity. Many of the airlines will have to give up planes for other purposes. So that this type of travel must be provided for in some way. The production job cannot go on without it.

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QUESTION: Colonel, we have had several speakers on the platform who gave somewhat conflicting estimates of the present freight car situation. From the position you are in, are you able to give us your estimate as to the adequacy of the freight cars now available? Is it below the number that will become available based on present contracts?

COLONEL VINEY: We regard it as being quite inadequate. The present fleet of freight cars is below the World War II level, although the age of them is somewhat better; in other words, they are younger. The military departments have supported the allocation of steel for the present freight car program, which was 10,000 cars a month. That has been reduced to 9,000, not because we don't think they need them but because the production is not sufficient to use more than enough steel for 9,000 cars.

I touched on the critical nature of the tank-car program. We are making a very strenuous effort to separate that from the freight-car program and get it as a separate program. And because it is so critical, we may go to the point of giving a military DO priority for the steel required for that.

QUESTION: You spoke of the relationship of your office with the heads of transportation in the three departments. Would you tell us what the relationship of your office is to the MATS and MSTS?

COLONEL VINEY: We are an OSD agency. We work directly with the secretaries of the three departments. Our working relations with the people I mentioned--the Chief of Transportation; Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts; and the Director of Maintenance, Supply and Services of the Air Force--are relatively informal so that any directive, any policies that are promulgated are addressed to the secretaries of the three departments. MSTS is wholly a naval operation under the jurisdiction of the Chief of Naval Operations. We work with the Chief of Naval Operations Office. Assistant Secretary of the Navy Koehler works on MSTS matters, but instructional directives must go through the secretaries.

With MATS we have had less contact than we have with MSTS. There are also informal dealings with Mr. Zuckert's office, and particularly with Mr. Van Zandt in that office.

I might touch on one thing with respect to those two agencies. MATS was the first of these consolidated agencies. It was given almost wholly an operating responsibility. Almost no traffic management is involved there. As a consequence, our dealings with that agency will always be very, very limited. MSTS, on the other hand, does have some very substantial traffic management responsibility. They are the people who charter space. They are the people who have a great deal to do with the selection of ports and the resultant use of the rail routes to the ports. So that we do have much closer dealings with MSTS and always will.

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COMMENT: Colonel, I am somewhat concerned about the amount of steel that you speak of that will be required to build those new sleeping cars, and the expense that we go to to make certain that troops traveling not over 36 hours have good sleeping accommodations. I know that I personally enjoy comfort and sleep at every opportunity. But when we think of the troops overseas not having sleeping cars and fighting the war the hard way, I wonder if we could not adjust our thinking of transportation within the United States on the basis of transportation the hard way, as being good training for the type of war the men are going into, and getting away from all this problem of restful sleeping.

COLONEL VINEY: Well, we discussed those very fine points. Actually, it is not a matter of traffic management so much as it is a matter of personnel policy, or the morale factor. In other words, what are you going to let the troops have? Now, it certainly doesn't do their morale any good for them to be riding in boxcars and you and me and others like us riding in a lounge car. I really don't know the answer to that one.

QUESTIONER: I wonder what the other countries do?

COLONEL VINEY: I couldn't answer that.

MR. HILL: Colonel Viney, our time is drawing to a close. May I tell you, sir, how adequately you have covered the subject. It is always a pleasure to welcome one of our alumni back. You have made a substantial down payment on any obligation you may feel toward this college.

COLONEL VINEY: Thank you.

(21 May 1951--650)S.